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INTRODUCTION
Tax Policy and Fiscal Consolidation in Croatia
Tax policy is one of the most complex parts of economic policy, since it 
has to achieve different efficiency, horizontal and vertical equity as well 
as fiscal and tax compliance objectives. There is often a trade-off be-
tween those competing goals which has to be solved by policy making 
decisions. Such confronting and counteracting goals are especially hard 
to achieve in a small open economy such as Croatian during the period 
of fiscal consolidation. 
In order to shape tax policy in general and in more detail, it is neces-
sary to objectively assess the current state-of-the-art and acceptable tax 
reform perspectives. The expert opinion survey was used to identify 
not only the most important problems, but also the area of agreement/
disagreement concerning tax policy options. The survey for Croatia with 
almost 100 questions covered all relevant aspects of the tax system – 
the general ones (tax burden, tax structure) as well as specific ones (par-
ticular taxes), with the relevant efficiency and equity aspects. Its main 
objectives were the following ones: 
• State-of-the-art: the overall current situation and problems in the 
field of tax system and policy; 
• Reliability of results: are they consistent and how are they related 
to the respondents (academics, public administration, private sec-
tor; age; academic degree); 
• Respondent’s attitudes (equity, efficiency, tax compliance, tax bur-
den, tax structure, particular taxes) 
• Tax policy recommendations/directions: topics of agreement; 
• Tax policy recommendation: topics of disagreement and their 
causes; 
• Interaction and results comparison with other research topics/
methodologies on the project (for instance for tax structure: em-
pirical research on tax structure and economic growth, multipliers 
and fiscal consolidation); 
• Foundation for further project research and further research at all 
(public acceptance/attitude of possible tax increases in terms of 
7structure shifting; identifying/confirming main particular taxation 
issues to be elaborated in detail); 
• Dissemination of the survey in the neighbouring countries (Slove-
nia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) including necessary modifica-
tions, analysis of results for those countries using the same meth-
odology as in the case of Croatia, comparative analysis of final 
results: similarities and differences among countries. 
The first paper in this book - Perspectives of Tax Reforms in Croatia: 
Expert Opinion Survey by Šimović, Blažić and Štambuk presents de-
tailed results of this Croatian survey. The most interesting results suggest 
the maintenance/(re)introduction of different tax incentives and reduced 
VAT rates, rejection of a flat tax as well as decrease of tax brackets, an 
increase in alcohol and tobacco duties, the introduction of a financial 
activities tax, a further shift from income to consumption, a decrease of 
the tax share in GDP and a belief in the behavioral responsiveness of tax 
decreases/exemptions, as well as a firm commitment to the principle of 
equity. The last three economic views/values are important predictors of 
other tax attitudes. 
Dissemination of the survey in the neighbouring countries (Slovenia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) using the same questions/statements and meth-
odology as in the case of Croatia, but including necessary modifications 
for those countries, resulted in numerous papers (see the list of papers). 
The first paper written for Slovenia - Slovenian Experiences and Les-
sons from Tax reforms by Klun criticises tax changes that focused 
more on fiscal consolidation than on the real change to promote eco-
nomic growth. The tax experts have a similar opinion, disagreeing with 
increasing the burden on consumption, but also with lowering taxes 
for companies and high personal income taxation. They support rein-
troduction of some non-standard reliefs within personal income tax 
and agree with corporate income tax reliefs for research and develop-
ment and for investments. The recommendations for the transfer of the 
tax burden from labour and capital to consumption have little support 
among professionals.
The paper for Bosnia and Herzegovina – Stanje i perspektive poreznih 
reformi u Bosni i Hercegovini: rezultati ankete poreznih stručnjaka 
(The State and Perspectives of Tax Reforms in Bosnia and Herze-
govina: Expert Opinion Survey Results) by Lazović-Pita and Štam-
buk points out the support for classic progressive personal income tax 
(this country has a flat tax), as well as maintenance of existing personal 
income tax reliefs. The respondents do not support changes in the tax 
rate of VAT and CIT (their rise), but mostly do support the introduction of 
reduced VAT rates and different corporate income tax incentives as well 
as introduction of excise duties for luxury products.
It is obvious that experts in all three countries, in spite of their differ-
ences, challenge not only the mainstream „base - broadening“, but also 
„rate flattening“, and even to some extent general „rate lowering“ issues, 
8which is ultimately confirmed in the recent comparative analysis of all 
three countries (What Tax Experts in Former Socialist Countries Think 
About Tax Policy: The cases of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina – see the list of papers). It seems that equity plays a very im-
portant role.
The equity influence was further elaborated in another paper for Croatia 
by Blažić, Šimović and Štambuk (2014, see the list of papers), where the 
influence of sociodemographic characteristics or vertical equity-related 
statements was explored. The same analysis for the remaining questions 
was performed by Štambuk in the last paper of this part of the book – Ut-
jecaj sociodemografskih obilježja na stavove stručnjaka o poreznom 
sustavu i poreznoj politici (The Influence of Sociodemographic Char-
acteristics on Experts’ Attitudes on Tax System and Policy).
Possible shifts in tax structure, introduction of new taxes, change of 
the existing ones and especially raising some of them are also hard to 
manage without the broad public acceptance (consensus). This public 
awareness is investigated by further surveys whose results are present-
ed later or are still in the process of publication.
The second part of the book covers papers on fiscal policy and fiscal con-
solidation from a broader (macroeconomic) perspective. The main focus 
of this group of papers is on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, 
especially through the lens of the Keynesian fiscal multiplier concept. 
Fiscal consolidation programmes can be structured and implemented 
through cuts on the expenditure side of the budget, through interventions 
in the tax system or by combination of both. Thus, all fiscal consolidation 
programmes have various macroeconomic effects and understanding of 
these effects is of great importance for both policy makers and academ-
ics. Some of the papers in this part of the book represent the first attempt 
of empirical estimation of fiscal multipliers in Croatia and bring more an-
alytical rigor into discussions on fiscal policy effectiveness in Croatia. In 
this sense, the authors show that public investments and indirect taxes 
are the most powerful tools of fiscal policy makers in Croatia. Also, this 
part of the book brings in-depth analysis of the main limitations of fiscal 
policy and characteristics of fiscal consolidation in Croatia and points 
out the importance of public debt and openness for the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy in CEE region. Also, there is a large space for reduction in 
government size and the resulting fiscal consolidation by raising public 
expenditures efficiency.
The first paper from this group - Empirical Assessment of Stabilization 
Effects of Fiscal Policy in Croatia by Grdović Gnip assesses the stabi-
lization effects of fiscal policy in Croatia in a structural vector autoregres-
sion framework. Results prove that the fiscal transmission mechanism in 
Croatia works mainly in a Keynesian manner. Output reacts negatively 
to a tax shock and positively to government spending shock. The output 
multiplier is above 2 at impact and the effect is significant through the 
whole time span. The negative effect of the tax shock is mostly driven 
9by indirect (not direct) taxes. The positive effect of government spending 
is more pronounced when government investment is considered, espe-
cially when private consumption and private investment responses are 
observed.
The second paper – Mogućnosti i ograničenja fiskalne politike u Hr-
vatskoj (Possibilities and Limitations of Fiscal Policy in Croatia) 
by Šimović, Ćorić and Deskar-Škrbić analyzes the possibilities and lim-
itations of fiscal policy in Croatia. Important limitations of fiscal policy 
such as lack of coordination of fiscal and monetary policy, inadequate 
budget planning, increasing tax pressure, the size and structure of public 
expenditures and deficit financing problems are pointed out. The pos-
sibilities of stabilizing role of fiscal policy are empirically assessed by 
analyzing the impact of general government revenues and expenditures 
on GDP growth. A structural VAR model to evaluate the impact of various 
components of public expenditures and revenues on economic growth in 
Croatia is developed. Further, fiscal policy possibilities are synthesized 
through the proposed measures of so-called “smart fiscal consolidation” 
which is the foundation for achieving the stabilizing role of fiscal policy. 
In the third paper - Karakter fiskalne politike i politička ekonomija 
fiskalne konsolidacije u Hrvatskoj u poslijekriznom razdoblju (The 
Type of Fiscal Policy and Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidation 
in Croatia in the Post-Crisis Period) Deskar-Škrbić and Raos analyse 
both phenomenons using the data about cyclically adjusted primary 
budget deficit in Croatia. They also analyse the basic characteristics of 
fiscal consolidation, with special emphasis on budget expenditures. The 
results indicate that most of the Croatian governments applied restrictive 
procyclical fiscal policy. A large part of fiscal consolidation is achieved by 
a decrease in capital investments, although it is a productive expenditure 
category which could have played an important role in the fulfilment of 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy. It was confirmed that unstable gov-
ernments, mostly depending on small parliamentary groups/individuals 
to keep the majority have difficulties achieving success in the process of 
fiscal consolidation. However, all governments were inclined to frequent 
changes in tax legislation.
In the fourth paper – Javni dug kao strukturni epifenomen monetar-
no-fiskalnog neksusa (Public Debt as a Structural Epiphenomenon 
of the Monetary and Fiscal Nexus) Pečarić (together with Slišković) 
analyses this important part of fiscal policy, whose management has 
been neglected for a long time in economic literature. The paper points 
out that the rise of public debt is not the cause of the crisis, but the ef-
fect of the “model crisis”, which is often neglected by the mainstream 
economic policy. Efficient public debt management implies reconceptu-
alisation of the theoretical framework and the role of public debt and the 
resulting institutional structure.
In the fifth paper - Fiscal Multiplier Determinants in the CESEE Re-
gion Deskar-Škrbić, Šimović and Buljan use the panel VAR model with 
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exogenous variables to analyse the effects of government consumption 
on economic growth in the Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 
controlling for the effects of the size of the economy, level of public debt, 
level of tax burden, openness of the economy, rigidity of labour market, 
monetary regime and the phase of the business cycle. These charac-
teristics have a significant effect on the size of the fiscal multiplier and 
they are in line with the theoretical assumption. The recessionary phase 
of the cycle, size of the economy, rigidity of the labour market and the 
fixed exchange rate regime increase the average size of fiscal multipliers 
while tax burden, indebtedness and openness of the economies reduce 
its size.
The last paper from this part of the book – Public Expenditure Efficien-
cy and the Optimal Size of Government in the European Union by 
Buljan, Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić investigates public expenditure effi-
ciency and its relation to the optimal size of government. There are sig-
nificant differences in efficiency coefficients across countries with most 
countries having the potential for increased efficiency of public spending. 
The conclusion is that there is a large space for reduction in government 
size and the resulting fiscal consolidation by increasing efficiency.
Moreover, further research shows significant multiplicative effects of 
public investment on GDP, not only in Croatia but most of the South-East 
European countries. Such effect is delivered primarily through crowding 
in of private investment. Public investment does not seem to increase 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, but reduces the debt level in the long term with 
positive effects on the unemployment rate in the case of Croatia. Such 
macroeconomic effects cannot be observed for total government spend-
ing, which confirms that both in South-East Europe and the advanced 
economies public investment can be viewed as a catalyst of positive 
spill-over effects to other sectors of the economy and thus contribute to 
productivity growth. Social policies do not deliver such favourable condi-
tions; therefore, structural policies in the perspective of fiscal consolida-
tion should be focused on transport and energy as main growth drivers. 
Such a conclusion is even more important given that further research 
within the project shows how an increase in taxes has a significant neg-
ative effect on macroeconomic aggregates. With both sides of the coin 
investigated, it seems that public investment could deliver the most effi-
cient outcomes on the path of fiscal consolidation. 
Some further elements of tax and the entire fiscal system relevant for 
fiscal consolidation have been investigated in the project, based on the 
analysed survey results, different economic growth effects, public atti-
tude and current Croatian tax system development. The most important 
among them are specific taxes such as local property (real estate) tax, fi-
nancial transaction tax (enhanced procedure in the EU), flat tax as well as 
specific government accounting issues relevant for fiscal consolidation.
Local property tax (real estate tax) seems to be the best tax regarding 
economic growth. It is one of the most advocated taxes in times of fiscal 
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consolidation, taking into account not only its efficiency and fiscal as-
pects but also equity aspects. A public opinion survey about the introduc-
tion of this tax in Croatia was conducted in addition to the presented ex-
pert opinion survey. The results are presented in the paper Introduction 
of a Local Real Estate Tax in Croatia: A Survey of Expert and Public 
Opinion (Blažić, Šimović and Štambuk). Support for the introduction of 
the real estate tax is stronger among the experts than the general public. 
However, the experts differ on professional lines, with faculty special-
ised in economics from departments of finance and accounting generally 
being against the tax. There is a positive relationship between support 
for the tax and support for more equitable taxation. The broader expert 
model is, besides profession and equity, also negatively influenced by 
attitudes in favour of lower taxation costs and positively influenced by 
attitudes in favour of property being an adequate indicator of ability to 
pay and of the need to tax capital income. The public opinion model 
is positively influenced by equity and negatively influenced by negative 
expectations about the abolition of existing real estate user charges and 
taxes. Work status is also relevant.
Recent financial crises and the resulting fiscal consolidation have put 
taxation of financial services in the limelight. In 2011 European Com-
mission constructed a proposal for an EU-level Financial Transaction 
Tax (FTT). In the paper The Impact of Introduction of the Financial 
Transaction Tax in Croatia Olgić Draženović analyses the fiscal role of 
the financial transaction tax and its effects on the Croatian tax system. 
The research results imply considerable negative effects on the domes-
tic illiquid and highly concentrated capital market. Moreover, the tax base 
is very narrow due to the lack of derivatives trading. The assessment of 
total economic and fiscal effects has shown that the introduction of the 
financial transaction tax in Croatia cannot be supported. 
Regarding personal income, tax efficiency principle has been given pri-
ority over equity principle in the past thirty years in both developed and 
transition countries. The motivation of the paper Income, Personal In-
come Tax and Transition: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
Lazović-Pita was to show that, under macroeconomic circumstances, 
‘flat tax’ is the best solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Progressive 
income tax can be introduced, similarly to the case of Slovakia, once the 
society as a whole becomes wealthier and when the transition process 
comes to an end. Application of the ‘flat tax’ in transition countries can be 
therefore observed as an intermediate phase in the wider transition pro-
cess. A move from ‘flat tax’ to progressive income tax in transition coun-
tries can occur when the top one per cent of the wealthiest members of 
the society becomes visible.
In the last paper – Contemporary Government Accounting and Fis-
cal Consolidation – Drezgić and Vašiček cover methodological chang-
es in government accounting related to the application of the Europe-
an system of national and regional accounts and Government Finance 
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Statistics Manual (IMF, 2014). They analyse their influence on fiscal 
consolidation efforts and give recommendations related to the introduc-
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PERSPECTIVES OF TAX REFORMS IN CROATIA: 
EXPERT OPINION SURVEY1
ABSTRACT
In order to shape tax reform it is necessary objectively to assess the current 
state-of-the-art of and of the outlook for the tax system. After having reviewed 
all previous reforms in the light of the consumption-based (interest-adjusted) 
concept of direct taxation, which was almost systematically implemented in Cro-
atia in 1994, we present the results of a broad expert opinion survey about the 
Croatian tax system. The most interesting results suggest the maintenance/(re)
introduction of different tax incentives and reduced VAT rates, rejection of a flat 
tax as well as decrease of tax brackets, an increase in alcohol and tobacco 
duties, the introduction of a financial activities tax, a further shift from income to 
consumption, a decrease of the tax share in GDP and a belief in the behavioral 
responsiveness of tax decreases/exemptions, as well as a firm commitment to 
the principle of equity. The last three economic views/values are important pre-
dictors of other tax attitudes.
Key words: opinion survey, tax reform, tax system, tax policy, Croatia
1. Introduction
In the summer of 2013 a Survey about State and Perspectives of the 
Croatian Tax System (Šimović et al., 2013) was conducted. The survey 
was based on a similar US survey from the beginning of 2013, organized 
by the National Tax Association (NTA) and ran among its members. This 
survey is referred and compared to previous similar US surveys from 
1994 and 1934 (Lim et al, 2013). 
1 This is a reprint of a paper published in the Financial Theory & Practice, 38(4), 2014, p. 
405-439, http://www.fintp.hr/upload/files/ftp/2014/4/simovic_blazic_stambuk.pdf 
This work has been supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under pro-
ject number IP-201311-8174 and in part by the University of Rijeka under project number 
13.02.1.2.02
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The purpose of our research, like that of the US survey, was to find out 
what tax experts think about the overall current situation and problems 
in the Croatian tax system and what they expect from tax policy in the 
future. Since similar research has never been done in Croatia, the analy-
sis is especially directed towards income versus consumption as the tax 
base, which has influenced all Croatian tax reforms. Besides that, there 
are some other motivations behind such an investigation. Croatia has 
witnessed two relatively turbulent decades and some very influential tax 
reforms. Above all, the research was begun in order to establish the atti-
tudes of tax experts almost 20 years after the fundamental tax reform in 
1994, when consumption-based taxation (interest-adjusted personal and 
corporate income tax) was introduced. Furthermore, apart from Greece, 
Croatia is the only EU country that is still in (5 year) recession with no 
positive expectations even in 2014. The decline in economic activity is 
causing additional political instability, changes to the system of taxation 
as well as changes in attitudes to the tax system and policy.  
As in the US survey, our survey encompasses three sectors of experts: 
government, private and academic. The results are assessed using the 
percentage of negative/positive answers of 61% as degree of consensus 
and analyzing that degree of consensus in more detail. We also wanted 
to analyze the possible influence of specific values and economic views 
on tax system/policy attitudes using binomial probit regression.
After the Introduction, the second part of the paper gives a short overview 
of Croatian tax reforms, with a special emphasis on changes related to 
the main taxation concepts of direct taxation (income versus consump-
tion). In the third part, the tax survey is analyzed giving an overview of 
the attitudes and outlining the prevailing consensus among Croatian tax 
experts. The fourth part entails binomial probit regressions in order to de-
termine how specific values and economic views (concerning behavioral 
responsiveness as well as incidence) influence experts’ policy opinions. 
2. Tax reforms in Croatia
In 2014, Croatia will mark 20 years from the first big tax reform, which set 
up foundations of the current tax system to a great extent. The tax sys-
tem from 1994 was in the spotlight of the numerous debates in the Cro-
atian as well as international tax literature.2 At that time, Croatia was the 
only country consistently implementing consumption-based taxation – 
2 For the literature overview of the debates and arguments about the consumption versus 
income concept of taxing personal and corporate income in Croatia see Šimović (2012: 10-
11), for the general literature overview about the advantages and disadvantages of consump-
tion-based taxation, especially ACE tax, see Blažić (2006: 67-68). For contributions to the 
debate, and especially concerning the Croatian ACE model 1994-2000, see Schmidt et al. 
(1996), Rose & Wiswesser (1998), Keen & King (2002) and Klemm (2007) and Blažić (2008). 
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interest-adjusted personal and corporate income tax3 (PIT and CIT).  Ac-
cording to that, special contribution to the debate was influenced by the 
Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) tax (called “protective interest” in 
Croatia). In addition to corporate income tax, Croatia introduced “syn-
thetic” personal income tax that in some elements still departed from the 
interest-adjusted income tax (the treatment of income from real estate) 
but included “protective interest” for business income (self-employed) 
also. In 1994 new excise taxes were also introduced, and the number 
of retail sales tax rates was gradually reduced in order to prepare for 
the introduction of value added tax (VAT). Although the first VAT law was 
enacted in 1995, it only entered into force in 1998. 
However, Croatia relatively quickly abandoned interest-adjusted person-
al and corporate income tax in its second great tax reform from 2001, 
which followed after parliamentary elections and a change in the party in 
power. The biggest changes happened in the field of corporate and per-
sonal income tax, where ACE was abandoned and numerous incentives 
introduced. Personal income tax started to encompass some capital in-
comes, but the main part of them was still exempt. Apart from introduc-
tion of the General Tax Act, there were no substantial changes in other 
tax forms. It could be said that this tax reform shapes in a substantial way 
the present characteristics of the Croatian tax system as modus operan-
di of the tax system and policy, which are changed with every change of 
the ruling party.4 So, the “mini” tax reform at the beginning of 2005 abol-
ished the taxation of dividends again (which was reintroduced in 2012), 
but did not bring back ACE as the basic element of consumption-based 
taxation at the entire business (corporate and personal – self-employed) 
level. The current Croatian tax system is a hybrid system, where both 
the elements of income-based and consumption-based taxation concept 
are present and where the domination of the particular concept depends 
mostly on the current ruling party. 
An overview of tax reforms in Croatia with special emphasis on the 
changes in direction to either the consumption or the income concept is 
presented in Table 1. 
3 The term “corporate income tax” used in this paper for the reasons of international com-
parability, would not be completely appropriate for Croatia. The tax payers of this tax are 
corporations, but also parts of the non-corporate sector (partnerships with “trader status” 
and even sole traders). In this way the typical distortion of the classical income tax concept 
–  between the corporate and the non-corporate sector - was avoided, as the consumption 
tax concept requires, and this remains even now. On the other hand, it could be argued that 
it is simply replaced by the distortion between business units (enterprises) that pay corpo-
rate income tax and business units that pay personal income tax (self-employed in “crafts 
and trades” that are relatively small or do not want to opt to pay a corporate income tax). In 
order to mitigate the problem, the Croatian legislation has from the very beginning given the 
self-employed the option of paying corporate income tax instead of personal income tax - the 
self-employed can opt to pay corporate income tax or have to pay it if the business is big 
enough in terms of number of employees, assets, income or turnover (see also Blažić, 2008).
4 In contrast to the tax reform from 1994, that of 2001 did not cause nearly as much 
debate. Although it was shown that this reform brought about a significant decrease in the 
tax burden, it remained questionable whether the results of the changes were the original 
intention of tax policy creators (Švaljek, 2005). 
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justed PIT and CIT)
1994
• Non-taxation of capital income (exception: property 
income)
• ACE (at CIT and PIT for business income) 
2001-2004
Mostly income- 
based system (with 
some of consump-
tion-based ele-




• Introduction of capital income taxation (dividends 
and part of interest)
• Abolishment of ACE and introduction of numerous 
incentives (tax holidays) 
Elements of consumption concept: interest-adjust-
ed income tax 
• Non taxation of most interest (bank saving and de-
posit accounts, securities) and capital gains from 
financial assets 
• Some dual income tax elements retained (linear 
taxation of most capital/property income by the way 
of final withholding tax)
Elements of consumption concept: saving-adjusted 
income tax and cash-flow tax
• Not only compulsory, but also voluntary pensions 
as well as life insurance contributions deductible 
(and later taxable) 










2005 „Mini“ tax reform
• Abolition of dividend taxation
• Abolition of immediate write–off and enhanced ac-
celerated depreciation (the accelerated deprecia-
tion in the form of doubled depreciation rates from 
before (2007) remains) 
• Modifications of CIT incentives
2010
• Abolition of deductibility for voluntary pension insur-
ance and life insurance premiums (from saving-ad-
justed to interest-adjusted model)
2012
• Reintroduction of dividend taxation (towards the in-
come concept, but not systematically)
• Non-taxation of reinvested profit




3. 2013 expert opinion survey about tax policy in Croatia 
3.1. Survey methodology
Opinion/attitude surveys, either rather general5 or more specific6 have 
been applied in taxation research. The Croatian survey is mostly based 
on the latest US NTA expert opinion survey (Lim et al., 2013; DeGroat, 
2013), which has a long history behind it (Walker, 1935; Slemrod, 1994; 
Brannon, 1995). However, a lot of modifications had to be made, with 
the majority of new questions introduced as well as a lot of questions 
omitted/changed. The 92 questions (i.e. statements) combine general 
issues and questions concerning the basic types of taxes, with specif-
ic questions about the most topical tax policy elements in Croatia. The 
basic yes/no/other question methodology has also been changed and 
Likert items (5 levels) are used instead. After the pilot (a couple of aca-
demic colleagues of the authors and tax practitioners) some questions 
were omitted/clarified. 
The survey was performed between May and July 2013. The call was 
sent by e-mail at the beginning of May to 1,000 addresses and sent to 
other addresses in the middle of July.  Most of the answers were gath-
ered by web page, with a small part by post (in hard copy). Out of the 
population of 1,000 experts targeted, 304 responded.
In accordance with the relevant mentioned surveys (Walker, 1935; Slem-
rod, 1994; Lim et al., 2013) the tax experts that could be divided into the 
following three groups: academe, the government sector and the private 
sector7 were the population targeted. Academics include professors and 
researchers at departments (faculties) of economics at universities and 
research institutes that devote at least part of their scientific and teaching 
work to the tax system and policy. The government sector consists of the 
Tax Administration (employees of sectors inside Central Office, heads 
of regional and local offices) and local and regional government units 
(heads of the finance departments of those units). The private sector 
means mostly tax advisors, but also some lecturers of private business 
polytechnics as well as employees in tax accounting, advising and pub-
lishing companies.
5 For instance for US: Behrens (1973), Fisher (1985), IRS (1993), McCabe & Stream 
(2006), Campbell (20099, Lim et al. (20139, for Israel: Dornstein (19879, for Austria: 
Kirchler (1999), for Australia: Murphy (2004), for Sweden: Hammar et al. (2008).
6 For instance for cigarette taxes Green & Gerken (1989), for local tax rates Ashworth & 
Heyndels (1997), for flat tax and sales taxes McGowan (2000), for estate tax and flat tax 
Fleischman & Hutchison (2001), for the income tax Eicher et al. (2001), Hasseldine & Hite 
(2003), for environmental taxes Thalmann (2003), Kallbekken & Saelen (2011), for tax 
deductibility of mortgages Van der Heijden et al. (2007), for the tax compliance and morale 
Torgler & Schneider (2005, 2007), Alm et al. (2006), Eicher & Stuhldreher (2007), Randlane 
(2012), for the estate tax Birney et al. (2006), Fatemi et al. (2008), for CO2 tax Löfgren & 
Nordblom (2010), for minimum corporate tax rates Osterloh & Heinemann (2013).
7 Table A1 in Appendix entails detailed information about respondents’ structure.
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As in similar surveys, the 92 survey questions could be thematically 
divided into a handful of groups: property taxes, personal income tax, 
corporate income tax, VAT, excise taxes, social contributions, general 
tax issues and values. In addition, some general questions were set to 
establish the demographic and professional characteristics of the re-
spondents.
3.2. Degree of Consensus
In order to enable comparison with the relevant NTA survey, at least 61% 
positive or negative answers (excluding neutral responses) are taken as 
the threshold for consensus (Lim et al., 2013). Since the Croatian survey 
was made with 5-level Likert items, the answers under “yes” entail an-
swers “totally/strongly agree” and “mostly agree”, while the answers un-
der “no” entail answers “mostly disagree” and “totally/strongly disagree”. 
Table 2 presents the number of answers with the consensus degree of at 
least 61%8. Table A2 in Appendix includes detailed data for the degree of 
consensus for all 92 survey statements/questions.  
Degree of consensus Total Academic Government Private
Total 61-74% 29 35 33 36
Total 75-100% 35 36 38 32
Total 61-100% 64 71 71 68
Total 61-100% (in %) 69.9 77.2 77.2 73.9
Table 2 Degree of consensus (number of questions, excluding the neutral response)
Source: authors based on survey responses
As many as 84 questions (out of 100) had a degree of consensus above 
61% in the US NTA survey, while such a degree of consensus in Croatian 
survey was elicited by only 64 statements or 69.9%.  If the consensus 
threshold were raised to 75% equal answers, the number would decline 
to only 38% (35 out of 92). Due to the frequent tax reforms and tax law 
changes in Croatia, such a low degree of consensus was to be expected. 
It is interesting that a slightly broader consensus was reached inside the 
academic and government sector in contrast to the private one. Unfortu-
nately, there are a significant number of statements without any general 
(total) consensus, which is not the case at the level of particular groups of 
respondents (sectors). When the experts are divided into sectors, there 
is much more homogeneity inside each sector, so a higher percentage of 
consensus was to be expected. We hope that the further development of 
the Croatian society will result in a higher level of legal certainty and tax 
stability, which could also lead to a higher degree of consensus between 
tax experts. Such a trend is observed in the US with a higher level of 
consensus in 2013 in comparison with 1994.
8 This arbitrary but seemingly reasonable threshold for consensus is taken for the rele-
vant comparison with the US survey also (Lim et al., 2013). More certain degree would be 
75% for sure, so this is also taken into account.
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However, there are some contrary statements, even when a consensus 
was reached. So it is hard to reach an agreement concerning specific 
issues without further analysis. Still, there is a significant difference in the 
degree of consensus even among the questions in which a consensus 
is achieved.
3.3. Special Tax Issues 
As mentioned previously, the 92 statements are divided into several 
groups concerning special tax issues (see Table A2). 
Concerning property taxation, only half of the statements reached the 
percentage for a consensus to have been reached (61%). The main 
question related to the introduction of real estate tax reached no consen-
sus (“only” 59% of answers in favor). The greatest opposition is found in 
the academic community, while private and government sectors reached 
a consensus in favor of that tax. Consensus was also reached about real 
estate tax being a local tax, for the maintenance of the local surcharge 
as well as the real estate transfer tax and for property being a necessary 
additional indicator of ability to pay. Furthermore, the respondents have 
different ideas about the tax burden of the real estate tax for business 
and citizens. Overall consensus was reached concerning the statement 
that citizens should not pay higher rates in than businesses, but not con-
cerning the statement that business should pay higher rates than cit-
izens.  Naturally, academia and the government sector supported the 
latter statement (62% and 65% in favor), in contrast to the private sector 
(68% against). 
Concerning the relatively different systems of property taxes and inher-
itance and gift taxes in Croatia and the US, it is hard to make any mean-
ingful comparisons. Still, respondents in both countries share the tradi-
tional view that real estate tax should be a local tax. On the other hand, 
unlike Croatian, US experts generally do not think that a real estate tax 
should distinguish between citizens and business. 
Most personal income tax statements, especially those about progres-
sivity, reached a consensus. Most of the respondents agree that the 
lowest (but not also the highest) marginal rate should be additionally 
reduced, that a flat tax should not be introduced, that there is no need to 
reduce the number of tax brackets any further and that tax allowances 
(deductions) for voluntary pension and life insurance, health insurance/
costs and owner-occupied housing should be reintroduced. It could be 
concluded that respondents strongly share the common vertical equi-
ty principle, but this could not be broadened to include capital income 
taxation in general. Although a consensus was reached concerning divi-
dends and financial capital gains taxation, there was no such consensus 
about interest on saving and securities.
Concerning the different tax treatments of incomes from labor and from 
capital, the private sector was alone in not achieving a consensus against 
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the lower taxation of capital incomes. Concerning additional arguments 
in favor of lower dividend taxation, there are significant differences be-
tween the academic and the private sector on the one hand (accept-
ing it) and the government sector on the other hand. There is a general 
agreement that capital incomes should not be taxed at lower rates, but 
there is no consensus about equal treatment of all sources of income or 
preferential dividend taxation – moreover, there are strong differences 
between particular sectors.
Due to the long tradition of a consumption-based (interest-adjusted) sys-
tem of direct taxation in Croatia in general and especially interest-adjust-
ed personal income tax, the basic elements of which remained in force 
even after 2001, a higher preference of experts for this concept could 
have been expected. The only such preference is seen in the area of in-
terest on savings (and securities) and, as already said, could be partially 
attributed to the individual taxpayer’s circumstances (in contrast to divi-
dends and financial capital gains taxation9). Some “modified element” of 
consumption-based taxation – a hybrid system between the income and 
the consumption concept – a lower taxation of capital incomes (instead 
of their being exempted) – the case of dual income tax, which is coming 
strongly into Croatian tax system, has, again, reached no support.10 It 
seems that experts strongly advocate classical comprehensive income 
taxation. One could then expect to get a (positive) consensus about the 
taxation of all sources of income in the same way (regarding Q27 as the 
control question), but this consensus is achieved only in the government 
sector. However, this may not be the case, since the question is (could 
be) related to currently taxable (mostly labor) incomes in Croatia and the 
very topical problem of “other” (additional, part-time) work being taxed at 
lower rates (by a way of final withholding tax) in contrast to wages/sala-
ries. The recent idea of the Croatian Ministry of Finance to tax all labor 
incomes in a same way in order to get additional budgetary revenues 
was (for the time being) rejected.
As in the previous case, it is hard to make comparisons with the US 
survey, especially concerning capital income taxation, where the US sys-
tem is strongly developed, also due to the development of the financial 
system. A similar conclusion could be drawn regarding the numerous 
tax allowances/deductions that exist in the US personal income tax sys-
tem. However, some characteristics in common could be found - affinity 
to stronger personal income tax progressivity as well as disagreements 
9 Not surprisingly, there is a strong and highly significant correlation between advocating 
dividend and capital gains taxation (rs = 0.878; p < 0.01) and much lower between former 
and interest taxation (rs = 0.365; p < 0.01) and later and interest taxation (rs = 0.431; p < 
0.01). Moreover, these Spearman correlations are calculated for original Lykert type an-
swers (1-5). The same applies to footnote 9.
10 There is, of course, negative correlation between advocating capital incomes taxation 
(Q24, 25 and 26) and their lower taxation than labor incomes (Q28). The correlation coef-
ficients are highly significant (p < 0.01), but low (rs = -0.295, rs =- 0.340, rs = -0.262). The 
same is true for the correlation between advocating dividend taxation and their lower taxa-
tion (rs = -0.304). 
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about taxation of capital income in the US, especially at the capital gains 
level. There is also a general conclusion about the preference for stronger 
comprehensive taxation, but some views regarding capital income, prop-
erty and inheritance and gifts mean that such a view is not undivided.
Experts do not consider that the minimum monthly assessment base for 
social contributions should be abolished. On the other hand, there is no 
consensus for the abolition of a maximum base (a ceiling). Furthermore, 
there is a strong disagreement here between the private sector (against 
abolition) and the government sector (in favor of abolition). Most of the 
respondents consider the first pillar contributions (intergenerational sol-
idarity) too high, suggesting they should be lowered. Although there is 
no general consensus, the private sector and academia circles support 
an increase in the second pillar (individual capitalized saving accounts) 
contributions. 
There is consensus for almost all statements in the field of corporate 
income tax. Most of the respondents consider that it should boost eco-
nomic activity, so different incentives should be retained or (re)intro-
duced (different tax holidays and investment allowances). Especially 
pronounced is the high degree of support (91%) for R&D and educational 
incentives. A high degree of consensus is achieved for reintroduction of 
ACE, favoring consumption-based taxation at the corporate level (in con-
trast to the personal level). The experience of Belgium proves that such 
system is still (for the time being11) compatible with EU requirements. Yet 
one of the reasons given for its withdrawal in Croatia was its uniqueness 
in in the EU (which was only partially true, due to some already existing 
elements of ACE in Austria and Italy at that time). Interestingly and rela-
tively unexpectedly, no consensus has been reached for the lowering of 
the CIT rate. It is especially interesting that the private sector is the only 
opponent, reaching a consensus against rate lowering. They are proba-
bly aware of the relatively low effective rate due to numerous incentives. 
No comparison of the US and the Croatian survey is possible, since the 
questions completely differ.
Experts are mostly against aiming at having only one (standard) VAT rate 
and also against abolition of the reduced rates. So, a consensus was 
reached concerning the maintenance of reduced rates for basic food-
stuffs as well as their extension to all food products. Such an attitude 
could be explained by the already mentioned relatively high preference 
of experts for vertical equity. A huge majority (97%, and 100% for the 
private sector) claim that the standard VAT rate should not be increased 
further, which is completely expected, since the Croatian VAT rate of 
25% is the second highest (after Hungary with 27%) in the EU.
11 Recent CCCTB development trends should be taken into account, including even the 
possibility of future shift of this tax base from optional to compulsory.
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There is high degree of consensus for most statements in the field of 
excise taxes. Most think that different excise taxes on energy and elec-
tricity should “not be raised” / “be lowered”. In contrast, most think that 
excise taxes on tobacco and tobacco products should be increased and 
that taxation of luxury products should be reintroduced. Here, some re-
semblance with the US survey, where similar opinions prevail, could be 
established. Most experts support excise taxes on cars, aircrafts and 
vessels, while no consensus was reached for excise taxes for coffee and 
car insurance premiums. Interesting, a consensus was reached for intro-
ducing excise taxes on “junk food”, where the Croatian differ from the US 
experts, who do not support such special taxes.
3.4. General Tax Issues, Experts’ Values and Economic Model
The last twenty survey statements relate to general attitudes about the 
tax system and policy as well as some economic models. These ques-
tions are pretty comparable to the US survey. In contrast to the US sur-
vey, no overall consensus has been reached for three of the statements, 
although even here some partial consensus exists.
For many questions the degree of consensus is high (over 75%). Most 
of the respondents solve the traditional “equity-efficiency trade-off” in 
favor of equity. This attitude is expected, taking into consideration the 
previous survey parts about particular taxes. It could be explained by the 
historical inheritance and the general justice awareness that prevails in 
Croatia, but maybe also by some recent tax policy tendencies due to the 
economic crisis. A high degree of consensus is present for the statement 
that penalties for tax evasion should be increased and administrative and 
compliance costs as well as para-fiscal levies decreased. The results for 
these statements are mostly in accordance with the US experts’ opinion.
Most experts think that the share of government in GDP (measured by 
public revenues and expenditures) should be decreased. In accordance 
with that there is a consensus about related statements that the entire 
tax burden should be lowered and the tax structure changed. There is 
no consensus about the currently advocated introduction of a financial 
transaction tax, as it is the case in the US survey. On the other hand, 
there is a consensus about a financial activities tax. One of the reasons 
for the different attitudes to those financial sector taxes could be the con-
cern of the experts about the incidence of the former tax.
There is also consensus concerning some views about economic ef-
fects. Most think that lower marginal income tax rates increase work ef-
fort and reduce leisure (81%) and that such a change would increase the 
tax base so that the revenue lost could be compensated for (65%). Most 
think also that non taxation of interest encourages saving (78%) and re-
spectively non taxation of financial capital gains encourages investment 
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and promotes economic growth (65%)12. The bulk of these reasonings 
are close to those in the US survey. 
While the US experts consider consumption taxes regressive, Croatian 
experts (except academics) have reached no consensus about regres-
sivity. Maybe this is due to the lack of knowledge of other groups about 
that term. However, experts from both countries have reached the con-
sensus that CIT is shifted mostly to consumers and employees. 
The efficiency of regional tax investment incentives in Croatia (the city of 
Vukovar and areas of special national concern) is one of the questions 
where no general consensus was achieved. A consensus about them 
not being efficient was reached only in the academic community (68%), 
while the percentage of negative answers in the private (58%) and gov-
ernment sector (51%) was not high enough. It could be concluded that 
this attitude supports recently (after the survey) conducted reform of stat-
ed investment incentives (their narrowing).
4. Determinants of experts’ policy opinions in Croatia
This part of the paper analyses factors that influence tax experts’ atti-
tudes in Croatia using a serial binomial probit regression. As in the case 
of the degree for consensus being reached, only positive and negative 
answers (without the neutral one) are observed. As in other relevant re-
search (Lim et al., 2013), the analysis is aimed in two directions. The 
first part analyses tax expert’s attitudes related to some value judgments 
(values) in the area of taxation, where two questions (Q75 -  The entire 
tax burden (the level of taxes relative to GDP) should be reduced and 
Q91 - The equity principle should have precedence over the efficiency 
principle in creating tax policy) are used as predictors (independent var-
iables). The second part of the analysis encompasses particular eco-
nomic views related to the behavioral responsiveness and tax incidence, 
whose predictors (independent variables) are tested over five questions 
(Q84 - Non taxation of interest encourages saving, Q85 - Non taxation of 
financial capital gains encourages investment and promotes economic 
growth., Q86 - Different government tax reductions (reliefs, incentives) 
promote economic growth, Q79 – The tax burden should be shifted from 
personal and corporate income to consumption and Q80 – The tax bur-
den should be shifted from personal and corporate income to property). 
In both cases, the regression includes also demographic characteristics 
(employment-sector, age and education level) as independent variables. 
12  However, one should keep in mind that the neutral answer (3) was eliminated from the 
survey results. Where it comes to such economic modelling statements (as well as value 
statements) such skepticism/indecisiveness could be reasonable, expressing no lack of 
knowledge of the respondents, but their awareness of complexity. The inclusion of neutral 
answers in these statements would make the results a little bit less optimistic (Blažić, Ši-
mović, Štambuk, 2014). 
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They are not particularly analyzed but detailed probit regression results, 
as well for demographic characteristics, are presented in Table A3 and 
A4 in Appendix. 
Seventeen different models are observed, where seventeen questions/
statements that best reflect topical disputes in Croatian tax systems and 
could be used to assess future tax trends were chosen as dependent 
variables.
4.1. Values
This part of the analysis wants to establish the influence of tax equi-
ty values and general values concerning the government’s role in the 
economy on professional attitudes about tax system and policy. In order 
to establish that influence, Q75 (The entire tax burden (the level of tax-
es relative to GDP) should be reduced) and Q91 (The equity principle 
should take precedence over the efficiency principle in creating tax poli-
cy), which somehow express different views concerning tax policy, were 
chosen as independent variables (predictors). The respondents that sup-
port the reduction in the entire tax burden (expressed as the level of 
taxes relative to GDP) - those that gave that gave the positive answer to 
Q75 (The entire tax burden (the level of taxes relative to GDP) should be 
reduced) could be regarded as having more (neo)liberal economic views 
i.e. advocating a smaller role of government in the economy. On the oth-
er hand, those that claim the equity is more important than the efficiency 
principle (compared to those that have answered negatively) support a 
greater role for equity i.e. higher state intervention regarding redistribu-
tive issues. Concerning consumption-based taxation, the former group 
could be expected to be more in favor of and the latter group to be more 
against it. Table 3 presents the results of binomial probit regression for 
variables Q75 (The entire tax burden (the level of taxes relative to GDP) 
should be reduced) and Q91 (The equity principle should take prece-
dence over the efficiency principle in creating tax policy) reflecting values 
in the field of taxation. 
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Question/statement Q75a Q91b χ2 c








Q03 Taxation should include other  forms of proper-
ty too (movable property, financial property etc.) i.e. 







Q16 Instead of more PIT rates only one rate should 































Q27 All sources of income inside PIT should be taxed 
in the same way (at statutory rates, without allowing 





































Q40 Protective interest (allowance for corporate equi-







Q42 Only one/standard VAT rate should be aimed at 





















Q76 General government should be financed less 
from taxes and more from different non-tax revenues 














Table 3 Binomial probit regression results for values
Source: authors’ calculation
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The p-values of the χ2 are in brackets. Other 
regressors include indicators of sector of employment, age and education. 
* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01
a) Q75 - Entire tax burden (the level of taxes relative the GDP) should be reduced.
b) Q91 - The equity principle should be prior to efficiency principle in creating tax policy.
c) Wald χ2 tests the hypothesis that at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to zero
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Presented results imply relatively consistent attitudes of Croatian tax ex-
perts. For the most observed models, the experts with neoliberal eco-
nomic views have mostly different preferences than the experts that 
advocate greater equity in taxation. Furthermore, Q91 (The equity prin-
ciple should take precedence over the efficiency principle in creating tax 
policy) is also a more significant predictor than the Q75 (The entire tax 
burden (the level of taxes relative to GDP) should be reduced) - which 
could imply that the equity principle is the dominant value in shaping tax 
attitudes for most of the experts.13 
More neoliberal tax experts i.e. those that answered to Q75 (The en-
tire tax burden (the level of taxes relative to GDP) should be reduced) 
positively are more inclined to reduce the CIT rate, especially for SMEs. 
They are also inclined to reduce para-fiscal levies and consider that the 
government should be financed less from taxes and more from user 
charges. This could be explained by their inclination to the benefit prin-
ciple (“quid pro quo”) as an alternative (in effect older) understanding of 
equity (equality) instead of the ability to pay principle. That is why they 
are also not inclined to the taxation of interest income (as well as other 
capital incomes14) following consumption-based (interest-adjusted) tax-
ation concept.
Tax experts expressing a preference for a greater role for vertical equi-
ty (those that reacted positively to Q91) are, expectedly, more inclined 
to the introduction of a real estate tax (as additional indicator of ability 
to pay) as well as to the taxation of capital incomes such as dividends 
and capital gains.15 Not unexpectedly they are also in favor of a finan-
cial transaction tax and especially a financial activities tax (as additional 
ability to pay tax on the “undertaxed” banking sector). Needless to say 
that they are against the flat tax, which, due to its indirect progressivity, 
jeopardizes the traditional equity-founded appreciation of the ability to 
pay principle.
4.2. Economic views
In order to establish the prevalence of specific economic views in tax-
ation, statements/questions that relate to taxpayers’ behavior and tax 
incidence are used as independent variables (predictors). For the tax-
payers’ behavioral response questions/statements QP84 (Non taxation 
of interest encourages saving), QP85 (Non taxation of financial capital 
13 It is harder to make the comparison with the US survey in this context since the set of 
observed models i.e. dependent variables is somehow different. The predictors are not 
identical also, but they could be put in the similar comparable context. In the US survey the 
question “Is the redistribution of income within the United States a legitimate role for gov-
ernment” turned out to be more important predictor (with the negative influence on attitudes 
of lower capital income and dividend taxation) than the question about higher equality of 
income distribution in the US (Lim et al., 2013: 790-791).
14 However, there is no statistical significance established for other capital incomes.
15 There is a positive influence on interest taxation also, but without statistical significance.
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gains encourages investment and promotes economic growth) and 
QP86 (Different government tax reductions (reliefs, incentives) promote 
economic growth) are used and for the tax incidence additional two 
questions/statements (Q79 – The tax burden should be shifted from per-
sonal and corporate income to consumption and Q80 – The tax burden 
should be shifted from personal and corporate income to property) are 
used. Table 4 presents the results of a binomial probit regression for the 
stated variables. 
Results relating to tax incidence show a relatively consistent attitude 
among tax experts. On the other hand, there are some inconsistencies 
concerning behavioral responses, which have already been referred to 
in the part of the analysis concerning the degree of consensus achieved.
Among behavioral response questions/statements, Q86 (Different gov-
ernment tax reductions (reliefs, incentives) promote economic growth) 
turned out to be the best predictor. The experts that answered that ques-
tion positively (compared to those that answered negatively) are more in-
clined to exempt the reinvested profits from taxation, to maintain different 
tax incentives and to reduce para-fiscal levies. They are also not inclined 
to abolish reduced VAT rates. This approach in favor of tax incentives and 
reliefs could be regarded as “classical interventionist” approach, where 
economic efficiency is not understood in a sense of neutrality, but more 
from a (cost)-effectiveness approach. Although the critics could say this 
has been consigned to history and is definitely incompatible with modern 
consumption-based proposals, as well as with modern tax reform pro-
posals in general from the eighties on, it is still popular especially in the 
tax practice of developing countries and (post)transition economies. The 
recent (re)introduction of numerous incentives in the developed coun-
tries at the beginning of the economic and financial crisis, shows that 
they are indeed still compatible with a modern tax system. Furthermore, 
the respondents that reacted positively to Q86 are in favor of real estate 
tax as well as net wealth tax, which could be easier explained by a tra-
ditional “interventionist” approach than the newest reform tendencies in 
favor of these taxes.
Since it is more narrow, Q85 (Non taxation of financial capital gains en-
courages investment and promotes economic growth) turned out to be 
a less important predictor. The experts that answered this question pos-
itively (compared to those that answered negatively) are, logically, not in 
favor of capital gains taxation only, but also of dividend taxation as well 
as a financial activities tax. Since the non-taxation of capital gains (as 
well as all capital incomes) is one of the crucial characteristics of con-
sumption-based (interest-adjusted) taxation it is completely logical that 
the same reasoning should be broadened to include dividend taxation 
(and also interest taxation, where the relationship is negative also, but 
not statistically significantly so). Furthermore, those interested in reduc-
ing the tax burden and tax distortions in financial markets are, logically 
again, not in favor of a financial transaction tax.
29
It is interesting that the same experts do not think that CIT incentives 
should be maintained. Although it could seem peculiar to the gener-
al public, it is completely in accordance with consumption-based ap-
proach or the more general modern “base broadening” approach, where 
non-taxation of capital incomes and rate lowering of taxable incomes are 
advocated as better and more neutral incentive measures. 
Q84 (Non taxation of interest encourages saving) showed all the contro-
versiality of interest taxation attitudes as well as of the survey in general. 
Although there is a negative influence presented concerning the need 
for interest taxation (Q26), it is not statistically significant. Q84 turned out 
to be significant predictor only for flat tax introduction. The link between 
non-taxation of interest as one of the basic characteristic of consump-
tion-based (interest-adjusted) taxation and Hall-Rabushka flat tax – one 
of the typical examples of interest-adjusted personal income tax accom-
panied with only one rate needn’t to be additionally explained. Regard-
less of statistical insignificance of other relationships, it is interesting that 
some of them are of a different direction in comparison with Q85 (Non 
taxation of financial capital gains encourages investment and promotes 
economic growth), which implies a lot of disagreements but also incon-
sistences among tax experts.
Regardless of the stated inconsistencies, statements/questions Q85 
(Non taxation of financial capital gains encourages investment and pro-
motes economic growth) and Q86 (Different government tax reductions 
(reliefs, incentives) promote economic growth) turned out to be signifi-
cant predictors, which work in the expected direction in most of the test-
ed models i.e. imply similar attitudes of the tax experts about different 
tax incentive mechanisms. Similar tendencies could be established in 
relation with the relevant US survey, where similar attitudes prevail and 
the question about influence of taxation on private saving turned out to 
be the weakest predictor (Lim et al., 2013: 791-793). 
Economic incidence results show relatively consistent attitudes of tax 
experts.16 Q79 (The tax burden should be shifted from personal and 
corporate income to consumption) turned out to be the most important 
predictor. The experts that responded to that question positively (com-
pared to those that answered negatively) are, expectedly, not in favor of 
capital income taxation in general (dividends, interest and capital gains) 
and are in favor of flat tax introduction, only one (standard) VAT rate as 
well as a reduction of the tax burden for SMEs. These experts follow 
contemporary tax policy recommendations and consumption-based (in-
terest-adjusted) tax concept in general. Those experts are very precise 
in their attitudes and the answers are in accordance with expectations 
at most tested models. Again, it is not surprising that the experts that fa-
vor a general non-taxation of capital incomes, flat tax and only one VAT 
16 In contrast to behavioral questions/statements, the comparison with US survey results 
is not possible here since the Croatian research entails other predictor questions that are 
more applicable to the Croatian tax system characteristics. 
30
rate are against retaining specific tax incentives. So, they prefer general 
horizontal and “neutral” effects and not “distortive” tax incentives. Not 
surprisingly, these incentives were introduced after Croatia abandoned 
consumption-based taxation at personal and corporate levels (Table 1). 
Q80 (Tax burden should be shifted from personal and corporate income 
to property) also turned out to be important predictor. The experts that 
answered this question positively (compared to those that answered 
negatively) are, logically, in favor of real estate tax as well as net wealth 
tax. But they are also more inclined to income-based taxation (in con-
trast to consumption-based of the former group) – they are in favor of 
capital income taxation (interest, dividends and capital gains) as well as 
of taxing all income sources in the same way (classical comprehensive 
S-H-S income). Not surprisingly that they are also in favor of a proposed 
financial transaction tax. 
Although both predictors (Q79 – The tax burden should be shifted from 
personal and corporate income to consumption. and Q80 – The tax bur-
den should be shifted from personal and corporate income to property) 
point to the experts’ attitudes relatively precisely, neither of them turned 
out to be significant (and positive) for Q40 (reintroduction of ACE tax). 
This is about an instrument that was crucial for the consumption–based 
interest-adjusted corporate income taxation in Croatia implemented in 
1994-2000. On the other hand, both predictors are significant for the 
(non)-taxation of capital incomes (Q24, Q25 and Q26) - the instruments 
that were crucial for the consumption-based interest-adjusted personal 
income tax not only in the same period, but also even further. The fact 
that ACE, unlike non-taxation of capital incomes non-taxation, has not 
been in effect since 2001 i.e. that it is almost forgotten, could be the 
main reason behind the lack of consistent (and positive) reactions to that 
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Q76 General government should be financed less from taxes and 

























Table 4 Binomial probit regression results for economic views
Source: authors’ calculation
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The p-values of the χ2 are in brackets. Other regressors include indicators of sector of employment, age and 
education. Omitted variable dropped from the estimation because model predicts success perfectly.
* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01
a) Q84 - Non taxation of interest encourages saving.
b) Q85 - Non taxation of financial capital gains encourages investment and promotes economic growth.
c) Q86 - Different government tax reductions (reliefs, incentives) promote economic growth.
d) Q79 - Tax burden should be shifted from personal and corporate income to consumption.
e) Q80 - Tax burden should be shifted from personal and corporate income to property.
f) Wald χ2 tests the hypothesis that at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to zero
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5. Conclusion
Maybe disappointingly, but not unexpectedly, there is no high and broad 
consensus of Croatian tax experts although the technique which was 
applied (elimination of neutral answers, yes or no answers only) implies 
as high a consensus as possible.
However, the relatively high degree of consensus concerning some spe-
cific questions enables us to draw some general conclusions about ex-
perts’ attitudes. In the field of (personal and corporate) income taxation 
they include maintenance of corporate tax incentives, reintroduction of 
personal income tax reliefs (deductions), and rejection of a flat tax as 
well as a decrease in number of tax brackets. Concerning consumption 
taxation, the most interesting results are in favor of the maintenance and 
even broadening of reduced VAT rates as well as an increase in alcohol 
and tobacco duties. Although experts support financial sector taxation in 
general, consensus was reached not about a financial transaction tax, 
but about a financial activities tax. Concerning general tax issues a fur-
ther shift from income to consumption as well as decrease of the share of 
taxation in GDP, as expected, is advocated. Experts showed remarkable 
belief in behavioral responsiveness of tax decreases/exemptions, but, on 
the other hand, solved the traditional equity-efficiency trade-off in favor 
of equity.
In a sectoral comparison, the government sector expresses higher social 
sensibility (equity principle) and a stronger inclination to the classical in-
come-based – ability to pay principle (which is reflected also in the prop-
erty as additional ability to pay indicator). However, government officers 
are not in favor of personal income tax deductions, maybe due to their 
high administrative costs, which burden the tax administration directly. 
The academic sector could be said to be more “rational” being not so 
much against a consumption-based (interest-adjusted) taxation as other 
sectors, but still not in favor of it (with the exception of the ACE tax that 
received substantial support).
Some values and economic views are found to be important and con-
sistent predictors of tax opinions. This is especially true of the equity 
principle, the behavioral effects of tax reductions and attitudes related 




Structure of respondents Valid Percent
Age
    18-29 17.2
30 - 44 46.7
45 - 54 19.4
55+ 16.7
Education
High school degree 4.6
    Associate degree/ BA 11.2









Editor and/or business advisor 16.7
Others 20.8
High business school (lecturer) 12.7
Sector: Government sector
Local and regional units 48.7
Tax Administration 41.6






Sector: Academic community - Economics
Public finance 23.1
Monetary finance and financial markets 18.3
Corporate finance and accounting 26.0
Macroeconomics 24.0
Management/entrepreneurship 8.7
Table A1 Demographics and sample information
Source: authors-survey
Br. Statement / question
Total Academic Government Private
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Property taxes, Inheritance and gift taxes
1. Croatia should introduce the proposed real estate tax. 41 59 47 53 37 63 39 61
2. Real estate tax should be a local tax. 18 82 18 82 21 79 16 84
3.
Taxation should include other forms of property too (movable prop-
erty, financial property etc.) i.e. should be a synthetic taxation of 
property (net wealth tax) 
44 56 50 50 39 61 50 50
4. Regardless of any possible real estate tax introduction, communal charge should still remain local revenue. 48 52 42 58 50 50 71 29
5. Regardless of any possible real estate tax introduction, tax on hol-iday houses should remain local revenue too. 43 57 34 66 46 54 68 32
6. Regardless of any possible real estate tax introduction, surtax on income tax should still remain local revenue too. 33 67 30 70 33 67 48 52
7. Real estate tax should be assessed at the same rate for business and residents. 71 29 75 25 71 29 68 32
8. Business should be taxed at a higher rate than residents. 40 60 38 62 35 65 68 32
9. Residents should be taxed at a higher rate than business. 88 12 87 13 88 12 82 18
10. Inheritances and gifts should be taxed. 56 44 54 46 61 39 43 57
11.
Inheritance and gift taxation should be progressive - according to 
the property inherited/gifted and the proximity of the relationship (in 
contrast to the current 5% with the exemption for the closest family 
members).
51 49 52 48 49 51 46 54
12. Real estate transfers should be taxed. 16 84 20 80 14 86 8 92
13. Property is a necessary additional indicator of ability to pay besides income. 17 83 14 86 17 83 23 77
Br. Statement / question
Total Academic Government Private
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Personal income tax
14. The highest PIT rate should be reduced further (recently reduced from 45% to 40%). 52 48 49 51 57 43 48 52
15. The lowest PIT rate should be reduced further (recently reduced from 15% to 12%). 34 66 36 64 29 71 46 54
16. Instead of more PIT rates only one rate should be introduced (a flat tax”) along with maintaining personal exemption. 69 31 63 37 72 28 79 21
17. The number of tax brackets should be increased (currently three). 47 53 41 59 49 51 70 30
18. The number of tax brackets should be decreased (currently three). 81 19 77 23 83 17 86 14
19. Tax deductions/allowances for health costs should be reintroduced. 27 73 23 77 27 73 46 54
20. Tax deductions/allowances for owner-occupied housing should be reintroduced. 30 70 23 77 35 65 48 52
21. Tax deductions/allowances for life insurance should be reintro-duced. 40 60 34 66 47 53 39 61
22. Tax deductions/allowances for voluntary pension insurance should be reintroduced. 35 65 29 71 42 58 32 68
23. Tax deductions/allowances for additional and private health insur-ance should be reintroduced. 35 65 30 70 38 62 36 64
24. Inside PIT, dividends should be taxed. 27 73 35 65 14 86 38 63
25. Inside PIT, financial capital gains should be taxed. 23 77 34 66 13 87 29 71
26. Inside PIT interest on saving and securities should be taxed. 54 46 60 40 46 54 55 45
Br. Statement / question
Total Academic Government Private
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
27.
All sources of income inside PIT should be taxed in the same way 
(at statutory rates, without allowing the lower withholding tax to be 
the final tax due). 
43 57 42 58 36 64 55 45
28. Capital incomes should be taxed at lower rates than labor incomes. 70 30 61 39 80 20 57 43
29. Dividends should be taxed at lower rates than other incomes (due to the economic double taxation of dividends). 43 57 28 72 61 39 38 62
Corporate income tax
30. CIT (general) rate should be reduced. 46 54 41 59 48 52 64 36
31. CIT burden for SMEs should be reduced. 21 79 21 79 17 83 36 64
32. Reinvested profits should be exempt from taxation. 12 88 7 93 12 88 25 75
33. Tax incentives for areas of special national concern should be maintained. 32 68 29 71 35 65 15 85
34. Tax incentives for mountain areas should be maintained. 32 68 34 66 31 69 15 85
35. Tax incentives for free trade zones should be maintained. 31 69 27 73 32 68 28 72
36. Tax incentives for the city of Vukovar should be maintained. 23 77 23 77 21 79 16 84
37. Tax incentives (state aid) for R&D should be maintained. 9 91 8 92 8 92 17 83
38. Tax incentives (state aid) for the education of employees should be maintained.. 9 91 6 94 10 90 14 86
39. Tax incentives for investment should be maintained. 11 89 9 91 12 88 13 88
40. Protective interest (allowance for corporate equity - ACE) should be reintroduced. 25 75 27 73 24 76 26 74
41. Accelerated depreciation (double depreciation rates) should be maintained. 26 74 20 80 28 72 39 61
Br. Statement / question
Total Academic Government Private
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
VAT
42. Only one/standard VAT rate should be aimed at (reduced rates should be narrowed/eliminated). 64 36 65 35 63 37 62 38
43.
In the transitional period (after accessing EU) Croatia should have 
tried to maintain zero rate of VAT for some goods and services that 
have a social purpose.
25 75 28 72 18 82 36 64
44. Tourist and restaurant services should be taxed at lower VAT rate. 51 49 48 52 57 43 39 61
45. Some basic foodstuff (bread, milk, baby food, edible oils and fats) should be taxed at a reduced VAT rate. 13 87 17 83 8 92 20 80
46. A special scheme for VAT for farmers should be introduced. 25 75 20 80 27 73 26 74
47. Standard/general VAT rate should be increased. 97 3 97 3 98 2 100 0
48. An increase of the standard/general VAT rate is better than the introduction of “crises tax”. 62 38 67 33 63 37 37 63
49. Instead of reduced VAT rates for some “basic” foodstuffs the re-duced VAT rate for all foodstuffs (and water) should be introduced. 36 64 39 61 35 65 41 59
50. The reduced VAT rate for newspapers and periodicals should not be applied for “the yellow press”. 27 73 26 74 25 75 36 64
51. The reduced VAT rate should be higher for scientific journals than for the daily press. 60 40 58 42 58 42 78 22
52. VAT revenues should be partially directed to local government. 40 60 43 57 35 65 55 45
Excise duties
53. A special tax on “junk food” should be introduced. 34 66 29 71 34 66 47 53
54. Excise taxes on mineral oil and petroleum products should be de-creased. 27 73 33 67 21 79 32 68
Br. Statement / question
Total Academic Government Private
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
55. Excise duties on natural gas should be increased. 91 9 91 9 91 9 89 11
56. Excise duties on electricity should be increased. 94 6 90 10 98 2 95 5
57. Excise duties on alcohol should be increased. 18 82 18 82 18 82 18 82
58. Excise duties on wine should be introduced. 60 40 58 42 59 41 71 29
59. Excise duties on tobacco and tobacco products should be in-creased. 15 85 11 89 15 85 24 76
60. Croatia has enough excise duties. 7 93 6 94 9 91 5 95
61. Excise duties should be levied on luxury products. 20 80 19 81 16 84 42 58
62. Excise duties should be levied on cars and other vehicles. 36 64 32 68 37 63 45 55
63. Excise duties should be levied on aircrafts and vessels. 22 78 24 76 15 85 40 60
64. Excise duties should be levied on liability and comprehensive road vehicle insurance premiums . 59 41 55 45 60 40 81 19
65. Excise duties should be levied on coffee. 55 45 50 50 58 42 55 45
66. Excise duties should be levied on non-alcoholic beverages. 68 32 65 35 74 26 65 35
Social contributions
67. The ceiling for pension insurance contributions should be abol-ished. 43 57 44 56 37 63 70 30
68. Minimum assessment base for pension insurance contributions should be abolished. 72 28 70 30 72 28 76 24
69. Rates for compulsory pension insurance contributions for intergen-erational solidarity (I. pillar) should be decreased. 39 61 39 61 41 59 33 67
Br. Statement / question
Total Academic Government Private
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
70. Rates for compulsory pension insurance contributions for individ-ual capitalized savings accounts (II. pillar) should be increased. 40 60 34 66 48 52 33 67
71. Health insurance contributions should be decreased. 41 59 40 60 44 56 30 70
72.
Small business personal income taxpayers are in a favorable posi-
tion compared to employment income taxpayers concerning com-
pulsory social security contributions’ payment.
47 53 43 57 51 49 43 57
General tax issues, experts’ values and economic model
73. A financial transaction tax should be introduced. 44 56 50 50 36 64 53 47
74. A financial activities tax should be introduced. 23 77 33 67 6 94 53 47
75. The entire tax burden (the level of taxes relative to GDP) should be reduced. 15 85 17 83 15 85 5 95
76.
General government should be financed less from taxes and more 
from different non-tax revenues (with an emphasis on different user 
charges). 
35 65 33 67 38 62 37 63
77. The entire level of public revenues (and public expenditures) rela-tive to GDP should be lowered. 18 82 23 77 16 84 9 91
78. The tax structure should be changed. 8 92 11 89 8 93 0 100
79. The tax burden should be shifted from personal and corporate in-come to consumption. 33 67 31 69 34 66 35 65
80. The tax burden should be shifted from personal and corporate in-come to property. 48 52 47 53 45 55 71 29
81. Para-fiscal levies should be reduced. 5 95 7 93 3 97 4 96
Br. Statement / question
Total Academic Government Private
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
82. Lower marginal income tax rates reduce leisure and increase work effort. 19 81 18 82 18 82 21 79
83. Lower marginal income tax rates increase work effort and taxable income generally so much as to raise revenue. 35 65 34 66 37 63 31 69
84. Non taxation of interest encourages saving. 22 78 22 78 24 76 14 86
85. Non taxation of financial capital gains encourages investment and promotes economic growth. 35 65 34 66 37 63 24 76
86. Different government tax reductions (reliefs, incentives) promote economic growth. 21 79 19 81 24 76 17 83
87. VAT is regressive. 40 60 33 67 42 58 59 41
88. CIT is mostly shifted onto consumers and employees. 26 74 23 77 28 72 33 67
89. Regional tax incentives (city of Vukovar, areas of special national concern) are efficient concerning investment attraction. 59 41 68 32 51 49 58 42
90.
Administrative and compliance costs of taxation should a play sig-
nificant role in creating tax policy (these costs should be reduced 
by making the tax system significantly simpler).
6 94 9 91 5 95 5 95
91. The equity principle should have priority over the efficiency princi-ple in creating tax policy. 13 87 15 85 6 94 40 60
92. Penalties for tax evasion should be increased. 13 87 11 89 12 88 29 71
Table A2 Responses’ distribution (in %) for all respondents and main groups according to employment (without neutral answer)
Source: authors – the survey
Note: Answers above 61% are bolded.
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Table A3 Binomial probit regression results for values, detailed 
Source: authors’ calculation
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The p-values of the χ2 are in brackets. Other regressors include indicators of sector of employment, age and 
education. Omitted variable dropped from the estimation because model predicts success perfectly.
* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01
a) Q75 - Entire tax burden (the level of taxes relative the GDP) should be reduced.
b) Q91 - The equity principle should be prior to efficiency principle in creating tax policy.
c) Reference category is private sector
d) Reference category is Level  4.2-6 according to Croatian Qualification Framework (high school - bachelor)
e) Wald χ2 Wald χ2 tests the hypothesis that at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to zero
Behavioral Responsiveness Incidence Sector.f Education.g
Question/statement Q84a Q85b Q86c Q79d Q80e Public Academic Age
Level 7
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Table A4 Binomial probit regression results for economic views, detailed
Source: authors’ calculation
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The p-values of the χ2 are in brackets. Other regressors include indicators of sector of employment, age and 
education. Omitted variable dropped from the estimation because model predicts success perfectly.
* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01
a) Q84 - Non taxation of interest encourages saving.
b) Q85 - Non taxation of financial capital gains encourages investment and promotes economic growth.
c) Q86 - Different government tax reductions (reliefs, incentives) promote economic growth.
d) Q79 - Tax burden should be shifted from personal and corporate income to consumption.
e) Q80 - Tax burden should be shifted from personal and corporate income to property.
f) Reference category is private sector
g) Reference category is Level 4.2-6 according to Croatian Qualification Framework (high school - bachelor)
h) Wald χ2 tests the hypothesis that at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to zero
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SLOVENIAN EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS 
FROM TAX REFORMS17
ABSTRACT
Budget constrains push several changes in fiscal policy and Slovenia is not an 
exception. Several debates and policy changes were focused on the fiscal gold-
en rule, decrease of social transfers and tax reforms. Following the tax policy 
priorities put forward by the European Commission and taking into consideration 
budget deficit reduction, Slovenia made several changes in its tax system in the 
past three years. In the paper we present tax changes in Slovenia, discuss how 
they are aligned with EC recommendations (shifting taxation away from labour, 
broadening tax bases, reducing corporate tax debt bias, and improving tax com-
pliance), and with regard to fairness, neutrality and redistribution. We also present 
research results of professionals’ opinions about tax policy in Slovenia. A survey 
among different professionals (academics, tax advisors and employees at the 
Ministry of Finance) was concluded in January 2014. The research results show 
the opinions about different statements connected with tax policy in the country. 
We tried to find out whether there were differences between professionals’ opin-
ion and at which points they disagreed the most. We focused on the statements 
that are in connection with the actual tax changes in the last years (i.e. whether 
they are in accordance with the professionals’ opinions). The research results 
could be of great importance, especially since comparisons with similar research 
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina could be done in the future. 
1. Introduction 
The growing economic crisis has led to a range of reforms. The tax sys-
tem is no exception. As part of the Europe 2020 strategy, the European 
Commission has decided to report on and propose measures to increase 
economic growth using the Annual Growth Survey. Consequently, at the 
end of 2012, the European Commission proposed that the following tax-
ation measures be implemented in 2013: shifting the tax burden away 
17 This is a language edited reprint of a conference paper published in: Ott, K: Blažić, H. 
and Šimović H. (eds), 2014, Tax reforms: Experiences and Perspectives, Conference Pro-
ceedings, Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb, Croatia, p. 149-156, http://www.ijf.hr/upload/
files/file/knjige/tax_reform_proceedings.pdf
This work has been supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under the pro-
ject number IP- 2013-11-8174 and by the University of Rijeka under the project number 
13.02.1.2.02. 
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from labour, broadening the tax bases, improving tax compliance and 
reducing company debts as a result of corporate income tax (European 
Commission, 2013a). An overview of the reforms in the past three years 
shows that most countries have made considerable efforts to prevent tax 
evasion; in order to stimulate economic growth, the EU member states 
have decreased corporate income tax or adopted additional tax meas-
ures to promote scientific and research work, investments and entrepre-
neurship in general (Garnier et al., 2013). In the recommendations for 
2012, one of the proposals for tax measures concerns property tax, pro-
posing that reform processes be focused mainly on introducing the kind 
of changes to property tax that will be effective in preventing the re-emer-
gence of financial risks in real estate. The special recommendation for 
Slovenia does not include measures in the field of taxation (Council of 
the European Union, 2013). This is also true for recommendations for 
Slovenia for the years 2011–2013. Regardless of the recommendations 
for Slovenia, in the past three years the country has begun to implement 
a number of changes, also in the field of taxation, which do not necessar-
ily comply with the recommendations of the 2012 Annual Growth Survey. 
The central thesis of this paper is that, despite the familiar theoretical 
assumptions on tax reforms promoting economic growth, most of the 
reforms are actually focused on fiscal consolidation. In the first part of the 
paper, the tax reforms in Slovenia are compared to measures adopted 
by other EU member states. Afterwards we present methodology of the 
research conducted among tax professionals. The next section presents 
the research results and the paper concludes with final remarks and 
recommendations.
2. Tax reforms in Slovenia
and comparison with the member states
While there are a number of reasons for tax reforms, the reforms in-
troduced in the last four years have undoubtedly been focused on the 
economic crisis. In most countries, the initial changes were unplanned 
and mainly concerned with increasing the budget, but eventually it be-
came clear that these types of reforms can actually have a detrimental 
effect on economic development. One thing is clear: the greater our fo-
cus on partial goals, the greater the likelihood that the whole system will 
no longer function in line with the principles of a good tax system. 
Slovenia has witnessed several important stages in the tax system de-
velopment. The greatest change came after independence, when Slove-
nia modified its tax system to match those of developed countries. The 
previous system consisted of a variety of tax levels and a multitude of 
taxes: according to some information, companies paid as many as 47 
different taxes and contributions. There were a number of levels and 
bases for each individual tax. The system of direct levies went through a 
thorough audit and reduction in the number of taxes and contributions, 
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different tax and contribution bases and tax sources. The corporate profit 
tax was introduced as the main tax for corporations and personal income 
tax as the main tax for natural persons. The Slovenian tax system un-
derwent several other significant changes in the 1990s. Environmental 
taxes were introduced in 1995. 1996 saw a thorough reform of the or-
ganisation of tax collection and the monitoring of tax payments. A single 
tax administration was established, combining the Republic of Slovenia’s 
Administration for Public Revenue and the Agency for Payment Transac-
tions. Previously, the former had collected and monitored the taxes paid 
by natural persons, while the latter monitored and collected corporate 
taxes. A single tax administration allowed more efficient collection and 
monitoring of taxes. Tax ID numbers were introduced and with them the 
central register of taxable persons. The last significant change to be im-
plemented in the 1990s was the introduction of VAT in 1999. To date, VAT 
tax levels have increased twice, in 2005 and 2013.
The second important period of the tax system reform in Slovenia took 
place in 2004-2006. Most of the changes were implemented in 2005, 
followed only by corrections. The main changes to personal income tax 
included: broadening income to include global income (i.e. the taxation 
of income generated in Slovenia and abroad) and some other sources 
(e.g. savings interest), lowering some direct (e.g. relief for expenditure) 
and indirect reliefs (e.g. lowering the flat rate expenses for royalty pay-
ments and rent), reducing the number of tax brackets and lowering the 
marginal tax rate for the lowest bracket. The corporate profit tax was re-
named corporate income tax, expenditure was more clearly defined, and 
the rates of depreciation were lowered. Investment relief was practically 
eliminated, but soon reintroduced with stricter restrictions. Due to the 
membership in the EU, the Tax Procedure Act was amended, as was the 
Tax Administration Act, since EU membership brought additional duties 
to the tax administration (reporting on taxable persons, assistance with 
tax collection, the VIES system). In addition to these major changes, in 
September 2004 the burden on the lowest salaries in the form of payroll 
tax was lifted and the tax on the balance sheet total of banks and savings 
institutions was abolished.
In 2005, the government established a special tax team that prepared 
proposals for adjustments of the 2004 reform. The most significant 
changes concerned personal income tax with the schedular system of 
taxation for some types of income and changes to some types of tax 
relief. Changes deemed advantageous for taxable persons entered into 
force the same year, in 2005. The tax process was simplified, the de-
fault interest rate was decreased (almost by half), the debt repayment 
method was changed, the period for debt repayment in instalments 
was extended (from 12 to 24 months) and the option of self-report-
ing was introduced. The simplification process continued in 2006: the 
number of tax brackets for personal income tax was reduced to three, 
the highest marginal tax rate was lowered, non-standard tax reliefs 
were eliminated, and pre-completed tax returns were introduced. In 
53
addition, changes were made concerning tax reliefs in the taxation of 
companies and several other taxes (e.g. the tax on motor boats and 
the tax on trading in real estate). It was clearly a period of consider-
able instability for the tax system, with new changes being introduced 
virtually every six months. 
This was followed by a period of relative stability of the tax system, with 
only a few minor changes being made. The third significant stage in the 
development of Slovenia’s tax system came as a consequence of the 
economic crisis. Several measures were introduced in 2010, mainly 
aimed at promoting and supporting the economy; however, these chang-
es were replaced by a major adjustment in 2013, aimed at fiscal consol-
idation. In 2010, the tax rate for corporate income tax was planned to be 
lowered gradually to 15%, but the changes introduced in 2013 brought 
the tax rate to 17%. The tax on the balance sheet total of banks was re-in-
troduced in 2011. The changes in the second half of 2012 and in 2013 
started with the Fiscal Balance Act, which introduced several changes 
to personal and corporate income taxes. 2013 saw the introduction of 
an additional personal income tax bracket and the re-introduction of the 
highest personal income tax rate of 50%. In addition, the tax rate for the 
taxation of income using the schedular system (interests, capital gains, 
dividends, and rent) was increased from 20% to 25%. The tax relief for 
student work was lowered, while the tax relief for people over 65 and 
commuters was abolished altogether. The recognised costs for people 
reporting their income based on flat rate expenses increased to 70%, 
establishing a flat rate system for people engaged in business. When it 
comes to corporate income tax, the upper limit on reliefs for investments 
was abolished, the reliefs for research and development increased to 
100% and, as previously mentioned, gradual lowering of the tax rate 
was halted. This period also saw an increase in the VAT rate and an 
increase in the threshold for entry into the VAT system from EUR 25,000 
to EUR 50,000. 
Comparing the last two stages of tax reforms in Slovenia with those in 
other EU member states in particular, we find that Slovenia has adopted 
similar measures to most other countries. If we compare the reforms 
introduced after the year 2000 and before the onset of the economic cri-
sis, we find that most tax reforms are focused on lowering the tax rates 
for the taxation of natural persons, increasing tax reliefs for people with 
low income and lowering the highest tax rates. A review of the chang-
es adopted in the tax legislation of the EU member states in 2009 and 
2010 shows some measures in a similar direction (more details in Klun 
& Jovanović, 2012). In the 2009-2010 period, 9 EU member states low-
ered the personal income tax rates, while as many as 20 increased the 
income tax personal allowance or non-taxable amounts. When it comes 
to corporate income tax, 7 EU member states lowered the tax rate, while 
tax reliefs or other measures for lowering the tax base (e.g. transferring 
losses to the following year, changes in depreciation rates) were amend-
ed by as many as 14 member states. Fewer tax rates were lowered when 
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it comes to social security contributions. Just three EU member states 
lowered their VAT rates, while four lowered some excise duties (Klun & 
Jovanović, 2012).  
A different trend has emerged after 2009. A more detailed review of the 
changes in each member state in 2012 and 2013 shows that most meas-
ures do not conform to the recommendations included in the 2012 Annu-
al Growth Survey. Where indirect taxes are concerned, most countries 
introduced VAT reforms that increase the tax rates. Excise duties were 
also increased. The VAT rate was increased by as many as nine EU 
member states, including Slovenia, while the rate was lowered in three 
member states. The excise duties on at least one group of excisable 
products were increased by a total of 19 member states. No member 
states decided to decrease excise duties. Staying with indirect taxes, 11 
member states increased the environmental tax rates, while three mem-
ber states decreased them. Despite the recommendations, the trend of 
increasing tax rates is noticeable even when it comes to the most im-
portant direct taxes. The corporate income tax rates were increased by 
six EU member states, while another six decided to lower them. On the 
other hand, as many as 16 member states adopted measures lowering 
the tax base (e.g. by increasing tax reliefs or introducing special arrange-
ments). The personal income tax rates were increased by nine member 
states and lowered by two. Additionally, a number of members adjusted 
the tax bases and introduced special tax arrangements. It is interesting 
to note that half of all the EU member states introduced reforms concern-
ing the taxation of property. Seven countries increased the tax rates, and 
additional four increased the tax base, while three countries lowered the 
tax rates (Garnier et al., 2013). 
Comparing the measures adopted in individual member states with the 
recommendations for individual member states, we find that the recom-
mendation for the transfer of the tax on labour to other tax bases was 
given to 11 member states, none of which implemented it fully by 2013. 
The broadening of the tax base, particularly to achieve greater efficien-
cy and competitiveness, was implemented only partially in some mem-
ber states. The recommendation was given to seven member states in 
2012 and further three in 2013. It was only implemented in Slovakia. 
A similar failure is apparent when it comes to recommendations to re-
duce borrowing incentives in the context of corporate income tax. The 
recommendation was first given to three EU member states and then to 
further two member states. None of them implemented it. When it comes 
to recommendations related to the taxation of property, the rate of im-
plementation was also low. A total of 13 member states were given the 
recommendation to transfer the tax burden from labour to property. The 
recommendation was implemented by just four member states (Europe-
an Commission, 2013b).
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3. Survey on the opinion of tax experts
on the tax system in Slovenia
In preparing the survey, we followed the example of a 2013 survey in the 
USA, which was carried out for the purpose of comparison with similar 
surveys in 1994 and 1934 (NTA, 2013, and Slemrod, 1995), and a survey 
in Croatia (Šimović et al., 2013). The survey was adapted to Slovenia’s 
tax system and includes both identical and partially different statements 
connected to tax legislation and the participants’ opinions. There is a total 
of 92 statements, which the participants evaluated with five grades. The 
survey was concluded with questions about the participants’ age, educa-
tion and area of work. The survey was carried out in a population that is 
professionally involved with the tax system. The survey was carried out 
from December 2013 to April 2014 among three groups: employees at 
the Ministry of Finance (including the Tax Administration and Customs 
Administration), tax consultants and academics in the field of finance and 
economics. The academics and tax consultants were sent the survey 
using e-mail addresses available on the websites of various faculties 
and institutes or in the business register. The survey was sent to a total 
of 53 academics and 300 tax consultants. The employees at the Ministry 
of Finance were forwarded the survey through the managing director of 
the Tax Administration, the Customs Administration head office, and the 
Ministry of Finance. The total number of recipients is therefore unknown, 
as it depends on how many heads of departments forwarded the survey, 
but the response in this group was considerable, with 101 employees 
filling in the survey. The response was the poorest in the private sector 
(just 18%) and somewhat better among academics (22.6%). In total, 169 
individuals responded to the survey. The structure of the respondents is 
presented below. 
N %
The academic community (universities, institutes) 13 7.7
The general government sector 101 59.8
The private sector 55 32.5
Total 169 100.0
Table 1. Respondent structure
Below, we wanted to analyse the respondents’ opinions concerning just a 
few specific areas. We will only focus on statements connected to chang-
es made in the last stage of tax reforms in Slovenia. We will analyse re-
sponses to questions on personal income tax and corporate income tax 
rates and reliefs and about the VAT rate. The table below shows only the 
most interesting findings. In general, most responses indicate an indiffer-
ent attitude to individual statements, as most grade averages are around 
3. This means that the professional public is indifferent about a higher tax 
rate and about changes to the lowest tax rate. There is more of a general 
agreement when it comes to re-introducing some non-standard reliefs 
(mainly housing relief and relief for donations, while there is less agree-
ment where insurance relief is concerned). There is a clear lack of agree-
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ment with abolishing pre-completed personal income tax returns. There 
is also a considerable lack of agreement with the statements on compre-
hensive taxation, as most respondents feel that the schedular taxation 
of passive income is required. It is interesting to note that the groups of 
respondents have expressed similar agreement or disagreement with 
individual statements. The greatest difference is apparent when it comes 
to the matter of the highest tax rate, which the government employees 







The highest personal in-
come tax rate should be 
lowered (recently set at 
50%).
3.182 2.780 3.852 3.158
The lowest personal in-
come tax rate should be 
lowered (currently 16%).
2.091 3.000 3.037 2.952
Instead of multiple per-
sonal income tax rates, a 
single tax rate should be 
introduced and personal al-
lowances preserved. 
2.333 1.950 2.611 2.192
Individual completion of tax 
returns should be re-intro-
duced instead of the cur-
rent informative statement.
1.417 1.564 1.623 1.572
All income should be taxed 
using the same method (by 
rates or a flat rate). 
2.750 2.634 2.302 2.536
Table 2. The average evaluation of statements connected to personal income tax
When it comes to the second set of questions, concerning corporate 
income tax, there is less of a consensus between the three groups of re-
spondents. Interestingly, the government employees and the academics 
both disagree with the continued lowering of the tax rates. The tax con-
sultants also disagree with lowering the tax rate, but their average grade 
is somewhat higher. The tax consultants agree more with the statement 
that there should be a smaller tax burden on small and medium-sized en-
terprises, government employees are indifferent to this statement, while 
the academics disagree with it. Overall, the three groups agreed most 
with the statements connected to tax relief for research and development 
and tax relief for investments; most respondents agreed with the state-









The corporate income tax 
rate should be lowered. 2.250 2.740 3.196 2.847
The tax burden on small and 
medium-sized enterprises 
should be reduced. 
2.583 3.168 3.889 3.359
There should be more re-
gional tax reliefs. 2.583 3.178 3.148 3.126
The tax reliefs for Pomurje 
should be preserved even 
after expiry.
2.500 2.663 2.944 2.743
The tax reliefs for research 
and development purposes 
are important. 
4.083 4.228 4.315 4.246
The tax relief for investments 
should be suspended. 4.000 4.059 4.333 4.145
Table 3. The average evaluation of statements connected to corporate income tax
It is evident that recommendations for the transfer of tax burden from 
labour and capital to consumption have little support among profession-
als. Analysing the statements connected to VAT, we found that most re-
spondents believe that the VAT rate should not be increased and feel that 







Standard VAT should be in-
creased 1.182 1.693 1.667 1.651
Higher VAT rate is better 
than “crisis tax” 1.833 2.820 2.778 2.735
Table 4. The average evaluation of statements connected to VAT
4. Conclusion
Considering the recommendations given to other EU member states and 
their response, it is interesting to note that Slovenia adopted amend-
ments to the tax legislation in a similar direction, focusing more on fiscal 
consolidation than on change to promote economic growth. The profes-
sionals have a similar opinion, disagreeing with increasing the burden 
on consumption, but also disagreeing with lowering taxes for companies 
and disapproving high personal income taxation. It is interesting to note 
that in their comments, the respondents emphasised that the tax system 
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in Slovenia is good for the most part, but that it is too hard on people 
willing to pay taxes. The respondents’ opinion is that much more effort 
and changes should be aimed at non-payers and the elements of the tax 
system that allow particular groups to enjoy special status. 
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STANJE I PERSPEKTIVE POREZNIH REFORMI U BOSNI 
I HERCEGOVINI: REZULTATI ANKETE POREZNIH 
STRUČNJAKA18
THE STATE AND PERSPECTIVES OF TAX REFORMS 
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: EXPERT OPINION 
SURVEY RESULTS 
SAŽETAK
Cilj ovoga rada je analizirati odgovore poreznih stručnjaka na skupinu anketnih 
pitanja u vezi stanja i perspektive poreznih reformi u Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH), od-
nosno u Federaciji BiH (FBiH). Anketa je provedena u 2014. godini, a obuhvatila je 
zaposlene u tri sektora: privatnom, javnom i akademskom dajući odgovore na pre-
ko šezdeset pitanja u vezi glavnih poreznih oblika kao i općih stavova o poreznoj 
politici u BiH. Anketa je, osim u FBiH, provedena i u Republici Srpskoj te su u radu 
uspoređeni i odgovori na ista pitanja u dva entiteta u BiH. Rezultati pokazuju da 
se u međuentitetskoj usporedbi ispitanici u tri sektora slažu oko uvođenja progre-
sivnog poreza na dohodak, zadržavanja standardnih odbitaka u sustavu poreza na 
dohodak, uvođenja trošarina na luksuzne proizvode i zadržavanja trenutnih stopa 
poreza na dodanu vrijednost i poreza na dobit. Međutim, postoje entitetske razlike 
u percepciji ispitanika u vezi eventualnog uvođenja diferenciranih stopa PDV-a, 
te ravnoteže koja postoji između načela pravednosti i efikasnosti u oporezivanju 
dohotka. U fokusu analize su odgovori ispitanika iz FBiH. U binomnoj probit re-
gresijskoj analizi provedenoj na bazi odgovora danih u FBiH u smislu ekonomskih 
vrijednosti odnosno neoliberalnih ili klasično-intervencionističkih percepcija ispi-
tanika, utvrđena su odstupanja odgovora u odnosu na očekivana. Kao eventualno 
objašnjenje odstupanja, u radu je dana i kratka usporedba stavova i percepcija 
poreznih stručnjaka s aktualnim prijedlozima Reformske agende za BiH čime se 
dodatno naglašava činjenica da se porezne reforme u BiH i dalje provode ad hoc.
Ključne riječi: porezna reforma, porezna politika, anketa stručnjaka, BiH
18 Ovaj rad sufinancirala je Hrvatska zaklada za znanost projektom IP-2013-11-8174 te 
Sveučilište u Rijeci projektom 13.02.1.2.02.
Dijelovi empirijske analize prikazani u ovome radu su ranije objavljeni u časopisu The 
South East European Journal of Economics and Business, volume 10 (2), 2015, str. 29-45 




The aim of this paper is to analyse the answers of tax experts to a group of 
survey questions regarding the state and perspective of tax reforms in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (B&H) and in the Federation of B&H (FB&H). The survey was 
conducted in 2014 and included employees in three sectors: the private, public 
and academic sector providing answers to over 60 questions regarding major tax 
forms as well as general views on tax policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Except 
in FB&H, the survey was also conducted in the Republika Srpska and the an-
swers to the same questions in the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
compared in this paper.The results show that, in inter-entity comparisons, the 
respondents in the three sectors agree on introducing progressive income tax, 
retaining standard income tax deductions, introducing excise tax on luxury prod-
ucts, and keeping current value added tax and profit tax rates. However, there 
are differences between entities in the respondents’ perception of the possible 
introduction of differentiated rates of VAT and the trade-off balance between the 
principles of fairness and efficiency in income taxation. The focus of the analysis 
is on the answers of respondents from FB&H. In the binomial probit regression 
analysis carried out based on responses provided in FB&H in terms of econom-
ic values, i.e. neoliberal or classic-interventionist perceptions of respondents, 
deviations of responses were recorded in relation to expected responses. As a 
possible explanation of deviations, there is also a short comparison of attitudes 
and perceptions of tax experts with the current proposals of the Reform Agenda 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina which further emphasises the fact that tax reforms 
in B&H are still being conducted ad hoc. 
Key words: tax reform, tax policy, expert survey, B&H
1. Uvod
BiH se nakon potpisivanja Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma i okončanja 
rata u BiH našla u jedinstvenoj ustavnoj organizaciji asimetrične feder-
acije koja se neminovno odrazila i na poreznu politiku i porezne reforme. 
Naime, porezna politika i reforme koje su se provodile i koje se provode 
u BiH u posljednja dva desetljeća uglavnom su posljedica savjeta i pre-
poruka međunarodnih financijskih institucija pa je provedeno istraživanje 
između poreznih stručnjaka u vezi stanja i perspektive poreznih reformi u 
BiH bilo dodatno zanimljivo i izazovno u odnosu na slično provedeno is-
traživanje u zemljama u regiji (za slučaj Hrvatske: Šimović, Blažić i Štam-
buk, 2013. i naknadno provedeno istraživanje za slučaj Slovenije: Klun i 
Štambuk, 2015.). Dakle, od 2006. godine kada se posljednji put provela 
sveobuhatna porezna reforma u BiH uvođenjem poreza na dodanu vri-
jednost, nadležnost i jurisdikcija nad pojedinim poreznim oblicima organ-
izirana je na sljedeći način: svi neizravni porezi, dakle porez na dodanu 
vrijednost kao predstavnik poreza na promet, trošarine, carine i cestarine 
zakonski su regulirane na razini BiH te je nadležnost za prikupljanje i 
raspodjelu prihoda od neizravnih poreza dodijeljena posebnoj poreznoj 
upravi – Upravi za neizravno oporezivanje u BiH; izravni porezi su u 
entitetskim nadležnostima zajedno sa socijalnim doprinosima, tako da u 
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području oporezivanja dohotka, dobiti i imovine te doprinosa nadležnost 
dijele dvije entitetske porezne uprave – Porezna uprava FBiH i Porezna 
uprava RS-a bez međusobnih formalnih dogovora. Ovakav kompleksan 
porezni sustav organizacije porezne politike u BiH ima svoje učinke i na 
pokretanje incijative i provođenje porezne politike u BiH, što izvjesno 
dovodi do nejednakog poreznog tretmana svojih građana, stimuliranje i 
privlačenje stranih ulaganja i dr. 
Aktualno stanje porezne politike u BiH je pred velikim izazovima. Naime, 
Lazović-Pita i Štambuk (2015: 32) daju kratki prikaz svih provedenih 
poreznih reformi u BiH od 1995. do 2014. godine kada je anketa i prove-
dena. Međutim, od 2014. g. do danas BiH se našla pred novim izazovima 
u području porezne politike i poreznih reformi definiranih u sklopu Re-
formske agende za BiH19 zarazdoblje 2015.-2018. g. (Vlada FBiH, 2015) 
pa su time rezultati provedene ankete u godini prije predloženih reformi 
još važniji i zanimljiviji za analizu. Dakle, Reformsku agendu su potpisale 
i usvojile sve razine vlasti u BiH (entiteti, kantoni) na temelju prijedloga i 
preporuka međunarodnih financijskih institucija kako bi uspješno izvrši-
li reformu u šest područja, gdje se prvo definirano područje odnosi na 
javne financije, oporezivanje i fiskalnu održivost. S tim u vezi, cilj ovoga 
rada je predstaviti rezultate ankete o stanju i perspektivama poreznih 
reformi u BiH s fokusom na odgovore iz FBiH u godini prije usvajanja 
Reformske agende kako bi se mišljenja poreznih stručnjaka mogla us-
porediti s implementacijom poreznih reformi danih u Reformskoj agendi. 
Početno stanje poreznog sustava u BiH po osnovnim poreznim oblicima 
je sažeto u tablici 1 te će poslužiti kao temelj za daljnju analizu.
19 Reformska agenda za BiH za razdoblje 2015.-2018. godine je dokument koji imple-
mentira Vijeće Ministara BiH, a na temelju tzv. „britansko-njemačke incijative za BiH“ iz 
2014. godine kako bi se ubrzao skup reformi u BiH i kako bi se BiH približila ispunjavanju 







Nominalno postoji porez na 
imovinu, kantonalno definiran 
(10 kantona), paušalno 
plaćanje na bazi m2 prema lok-
aciji/reforma nije provedena
Da, reforma provedena 
od 2013.g., niska stopa 
od maks. 0,2 % godišn-
je na procijenjenu vrijed-
nost
Porez na darove i 
nasljedstvo
Da, kantonalno određen u 
nekim kantonima, stope 2 
%-10 %
Ne
Porez na promet 
nekretnina
Da, kantonalno definiran, 
stope do 5 % Ne
Porez na dohodak





Nestandardni odbitci Da, npr. kamata na stambeni kredit









Porezne stope 10 % 10 %
Izuzeća i investicijski 
poticaji Da Da
Doprinosi
Da, 31 % (mirovinsko, zdra-
vstveno, za slučaj nezapos-
lenosti) ‒ snosi zaposlenik; 
10,5 % (po istim osnovama) 
snosi poslodavac
Da, 33 % (mirovinsko, 
zdravstveno, za slučaj 
nezaposlenosti, dječja 
zaštita) ‒ snosi zapos-
lenik
Neizravni porezi BiH razina
Stope PDV-a (stand-
ardne, snižene) Da, 17 % standardna stopa, bez snižene stope
Trošarine Da, kao u standardnoj praksi EU-a + kava i  bezalkoholna pića
Tablica 1. Stanje poreznog sustava u BiH20 (2014.-2015. g.)
Izvor: vlastiti prikaz na temelju relevantnih zakonskih rješenja
20 Značajne zakonske izmjene nisu prisutne ni u 2017. godini.
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2. Metodologija
Blažić et al. (2017) navode kako, za razliku od uobičajene američke 
prakse (Lim, Slemrod i Wilking, 2013), koja uključuje istraživanja stanja i 
perspektiva poreznih reformi u redovnim ciklusima, u (post)tranzicijskim 
zemljama ovakva istraživanja nisu uobičajena. Dakle, anketa o stanju 
i perspektivama poreznih reformi u BiH koja je provedena u proljeće i 
ljeto 201421. godine je prva anketa ikada provedena u BiH. Anketa je 
paralelno provedena i u RS, ali s malim brojem anketiranih (svega 28 
popunjenih anketa, Antić, 2014) tako da će se u nastavku analize dati 
kratki usporedni prikaz između odgovora ispitanika u FBiH i RS. Anketni 
upitnik je sastavljen tako da sadrži 64 odnosno 61 pitanje u FBiH i RS 
anketi redom, a odgovori su Likertovog tipa od 1 do 5 (1 - u potpunosti se 
ne slažem; 5 - slažem se u potpunosti). Odgovori na pitanja Likertovog 
tipa će biti prikazani kao da / ne / neutralna pitanja tako da će ocjene 1 
i 2 (u potpunosti se ne slažem i uglavnom se ne slažem) biti prikazane 
kao negativan odgovor, neutralni odgovori odgovaraju ocjeni 3 (niti se 
slažem niti se ne slažem), a odgovori 4 i 5 (uglavnom se slažem i u pot-
punosti se slažem) kao pozitivni odgovori. 
U smislu strukture ankete u oba entiteta, pitanja u području indirektnih 
poreza jednaka su u obje ankete, gdje su pitanja u vezi s poreznom 
politikom u nadležnosti entiteta modificirana i prilagođena aktualnom 
entitetskom zakonodavstvu. Kao što je navedeno, u RS je anketa prove-
dena na 28 ispitanika, a prikaz osnovnih rezultata je dan u Antić (2014). 
Anketa u FBiH je uključivala 194 ispitanika grupiranih u tri grupe: javni 
sektor, privatni sektor i akademski sektor, te je prikaz rezultata dan u La-
zović-Pita i Štambuk (2015) i u Lazović-Pita i Štambuk (2016). Ispitanici 
su na anketu uglavnom odgovarali elektronskim putem (putem e-pošte) 
te pisanim putem, odnosno putem pošte. Pošto je provođenje ankete u 
javnom sektoru povjereno zaposlenicima Porezne uprave FBiH, a na te-
melju odobrenja direktora Porezne uprave FBiH, točan broj osoba kojima 
je poslan upitnik je nepoznat, ali se procjenjuje da je anketu zaprimilo 
oko 214 službenika, odnosno šefova i pomoćnika šefova poreznih is-
postava u FBiH kao i predstavnika poreznih odjela u Federalnom Minis-
tarstvu financija. Anketiranje u privatnom sektoru je izvršeno tako da su 
kontaktirani zaposlenici domaćih i međunarodnih računovodstveno-revi-
zorskih kuća te porezni savjetnici, a anketiranje akademskog osoblja je 
izvršeno slanjem anketa putem pošte, uglavnom javnim sveučilištima u 
FBiH gdje su ciljna skupina bili profesori iz područja ekonomije, odnosno 
javnih financija. Stopa ispitanika koji su odgovorili na upitnik u privatnom 
i akademskom sektoru iznosi oko 47 %, (za javni sektor možemo proci-
jeniti da je stupanj ispitanika koji su odgovorili na anketu visok te da izno-
si oko 51 %). Slično kao i u američkoj (Lim, Slemrod i Wilking, 2013), hr-
vatskoj (Šimović, Blažić i Štambuk, 2014: 410) i slovenskoj anketi (Klun 
i Štambuk, 2015), u nastavku će se koristiti prag konsenzusa od barem 
21 Jedan dio ispitanika je dostavio anketu u rujnu 2014. g., a uslijed nasilnih prosvjeda u 
FBiH u proljeće kada je anketa prvi put poslana.
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61 % pozitivnih ili negativnih odgovora, bez neutralnih odgovora. U 
slučaju FBiH takav stupanj konsenzusa postignut je u 57 od 64 pitanja. 
Ovaj visok stupanj konsenzusa ne treba poistovjećivati s konzistentnom 
primjenom porezne politike u FBiH odnosno BiH. 
Dakle, u nastavku analize, najprije ćemo dati strukturu ispitanika u FBiH 
u sve tri grupe prema osnovnim statističkim, demografskim i obrazovnim 
karakteristikama, a zatim ćemo izvršiti dvije analize: prva će se odnos-
iti na usporedni prikaz i analizu rezultata na skup pitanja po poreznim 
oblicima i prema općim stavovima prema poreznoj politici u FBiH i RS, a 
druga analiza će se odnositi na procjenu ekonomskih vrijednosti ispitan-
ika u FBiH u smislu njihove veće ili manje sklonosti ka neoliberalnim ili 
klasično-intervencionističkim preferencijama u provođenju porezne poli-
tike. Lazović-Pita i Štambuk (2015) i Lazović-Pita i Štambuk (2016) daju 
detaljniju empirijsku analizu prezentiranih ekonomskih vrijednosti i pers-
pektiva prema grupama ispitanika, ali za potrebe ovoga rada, one neće 
biti dodatno analizirane. U dijelu rasprave ćemo pokušati dati odgovore 
na osnovna pitanja u smislu stanja i perspektiva poreznih politika u FBiH, 
odnosno BiH. 
3. Rezultati istraživanja
Kako je navedeno u metodologiji, u nastavku u tablici 2 dajemo strukturu 
ispitanika u FBiH u sve tri grupe prema osnovnim statističkim, demograf-


























sektor 23 % 41 93 % 84 % ekonomija
Privatni 
sektor 20 % 35 28 %
26 % porezni 
savjetnici
Javni  
sektor 57 % 49 11 %








Tablica 2. Prikaz strukture ispitanika u FBiH u sve tri grupe
Izvor: obrada autora
Iz tablice 2 je vidljivo da najveći broj anketiranih (57 %) dolazi iz javnog 
sektora te da u okviru ove grupe najveći broj ispitanika dolazi iz Porezne 
uprave FBiH. Prosječna starost u ovoj grupi je 49 godina, što je iznad 
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prosjeka ukupnog broja anketiranih (44 godine). Svi ispitanici imaju mini-
malno predbolonjski ili bolonjski stupanj obrazovanja, a svega 11 % ispi-
tanika u javnom sektoru ima minimalno magistarski22 stupanj obrazovan-
ja ili doktorat. Privatni sektor u ukupnoj strukturi ispitanika ima najmanje 
učešće (svega 20 %), ali je ova grupa ispitanika i najmlađa (35 godina) i 
znatno ispod prosječne starosti ukupno anketiranih. Svega 26 % ispitan-
ika iz privatnog sektora dolazi iz područja poreznog savjetovanja jer ovo 
područje u FBiH nije zakonski-strukovno regulirano. Većina ispitanika u 
ovom području dolazi iz financijskih institucija kao zaposlenici u području 
računovodstva i revizije. Akademski sektor sudjeluje s 23 % ispitanih u 
ukupnom broju ispitanika, te, očekivano, najveći broj ispitanika ima mini-
malno završene poslijediplomske studije (93 %) i to u području ekonom-
ije. Prosječna starost ove grupe iznosi 41 godinu.
U nastavku analize u tablici 3 dajemo skraćeni prikaz odgovora ispitani-
ka u FBiH i RS grupiranih kao da / ne / neutralni odgovori u okviru svakog 
poreznog oblika te kao opći stavovi prema poreznom sustavu. Poseb-
no je zanimljivo usporediti odgovore u oba entiteta, utvrditi eventualne 
različitosti u stavovima te dati osvrt na aktualno stanje s aspekta pre-
poručenih poreznih reformi definiranih u Reformskoj agendi za BiH čiji 
su potpisnici i entitetske vlade. 
22 Slično kao i kod klasifikacije dodiplomskih studija, poslijediplomski studiji uključuju 
predbolonjski magistarski program i bolonjski magistarski program. 
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Stavovi
RS   FBiH   
Ne Neutralno Da Ne Neutralno Da
Neizravni porezi
Treba uvesti sniženu stopu PDV-a 
na određene proizvode. 50 0 50 27 2 72
Treba povećati opću stopu PDV-a. 78 12 10 71 6 22
Trošarine na naftu i naftne derivate 
treba povećati.   71 10 19 68 14 18
Luksuzne proizvode treba oporezi-
vati trošarinama. 7 7 86 9 6 85
Izravni porezi i socijalni doprinosi
Treba povećati stope doprinosa  
po svim osnovama. 100 0 0 86 5 9
(Re)investiranu dobit treba izuzeti 
od oporezivanja. 18 2 80 21 10 68
Treba povećati stopu poreza  
na dobit. 65 10 25 62 9 29
Dividende treba oporezivati nižom 
stopom od ostalih dohodaka 
(zbog ekonomskog dvostrukog 
oporezivanja dividendi, tj. prethod-
nog plaćanja poreza na dobit).
22 14 64 34 16 51
Umjesto jedne stope poreza na do-
hodak od 10 %, treba uvesti više 
graničnih stopa / razreda poreza 
na dohodak.  
28 15 57 29 5 66
Imovina je nužan dopunski poka-
zatelj ekonomske (porezne) snage 
uz dohodak.
6 13 81 8 10 82
Opći stavovi prema poreznom sustavu
Treba povećati kazne za porezne 
prekršaje. 22 8 70 25 7 67
Načelo pravednosti treba biti is-
pred načela efikasnosti u kreiranju 
porezne politike.
33 33 34 19 19 62
Ukupno porezno opterećenje tj. 
udio poreza u BDP-u treba smanjiti. 15 18 67 16 18 66
Porezni teret treba što više prebac-
iti s dobiti i dohotka na potrošnju. 45 15 40 39 17 44
Porezni teret treba što više prebaci-
ti s dobiti i dohotka na imovinu. 32 18 50 28 21 51
Tabela 3. Skraćeni prikaz odgovora ispitanika u FBiH i RS prema osnovnim poreznim oblicima, 
u %
Izvor: obrada prema Lazović-Pita i Štambuk 2015: 35.-38. i Antić 2014
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Drugi dio analize se temelji na procjeni stavova ispitanika i njihove sklo-
nosti ka neoliberalnim ili klasično-intervencionističkim preferencijama u 
provođenju porezne politike u FBiH. Za te potrebe, u binomnom probit 
regresijskom modelu se kao prediktori (nezavisne varijable) koriste dva 
stava: stav br. 24 (Ukupni udio javnih prihoda (i javnih rashoda) u BDP-u 
treba smanjiti) koji odražava neoliberalne sklonosti i stav br. 34 (Načelo 
pravednosti treba biti ispred načela efikasnosti u kreiranju porezne poli-
tike) koji odražava klasično-intervencionističke preferencije. Regresijska 
analiza je izvršena na temelju grupiranih odgovora kao da/ne, bez neu-
tralnih odgovora, te su demografski podaci (stupanj obrazovanja, sektor 
u kojemu su ispitanici zaposleni i dob) korišteni kao kontrolne varijable, 
ali kao takve nisu posebno analizirane. Dakle, oni ispitanici koji su pot-
vrdno odgovorili na stav br. 24 (u odnosu na one koji su odgovorili pro-
tivno) smatraju se neoliberalnijima u svojim ekonomskim vrijednostima, 
odnosno promoviraju manju ulogu države u gospodarstvu. Takvi ispitan-
ici će u odnosu na one koji nisu protiv smanjenja ukupnog udjela javnih 
prihoda/rashoda u BDP-u biti skloniji pozitivno odgovarati na pitanja u 
vezi proširenja porezne osnovice kao i na pitanja u vezi smanjenja na-
jviših poreznih stopa (u području oporezivanja dohotka). Na isti način, 
oni koji su potvrdno odgovorili na stav br. 34 (u odnosu na one koji su 
odgovorili protivno) smatraju se sklonijima klasično-intervencionističkim 
mjerama u ekonomiji, dakle, većoj redistributivnoj funkciji države, a time 
i njenim značajnijim učešćem. U smislu oporezivanja dohotka, ova grupa 
ispitanika koja je potvrdno odgovorila na stav br. 34 u odnosu na one 
koji su odgovorili protivno, trebala bi preferirati sveobuhvatnu definiciju 
dohotka prema Schanz-Haig-Simonsu (S-H-S) kao poreznu osnovicu. 
Provedeno je 26 regresija čiji su zbirni prikazi dani u tablici 4.
Stav P24a P34b χ2




Treba povećati opću stopu PDV-a.
-0.651 -0.767** 10425
(0.424) (0.389) [0.108]








Treba uvesti porez na financijske transak-
cije (npr. trgovina vrijednosnim papirima i 








Financiranje funkcija države treba biti man-
je iz poreza, a više iz različitih neporeznih 




Oporezivanjem treba obuhvatiti i ostale ob-
like imovine (npr. pokretnine, financijsku im-




Nasljedstva i darove treba oporezivati.
0.204 -0.117 8643
(0.373) (0.344) [0.195]
Imovina je nužan dopunski pokazatelj ekon-
omske (porezne) snage uz dohodak.
-0.108 0.678* 8727
(0.595) (0.402) [0.19]
Umjesto jedne stope poreza na dohodak 
od 10 %, treba uvesti više graničnih stopa/
razreda poreza na dohodak.  
0.214 0.112 19025
(0.386) (0.34) [0.866]








Treba ukinuti odbitke za uzdržavane članove 
obitelji u sustavu poreza na dohodak.
-0.093 -0.702* 7129
(0.434) (0.373) [0.309]
Treba ukinuti olakšice kod poreza na do-
hodak po osnovi plaćenih zdravstvenih uslu-
ga (dodatni osobni odbitak).
1.117** -0.722* 10044
(0.548) (0.376) [0.123]
Treba ukinuti olakšice kod poreza na do-
hodak po osnovi rješavanja (prvog) stam-
benog pitanja (dodatni osobni odbitak).
0.511 -0.517 26146
(0.455) (0.348) [0.191]
U okviru poreza na dohodak treba oporezi-
vati dividendu i udjele.
-0.098 -0.71* 6848
(0.398) (0.404) [0.335]
U okviru poreza na dohodak treba oporezi-
vati realizirane financijske kapitalne dobiti.
-0.29 -0.697* 5332
(0.421) (0.401) [0.502]
U okviru poreza na dohodak treba oporezi-
vati kamate na štednju.
-0.435 -0.24 42253
(0.386) (0.344) [0.33]
Sve izvore dohotka u okviru poreza na do-




Dohotke od kapitala treba oporezivati nižom 
stopom nego dohotke od rada.
0.451 0.193 9193
(0.474) (0.393) [0.163]
Dividende treba oporezivati nižom stopom 
od ostalih dohodakka (zbog ekonomskog 
dvostrukog oporezivanja dividendi tj. pre-




Naknade zaposlenima (topli obrok, regres, 
dnevnice do propisanog iznosa) treba i dalje 
izuzeti iz oporezivanja porezom na dohodak.
0.112 0.186 3347
(0.422) (0.359) [0.764]
Treba povećati stopu poreza na dobit.
0.047 -0.253 4057
(0.435) (0.377) [0.669]
Treba uvesti diferencirane stope poreza na 
dobit tj. snižene stope za određene industri-
jske grane (npr. poljoprivreda, turizam). 
-0.229 -0.072 34001
(0.427) (0.348) [0.818]




Tablica 4. Rezultati binomne probit regresije za ekonomske vrijednosti u FBiH
Izvor: obrada prema: Lazović-Pita i Štambuk 2015: 39.-40.
N.B: Kontrolne varijable su sektor zaposlenja, dob i obrazovanje. Robusna standardna 
pogreška je u zagradama. p-vrijednost χ2 je u zagradama.
* p< 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
aP24 - Ukupni udio javnih prihoda (i javnih rashoda) u BDP-u treba smanjiti.
bP34 - Načelo pravednosti treba biti ispred načela efikasnosti u kreiranju porezne politike.
4. Analiza rezultata i rasprava
Skraćeni usporedni prikaz stavova poreznih stručnjaka u FBiH i RS pri-
kazanih u tablici 3 pokazuje da su porezni stručnjaci složni oko većine 
odgovora u oba entiteta. Ispitanici i u FBiH i u RS se uglavnom slažu 
da ne treba povećavati opću stopu PDV-a te da ne treba povećava-
ti trošarine na naftu i naftne derivate, kao i da bi trebalo trošarinom 
oporezivati luksuzne proizvode. Jedino pitanje na koje postoje različitosti 
u odgovorima između ispitanika u FBiH i RS odnosi se na mogućnost 
uvođenja diferencirane (snižene) stope PDV-a gdje su ispitanici iz RS 
podijeljeni u svom mišljenju, a u FBiH većina ispitanika smatra da bi 
trebalo uvesti sniženu stopu PDV-a. Ovi odgovori su posebno zanimljivi 
u odnosu na aktualno stanje u poreznoj politici u BiH u smislu Reform-
ske agende gdje se u sektoru oporezivanja trošarina na naftu i naftne 
derivate u praksi dogodio potpuno suprotan scenarij u odnosu na sta-
vove poreznih stručnjaka. Naime, u BiH su nedavno, nakon više mjeseci 
odbijanja usvajanja Izmjena i dopuna zakona o troširanama na naftu i 
naftne derivate, usvojene predložene zakonske izmjene koje planiraju 
povećanje trošarina u navedenoj skupini trošarina, koje će imati status 
namjenske trošarine ‒ cestarine s ciljem izgradnje autocesta i cestovne 
infrastrukture u BiH (oba entiteta). Zanimljivo je napomenuti da je troša-
rina na naftu i naftne derivate prije usvajanja zakonskih izmjena i dopuna 
također imala namjensku dimenziju, odnosno status cestarine koja je 
sada pribrojena nenamjenskoj trošarini na naftu i naftne derivate. 
Sljedeća analizirana skupina pripada području izravnih poreza i dopri-
nosa gdje su odgovori slični u svim skupinama, iako su zakonodavstva 
u ovoj oblasti u entitetskoj nadležnosti pa su time i različita. Dakle, ispi-
tanici se slažu da reinvestiranu dobit treba izuzeti od oporezivanja, da 
dividende treba oporezivati nižom stopom od ostalih dohodaka, da treba 
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uvesti progresivno oporezivanje dohotka te da je imovina nužan dopun-
ski pokazatelj ekonomske (porezne) snage uz dohodak. Ispitanici se ne 
slažu da treba povećati stope doprinosa, niti da treba povećati stopu 
poreza na dobit. U federalnom akcijskom planu u FBiH koji je sastavljen 
na temelju Reformske agende, neki segmenti ove analize su uključeni u 
nacrte i prijedloge zakona. Primjerice, nacrt zakona o porezu na dohodak 
u FBiH, bez uporišta u Reformskoj agendi, predlaže, inter alia, uvođen-
je progresivnih stopa poreza na dohodak od 10 % i 20 %, proširenje 
porezne osnovice za dosad neoporezive kategorije toplog obroka, re-
gresa, naknade za prijevoz i dr., povećanje iznosa standardnog osobnog 
odbitka, ali i ukidanje osobnih odbitaka za uzdržavane članove obitelji. 
Ovaj zakon je u nacrtnoj fazi predložen zajedno s novim zakonom o do-
prinosima koji podrazumijeva ukidanje stopa doprinosa na plaće koje su 
teretile poslodavce, ali i povećanje stopa doprinosa iz plaće s postojećih 
31 % na 33 % koje terete zaposlenike. Iz tablice 3 vidimo da su stavovi 
poreznih stručnjaka po osnovi većine navedenih pitanja protivni pred-
loženim zakonskim rješenjima. 
U tablici 3 je dan i skraćeni prikaz općih stavova poreznih stručnjaka pre-
ma poreznoj politici gdje bilježimo najznačajnija odstupanja u stavovima 
poreznih stručnjaka u dva entiteta. Porezni stručnjaci u FBiH i RS su ug-
lavnom suglasni da se trebaju povećati kazne za porezne prekršaje, da 
ukupno porezno opterećenje, tj. udio poreza u BDP-u treba smanjiti te da 
dio poreznog tereta treba prebaciti s dohotka i dobiti na imovinu. Razlike 
u odgovorima postoje u važnom pitanju u vezi s davanjem preferencije 
načelu pravednosti u odnosu na načelo efikasnosti u kreiranju porezne 
politike, gdje se ispitanici u FBiH uglavnom slažu s ovim stavom, a u RS 
su odgovori višeznačni. Slično stanje u odgovorima u oba entiteta je i u 
slučaju prebacivanja poreznog tereta s dohotka i dobiti na potrošnju što 
otvara pitanje opravdanosti fiskalne devalvacije koja se javila kao ideja u 
institucijama BiH u posljednjih nekoliko godina. 
U smislu mjere ekonomskih vrijednosti u FBiH, u tablici 4 smo dali rezu-
ltate 26 regresijskih analiza. Oni ispitanici s većim neoliberalnim prefer-
encijama koji su odgovorili potvrdno na stav br.2423 skloniji su podrža-
vanju uvođenja poreza na financijske transakcije. Ovaj odgovor nije u 
skladu s neoliberalnim preferencijama koje bi ispitanici trebali podržava-
ti. U području oporezivanja dohotka porezom na dohodak, ispitanici koji 
su skloniji neoliberalnom stavu podržavaju ukidanje poreznih izdataka za 
zdravstvene usluge što se može objasniti kao mjera proširivanja porezne 
osnovice poreza na dohodak. Jedino preostalo pitanje koje se pokazalo 
signifikantnim je protivljenje povećanju stope poreza na dohodak s pos-
tojećih 10 %. Slično kao i prethodnom pitanju, i ovaj stav je u skladu s 
neoliberalnim preferencijama.
Za razliku od prethodne grupe, ispitanici s klasično-intervencionističkim 
preferencijama koji su na stav br. 34 odgovorili pozitivno, skloniji su 
odgovoriti negativno na pitanje u vezi s povećanjem standardne stope 
23 Svi stavovi u pitanjima br. 24 i 34  mjereni su u odnosu na one koji su odgovorili protivno.
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PDV-a. Ovaj stav se može objasniti kao sklonost ispitanika ka regre-
sivnom djelovanju PDV-a kakav je u primjeni u BiH s jednom standard-
nom stopom od 17 %. Ovdje je važno napomenuti da su ispitanici neg-
ativno odgovorili na stav po pitanju regresivnog djelovanja PDV-a iako 
po ovom pitanju konsenzus nije postignut. Neočekivan odgovor u smislu 
navedenih klasično-intervencionističkih preferencija ove grupe odnosi 
se na negativan odgovor ispitanika u vezi s uvođenjem poreza na fi-
nancijske transakcije. Međutim, ovakav stav poreznih stručnjaka može 
se objasniti činjenicom da je financijsko tržište u BiH, pa time i u FBiH, 
fragmentirano i nedovoljno razvijeno. Osim toga, oni koji su pozitivno 
odgovorili na stav br. 34 preferiraju uvođenje poreza na aktivu banaka 
što se može objasniti trenutnim stanjem na financijskom tržištu BiH i 
FBiH koje je bankocentrično. Očekivani odgovori su vidljivi u izjavama 
vezanima za povećanje trenutne stope poreza na dohodak od 10 % kao 
i činjenice da je imovina nužni pokazatelj ekonomske snage uz dohodak. 
Ovaj odgovor je posebno zanimljiv u odnosu na pitanje o uvođenju pro-
gresivnog sistema oporezivanja dohotka u FBiH koje se nije pokazalo 
signifikantnim. Ispitanici koji preferiraju načelo pravednosti u odnosu na 
načelo efikasnosti u oporezivanju skloniji su protivljenju ukidanju stand-
ardnih i nestandardnih odbitaka (osobnih, obiteljskih, po osnovi plaćenih 
zdravstvenih usluga i dr.), što je u skladu s očekivanjima. Međutim, ono 
što nije očekivano od ove grupe ispitanika, a izravno se veže za aktualna 
zakonska rješenja, jest da se ova grupa ispitanika protivi oporezivanju 
dividendi i udjela te ostvarenih financijskih dobitaka. Iako ovaj stav nije u 
skladu sa sveobuhvatnom definicijom dohotka prema S-H-S, djelomično 
bi se mogao opravdati činjenicom da u zemlji kakva je BiH, gdje se odvija 
prvobitna akumulacija kapitala, neoporezivanje dohotka iz štednje kakve 
su dividende, udjeli i dr. dovode do brže akumulacije domaćeg kapitala, 
što je jako značajno u postojećim ekonomskim uvjetima. 
Iz kratke analize možemo utvrditi da postoje odstupanja od očekivanih 
odgovora u obje grupe mjerenja stavova što se može djelomično obja-
sniti ad hoc poreznim reformama koje se provode u posljednjih dvadeset 
godina u BiH, i to pod pritiscima ili čak konačnim odlukama međunarod-
nih financijskih institucija u BiH. Posljednja u nizu, Reformska agenda 
za BiH, ujedno je i dokaz ovoga stava gdje postoje značajna odstupanja 
u smislu implementacije Reformske agende u odnosu na inicijalnu re-
formsku ideju kao i utvrđena odstupanja stavova poreznih stručnjaka u 
odnosu na prijedloge implementacije Reformske agende za BiH.  
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5. Zaključak i preporuke
Cilj ovoga rada je dati prikaz stanja i perspektiva porezne politike u BiH 
s fokusom na stanje u FBiH. S tim u vezi, provedena anketa o stanju i 
perspektivama poreznog sistema BiH u oba entiteta u BiH je pokazala 
da se ispitanici uglavnom slažu u većini postavljenih pitanja. Razlike u 
odgovorima ispitanika u oba entiteta postoje i uglavnom se odnose na 
pitanja u vezi uvođenja diferenciranih stopa PDV-a, te na pitanja u vezi s 
općim stavovima o poreznoj politici u BiH, kao što su davanje preferenci-
je načelu pravednosti u odnosu na načelo efikasnosti u oporezivanju ili 
po pitanju prebacivanja poreznog tereta s dohotka i dobiti na potrošnju. 
Provedena binomna probit regresija vezana uz ekonomske vrijednosti u 
FBiH ukazala je na neka odstupanja u odnosu na očekivane odgovore 
ispitanika u smislu njihovih više ili manje neoliberalnih ili klasično-inter-
vencionističkih preferencija. U svakoj grupi je regresijska analiza poka-
zala većinom očekivane odgovore, ali i odstupanja od očekivanih odgov-
ora koja se mogu djelomično objasniti ad hoc poreznim reformama koje 
se provode u posljednjih dvadeset godina u BiH, i to pod pritiscima ili čak 
konačnim odlukama međunarodnih financijskih institucija. Kratka anal-
iza odgovora poreznih stručnjaka u godini prije predložene Reformske 
agende za BiH s analizom prijedloga reformi i provedenih reformi od 
2015. godine do danas posljednji je dokaz da se, nažalost, porezna poli-
tika u BiH i dalje provodi ad hoc i uglavnom pod pritiscima međunarodnih 
financijskih insititucija u BiH.
Kao prijedlog unaprjeđenja postojeće analize, bilo bi korisno anketu 
ponovno provesti kako bismo eventualno ustanovili postoje li promjene u 
stavovima i percepciji poreznih reformi u BiH. Osim toga, odgovore pos-
tojeće tri grupe ispitanika bi u perspektivi trebalo usporediti s odgovorima 
donositelja odluka, odnosno predstavnika u Parlamentima u BiH.
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UTJECAJ SOCIODEMOGRAFSKIH OBILJEŽJA NA 
STAVOVE STRUČNJAKA O POREZNOM SUSTAVU I 
POREZNOJ POLITICI24 25
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS ON EXPERTS’ ATTITUDES ON TAX 
SYSTEM AND POLICY
SAŽETAK 
Svrha rada je istražiti utjecaj nekih sociodemografskih obilježja stručnjaka na 
njihove stavove o poreznoj sustavu i poreznoj politici. Provedena je anketa o 
stanju i perspektivama hrvatskoga poreznog sustava kojom su se ispitivali sta-
vovi stručnjaka iz akademske zajednice, javnog i privatnog sektora. Osim pitanja 
vezana uz poreznu tematiku, u anketi su postavljena i pitanja o raznim sociode-
mografskim obilježjima ispitanika. Povezanost karakteristika anketiranih struč-
njaka sa stavovima o poreznoj tematici istražena je neparametrijskim statističkim 
metodama: Mann-Whitneyevim testom, Kruskal-Wallisovim testom s post hoc 
Dunnovim testom s Bonferronijevom korekcijom te neparametrijskom Spearma-
novom korelacijom, po potrebi kontroliranom po slojevima. Provedeno istraživa-
nje pokazalo je kako karakteristike vezane uz sektor i područje zaposlenja često 
imaju veći utjecaj na stavove stručnjaka o poreznoj tematici nego njihove demo-
grafske karakteristike. Mnoge razlike u stavovima stručnjaka mogu se objasniti 
njihovim radnim mjestom, ali i samointeresom. 
Ključne riječi: anketa stručnjaka, porezni sustav, sociodemografska obilježja, 
Hrvatska
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the paper is to explore the influence of some sociodemographic 
characteristics of experts on their attitudes on tax system and tax policy. The 
conducted survey on the state and perspectives of the Croatian tax system ex-
amined the attitudes of experts from the academic community, the public and pri-
vate sector. In addition to questions related to tax topics, the survey also included 
questions about different sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents. 
24 Ovaj rad financirala je Hrvatska zaklada za znanost projektom IP-2013-11-8174.
25 Autorica zahvaljuje prof. dr. sc. Heleni Blažić s Ekonomskoga fakulteta u Rijeci na ko-
risnim prijedlozima u vezi porezne tematike te prof. dr. sc. Hrvoju Šimoviću s Ekonomskoga 
fakulteta u Zagrebu na ustupljenim podacima.
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The relationship of these characteristics with attitudes on tax topics was explored 
using non-parametric statistical methods: Mann-Whitney test, Kruskal-Wallis test 
with post hoc Dunn’s test with Bonferroni correction and non-parametric Spear-
man correlation. The research indicates that sector-related and employment-re-
lated characteristics often have greater influence on experts’ attitudes on tax top-
ics than their demographic characteristics. Many differences in experts’ attitudes 
can be explained by their workplace, but also their self-interest. 
Key words: survey of experts, tax system, sociodemographic characteristics, 
Croatia
1. Uvod
Članak se bavi istraživanjem pristranosti pri ispunjavanju anketnog upit-
nika; konkretno, istraživanjem utjecaja nekih sociodemografskih karat-
ketristika anketiranih stručnjaka na njihove odgovore o poreznoj temati-
ci. Tijekom 2013. godine provedena je Anketa o stanju i perspektivama 
hrvatskog poreznog sustava (Šimović et al., 2013) kojim je istraženo 
mišljenje stručnjaka. Anketni upitnik sastavljen je najviše prema uzo-
ru na anketu koju je provela američka National Tax Association (NTA, 
2013; Lim et al., 2013), ali je prilagođen hrvatskom poreznom sustavu. 
U istraživanju su sudjelovali stručnjaci iz akademske zajednice, javnog 
i privatnog sektora. U anketi su ispitani stavovi prema 92 tvrdnje gru-
pirane u područja: oporezivanje imovine, oporezivanje dohotka, opore-
zivanje dobiti, porez na dodanu vrijednost, trošarine te opći stavovi o 
poreznoj politici.
Uz pitanja kojima se istražuju stavovi stručnjaka ispitane su i razne soci-
odemografske karakteristike anketiranih stručnjaka. 
Provedena anketa omogućila je dublja saznanja i izradu modela o sta-
vovima u području horizontalne i vertikalne pravednosti (Blažić et al., 
2014), direktnog i indirektnog oporezivanja (Šimović et al., 2016), pore-
zne reforme (Šimović et al., 2014), poreza na nekretnine (Blažić et al., 
2016a, 2016b), kao i usporedbu (Blažić et al., 2017) sa sličnim anketa-
ma provedenim u Sloveniji (Klun, 2014; Klun & Štambuk, 2015a, 2015b, 
2016; Klun et al., 2016, Klopčić & Klun, 2018) te Bosni i Hercegovini 
(Lazović-Pita, 2016; Lazović-Pita & Štambuk, 2015, 2016). 
Ovaj rad predstavlja nastavak istraživanja rada Mjesto socijalne politike 
u poreznoj politici RH: anketa poreznih stručnjaka (Blažić et al., 2014). 
U tom članku je analiziran utjecaj nekih obilježja stručnjaka na njihove 
stavove o socijalnoj politici u okviru porezne politike. Obrađena su 32 
pitanja povezana sa socijalnom politikom. 
Pri odgovaranju na anketu postoji pristranost, što vrijedi čak i za anketu 
na koju odgovaraju stručnjaci u nekom području (Melnick & Everitt, 2008; 
Meyer & Booker, 2001; Burgman et al., 2006); stoga je u ovome radu 
istražen utjecaj demografskih i socioekonomskih obilježja stručnjaka na 
60 pitanja čija povezanost s obilježjima ispitanika nije bila istražena na 
ovaj način. Navedena pitanja prikazana su u tablici 1.
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Prilikom navođenja pitanja zadržan je redni broj pitanja iz ankete, kao i 
oznaka područja kojim se pitanje bavi26.
Pitanje
P02-imo-Porez na nekretnine treba biti lokalni porez.
P04-imo-Bez obzira na uvođenje poreza na nekretnine komunalna naknada 
treba ostati kao lokalni prihod
P05-imo-Bez obzira na uvođenje poreza na nekretnine i porez na kuće za od-
mor treba ostati kao lokalni prihod.
P06-imo-Bez obzira na uvođenje poreza na nekretnine kao lokalni prihod u 
budućnosti treba ostati i prirez.
P07-imo-Porez na nekretnine treba se razrezivati po istoj stopi i za poslovne 
subjekte i za građane.
P08-imo-Poslovni subjekti kod oporezivanja nekretnina trebaju platiti veću sto-
pu od građana.
P09-imo-Građani kod oporezivanja nekretnina trebaju platiti veću stopu nego 
poslovni subjekti.
P21-doh-Treba ponovno uvesti olakšice kod poreza na dohodak po osnovi 
premija životnog osiguranja s obilježjem štednje (dodatni osobni odbitak).
P22-doh-Treba ponovno uvesti olakšice kod poreza na dohodak po osnovi 
premija dobrovoljnog  mirovinskog osiguranja (dodatni osobni odbitak).
P29-doh-Dividende treba oporezivati niže od ostalih dohodaka (zbog ekonom-
skog dvostrukog oporezivanja dividendi tj. prethodnog plaćanja poreza na dobit).
P30-dob-Treba sniziti (opću) stopu poreza na dobit.
P31-dob-Treba sniziti porezno opterećenje za mala i srednja poduzeća.
P32-dob-Reinvestiranu dobit treba izuzeti od oporezivanja.
P33-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za područja posebne državne skrbi.
P34-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za brdsko-planinska područja.
P35-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za slobodne zone.
P36-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za Grad Vukovar.
P37-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice (državnu potporu) za istraživačko-razvojne 
projekte.
P38-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice (državnu potporu) za obrazovanje i izobrazbu 
zaposlenika.
P39-dob-Treba zadržati poticaje za ulaganja.
P40-dob-Treba ponovno uvesti zaštitnu kamatu.
P41-dob-Treba zadržati ubrzanu amortizaciju (porezno dopuštanje podv-
ostručavanja godišnjih amortizacijskih stopa).
P44-pdv-Turističke i ugostiteljske usluge trebaju se oporezivati sniženom sto-
pom PDV-a.
P46-pdv-Treba uvesti posebni postupak (shemu) kod PDV-a za poljoprivrednike.
26 Oznake područja: imo – porez na imovinu, doh - porez na dohodak, dob - porez na 
dobit, pdv - PDV, tro - trošarine, dop – doprinosi, opc - opći stavovi o načelima porezne 
politike i uvođenju novih poreza
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Pitanje
P50-pdv-Kod snižene stope PDV-a za novine i časopise treba provesti difer-
encijaciju između dnevnog informativnog tiska i „žutog tiska“.
P51-pdv-Snižena stopa PDV-a treba biti viša za znanstvene časopise nego za 
dnevni tisak.
P52-pdv-Prihode od PDV-a treba jednim dijelom prepustiti nižim razinama vlas-
ti (općine i gradovi).
P53-tro-Treba uvesti posebni porez na „nezdravu hranu“ (masnoće, prženo, 
„fast-food“, pretjerano zaslađenu).
P54-tro-Trošarine na naftu i naftne derivate treba smanjiti.
P55-tro-Trošarine na prirodni plin treba povisiti.
P56-tro-Trošarine na el. energiju treba povisiti.
P57-tro-Trošarine na alkohol treba povisiti.
P58-tro-Treba uvesti trošarine na vino.
P59-tro-Trošarine na duhan i duhanske prerađevine treba povisiti.
P60-tro-Hrvatska ima dovoljno trošarina /posebnih poreza.
P64-tro-Treba razrezivati posebne poreze na police osiguranja AO i kasko osi-
guranja.
P65-tro-Treba razrezivati poseban porez na kavu.
P66-tro-Treba razrezivati posebne poreze na bezalkoholna pića.
P67-dop-Treba ukinuti najvišu mjesečnu osnovicu za obračun doprinosa za 
mirovinsko osiguranje.
P68-dop-Treba  ukinuti najnižu mjesečnu osnovicu za obračun doprinosa za 
mirovinsko osiguranje.
P69-dop-Treba sniziti stope doprinosa za obvezno mirovinsko osiguranje na 
temelju generacijske solidarnosti (I. stup).
P70-dop-Treba povisiti stope doprinosa za obvezno mirovinsko osiguranje na 
temelju individualne kapitalizirane štednje (II. stup).
P71-dop-Treba sniziti doprinose za zdravstveno osiguranje.
P72-dop-Obrtnici i slobodna zanimanja su u povoljnijem položaju u odnosu na 
nesamostalni rad kod obračuna obveznih doprinosa.
P75-opc-Ukupno porezno opterećenje tj. udio poreza u BDP-u treba smanjiti.
P76-opc-Financiranje opće države treba biti manje iz poreza, a više iz različitih 
neporeznih prihoda (s naglaskom na različite naknade korisnika).
P77-opc-Ukupni udio javnih prihoda (i javnih rashoda) u BDP-u treba smanjiti.
P78-opc-Porezna struktura (udio prihoda pojedinih poreza u ukupnim poreznim 
prihodima) se treba promijeniti.
P80-opc-Porezni teret treba što više prebaciti s dobiti i dohotka na imovinu.
P81-opc-Treba smanjiti parafiskalne namete.




P83-opc-Niže granične stope poreza na dohodak potiču toliko puno rad i 
dovode do tako velikog povećanja porezne osnovice da se time kompenziraju 
izgubljeni porezni prihodi.
P84-opc-Neoporezivanje kamata potiče štednju.
P85-opc-Neoporezivanje financijskih kapitalnih dobitaka potiče investicije i 
ekonomski rast.
P86-opc-Različita smanjenja poreznog opterećenja (olakšice, poticaji i sl.) 
potiču ekonomski rast.
P87-opc-PDV je nepravedan (regresivan, nesocijalan) porez.
P88-opc-Porez na dobit se prevaljuje uglavnom na potrošače i radnike.
P89-opc-Regionalni porezni poticaji (grad Vukovar, područja posebne državne 
skrbi, brdsko-planinska područja) su učinkoviti s obzirom na privlačenje inves-
ticija u ta područja.
P90-opc-Troškovi poreznih vlasti (administrativni troškovi) i troškovi poreznih 
obveznika (troškovi ispunjavanja porezne obveze odnosno svi troškovi udo-
voljavanja poreznoj obvezi mimo samih iznosa poreza) trebaju igrati značajnu 
ulogu u kreiranju porezne politike (u smislu da je nužno smanjiti ove troškove 
kroz značajno pojednostavljenje sustava).
P92-opc-Treba povećati kazne za porezne prekršaje.
Tablica 1. Analizirana pitanja iz upitnika (60 pitanja)
Izvor: autorica
2. Obilježja ispitanih stručnjaka
Istražene su sociodemografske karakteristike ispitanika, a kako pojedini 
anketirani stručnjaci nisu odgovorili na sva pitanja, u pojedine analize su 
uvršteni samo oni ispitanici koji su odgovorili na relevantna pitanja.
Ispitani stručnjaci u podjednakoj mjeri dolaze iz akademske zajednice 
(46,9 %) i iz javnog sektora (43,5 %), te manji broj iz privatnog sekto-
ra (9,6 %). Iz akademske zajednice anketirani su sveučilišni profesori 
te znanstvenici iz instituta koji se bave poreznom tematikom. U javnom 
sektoru anketirani su u najvećoj mjeri zaposleni u jedinicama lokalne i 
regionalne samouprave te Poreznoj upravi Ministarstva financija (tablica 
2). Iz privatnog sektora anketirani su porezni savjetnici te stručnjaci iz 
računovodstvenih i savjetničkih kuća i visokih škola (tablica 3). 
Podsektor %
Jedinice lokalne i regionalne samouprave 48,7
Porezna uprava Ministarstva financija 41,6
Javno poduzeće  3,5
Ministarstvo financija (izvan Porezne uprave) 1,8
Ostali 4,4





Poslovni savjetnik / urednik 16,7
Predavač visoke poslovne škole 12,5
Ostali 20,8
Tablica 3. Struktura anketiranih stručnjaka iz privatnog sektora
Izvor: obrada autorice
Za akademsku zajednicu navedeno je dolazi li ispitanik iz područja eko-
nomije (86,2 %), prava (12,2 %) ili političkih znanosti (1,6 %). Kao što 
je i očekivano, najveći je udio anketiranih iz područja ekonomije te je za 
ekonomiste dodatno ispitano i uže područje, što se vidi u tablici 4.
Područje %
Javne financije 23,1
Monetarne financije i financijska tržišta 18,3
Poslovne financije i računovodstvo 26,0
Makroekonomija 24,0
Menadžment/poduzetništvo 8,7
Tablica 4. Struktura anketiranih ekonomista u akademskoj zajednici
Izvor: obrada autorice
Ispitani stručnjaci iz svih triju sektora grupirani su po područjima pa je 
napravljeno grupiranje u skupine. 
Grupirajući stručnjake dobiveno je sedam skupina prema načinu grupi-
ranja u tablici 5. Nekolicina ispitanih nije ubrojena u ove skupine, već se 
vode se u rubrici ostalo te ne ulaze u daljnje analize po ovom obilježju. 
R br. Grupacija Obuhvaćeno
1. PS Porezni savjetnici
2. PU Ministarstvo financija – Porezna uprava i Ministarstvo financija (ostalo)
3. JLS Jedinice lokalne i regionalne samouprave
4. Prav Pravnici iz akademskog sektora
5. JF Ekonomisti u akademskoj zajednici iz područja javnih financija
6. PFR Ekonomisti u akademskoj zajednici iz područja poslovnih financija i računovodstva
7. MM Ekonomisti u akademskoj zajednici iz područja mak-roekonomije, monetarnih financija i financijskih tržišta
Tablica 5. Grupiranje stručnjaka u sedam grupacija
Izvor: obrada autorice
Ispitanici su u pravilu visokoobrazovani te je njihova stručna sprema 
grupirana u tri razreda, koji su prema Hrvatskom kvalifikacijskom okviru 
označeni kao razine 4.2-6 kao najniža razina s 15,8 % ispitanih, razina 7 
s 45,2 % ispitanih te najviša razina 8.1-8.2 s 39 % ispitanih.
Dob ispitanika kreće se u rasponu od 21 do 75 godina, s prosječnom 
starošću od 40,82 godine (SD = 11,61).
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3. Uporabljene metode 
Povezanost sociodemografskih obilježja ispitanika sa stavovima o po-
reznom sustavu i poreznoj politici ispitana je kroz usporedbu odgovora 
koje su na anketna pitanja dali ispitanici različitih karakteristika. 
Ispitane varijable, tj. anketna pitanja, pitanja su Likertovog tipa, i kao 
takva vrsta su ordinalne mjerne ljestvice. Iz tog razloga provedene su 
neparametrijske statističke metode. Svi izračuni rađeni su na razini si-
gnifikantnosti α = 0,05. 
Kod usporedbe distribucije odgovora dviju skupina ispitanih stručnja-
ka rabljen je Mann-Whitneyev test, a u slučaju usporedbe više od dviju 
skupina ispitanih rabljen je Kruskal-Wallisov test. Za varijable kod ko-
jih se Kruskal-Wallisov test pokazao signifikantnim napravljena je post 
hoc analiza Dunnovim testom s Bonferronijevom korekcijom kako bi se 
ispitalo koji parovi skupina se međusobno signifikantno razlikuju. Uz 
Mann-Whitneyev i Kruskal-Wallisov test navedeni su i medijani (Mdn) te 
rangovi odgovora po skupinama ispitanika. Kada je ispitivana sociode-
mografska varijabla na ordinalnoj ili na kvantitativnoj mjernoj ljestvici, pri-
mijenjena je neparametrijska Spearmanova korelacija ranga kako bi se 
ispitala povezanost karakteristika ispitanika s danim odgovorima o pore-
znoj tematici. U slučaju kontroliranja korelacije po skupinama, kako se 
radi o neparametrijskoj korelaciji, ne računa se novi koeficijent korelacije 
kao pri parametrijskoj korelaciji, već se varijabla rastavlja po slojevima te 
se računaju koeficijenti korelacije za svaki sloj zasebno. 
Dobiveni rezultati prikazani su u nastavku rada na način da su za svaku 
ispitanu karakteristiku navedene varijable kod kojih postoji signifikantna 
razlika u distribuciji odgovora između anketiranih stručnjaka različitih so-
ciodemografskih obilježja. Varijable kod kojih provedena analiza nije po-
kazala signifikantan rezultat nisu prikazane u rezultatima. U slučajevima 
kada je provedeni test pokazao veći broj signifikantnih varijabli, tumače-
nje rezultata nije dano za sve varijable koje su prikazane u rezultatima, 
već samo za varijable s izračunatom signifikantnošću manjom od 0,01.
4. Rezultati i rasprava
Povezanost dobi sa stavovima o poreznom sustavu
Izračunati su neparametrijski Spearmanovi koeficijenti korelacije ranga 
između godina starosti ispitanika i analiziranih pitanja iz anketa.
Spearmanov koeficijent korelacije signifikantan je za 10 pitanja prikaza-
nih u tablici 6.
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Pitanje rs
P08-imo-Poslovni subjekti kod oporezivanja nekretnina trebaju platiti 
veću stopu od građana. -,151
*
P33-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za područja posebne državne skrbi. -,177**
P34-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za brdsko-planinska područja. -,185**
P35-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za slobodne zone. -,189**
P36-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za Grad Vukovar. -,178**
P37-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice (državnu potporu) za istraživačko-raz-
vojne projekte. -,158
*
P38-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice (državnu potporu) za obrazovanje i 
izobrazbu zaposlenika. -,146
*
P39-dob-Treba zadržati poticaje za ulaganja. -,151*
P41-dob-Treba zadržati ubrzanu amortizaciju (porezno dopuštanje 
podvostručavanja godišnjih amortizacijskih stopa). ,146
*
P51-pdv-Snižena stopa PDV-a treba biti viša za znanstvene časopise 
nego za dnevni tisak. -,167
*
P53-tro-Treba uvesti posebni porez na „nezdravu hranu“ (masnoće, 
prženo, „fast-food“, pretjerano zaslađenu). -,135
*
P56-tro-Trošarine na el. energiju treba povisiti. -,132*
P58-tro-Treba uvesti trošarine na vino. -,152*
P64-tro-Treba razrezivati posebne poreze na police osiguranja AO i 
kasko osiguranja. -,288
**
P65-tro-Treba razrezivati poseban porez na kavu. -,210**
P66-tro-Treba razrezivati posebne poreze na bezalkoholna pića. -,255**
P77-opc-Ukupni udio javnih prihoda (i javnih rashoda) u BDP-u  
treba smanjiti. ,259
**
P81-opc-Treba smanjiti parafiskalne namete. ,234**
P86-opc-Različita smanjenja poreznog opterećenja (olakšice, poticaji i 
sl.) potiču ekonomski rast. -,150
*
Tablica 6. Spearmanovi koeficijent korelacije s dobi za varijable kod kojih je korelacija 
signifikantna
Izvor: obrada autorice
Napomena: ** - signifikantnost na razini 0,01; *- signifikantnost na razini 0,05.
Iako su korelacije signifikantne, koeficijenti korelacije su slabi; apsolut-
na vrijednost koeficijenta korelacije manja je od 0,3 za sve analizirane 
varijable. 
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Pretežno negativne vrijednosti koeficijenta korelacije ukazuju na to da, 
što su ispitanici stariji, to su manje skloni poreznim olakšicama i trošari-
nama i stavu da smanjenja poreznog opterećenja potiču ekonomski rast. 
Također, sa starošću se smanjuje stav da poslovni subjekti kod opore-
zivanja nekretnina trebaju platiti veću stopu od građana. S dobi raste 
stav da je potrebno smanjiti parafiskalne namete te udio javnih prihoda i 
rashoda u BDP-u.  
Ovo je zanimljiv rezultat jer bi se očekivalo bi se da stariji i konzervativni 
budu skloniji poreznim olakšicama (to je posebno bilo aktualno i smatra-
lo se pozitivnim u svijetu 60-ih i 70-ih, a očekivalo bi se i da stariji budu 
skloniji tome jer će im i osobno više trebati). Isto bi tako bilo logično da 
su skloniji trošarinama jer ih vjerojatno sve manje plaćaju. 
Isto vrijedi i za porez na nekretnine. Zanimljivo je da su stariji za smanje-
nje parafiskalnih nameta (koji uglavnom terete poduzetnike, a ne umi-
rovljenike) te da su za smanjenje udjela javnih prihoda i rashoda, a baš 
njima u starosti više trebaju ti javni rashodi, dok skoro uopće više ne 
uplaćuju prihode (mirovine su najvećim dijelom neoporezive).
Povezanost stručne spreme sa stavovima o poreznom sustavu
Povezanost stručne spreme sa stavovima o poreznom sustavu istražena 
je pomoću Spearmanovog koeficijenta korelacije. S obzirom na to da je u 
akademskoj zajednici stupanj obrazovanja u pravilu veći nego u drugim 
sektorima, moguće je da pravi čimbenik nije toliko sama stručna sprema, 
već ulogu igra sektor. Iz tog razloga korelacija sa stručnom spremom 
kontrolirana je po sektoru. Kontroliranje je izvedeno kao rastavljanje po 
slojevima, u ovom slučaju po sektorima, te su izračunati koeficijenti ko-
relacije za svaki sloj, tj. sektor posebno.




P09-imo-Građani kod oporezivanja nekretnina trebaju platiti 
veću stopu nego poslovni subjekti. ,153
* Ne
P29-doh-Dividende treba oporezivati niže od ostalih doho-
daka (zbog ekonomskog dvostrukog oporezivanja dividendi 
tj. prethodnog plaćanja poreza na dobit).
,243** Ne
P36-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za Grad Vukovar. -,154*
Da
P51-pdv-Snižena stopa PDV-a treba biti viša za znanstvene 
časopise nego za dnevni tisak. -,131
*
Da
P52-pdv-Prihode od PDV-a treba jednim dijelom prepustiti 






P54-tro-Trošarine na naftu i naftne derivate treba smanjiti. -,209** Da
P55-tro-Trošarine na prirodni plin treba povisiti. ,179** Da
P56-tro-Trošarine na el. energiju treba povisiti. ,184** Da
P66-tro-Treba razrezivati posebne poreze na bezalkoholna 
pića. ,149
* Da
P89-opc-Regionalni porezni poticaji (grad Vukovar, područja 
posebne državne skrbi, brdsko-planinska područja) su učin-
koviti s obzirom na privlačenje investicija u ta područja.
-,157* Da
Tablica 7. Spearmanovi koeficijenti korelacije te kontrola po sektorima za pitanja kod kojih 
je korelacija sa stručnom spremom signifikantna
Izvor: obrada autorice
Napomena: NE – varijabla kontrolirana po sektorima u nastavku analize nije imala 
signifikantnu korelaciju niti za jedan sektor; DA – korelacija sa stručnom spremom je 
signifikantna za barem jedan sektor
** - signifikantnost na razini 0,01; *- signifikantnost na razini 0,05.
Utjecaj sektora na povezanost stručne spreme sa stavovima o poreznom 
sustavu pobliže je analiziran u tablici 8 koja prikazuje rezultate korela-
cijske analize kontrolirane po sektorima za one sektore u kojima postoji 






Privatni P39-dob-Treba zadržati poticaje za ulaganja. -,402* -,083
Privatni P80-opc-Porezni teret treba što više prebaciti s dobiti i dohotka na imovinu. -,414
* -,028
Privatni
P89-opc-Regionalni porezni poticaji (grad 
Vukovar, područja posebne državne skrbi, 
brdsko-planinska područja) su učinkoviti s ob-
zirom na privlačenje investicija u ta područja.
-,429* -,157*
Javni P36-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za Grad  Vukovar. -,233
* -,154*
Javni P54-tro-Trošarine na naftu i naftne derivate tre-ba smanjiti. -,251
** -,209**
Javni P55-tro-Trošarine na prirodni plin treba povisiti. ,200* ,179**
Javni P56-tro-Trošarine na el. energiju treba povisiti. ,194* ,184**
Javni P66-tro-Treba razrezivati posebne poreze na bezalkoholna pića. ,207
* ,149*
Javni P85-opc-Neoporezivanje financijskih kapitalnih dobitaka potiče investicije i ekonomski rast. -,214
* -,040








Akademski P38-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice (državnu pot-poru) za obrazovanje i izobrazbu zaposlenika. -,189
* -,008
Akademski P39-dob-Treba zadržati poticaje za ulaganja. -,183* -,083
Akademski
P50-pdv-Kod snižene stope PDV-a za novine i 
časopise treba provesti diferencijaciju između 
dnevnog informativnog tiska i „žutog tiska“.
-,200* -,044
Akademski P51-pdv-Snižena stopa PDV-a treba biti viša za znanstvene časopise nego za dnevni tisak. -,214
* -,131*
Akademski P75-opc-Ukupno porezno opterećenje tj. udio poreza u BDP-u treba smanjiti. ,189
* ,075
Tablica 8. Spearmanov koeficijent korelacije kontroliran po sektorima i usporedba 
s koeficijentom za sve anketirane zajedno za pitanja gdje je korelacija po sektorima 
signifikantna
Izvor: obrada autorice
** - signifikantnost na razini 0,01; *- signifikantnost na razini 0,05.
Kontroliranjem varijabli po sektoru pokazalo se da korelacija sa struč-
nom spremom više nije signifikantna za dio pitanja, što se vidi iz tablice 
7 gdje u stupcu „signifikantnost po sektoru“ piše Ne. Prilikom kontrolira-
nja po sektoru pokazale su se signifikantnima i neke varijable koje prije 
toga nisu pokazivale signifikantnu korelaciju sa stručnom spremom, što 
je navedeno u tablici 8; međutim, može se primijetiti da su sve korelacije 
zadržale isti smjer, bilo pozitivni, bilo negativni.
Povezanost sektora sa stavovima o poreznom sustavu
Usporedba stavova o poreznom sustavu po sektorima istražena je Kru-
skal-Wallisovim testom. Za varijable za koje je utvrđeno da postoji signifi-
kantna razlika među sektorima provedena je post hoc analiza Dunnovim 
testom s Bonferronijevom korekcijom kojim se pronašlo koji parovi sekto-
ra se međusobno signifkantno razlikuju u distribuciji odgovora. Rezultati 
Kruskal-Wallisovog testa i post hoc analize za varijable sa signifikantnim 
Kruskal-Wallisovim testom, kao i medijani i rangovi po sektorima prika-
zani su u tablici 9.
Pitanje Mdn (rang) K-W
Sektor Privatni Javni AZ H p








P04-imo-Bez obzira na uvođen-
je poreza na nekretnine komu-









Pitanje Mdn (rang) K-W
Sektor Privatni Javni AZ H p
P08-imo-Poslovni subjekti kod 
oporezivanja nekretnina trebaju 
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P52-pdv-Prihode od PDV-a treba 
jednim dijelom prepustiti nižim razi-























P67-dop-Treba ukinuti najvišu 
mjesečnu osnovicu za obračun do-
















P77-opc-Ukupni udio javnih pri-
















P90-opc-Troškovi poreznih vlasti 
(administrativni troškovi) i trošk-
ovi poreznih obveznika (troškovi 
ispunjavanja porezne obveze od-
nosno svi troškovi udovoljavanja 
poreznoj obvezi mimo samih izno-
sa poreza) trebaju igrati značajnu 
ulogu u kreiranju porezne politike 
(u smislu da je nužno smanjiti ove 








Tablica 9. Medijani i rangovi po sektorima, Kruskal-Wallisov test i post hoc Dunnov test s 
Bonferrronijevom korekcijom za pitanja sa signifikantnim Kruskall-Wallisovim testom
Izvor: obrada autorice
Napomena: K-W – Kruskal-Wallisov test
Grupe koje ne dijele isti superskript signifikantno se razlikuju
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Kruskal-Wallisov test pokazao se signifikantnim za 13 varijabli što je gra-
fički prikazano rangovima odgovora po sektorima na slici 1 u prilogu. Uo-
čene razlike su u pravilu objašnjive s pozicija pojedinih sektora, kao što 
se može vidjeti u tumačenjima u nastavku koja su dana za one varijable 
kod kojih je pri Krusal-Wallisovovom testu p<0,01. 
P08 – osobni interes – privatni sektor su poslovni subjekti ili oni koji izrav-
no rade za poslovne subjekte
P29 – akademski sektor je puno informiraniji o problemu ekonomskog 
dvostrukog oporezivanja dividendi (porezna teorija i politika – praksa ve-
ćine zemalja), a službenici javnog sektora o tome u pravilu ne znaju.
P54 – ovo je pitanje bilo postavljeno uzevši u obzir trenutne promjene u 
poreznom sustavu odnosno kretanja koja su bila u suprotnome smjeru 
od postavljenih pitanja te su stoga logični ovakvi suprotni (no ipak blago 
suprotni) odgovori 
P67- Sasvim logično. Kod privatnog sektora opet je samointeres u pita-
nju jer su među onima koji sigurno imaju više osnovice pa bi platili više 
doprinosa; javni sektor je vjerojatno manje plaćena skupina, pa želi da 
privatni sektor plati više, a i svjesni su da zbog toga nedostaje pore-
znih prihoda. U akademskoj zajednici svjesni su da je takva mjera re-
gresivna (relativno više opterećuje niže dohotke tj. rasterećuje konkretno 
više dohotke).
Ispitanici su nadalje grupirani u različite skupine kako bi se utvrdila pove-
zanost različitih skupina stručnjaka sa stavovima o poreznom sustavu. 
Usporedba je napravljena unutar različitih podsektora akademske zajed-
nice i javnog sektora. Za privatni sektor takva usporedba zbog manjeg 
broja anketiranih nije napravljena. 
Usporedba stavova o poreznom sustavu napravljena je i za različite sku-
pine svih ispitanika zajedno, pa su tako uspoređeni stavovi ispitanika 
grupiranih u sedam skupina kao u tablici 5.
Usporedba ekonomista i neekonomista u akademskoj zajednici
Unutar akademske zajednice uspoređeni su stavovi ekonomista i neeko-
nomista. Analiza je napravljena pomoću Mann-Whitneyevog testa, a re-
zultati analize za varijable koje su pokazale signifikantne razlike između 
ekonomista i neekonomista u akademskoj zajednici zajedno s medijani-
ma i rangovima dani su u tablici 10.
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Mdn (Rang) Mann-Whitney
Pitanje Neekonomisti Ekonomisti U p
P02-imo-Porez na nekret-



















Tablica 10. Usporedba ekonomista i neekonomista u akademskoj zajednici: medijan, rang 
i Mann-Whitneyev test za pitanja gdje postoji signifikantna razlika
Izvor: obrada autorice
Iako broj pitanja kod kojih postoji signifikantna razlika u akademskoj za-
jednici između ekonomista i neekonomista nije velik, o doprinosima eko-
nomisti ne misle toliko s fiskalnog aspekta (da bude dosta javnih prihoda 
u proračunu odnosno za financiranje zdravstva, koje definitivno ima kon-
stantni deficit – pokriva se iz općih poreza, npr. PDV-a jer doprinosa nije 
dovoljno), već s ekonomskog, i to sa stajališta poduzetnika – kroz sma-
njenje troškova poduzetnika, i to troškova radne snage – doprinos za 
zdravstveno osiguranje najveća je komponenta doprinosa posloprimaca. 
Neekonomisti više gledaju „sebično“, tj. kao obični ljudi da njima ostane 
više za zdravstvene troškove; što je i razumljivo zbog gore navedenih 
velikih problema financiranja zdravstva. Slična briga da gospodarstvo, 
odnosno porezni obveznici ne budu previše opterećeni (što ima negativ-
ne ekonomske učinke) vidi se i kod trošarina. Tu se, osim ekonomskoga, 
očituje i tzv. „tehnički učinak“– konkretnije, briga za pojednostavljenje 
poreznog sustava i smanjenje troškova poreznih obveznika (s većim 
brojem poreza više se povećavaju troškovi poreznih obveznika u smislu 
administracije – tzv. „troškovi ispunjavanja porezne obveze“ – tax com-
pliance costs). 
Kod poreza na nekretnine imaju pravo neekonomisti jer je to u svijetu 
u pravilu lokalni porez (iako ima izuzetaka, npr. Švedska); dakle, eko-
nomisti su skloniji fiskalnoj centralizaciji, što opet ima svoju logiku zbog 
situacije visokog deficita i javnog duga.
Usporedba unutar javnog sektora: zaposleni u Poreznoj upravi 
Ministarstva financija i zaposleni u jedinicama lokalne i regionalne 
samouprave 
Među ispitanicima u javnom sektoru napravljena je usporedba zaposle-
nih u jedinicama lokalne i regionalne samouprave i zaposlenih u Pore-
znoj upravi Ministarstva financija kao najbrojnijih grupacija anketiranih iz 
javnog sektora. Usporedba je izvedena primjenom Mann-Whitneyevog 
testa, a rezultati testa te pripadajući medijani i rangovi za varijable koje 
imaju signifikantan rezultat testiranja navedeni su u tablici 11. 
Pitanje Mdn (rang) Mann-Whitney
JLS PU U p
P02-imo-Porez na nekretnine treba biti lokalni porez. 5 (59) 4 (43) 891,000 0,003
P06-imo-Bez obzira na uvođenje poreza na nekretnine kao lokalni prihod u budućnosti treba ostati i prirez. 5 (58) 3 (44) 947,000 0,015
P30-dob-Treba sniziti (opću) stopu poreza na dobit. 4 (60) 3 (41) 808,000 0,001
P31-dob-Treba sniziti porezno opterećenje za mala i srednja poduzeća. 4 (58) 4 (43) 915,000 0,007
P32-dob-Reinvestiranu dobit treba izuzeti od oporezivanja. 4 (57) 4 (45) 975,500 0,023
P33-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za područja posebne državne skrbi. 4 (59) 3 (43) 900,500 0,007
P34-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za brdsko-planinska područja. 4 (57) 4 (45) 995,500 0,039
P35-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za slobodne zone. 4 (59) 3 (43) 896,500 0,006
P36-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice za Grad Vukovar. 5 (58) 4 (44) 952,500 0,016
P37-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice (državnu potporu) za istraživačko-razvojne projekte. 5 (59) 4 (42) 864,500 0,002
P38-dob-Treba zadržati olakšice (državnu potporu) za obrazovanje i izobrazbu zaposlenika. 5 (59) 4 (42) 856,000 0,001
P39-dob-Treba zadržati poticaje za ulaganja. 5 (58) 4 (44) 917,000 0,007
P40-dob-Treba ponovo uvesti zaštitnu kamatu. 4 (63) 3 (38) 675,500 0,000
P41-dob-Treba zadržati ubrzanu amortizaciju (porezno dopuštanje podvostručavanja godišnjih amortizaci-
jskih stopa). 4 (58) 3 (44) 944,000 0,016
P52-pdv-Prihode od PDV-a treba jednim dijelom prepustiti nižim razinama vlasti (općine i gradovi). 5 (68) 2 (32) 377,000 0,000
P58-tro-Treba uvesti trošarine na vino. 2 (46) 3 (58) 979,000 0,031
P65-tro-Treba razrezivati poseban porez na kavu. 2 (46) 3 (58) 995,500 0,041
P71-dop-Treba sniziti doprinose za zdravstveno osiguranje. 3 (46) 4 (58) 967,000 0,025
P89-opc-Regionalni porezni poticaji (grad Vukovar, područja posebne državne skrbi, brdsko-planinska po-
dručja) su učinkoviti s obzirom na privlačenje investicija u ta područja. 4 (61) 3 (40) 753,000 0,000
Tablica 11. Usporedba zaposlenih u jedinicama lokalne i regionalne samouprave sa zaposlenima u Poreznoj upravi Ministarstva financija: medijani, rangovi i Mann-
Whitneyev test za pitanja gdje postoji signifikantna razlika
Izvor: obrada autorice
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Unutar javnoga sektora veće je nesuglasje nego unutar akademske za-
jednice; razlika između zaposlenih u lokalnoj i regionalnoj samoupravi 
te zaposlenih u Poreznoj upravi Ministarstva financija signifikantna je za 
skoro jednu trećinu ispitanih varijabli. S obzirom na tako veliki broj signi-
fikantnih razlika na razini a=0,05, u nastavku nisu objašnjene sve razlike, 
nego samo razlike za koje je p<0,01. 
Sasvim je logično da su jedinice lokalne samouprave (njihovi službenici) 
skloniji stavu da porez ide njima. Isto je tako logično da se brinu za sma-
njenje poreznog tereta poreznih obveznika jer su im bliže (sa stajališta 
lokalnog razvoja su itekako više zainteresirani, a imaju i više doticaja s 
poreznim obveznicima poduzetnicima). 
Isti je slučaj s olakšicama i poticajima, a prepuštanje prihoda nižim razi-
nama vlasti i ne treba posebno komentirati (tu je najveće odstupanje). U 
konačnici, isti je slučaj i s regionalnim poticajima. 
Usporedba zaposlenih grupiranih u sedam skupina
Anketirani stručnjaci iz svih područja grupirani su u sedam skupina kao 
u tablici 5. Usporedba stavova prema poreznom sustavu među zaposle-
nima u sedam skupina provedena je Kruskal-Wallisovim testom, a za 
varijable kod kojih je test signifikantan u nastavku je sprovedena post 
hoc analiza Dunnovim testom s Bonferronijevom korekcijom. Rezultati 
tako provedene analize zajedno s medijanima i rangovima prikazani su u 
tablici 12 za varijable kod kojih je utvrđena signifikantnost Kruskal-Walli-
sova testa.
Pitanje PS PU JLS Prav JF PFR MM H p















P05-imo-Bez obzira na uvođenje poreza na nekretnine i porez na kuće 















P29-doh-Dividende treba oporezivati niže od ostalih dohodaka (zbog 









































































































































P52-pdv-Prihode od PDV-a treba jednim dijelom prepustiti nižim razina-






























Pitanje PS PU JLS Prav JF PFR MM H p














































P67-dop-Treba ukinuti najvišu mjesečnu osnovicu za obračun doprino-














































P89-opc-Regionalni porezni poticaji (grad Vukovar, područja posebne 
državne skrbi, brdsko-planinska područja) su učinkoviti s obzirom na 















P90-opc-Troškovi poreznih vlasti (administrativni troškovi) i troškovi po-
reznih obveznika (troškovi ispunjavanja porezne obveze odnosno svi 
troškovi udovoljavanja poreznoj obvezi mimo samih iznosa poreza) tre-
baju igrati značajnu ulogu u kreiranju porezne politike (u smislu da je 






























Tablica 12. Usporedba zaposlenih grupiranih u sedam skupina: medijani, rangovi i Kruskal-Wallisov test s post hoc Dunnovim testom s Bonferronijevom 
korekcijom za pitanja sa signifikantnim Kruskal-Wallisovim testom
Izvor: obrada autorice
Napomena: PS – porezni savjetnici; PU – Ministarstvo financija - Porezna uprava i ostali anketirani iz Ministarstva financija; JLS – jedinice lokalne i regionalne 
samouprave; Prav – pravnici iz akademskog sektora; JF – ekonomisti u akademskoj zajednici iz područja javnih financija, PFR – ekonomisti u akademskoj 
zajednici iz područja poslovnih financija i računovodstva; MM – ekonomisti u akademskoj zajednici iz područja makroekonomije, monetarnih financija i 
financijskih tržišta
H – Kruskall-Wallisov H, p – signifikantnost Kruskal-Wallisovog testa
Grupe koje ne dijele isti superskript signifikantno se razlikuju.
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Na slici 2 (u Prilogu) grafički su prikazani rangovi odgovora po skupina-
ma za sva pitanja sa signfikantnim Kruskal-Wallisovim testom. S obzirom 
na to da se kod čak 22 od 30 pitanja Kruskal-Wallisov test pokazuje si-
gnifikantnim, nisu objašnjene sve navedene varijable, već samo one kod 
kojih je p<0,01. Tumačenja rezultata nisu nužno dana samo na osnovi 
Dunnovog testa s Bonferronijevom korekcijom, već i temeljem medijana 
i rangova, što se može vidjeti na slici 2.
Kod poreza na nekretnine (P02) reflektira se već prije rečeno. Očekivano 
je da se tu dodaju i pravnici, jer, kako je već rečeno, to je u pravilu u za-
konodavstvu svih zemalja lokalni porez. Zato je i logično da su je taj stav 
blizak profesorima iz javnih financija (JF). Porezni savjetnici (PS) to isto 
vjerojatno jako dobro znaju.
Logično je da će se porezni savjetnici zalagati da se dividende manje 
oporezuju (P29) (da njihovi klijenti manje plate, a vjerojatno su upoznati 
i s teorijom koja tome ide u prilog – tzv. „dvostruko oporezivanje dividen-
di“tj. prvo dobiti pa dividendi –  u pravilu se kritizira i treba ga smanjiti 
– zato su tu i profesori javnih financija (JF) koji to znaju. Ekonomisti u 
akademskoj zajednici iz područja makroekonomije, monetarnih financija 
i financijskih tržišta (MM) na to slično gledaju kao i porezni savjetnici (PS) 
– sa stajališta klijenata.
P35 (olakšice za slobodne zone) i slične olakšice i poticaji (npr. Vukovar 
– P89) – vidi se da se svugdje ističu zaposlenici u jedinicama lokalne i 
regionalne samouprave (JLS) (kao što je i prije zaključeno). Za spuštanje 
prihoda PDV-a (P52) već je sve prethodno navedeno.
Kod zaštitne kamate (P40) nije čudno da se jako ističu i porezni savjetni-
ci (PS) kao i kod poticaja ulaganja općenito jer je to najbolje za poslovne 
subjekte (njihove klijente). Za zaštitnu kamatu tu su i poslovne financije 
i računovodstvo (PFR) jer oni sa stajališta računovodstva razumiju r o 
čemu se radi i shvaćaju takav poticaj slično kao porezni savjetnici. 
U vezi prepuštanja dijela prihoda od PDV-a nižim razinama vlasti (P52) 
stručnjaci iz jedinica lokalne i regionalne samouprave (JLS) signifikantno 
se razlikuju od svih ostalih skupina ispitanika. Ovo se u potpunosti može 
objasniti vlastitim interesom kojim bi više poreznih prihoda pripalo njima.
Kod stava da su regionalni poticaji učinkoviti za privlačenje investicija 
u ta područja (P89) opet je uočljiv interes jedinica lokalne i regionalne 
samouprave (JLS) čiji su djelatnici, logično, skloniji tom stavu za razliku 
od djelatnika Porezne uprave (PU) koji se također mogu objasniti vlasti-
tim interesom te stavova ekonomista u akademskoj zajednici iz područja 
javnih financija (JF) i makroekonomije, monetarnih financija i financijskih 
tržišta (MM) koji nemaju povjerenja u djelovanje te mjere, a mjeri nisu 
skloni niti pravnici iz akademske zajednice (Prav).
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5. Zaključak
Istraživanje stavova stručnjaka o poreznom sustavu i poreznoj politici 
važan je doprinos čitavoj financijskoj, posebno javnofinancijskoj, i unutar 
nje poreznoj znanosti i može poslužiti kreatorima ekonomske te osobito 
fiskalne i porezne politike. Ipak, pri provođenju ankete uvijek postoji pri-
stranost, čak i kada se anketa provodi među stručnjacima. 
Istraživanje je pokazalo da postoji povezanost obilježja ispitanika s nji-
hovim odgovorima, posebice sa sektorom zaposlenja i užim područjem 
rada. Korelacija s dobi pokazala je neočekivane rezultate. Kod starijih 
ispitanika, za koje se očekuje da su konzervativniji i skloniji poreznim 
olakšicama te trošarinama, pokazalo se suprotno. Također, suprotno 
očekivanjima, pokazalo se da su stariji za smanjenje parafiskalnih na-
meta, iako ih manje terete, te da su za smanjenje udjela javnih prihoda 
i rashoda, iako im javni rashodi više trebaju, a javne prihode uglavnom 
više ne uplaćuju.
Povezanost stručne spreme sa stavovima o poreznoj politici jednim di-
jelom može se objasniti sektorom zaposlenja, s obzirom na to da je u 
akademskoj zajednici stupanj obrazovanja u pravilu veći nego u drugim 
sektorima. 
Utjecaj sektora zaposlenja pokazao je da do razlike u stavovima naj-
češće dolazi između privatnog i akademskog sektora. Može se pri-
mijetiti da se u privatnom sektoru često zauzimaju stavovi sukladno 
vlastitom interesu.
Unutar akademske zajednice nema puno pitanja po kojima se razlikuju 
stavovi ekonomista i neekonomista, ali u manjem broju pitanja u kojemu 
postoje razlike pokazuje se da ekonomisti ne polaze toliko s fiskalnog as-
pekta koliko s ekonomskog aspekta, i to s gledišta poduzetnika. Neeko-
nomisti češće polaze od osobnog interesa.
Usporedba stručnjaka iz jedinica lokalne i regionalne samouprave te 
stručnjaka iz Porezne uprave Ministarstva financija unutar javnog sekto-
ra pokazala je puno više neslaganja. Tu je također prisutan samointeres 
jer u jedinicama lokalne i regionalne samouprave smatraju kako porezi 
trebaju pripasti njima.
Grupirajući stručnjake različitih profila u sedam skupina prema njihovom 
užem području rada, može se primijetiti kako su stručnjaci koji dolaze iz 
jedinica lokalne i regionalne samouprave oni čiji stavovi najčešće odu-
daraju od stavova neke druge skupine stručnjaka. Te razlike u stavovima 
često su posljedica interesa jedinica lokalne i javne samouprave.
Iz tog razloga, pri izvođenju zaključaka na temelju ankete, nužno je voditi 
računa i o karakteristikama anketiranih stručnjaka.
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Prilozi




Slika 2. Rangovi odgovora ispitanika grupiranih u sedam skupina za pitanja sa signifikantnim 
Kruskal-Wallisovim testom
Izvor: obrada autorice
Napomena: PS – porezni savjetnici; PU – Ministarstvo financija – Porezna uprava i ostali 
anketirani iz Ministarstva financija; JLS – jedinice lokalne i regionalne samouprave; Prav 
– pravnici iz akademskog sektora; JF – ekonomisti u akademskoj zajednici iz područja 
javnih financija, PFR – ekonomisti u akademskoj zajednici iz područja poslovnih financija 
i računovodstva; MM – ekonomisti u akademskoj zajednici iz područja makroekonomije, 
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EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF STABILIZATION 
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY IN CROATIA 27 28
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to assess the stabilization effects of fiscal policy in Cro-
atia in a structural vector autoregression framework as proposed by Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002). Results prove that the fiscal transmission mechanism in Cro-
atia works mainly in a Keynesian manner. Output reacts negatively to a tax shock 
and positively to government spending shock. The output multiplier is above 2 at 
impact and the effect is significant throught the whole time span. The negative 
effect of the tax shock is mostly driven by indirect (not direct) taxes. The positive 
effect of government spending is more pronounced when government invest-
ment is considered, especially when private consumption and private investment 
responses are observed. 
Key words: fiscal multiplier, spending shock, tax shock, SVAR, Croatia
1. Introduction
Fiscal policy has been in center of debates in economic circles since 
decades, even more in periods of economic downturn (during the 1980s 
or recently in the 2010s), focusing merely on the role of expansionary 
fiscal policy in stimulating economic growth. Such a debate goes mainly 
around one question: what is the transmission of fiscal shocks?  
Empirical research of fiscal policy effects has not shown an absolute 
consensus on the effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomics. Even 
theoretical literature suggests diverging positions with respect to the gen-
eral effectiveness of fiscal policy (and fiscal stimuli packages at the end). 
Real business cycle models for instance predict that an increase in gov-
ernment consumption will be completely offset by the decrease in private 
consumption, while Keynesian models assume that the same increase 
will lead to an increase in private. Moreover, Pappa (2003, 2) points that 
fiscal shocks are difficult to identify in practice due to the “endogeneity 
of fiscal variables, interactions between fiscal and monetary policy var-
27 This is a reprint of a paper published in the Romanian Journal of Economic Forecast-
ing, Volume 18, Issue 1, year 2015 that is available at: http://www.ipe.ro/rjef/rjef1_15/
rjef1_2015p47-69.pdf
28 The author would like to thank anonymous referees. This   work   has   been   supported 
by   the   Croatian   Science   Foundation   under   the   project   number   IP-2013-11-8174.
101
iables, delays between planning, approval and implementation of fiscal 
policies and scarceness of reasonable zero-identifying restrictions”.
However, empirical results agree on one fact only, i.e. that a positive gov-
ernment spending shock has a positive effect on output. The effects of a 
tax shock on output as well as effects of expenditure and tax shocks on 
other macroeconomic variables (GDP components, employment, inter-
est rate, inflation) provide contradictory evidence29. Blanchard & Perotti 
(2002) find evidence of Keynesian predictions in a case of a positive 
government expenditure shock as well as a negative tax shock, both 
exerting a positive and significant effect on output and private consump-
tion. Nevertheless, they find that investment reacts negatively to the 
expenditure shock, which is in line with neoclassical models. Kirchner, 
Cimadomo & Hauptmeier (2010) show that in the Euro area the reaction 
of investment to an expenditure shock is positive and significant: a 1% 
GDP increase in expenditure raises investment by 1.6% GDP. Perotti 
(2004) shows that the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity in five 
OECD countries (US, Canada, Australia, Germany and UK) have the 
propensity to be small and substantially weaker over time. Furthermore, 
in the case of European countries, Marcellino (2002) finds heterogenous 
responses to fiscal shocks in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, but con-
cludes that expenditure shocks are usually rather ineffective in boosting 
the economy and that tax shocks have minor effects on output. Similarly, 
Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen & Wolff (2006), de Castro & de Cos (2008) and 
Biau & Girard (2005) evidence that a tax shock does not significantly 
affect output in Germany, Spain and France respectively. 
There are quite few studies that try to assess stabilization effects of fis-
cal policy in emerging economies. Baxa (2010) shows that the Czech 
economy behaves in line with Keynesian assumptions, because govern-
ment expenditures positively affect economic activity. Still, Baxa (2010, 
27) finds that government tax shock exercises a “very uncertain, very to 
zero, but most probably rather negative” effect on output. Oppositely, by 
analyzing fiscal policy shocks in a group of six European transition econ-
omies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and 
Romania) Mirdala (2009) finds that output increases after a tax shock in 
the Czech Republic. The same is evidenced for Hungary, Slovak Repub-
lic, Bulgaria and Romania. Jemec, Strojan Kastelec & Delakorda (2011) 
show that in Slovenia a 1% GDP increase in government revenue makes 
output fall by 0.38%, but the negative effect is evidenced only in the 
first quarter after the shock. Furthermore, they find that the reaction of 
29 Although the latter can be attributed in some extent to different variables, sample pe-
riods, dummies and trend, Caldara & Kamps (2008) prove that different methodologies 
applied to the same dataset lead to conflicting conclusions for responses of GDP com-
ponents on a fiscal shock. Moreover, even when estimated responses to fiscal shocks 
are of the same sign and direction, the estimated magnitude and duration can quite differ. 
However, the most widely applied method in assessing responses to fiscal policy shocks is 
the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR, based on the assumption that fiscal variables do not react 
contemporaneously to changes in economic conditions. 
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private consumption and investment to a tax shock is negative (being 
0.05% GDP and 0.35% GDP respectively), while an expenditure shock 
positively affects both components (evidence show an increase of 1.1% 
GDP and 1.6% GDP respectively).
Responses to fiscal shocks on the Croatian case are studied in Ravnik 
& Žilić (2011) and Šimović & Deskar-Škrbić (2013). Based on a monthly 
data span 2001M1 to 2009M12 Ravnik & Žilić (2011) conclude that the 
strongest response after both fiscal shocks has the interest rate, while 
the lowest the price level. Moreover, non-commonly, they show that the 
response of output (proxied with industrial production) is positive after a 
tax shock and negative after a spending shock, concluding that on one 
hand industrial production may not be a good proxy variable for output, 
and on the other hand that maybe the crowding out effect predominates 
the output effect.  On the other hand, Šimović & Deskar-Škrbić (2013) 
show that output reacts strongly and positively to spending shocks (be-
ing the multipliers 2.18 at the consolidated general government level and 
0.82 at the central government level), while a negative response is evi-
denced after a tax shock. 
Although this research employs the same SVAR method there are two 
main novelties with respect to Ravnik & Žilić (2011) and Šimović & 
Deskar-Škrbić (2013): (i) except the effects of fiscal shocks on output, 
prices and interest rates, the analysis embraces also the response of 
GDP components (private consumption and private investment), and (ii) 
the investigation also includes effects of different government expendi-
ture and revenue components on macroeconomic variables. The main 
motivation of the paper in investigating the aforementioned comes from 
the need of a deeper discussion of the transmission mechanism of fiscal 
policy in Croatia for policy makers and academics. Croatia, like other 
countries, opted for several fiscal discretionary measures during the lat-
est economic crisis in order to ad hoc achieve fiscal consolidation. Still, 
no previous research investigated the possible effects of such measures 
on private consumption and private investment, and thus did not take 
into account possible outcomes in a medium and long run. Being that 
the fact, the taken restrictive tax measures (introduction of new taxes, 
increment of tax rates, narrowing the tax base, etc.) during recession-
ary times, may have been the driving force why Croatia is experiencing 
one of the longest recessionary periods amid EU countries.  Moreover, 
this research with respect to the aforementioned has a different data 
frequency and longer time span, making the estimates more suitable 
and reliable. 
Main results are in line with Keynesian theory. A spending shock pos-
itively affects output, private consumption and private investment and 
the response is significant.  Moreover, when investigating the effect of 
government consumption versus government investment, the positive 
effect of both with respect to output and output components are signif-
icant. A tax shock leads to a drop in output, private consumption and 
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private investment. Interesting is the fact that output responds negatively 
on impact after a shock in direct taxes, but the negative effect lasts only 
for a quarter, being afterwards positive and significant for two years. Op-
positely, the negative effect of indirect taxes on output is more persistent 
and lasts for three years. This is in line with the expectations because, 
among others, indirect taxes make more than 70% of total tax receipts 
(social security contributions excluded) in Croatia. 
This paper is structured as follow: section two explains the methodology 
and data, while section three presents the results. The fourth section 
underlines concluding remarks and gives policy recommendation.
2. Methodology and data information
2.1. Data description and VAR setup
The empirical analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on macroeconom-
ic variables in this study is based on a structural vector autoregres-
sion (SVAR) approach, particularly on the methodology proposed by 
Blanchard & Perotti (2002), which is considered the pioneering paper 
for fiscal policy SVAR analysis. Blanchard & Perotti (2002) argue that 
governments cannot react within the same quarter to changes of mac-
roeconomic setting mainly because fiscal policy decisions involve many 
agents (parliament, government and society) and therefore need a long 
period of time for implementation. All fiscal policy events that do not re-
flect automatic responses are seen as structural fiscal policy shocks. The 
latter are unaffected by the macroeconomic variables in the VAR model, 
because discretionary fiscal policy shocks are analyzed using fiscal pol-
icy decision lags.
This paper uses a quarterly dataset from 1996Q1 to 2011Q4 for output 
(Yt), government spending (Gt), government revenue (Rt - also referred 
to as taxes or net taxes in the rest of the paper), prices (πt) and interest 
rates (rt) in the 5 variable baseline SVAR model. Fiscal variables are 
defined as in the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) setup, i.e. both net of 
transfers, but at the consolidated central government level30. The price 
level is measured by the Consumer Price Index, while the interest rate 
is represented by the short term interest rate on the interbank demand 
deposit trading. All variables, except the interest rate, are in logarithms, 
30 It is common empirical practice to analyze fiscal policy of a country using general gov-
ernment data. Still, this paper (as many others that examine fiscal policy in Croatia (Bena-
zić, 2006; Rukelj, 2009; Grdović Gnip, 2011; Ravnik & Žilić, 2011)) bases the research on 
consolidated central government data. It is important to point out that quarterly fiscal data 
for Croatia at the general government level are not available for the period 1995-2004. 
Nevertheless, such a limitation should not pose significant differences amid results of fiscal 
policy effects in the Croatian case, principally for two reasons: (1) discretionary decisions 
are carried by the consolidated central government, and (2) the share of local governments’ 
budgets in the general budget is on average less than 10% and embrace only 53 local units 
(20 regions, 32 cities plus the City of Zagreb, out of 555 cities and counties in total).
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while output and fiscal variables are additionally seasonally adjusted us-
ing the ARIMA X12 algorithm. Moreover, all variables are in real terms, 
they are CPI deflated 2000=100.
Unit root tests find conclusive evidence that only the interest rate variable 
is stationary in levels at the 1% significance level, while other variables 
present unit roots in levels, according to the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test. Moreover, results show the presence of co-integrating rela-
tions and a possible specification of a vector error correction model, but 
as noted by Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen & Wolff (2006, 12), when estimating 
models that have many disaggregated time series it is difficult to find 
economically interpretable cointegration vectors31. Moreover, Blanchard 
& Perotti (2002) find no significant differences between results obtained 
with and without taking the cointegration relation into account.
Although the system is stationary in first differences, the analysis is 
done using variable in levels, because the focus of the analysis is on 
the dynamics (i.e. impulse responses), not the coefficient estimation32. To 
choose the appropriate lag length the judgment is based on information 
criteria results, the length of the sample and economic sense. The AIC 
criterion suggests two lags, while the BIC and HQC indicate one lag as 
optimal. This analysis will allow for dynamic interaction up to two lags as 
suggested by the Akaike criterion.
As mentioned previously five variables enter in the baseline model setup 
and their order is of particular importance since it defines the relation-
ship structure amid innovations. It is common empirical practice to order 
variables according the timeline of their occurrence. This analysis orders 
the variables as in Caldara & Kamps (2008), i.e. government spending 
is ordered first, followed by output, prices, net taxes and interest rate33. 
The reduced form VAR model can be written as:
 (1)
where Yt is vector of endogenous variables, C(L) is a n x n autoregres-
sive lag polynomial matrix and Ut is a vector of reduced form residuals34.
The errors from a VAR in its reduced form are expected to be i.i.d., but 







r  can be thought as a linear combination 
of three types of structural shocks, i.e. of (1) the automatic responses 
31 Due to the limited space these results are not reported here but are available upon 
request.
32 This is common empirical practice. Studies that estimate a SVAR in levels no matter 
of the stationarity in first differences are Perotti (2002), Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen & Wolff 
(2006), de Castro & de Cos (2006), Jemec, Strojan-Kastelec & Delakorda (2011), Ravnik 
& Žilić (2011). 
33 Refer to Caldara & Kamps (2008, 13) for a detailed discussion about the mentioned 
ordering. 
34 Reduced form residuals Ut are a linear combination of different structural innovations 
and therefore have no economic interpretation.
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of government expenditure and revenue to real output, inflation and in-
terest rate, (2) the systematic discretionary response of government ex-
penditure and revenue to the same macroeconomic variables and (3) 
the random discretionary fiscal policy shocks. Since a 
   
ut
j shock contains 
information about other shocks of the system, it is not possible to isolate 
a shock of just one of the variables. Thus, to be able to isolate the shocks 
in focus, i.e. fiscal shocks, there is a need of structure on the VAR. This 
structure is obtained by defining the contemporaneous effects (those 
that occur in lag=0) of variables among each other. If reduced form re-
siduals Ut are written as a linear combination of structural shocks Vt then 
the structural VAR can be written as: 
 (2)
To make the system just identified 35 restrictions should be imposed35. 
The matrix representation of the mentioned system is the following:
 (3)
The imposed restrictions include the following: (i) values across the main 
diagonal of matrix A are set to one, which makes five restrictions; (ii) 
matrix B contains 18 elements set to zero, which makes additional 18 





a rg and 
   
a ig are set to zero because it is assumed 
that government spending is solely under the control of fiscal authori-
ty, while the impact of inflation
   
apg is assumed to be -0.5, as in Perotti 
(2002) among others; all these make additional four restrictions; (iv) the 
assumption that the short term interest rate innovation does not influence 




a ip and 
   
a ir zero; the reduced 
form innovation of output is not affected by the innovation of inflation, so 
   
apy is also set to zero; all these add four restrictions; (v) the impact of the 
innovation of output and prices on the innovation of taxes, i.e. 
   
a yr and 
   
apr  respectively, are estimated exogenously (see further in this section) 
which makes two addition restrictions; (vi) the remaining two restrictions 
depend on how the relationship between two fiscal variables are mod-
eled. The impact of government spending on taxes is modeled through 
the B matrix, so 
   
a gr  is set to zero, and assuming that government spend-
ing decisions come first means setting 
   
brg to zero, which gives the last 
two needed restrictions.
The random discretionary fiscal policy shocks are actually of main in-
terest and represent underlying structural shocks used to study the re-
sponse of macroeconomic variables. Thus, to explain the relationship 
35 The system needs  restrictions, where n is the number of endogenous variables.
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between fiscal variables, lets focus on the equations showing the re-






g and  
   
vt
r represent structural shocks to government spend-
ing and revenue respectively. The 
   
a ij coefficients capture the automatic 
responses of macroeconomic variables to a government spending and 
revenue shock under the existing fiscal policy rules as well as any discre-
tionary adjustment of fiscal policy in response to unexpected movements 
in macroeconomic environment. The 
   
bij coefficients express how the 
structural shock to government spending and revenue affects revenue or 
spending respectively. 







r, in order to correctly identify the shocks exogenous 




Next, it is necessary to make a decision with respect to the relative order-
ing of the fiscal variables. Assuming that tax decisions come first means 
setting 
   
bgr equal to zero, while oppositely, assuming that expenditure 




Although Perotti (2002) points out that neither of the alternatives of pri-
ority has any theoretical or empirical basis, most of the works as well as 
Blanchard & Perotti (2002) and this research test both assumptions to 
see whether the ordering makes difference to the impulse responses.






ber is estimated by OLS to retrieve the structural shocks to the 
fiscal variables.
Other reduced form residuals’ equations are estimated recursively using 
instrumental variables regressions, in order to account for the correlation 
of the respective regressors and error terms. Since the cyclically adjust-
ed variables are orthogonal, they are used as instruments (Blanchard & 
Perotti, 2002)36. 
36 Since Blanchard & Perotti (2002) base their seminal work on a three variable VAR, 
cyclically adjusted fiscal variables are used as instruments only. Nevertheless in a five var-
iable VAR, there is more then one equation to be estimated using the IV method, therefore 
obtained structural shocks are used as instruments as well (Perotti, 2005; Heppke-Falk, 
Tehnhofen & Wolff, 2006; Giordano, Momigliano, Neri & Perotti, 2007; among others).
107
2.2. Exogenous elasticities
The exogenous elasticities of a budgetary item with respect to output are 
obtained as product of the elasticity of the budgetary item to its macro-
economic base and the elasticity of this base with respect to output. If 
the elasticity of a budgetary item is constructed as an average value of 
two or more sub-components’ elasticities, then their respective shares in 




Table 1 shows the elasticities of different budget components to output 
and prices. It is important to note that the overall total tax elasticity is 
0.93, but since the fiscal variable regarding government revenues used 
in the analysis is constructed following the Blanchard & Perotti (2002) 
assumptions, i.e. net of transfers, it is corrected by the elasticity of un-
employment related expenditures to output weighted by the share of this 
expenditure in total government expenditure38.
Calculating the elasticity of taxes with respect to prices means adjusting 
equation (11) for the elasticity of the macroeconomic base with respect 
to prices, i.e. 
   
apBi  instead of 
   
a yBi . The results indicate that the price elas-
ticity of taxes (
   
apr) is 0.73, which is again does not deviate from results 
obtained by other studies in this field. 
Budgetary item





Net taxes 0.92 0.73
Direct taxes 0.53 -0.32
Indirect taxes 1.36 1.90
Government expenditure 0 -0.5
Current expenditure 0 -1
Capital expenditure 0 -1
Public wages expenditure 0 0
Public purchases expenditure 0 -1
Table 1. Exogenous elasticities with respect to output and prices
Source: Perotti (2002) and author’s calculation
Note: For details on sub-components’ elasticities see Appendix C; The price elasticity of 
total government expenditure and its components is set as in Perotti (2002).
37 Details on each tax item elasticity to its macroeconomic base, as well as the elasticity 
of the latter with respect to output or prices are available upon request.
38 Following Grdović Gnip (2011) the output elasticity of unemployment related expendi-
tures is -0.58, and these expenditures amount to 0.85% of total consolidated central gov-
ernment expenditures, which allows for a -0.01 correction of the total tax elasticity, to obtain 
the output elasticity of net taxes.
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Same as in Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen & Wolff (2006) among others, this 
study assumes that expenditure do not respond to output within a quarter 
because they are predetermined in a budgetary plan and therefore not 
elastic in the short run39. 
2.3. Fiscal policy effects in alternative models
In order to assess the stabilization effects of fiscal policy on different 
GDP components (pivate consumption and private investment) and la-
bour market, as well as effects of different spending and tax components 
the re-estimation of (4) is done by extending the SVAR to a six variable 
model as follows:
a. In order to examine the effects of fiscal shocks on GDP components 
(private consumption and private investment) the vector of endoge-
nous variables 
   
Yt is extended, being yet 
   
gt yt zt p t rt it[ ]
where 
   
zt corresponds to the (in turn) added variable, i.e. private 
consumption or private investment. This order follows the suggestion 
by Caldara & Kamps (2008), as in the case of the baseline model 
and the mentioned assumptions (see Footnote (7)). To recall, placing 
private consumption or private investment at the third place means it 
does not react contemporaneously to prices, taxes and interest rates 
shocks, but is contemporaneously affected by government spending 
and output shocks. Yet, the equations showing reduced form innova-
tions of fiscal variables are:





a zg and 
   
a zr represent the elasticity with respect to the GDP 
component (private consumption or private investment) of govern-




 are the reduced 
form innovations of the GDP component under analysis. In order 
to fully identify the SVAR the mentioned two elasticities have to be 
estimated. Recalling the assumption that government spending are 
solely under the control of fiscal authority, in the equation explaining 
reduced innovation in government spending all elasticities (except 
the price elasticity) are again set to zero.Therefore the spending 
elasticity with respect to private consumption and private investment 
is zero. On the other hand, the tax elasticities with respect to private 
consumption and private investment have to be estimated. Following 
the same procedure as in case of previous exogenous elasticity esti-
mation, the elasticity of (total) taxes with respect to private consump-
tion and private investment results to be 0.84 and 0.49 respectively.
39 However, worth noting is that some recent studies challenge this assumption. Among 
others, Rodden & Wibbles (2010) find evidence of spending elasticity with respect to out-
put at the state and local level in the US being 0.17. But, this work (as well as others in 
this field) is based on annual data, so it is reasonable to assume that such a procyclicality 
vanishes in quarterly frequencies.
109
b. Since different government spending components can affect eco-
nomic activity in a different manner, the effects of government con-
sumption and government investment shocks on the macroeconom-
ic environment in Croatia are inspected. To do so, total government 
spending 
   
gt is replaced in the six variable model in turn by govern-
ment consumption or government investment. Therefore, the vector 
of endogenous variables 
   
Yt  is now 
   
gt
j yt zt p t rt it[ ], being 
   
gt
j a spending component. Government consumption is defined as 
in Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen & Wolff (2006), i.e. the sum of person-
nel and operating budget expenditure, while government investment 
corresponds to capital spending.
c. Following a similar rationale as ad b., the vector of endogenous vari-
ables in case of investigating the effects of tax shocks by component 
is 
   
Yt = gt yt zt p t rt j it[ ]’, being 
   
rt
j a tax component, i.e. 
direct taxes or indirect taxes. In order to correctly define the fiscal 
equation, the exogenous elasticities in case of different tax com-
ponents with respect to output and prices were already presented 
in Table 1 of this work. Since it is important to inspect different tax 
components’ effect on GDP components as well, the elasticities of 
direct and indirect taxes with respect to private consumption and pri-
vate investment were estimated. In line with the previously explained 
methodology, the elasticity of direct taxes with respect to private con-
sumption and private investment results to be in Croatia 0.23 and 
0.29 respectively. On the other hand, the elasticities of indirect taxes 
with respect to private consumption and private investment are 1.53 
and 0.7 respectively.
3. Results
This section presents impulse response functions and multipliers derived 
from the baseline model as well as extended models. According to the 
level specification, structural shocks are interpreted as one percentage 
point increase in the policy variables, while impulse responses represent 
the percent change of the responding variable. The path is shown for a 
horizon of 20 quarters i.e. five years. Moreover, the 95% percentile con-
fidence intervals coverages are shown, obtained from 100 bootstraps of 
the impulse response distribution40. 
3.1. Baseline model 
It is possible to notice that output responds positively to a government 
spending shock and the positive impact is significant throughout the 
whole time horizon (Figure 1). A long term positive effect is also evi-
40 Confidence intervals are obtained using the Hall (dashed lines) and Efron (dotted lines) 
Bootstrap available in the JMulTi package, which was used along with Gretl software 
throughout the estimations in this paper.
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denced in Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004) and Fatas & Mihov 
(2001), who show that in the case of the US the government spending 
positively affects output for more than five years41.
Figure 1. Impulse responses to an increase in government spending (baseline model)
Source: Author’s estimation
Although not of typical hump-shape, the response of output results to 
be similar to the same in developing countries. Mirdala (2009) shows 
that, after the initial positive impact, output starts to gradually increase in 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Poland and Hungary, and its effects vanish 
only in the long term. The cumulative output multiplier in Croatia is above 
one unit in all presented periods, being the highest at impact42 (Table 2)
41 In case of other developed countries the positive impact is more of short and/or medium 
term. Refer to Perotti (2004), Marcellino, (2002), Biau & Girard (2005) and Giordano et al 
(2007) among others. 
42 The cumulative output multiplier in a given quarter is calculated as the ratio between 
the cumulative response of output and the cumulative response of government expenditure 
after the government spending shock.
111
Quarters
Shock to: 4th 8th 12th 16th
Government spending 2.45 1.79 1.49 1.33
Table 2. Cumulative output multipliers to government spending shocks
Source: Author’s estimation
If the given multipliers are compared to those obtained by Šimović & 
Deskar-Škrbić (2013) for the same (consolidated central) government 
level then it is possible to observe that in the first year their multiplier is 
for almost one percentage point lower (being 1.58), while the one corre-
sponding for first two years is almost the same (being 1.80 in their case). 
The difference that occurs in the short-run may be due to two things 
mainly: (1) a shorter time span in Šimović & Deskar-Škrbić (2013) and 
(2) a “smaller” VAR model which embraces three variables only. 
The negative response of price after the same spending shock is minimal 
and vanishes in two years. Empirical evidence does not find conclusive 
results here although theoretically one would expect an increase in the 
price level after a government spending shock either at impact or for a 
longer time period. Still, among developing countries evidence show a 
predominant, at least initially, positive effect43, while in case of developed 
countries results are various44. 
A spending shock positively affects interest rates only at impact, while 
afterwards the response is negative throughout the whole period, as in 
Caldara & Kamps (2006) or Mancellari (2011). Keynesian theory sug-
gests that an increase in interest rates is due to an increase in income. 
Moreover, Barro (1987) argues that, when the increase in government 
spending is taken as permanent the increase in output will be realized 
without increasing interest rates. 
If innovations in taxes are considered, the response of output after a 
tax shock is negative the whole time horizon of five years (Figure 2). 
Important to notice is that it shows to be permanent, not temporary, and 
moreover, as in case of a spending shock, the response is significant 
throughout the whole time horizon. If this is looked through the lenses 
of other empirical studies it maybe concluded that Croatia is closer to 
the average results of developed than developing countries, where one 
can find more evidence of a positive response of output initially or for a 
43 Mirdala (2009) shows that prices react positively after a spending shock in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and Romania, vanishing in the latter 
only in the long run. 
44 Similar to results of this study, Fatas & Mihov (2001), Mountford & Uhlig (2002) and 
Caldara & Kamps (2006) evidence that, prices react negatively through the whole time 
horizon. 
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longer time horizon45. Moreover, the response of taxes after a tax shock 
confirms the hypothesis of permanent change.
Figure 2. Impulse responses to an increase in net taxes (baseline model)
Source: Author’s estimation
If tax multipliers are considered than it is possible to conclude that its size 
on impact is very similar to the same obtained by a spending increase 
but of opposite direction (Table 3). Moreover, the effect is highly compa-
rable to Šimović & Deskar-Škrbić (2013, 67).
45 In case of the US Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004) and Mountford & Uhlig 
(2002) show that the negative response of economic activity lasts for more than five years. 
Empirical evidence based on German data does not provide such unanimous results (Per-
otti, 2004; Marcellino, 2002; Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen & Wolff, 2006), while in case of Spain, 
France and Italy output response to a revenue shock is insignificant, being negative in the 
first two cases and positive in case of Italy (de Castro & de Cos, 2008; Biau & Girard, 2005; 
and Giordano et al, 2005; respectively). On the other hand, Mirdala (2009) shows that 
after a tax shock output increases in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Bulgaria and Romania, being positive throughout the whole time horizon in all cases except 
Poland. Same is evidenced for Albania (Mancellari, 2011), while in Colombia the positive 
response vanishes after two years.
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Quarters
Shock to: 4th 8th 12th 16th
Taxes -2.35 -1.66 -1.17 -0.81
Table 3. Cumulative output multipliers to tax shocks
Source: Author’s estimation
The response of prices to a tax shock is positive the first two quarters 
and then volatile around zero. Similar evidence can be found among oth-
er studies. The effect of a revenue shock on prices in the US is initially 
positive and then turns negative. According to Perotti (2004) inflation is 
evidenced only in the first quarter, while Mountford & Uhlig (2002) prove 
that it lasts for the first four quarters. Oppositely, the same effect in Ger-
many is negative according to Perotti (2004), while Marcellino (2002) 
partly disagrees stating that the effect turns negative after being initially 
positive during the first year. Moreover, Giordano et al. (2005) find the 
effects on inflation very small and insignificant in the case of Italy. In Po-
land, the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria a tax shock increases inflation, 
while in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania it decreases the rate 
of inflation (with differing intensity and durability in both cases) (Mirdala, 
2009, 11).
A tax shock exercises a negative and insignificant response of the inter-
est rate in Croatia. A negative response of the interest rate on a tax shock 
is also evidenced in the case of Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and 
Bulgaria and remained permanent through the whole time horizon (Mird-
ala, 2009). Additionally, the effects on interest rates in Croatia showed 
to be insignificant after a tax shock, same as in Germany (Heppke-Falk, 
Tenhofen & Wolff, 2006), while in Spain, interest rates tend to increase 
persistently (de Castro & de Cos, 2008).
3.1.1. Robustness check
The robustness of the baseline results was checked by means of four 
alternatives: (1) Changing the values for 
   
a yr and 
   
apr , i.e. using different 
elasticities of taxes with respect to output and prices. In this case elastici-
ties obtained by Ravnik & Žilić (2011) are used to estimate the model and 
extract the impulse response functions. (2) Changing the value of 
   
apg, 
i.e. the price elasticity of government spending. It has been mentioned 
earlier that the price elasticity of spending is set to be -0.5 following Per-
otti (2002). Still, this elasticity ranges from -1 to 0, so both extreme cases 
of 
   
apg are tested. (3) Assuming that a government tends to decide on 
taxes first, i.e. defining that 
   
bgr=0. (4) Using a first order lag polynomial 
as suggested by Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn. 
In none of the four cases the results do not change substantially. The 
pattern of response remains the same. Moreover, since the response 
of prices and interest rates is small and/or insignificant, a simple three 
variable SVAR including government spending, output and net taxes (as 
in the seminal paper of Blanchard & Perotti (2002)) is also run, in order to 
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check whether the responses of output move in the same direction after 
a fiscal. Indeed, results are similar and the responses are significant in 
cases of both confidence intervals bootstrapping method. Furthermore, 
nothing changes if the observed time period is shorten, starting from first 
quarter 200046.
3.2. Alternative models
Government spending increases lead to a positive effect in private con-
sumption and private investment, with a slightly different development 
throughout the time horizon (Figure 3). Interesting is the fact that the 
effects are significant in the short run and result to be permanent.
Figure 3. Responses to an increase in government spending (alternative model) 
Source: Author’s estimation
Fatas & Mihov (2001), Blanchard & Perotti (2002) and Caldara & Kamps 
(2006) outline that a positive government spending shock in the US in-
creases significantly private consumption. In case of Germany and Spain 
private consumption increases initially after the expenditure shock, fall-
ing subsequently to levels below the initial one (Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen 
& Wolff, 2006; and de Castro & de Cos, 2008, respectively). Giordano 
et al (2007) and Biau & Girard (2005) find that the response of private 
consumption to an expenditure shock in Italy and France respectively is 
hump-shaped, i.e. after the initial stimulation the effect decreases pro-
gressively in the medium term. Still, Kirchner, Cimadomo & Hauptmeiere 
(2010) find evidence that in the Euro area the reaction of private con-
sumption is positive and significant. A 1% GDP increase in expenditure 
raises private consumption by 1.1% GDP.
46 The reasoning behind this decision is supported by the fact that the Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics started to publish a quarterly GDP estimation in 2000 (quarter by quarter). The 
quarterly GDP/output data prior to year 2000 are results of an a posteriori estimation done 
also by Mikulić & Lovrinčević (2000), which is commonly and widely used in empirical stud-
ies on the Croatian case.
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Although both responses are persistent, the positive response of private 
investment to a spending shock is higher (in terms of units of measurment) 
throughout the whole time horizon. Kirchner, Cimadomo & Hauptmeiere 
(2010) find evidence that in the Euro area the reaction of investment to 
an expenditure shock is positive and significant. A 1% GDP increase in 
expenditure raises investment by 1.6% GDP. Oppositely, Fatas & Mihov 
(2001) show that investment does not react significantly to increases in 
government spending in the US. Similarly, in Spain investment does not 
appear too persistent to a government expenditure shock (De Castro & 
de Cos, 2008), while in Italy the impact is evidenced in the fourth quarter 
at about 0.2 percentage points of GDP (Giordano et al., 2007).
Private consumption reacts in a Keynesian manner after a government 
spending shock; still the effect is not the same when the spending shock 
occurs due to increase in government consumption or due to govern-
ment investment (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Responses of private consumption and private investment to an increase in 
government spending component (alternative model)
Source: Author’s estimation
Both (government consumption and investment) shocks increase private 
consumption, but the effect after a government consumption shock is 
significant, permanent and larger throughout the whole period (Figure 
4). On the other hand, the response of private investment is larger, sig-
nificant and permanent after a government investment shock. Similarly, 
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Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen & Wolff (2006) find that in Germany after a gov-
ernment investment shock private investment increase47,48. 
When investigating tax shocks on private consumption and private in-
vestment it is noticeable that the effect on impact is negative in both 
cases, but with a different development afterwards (Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Responses to an increase in taxes (alternative model)
Source: Author’s estimation
After a tax shock private consumption drops and remains permanent and 
negative throughout the whole time horizon. On the other hand, the effect 
of the same shock on investment is much larger but it stabilizes after the 
first year. Blanchard & Perotti (2002) reveal that both increases in taxes 
and increases in government spending have a strong negative effect on 
investment spending in the US. Moreover, the response of investment 
after a tax shock is insignificant in Germany and Spain (Heppke-Falk, 
Tenhofen & Wolff, 2006; and de Castro & de Cos, 2008; respectively).
In the Croatian case it can be concluded that results go in favor of 
Keynesian assumptions because on one hand a spending shock affects 
positively private consumption, and on the other hand the response of 
private investment to a spending shock is opposite of its response to a 
tax shock. 
Recalling that the baseline model results showed that a tax shock neg-
atively affects output, it is yet possible to inspect whether the negative 
effect comes more from direct or indirect taxes. The results are in line 
with the expectations, since one would expect that, due to its high share 
in total taxes, indirect taxes category mainly affects economic activity. 
47 Moreover, in this case Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen and Wolff (2006) find that output reaction 
is weak and insignificant in case of a government consumption shock, being strong, signif-
icant and persistent in case of a government investment shock.
48 It is important to point that, no matter of the GDP component included in the model and 
of the spending component under analysis, the effect on prices and interest rates results to 
be insignificant and of similar pattern as in the baseline model. A government consumption 
shock makes prices fluctuate around zero (after an initial positive impact) and stabilize after 
a year, while the effect on interest rates is negative and permanent. A government invest-
ment shock exercises a small and negative effect on prices and a positive and permanent 
effect on interest rates, the latter being expected in accordance to the increase in output.
117
Results show that an indirect tax shock negatively affects private con-
sumption for three years, when the effect stabilizes around zero (Figure 
6). Private investment also reacts negatively after an indirect tax shock, 
but the effect fades out after two years. 
Figure 6. Responses of private consumption and private investment to an increase in 
indirect and direct taxes (alternative model)
Source: Author’s estimation
The response of output components to a tax shock are a bit “odd” in the 
Croatian case. An increase in direct taxes leads to an increase in private 
consumption (although the magnitude of the effect is really small) and to 
a decrease in private investment at impact only. This may be also due to 
several reasons. On one hand methodological limitations may influence 
the results, since a SVAR model implies time-invariant elasticities. In case 
of direct taxes on the Croatian case this may be a problem due to the fact 
that, since its introduction in 1994 the personal and corporate income 
tax legislations are characterized by numerous changes (more than forty 
in case of personal income tax only). Although, the elasticity estimation 
procedure embraces all those changes it ends up as a one-number only, 
which cannot effectively represent the whole time span under analysis. 
Indirectly, these odd results may be attributed to the problem of “shadow 
economy” in the Croatian case. Namely, an increase in personal income 
taxes reduces employers’ incentives to hire new persons. Since dec-
ades, Croatia registers a substantial gap between the registered and the 
LFS unemployment rate, meaning that a substantial number of persons 
registered as unemployed exercise on the labour market. This share of 
individuals gets paid, and thus consumes (keep in mind that the direct 
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tax revenues do not capture labour market outcomes). A further research 
extended for labour market outcomes is needed in order to deeply inves-
tigate the propagation of direct tax shocks49. 
4. Policy recommendations and conclusion
This paper assesses the stabilization effects of fiscal policy in Croatia in 
the period 1996-2011 using the structural vector autoregression model 
proposed by Blanchard & Perotti (2002). Results show that output moves 
in line with Keynesian propositions, i.e. it increases after a government 
spending shock and decreases after a tax shock. The impact multiplier 
is above 2 in both cases, but being positive when the government uses 
spending- and negative when using a tax-increase. Moreover the effects 
on output are permanent and significant in a long term. When extending 
the model for an additional macroeconomic variable, among others it is 
worth mentioning the following results: (a) private consumption and pri-
vate investment follow the same responses as output after a government 
shock, (b) government consumption shock leads to a significant increase 
in private consumption, while government investment exercise an even 
more important effect on private investment, (c) a drop in output and 
private consumption after a tax shock is mainly driven by indirect (not 
direct) taxes.
If considering the mentioned results through the lenses of the recent cri-
sis that affected the economic activity of all countries across the globe, 
there are several relevant points. In order to achieve fiscal consolidation 
Croatian governments during the last five years mainly opted for discre-
tionary measures on the tax side of the budget, i.e. increment of the VAT 
standard rate twice, several increments of excise duties, introduction of 
the so-called “crisis tax” levied on net wages, and reduction of the per-
sonal income tax base in all three tax brackets. The spending side of 
the budget grew more or less according to constant rates and was left 
intact, since the governments were confident that increased revenues 
would cover eventual deficits. Having in mind the shown results, that an 
increase in taxes leads to a drop in output (being the multiplier larger 
than 2) and that an increase in indirect taxes, as Croatian major revenue 
spring, leads to a significant decrease in private consumption and invest-
ment, the effectiveness of the taken discretionary measures as stabiliz-
ing tool are under question. Although this will be possible to empirically 
investigate, once the crisis period ends and the data become available, it 
is already noted that Croatia, among EU countries, registers the longest 
recessionary period. Moreover, the assigned excessive deficit procedure 
proves that taken were a leading force in creating a so-called fiscal cliff. 
Additionally, a drop in output resulted to a huge drop in employment, 
giving additional headaches to the Croatian government, since it implies 
even higher spending and lower revenue collection. 
49 This paper does not go into detail regarding this respect mainly because of the availa-
bility of labour market data for the given (1996Q1-2011Q4) time span. Reducing the time 
span would seriously lower the power of tests in a 6 variable SVAR. 
119
References:
Barro, R. (1987.): The economic effects of budget deficits and govern-
ment spending: introduction. Journal of Monetary Economics, 20(2), 
p.191-193.
Baxa, J. (2010.): What the data say about the effects of fiscal policy in 
the Czech Republic? Mathematical Methods in Economics, p. 24-29.
Benazić,́ M. (2006.): Fiskalna politika i gospodarska aktivnost u Republici 
Hrvatskoj: model kointegracije, Ekonomski pregled, 57(12), p. 882-918.
Biau, O., Girard, E. (2005.): Politique budgétaire et dynamique économ-
ique en France: l’approche VAR structurel, Revue economique, 56(3), 
p. 755-764.
Blanchard, O., Perotti, R. (2002.): An Empirical Characterization of the 
Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on 
Output, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), p. 1329-68.
Bouthevillain, C., Cour-Thimann, P., van der Dool, G., de Cos, P., Lange-
nus, G., Mohr, M., Momigliano, S., Tujula, M. (2001.): Cyclically Adjusted 
Budget Balances: an Alternative Approach, ECB Working Paper No. 77., 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp077.pdf  (Accessed 
on October 2013)
Caldara, D., Kamps, C. (2006.): What Do we Know about the Effects 
of Fiscal Policy Shocks? A Comparative Analysis, Computing in Eco-
nomics and Finance Series, No. 257/2006, http://repec.org/ sce2006/
up.9905.1140994990.pdf (Accessed on September 2013)
Caldara, D., Kamps, C. (2008.): What are the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks? a VAR-based comparative analysis, ECB Working Papers se-
ries No. 877, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp877.pdf 
(Accessed on August 2013)
Davidson, R., MacKinnon, J. (1993.): Estimation and Inference in Econo-
metrics, London: Oxford University Press
de Castro, F.,  de Cos, P. (2008.): The economic effects of fiscal policy: 
The case of Spain, Journal of Macroeconomics, 30(3), p. 1005-1028.
Edelberg, W., Eichenbaum, M., Fisher, J. (1999.): Understanding the Ef-
fects of a Shock to Government Purchases, Review of Economics Dy-
namics, 2(1), p. 166-206.
Fatás, A., Mihov, I. (2001.): The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Consumption 
and Employment: Theory and Evidence, Center for Economic Policy Re-
search, Discussion Paper No. 2760. http://www.cepr.org/active/publica-
tions/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2760 (Accessed on August 2013)
Giordano, R., Momigliano, S., Neri, S., Perotti, R. (2005.): The Effects 
of Fiscal Policy in Italy: Estimates With a Svar Model, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2028353 (Accessed on July 2013) 
120
Grdović Gnip, A. (2011.): Discretionary measures and automatic stabiliz-
ers in the Croatian fiscal policy, Ekonomska istraživanja, 24(3), p. 45-74.
Heppke-Falk, K. Tenhofen, J., Wolff, G. (2006.): The Macroeconomic 
Effects of Exogenous Fiscal Policy Shocks in Germany: a Disaggregat-
ed SVAR Analysis, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series 1: 
Economic Studies No 41/2006, http://www.eea-esem.com/files/papers/
EEA-ESEM/2007/1937/Heppke-FalkTenhofenWolff2006final.pdf (Ac-
cessed on August 2013)
Jemec, N. Strojan Kastelec, A., Delakorda, A. (2011.): How do fiscal 
shocks affect the macroeconomic dynamics in the Slovenian economy, 
Banka Slovenije: Prikazi in analize 2/2011, http://www.bsi.si/library/in-
cludes/datoteka.asp?DatotekaId=4444 (Accessed on July 2013)
Kirchner, M., Cimadomo, J., Hauptmeier, S. (2010.): Transmission of 
government spending shocks in the euro area: Time variation and driving 
forces, ECB Working Paper Series No. 1219., https://www.ecb.europa.
eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1219.pdf (Accessed on August 2013)
MacKinnon, J. G. (1996.): Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit 
Root and Cointegration Tests, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11(6), p. 
601-618.
Mancellari, A. (2011.): Macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in Albania: a 




Marcellino, M. (2002.): Some Stylized Facts on Non-Systematic Fiscal 
Policy in the Euro Area, Center for Economic Policy Research Discus-
sion Papers No. 3635, http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discus-
sion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3635 (Accessed on September 2013)
Mirdala, R. (2009.): Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks in the European 
Transition Economies, MPRA Paper No. 19481, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/19481/ (Accessed on August 2013)
Mountford, A., Uhlig, H. (2002.): What Are the Effects of Fiscal Policy 
Shocks? Center for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 
3338, http://qed.econ.queensu.ca:80/jae/2009-v24.6/ (Accessed on 
September 2013)
Pappa, E. (2003.): New-keynesian or RBC transmission? The effects of 
fiscal policy in labour markets. http://www.aueb.gr/crete2004/docs/Pap-
pa.pdf (Accessed on October 2013)
Perotti, R. (2002.): What Do We Know About the Effects of Fiscal Policy? 
In: M. Bordignon and D. da Empoli, ed. Politica fiscale: flessibilità dei 
mercati e crescita, Milano: Franco Angeli, Ch. 4.
Perotti, R. (2004.): Estimating the effects of fiscal policy In OECD coun-
tries, http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0503/fpoecd.pdf  (Ac-
cessed on September 2013)
121
Ramey, V. A., Shapiro, M. D. (1998.): Costly Capital Reallocation and 
the Effects of Government spending, Carneige-Rochester Conference 
series on Public Policy 48 (June), p. 145-194. 
Ravnik, R., Žilić, I. (2011.): The use of SVAR analysis in determining the 
effects of fiscal shocks in Croatia, Financial theory and practice, 35(1), 
p. 25-58.
Rodden, J., Wibbles, E. (2010.): Fiscal Decentralization and The Busi-
ness Cycle: The Empirical Study Of Seven Federations, Economics and 
Politics, 22(3), p. 37-67.
Rukelj, D. (2009.): Modelling Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions 
in Croatia Using Structural Vector Error Correction Model, Privredna 
kretanja i ekonomska politika, 121(2009), p. 27-58. 
Šimović, H., Deskar-Škrbić, M. (2013.): Dynamic effects of fiscal policy 
and fiscal multipliers in Croatia, Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u 
Rijeci, 31(1), p. 55-78.
122
izv. prof. dr. sc. Hrvoje Šimović
Ekonomski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu 
e-mail: hsimovic@efzg.hr 
doc. dr. sc. Tomislav Ćorić
Ekonomski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu 
e-mail: tcoric@efzg.hr 
Milan Deskar-Škrbić
Erste i Steiermarkische Banka d.d.
e-mail: mdskrbic@erstebank.com
MOGUĆNOSTI I OGRANIČENJA FISKALNE POLITIKE  
U HRVATSKOJ50
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF FISCAL POLICY 
IN CROATIA
SAŽETAK
U radu se analiziraju mogućnosti i ograničenja fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj. Prvo 
se analiziraju brojna ograničenja fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj od (ne)koordinaci-
je fiskalne s monetarnom politikom, lošeg proračunskog planiranja, trendova u 
kretanju javnih prihoda, problem postojeće visine i strukture javnih rashoda te 
problem financiranja deficita. U središnjem dijelu analize ispituju se mogućnos-
ti stabilizacijske uloge fiskalne politike kroz analizu utjecaja prihoda i rashoda 
opće konsolidirane države na kretanje BDP-a. U tu svrhu razvijen je strukturni 
VAR model kojim se ispituje koje komponente javnih prihoda i rashoda najviše 
doprinose ekonomskom rastu u Hrvatskoj. Nadalje, mogućnosti fiskalne politike 
sintetiziraju se kroz prijedlog mjera tzv. pametne fiskalne konsolidacije kao te-
melja učinkovito stabilizacijsko djelovanje fiskalne politike.
Ključne riječi: fiskalna politika, multiplikatori javnih rashoda, porezni multiplika-
tori, ekonomski rast, pametna fiskalna konsolidacija, Hrvatska
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the possibilities and limitations of fiscal policy in Croatia. 
Firstly, we analyze important limitations of fiscal policy such as lack of coordi-
nation of fiscal and monetary policy, inadequate budget planning, increasing 
tax pressure, the size and structure of public expenditures and deficit financing 
50 This is a reprint of a paper published in the Ekonomski pregled, 65 (6), 2014., p. 541- 
575, http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/196254 
This work has been supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under pro-
ject number IP-201311-8174 and in part by the University of Rijeka under project number 
13.02.1.2.02
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problems. In the central part of the analysis we empirically estimate the possibil-
ities of stabilizing role of fiscal policy by analyzing the impact of general govern-
ment revenues and expenditures on GDP growth. For this purpose we develop 
a structural VAR model to evaluate the impact of various components of public 
expenditures and revenues on economic growth in Croatia. Further, fiscal policy 
possibilities are synthesized through the proposed measures of so-called “smart 
fiscal consolidation” which is the foundation for achieving the stabilizing role of 
fiscal policy. 
Key words: Fiscal policy, expenditure multipliers, tax multipliers, economic 
growth, smart fiscal consolidation, Croatia
1. Uvod
U uvjetima ekonomske krize često se preispituju mogućnosti i ograničen-
ja stabilizacijske fiskalne politike. Rasprava se posebno intenzivira u vri-
jeme donošenja državnog proračuna, odnosno rebalansa. S obzirom 
na učestale rebalanse državnog proračuna u Hrvatskoj kao i negativne 
projekcije ekonomskog rasta, za očekivati je kako će fiskalna politika još 
neko vrijeme biti predmet rasprave kako u znanstvenoj i stručnoj, tako 
i u široj javnosti. Tome će posebno doprinijeti članstvo u Europskoj uniji 
(EU) i procedura prekomjernog deficita.
Teza od koje se polazi u ovom radu je da i uz brojna ograničenja fiskalna 
politika u Hrvatskoj ima određene mogućnosti stabilizacijskog djelovanja 
koje se mogu postići kroz promjenu strukture javnih rashoda i prihoda. 
Kako bi se istražile mogućnosti fiskalne politike potrebno je izračunati 
koji segmenti javnih rashoda i javnih prihoda imaju najveći multiplikativni 
učinak na BDP. Osnovni cilj rada je procjeniti veličinu multiplikatora po-
jedinih komponenti javnih rashoda i javnih prihoda u Hrvatskoj, što je pre-
ma uvidu u postojeću literaturu predstavlja prvi takav pokušaj. Također, 
cilj rada je analizirati u organičenja fiskalne politike u Hrvatkoj koja su 
brojna i kompleksna te će imati značajan utjecaj foruliranje diskrecijskih 
mjera fiskalne politike u predstojećem srednjoročnom razdoblju. 
Kako bi se ostvarili ciljevi istraživanja, nakon uvoda, u drugom dijelu rada 
daje iscrpan pregled dosadašnjih istraživanja o fiskalnoj politici u Hrvat-
skoj. U trećem dijelu rada analizirana su ograničenja fiskalne politike koja 
se pretežno se promatraju kroz razdoblje od 2004. do 2012. godine, koje 
najbolje ocrtava posljednji ekonomski ciklus (prvo visoke i stabilne stope 
rasta BDP-a, te kasnije recesija). Četvrti dio radi predstavlja središnji dio 
istraživanja u kojem se analiziraju mogućnosti fiskalne politike. U ovom di-
jelu predložene su konkretne promjene u strukturi javne potrošnje odnos-
no mjere tzv. pametne fiskalne konsolidacije. Posljednji dio je zaključak. 
2. Pregled literature o fiskalnoj politici u Hrvatskoj
U Hrvatskoj postoji relativno velik broj radova vezanih uz fiskalnu poli-
tiku. Stvaranjem određenih preduvjeta (izgradnja bazi podataka, duljina 
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vremenskih serija itd.), posljednjih godina intenzivirao se broj ali i kvalite-
ta istraživanja. Ovisno o području, postojeća istraživanja o fiskalnoj polit-
ici mogu se svrstati u nekoliko skupina. U Tablici 1. dan se sažet pregled 
istraživanja primarno empirijskih radova, ovisno o području istraživanja, 
s tim da je potrebno napomenuti kako određeni radovi sadrže doprinos u 






nomski rast ili 
(pojedinu) eko-
nomsku aktivnost
Pivac i Jurun (2002), 
Benazić (2006), Rukelj 
(2009), Šimović (2009), 
Darvas (2010), Ravnik i 
Zilić (2011), Tkalec i Vi-
zek (2011), Šimović & 
Deskar-Škrbić (2013), Gr-
dović Gnip (2013; 2014), 
Deskar-Škrbić et al. (2014) 
Pretežno se radi o pozitivnim krat-
koročnim učincima javnih rashoda 
i negativnim učincima poreza na 
gospodarski rast.
Utjecaj strukture 
javnih rashoda (i 
prihoda)
Sever et al. (2011), Dalić 
(2013a)
Uglavnom kapitalni rashodi su ti 
koji imaju pozitivne dugoročne i 
kratkoročne učinke. Tekući rasho-
di (pojedine kategorije) mogu imati 





ljek (2003), Švaljek et 
al. (2009), Grdović Gnip 
(2011), Dalić (2013b)
Uglavnom procikličnog karaktera, 
iako postoje razdoblja promjenjivog 
karaktera fiskalne politike. Djelova-
nje automatskih stabilizatora rela-
tivno slabo.
Koordinacija mo-
netarne i fiskalne 
politike (ili nekih 
elemenata fiskal-
ne politike, npr. 
upravljanje jav-
nim dugom)
Švaljek (2003), Babić et al. 
(2001), Rukelj (2009), Gr-
gurek i Vidaković (2009), 
Mihaljek (2009), Zdunić 
(2010), Ćorić et al. (2013, 
2014)
Uglavnom se ističe problem slabe 
koordinacije ili nikakve koordinacije 
fiskalne i monetarne politike, te rizi-
ka kojim fiskalna politika (zaduživa-
nje) može ugroziti stabilnost cijena 
(cilj monetarne politike).
Održivost fiskal-
ne politike (i jav-
nog duga)
Babić et al. (2001), Krz-
nar (2002), Sever (2005), 
Babić et al. (2003), Miha-
ljek (2003, 2009), Sopek 
(2009, 2010, 2011)
Uglavnom neodržive projekcije po-
stojećeg modela fiskalne politike i 
zaduživanja. Ograničena (ekspan-
zivnu) uloga fiskalne politike u Hr-
vatskoj uvjetovanju ograničenjima 
u visini javnog i/ili vanjskog duga.
Politička ekono-
mija i fiskalna 
politika
Bratić (2004), Klašnja 
(2008), Vučković (2011), 
Vučković i Basarac Sertić 
(2013), Mačkić (2014)
Utjecaj na rast rashoda i deficita 
prije izbora, posebno socijalnih iz-
dataka (oportunistički ciklusi). Na 
rast rashoda utječu fragmentiranost 
vlade. Izvršna vlast ima odlučujuću 
ulogu u proračunskom procesu.
Tablica 1. Empirijska istraživanja o fiskalnoj politici u Hrvatskoj
Izvor: obrada autora
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Prvu skupinu čine radovi koji prema različitim metodologijama istražuju 
učinke djelovanja fiskalne politike. Najbrojniji su radovi koji koriste VAR 
(ili VEC) metodologiju (uključujući i SVAR). Iako postoje određene raz-
like u rezultatima istraživanja, svi radovi ukazuju na određene pozitivne 
mogućnosti djelovanja fiskalne politike na ekonomski rast. Uglavnom se 
javni rashodi ističu kao ključni instrument fiskalne politike koji ima pozi-
tivan učinak na gospodarski rast, i to uglavnom u kratkom roku. Slično 
vrijedi i za poreze, pri čemu je njihov utjecaj na ekonomski rast pretežno 
negativan (Benazić, 2006; Rukelj, 2009; Belullo i Dužman, 2013; Šimov-
ić i Deskar-Škrbić, 2013, Grdović Gnip, 2013 i 2014.). No, postoje i ra-
dovi koji nude bitno drukčije rezultate, što ukazuje na potrebu opreza 
pri interpretaciji podataka (Šimović, 2009; Ravnik i Žilić, 2011). Nadalje, 
Tkalec i Vizek (2011) primjenom višestruke regresijske analize pokazuju 
da državna potrošnja ima signifikantan učinak na prerađivačku industriju 
u Hrvatskoj, pogotovo na sektore s niskom razinom tehnologije.
Na sličan zaključak vezano uz smjer djelovanja ukupnih prihoda i ra-
shoda upućuju i radovi koji se dominantno bave strukturom javnih pri-
hoda i rashoda. Sever et al. (2011) VAR analizom utvrdili su da su ka-
pitalni rashodi ti koji i u dugom i u kratkom roku imaju pozitivan učinak 
na gospodarski rast, dok su rashodi za dobra i usluge te subvencije 
značajni tek u kratkom roku. Tekući rashodi i rashodi za plaće nemaju 
pozitivan učinak na BDP (Sever et al., 2011). Slične zaključke iznosi i 
Dalić (2013a) na temelju panel analize Hrvatske i novih zemalja članica 
EU-12. Također, ukazuje se na problem hirovitosti fiskalne politike koja 
u pogledu državnih investicija može također negativno djelovati na rast 
(Dalić, 2013a). 
Bez obzira na visinu i strukturu javnih prihoda i rashoda, važno je na-
pomenuti da je Hrvatska mala otvorena ekonomija te da otvorenost 
privrede i učinak izlijevanja dodatno umanjuju eventualne pozitivne 
učinke fiskalne politike na ekonomski rast (Deskar-Škrbić et al., 2014).
Također, treba uzeti u obzir kako je fiskalna politika u zemljama u razvo-
ju ali i tranzicijskim zemljama prociklična (Ilzetski & Vegh, 2008). To se 
posebice odnosi na pojedine kategorije javnih rashoda koji daju dodatni 
impuls rastu (npr. kapitalni rashodi). Iako u Hrvatskoj  istraživanja tek 
parcijalno ukazuju na procikličnosti fiskalne politike (Švaljek et al., 2009; 
Grdović Gnip, 2011), naša zemlja je uključena u neka šira istraživanja 
iz kojih se takav zaključak može sa sigurnošću iznijeti (Darvas, 2010; 
Dalić, 2013b).
Kad je riječ o karakteru fiskalne politike, Jurković (2002) nudi prvu 
značajniju analizu za razdoblje od 1994. do 2000. godine. Prema autoru, 
fiskalna politika u tom razdoblju bila je prije svega podređena punjenju 
proračuna i financiranju često preambiciozno utvrđenih prava i nereal-
nih aspiracija, a sve to nauštrb ostvarivanju stabilizacijskih i razvojnih 
ciljeva. Na taj način, fiskalna politika je uglavnom neutralno djelovala na 
očekivanu stopu gospodarskog rasta. Dojam je da se u tom razdoblju 
utvrđeni obrazac fiskalne politike do danas nije promijenio. 
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Kasnija ekonometrijska istraživanja preko procjene ciklički prilagođenog 
proračunskog salda omogućuju izvođenje pokazatelja fiskalnog stan-
ja koji upućuju na karakter fiskalne politike. U razdoblju od 1996. do 
2008. godine može se govoriti o izmjenjivanju razdoblja procikličke i an-
ticikličke fiskalne politike, pri čemu posljednjih godina prevladava restrik-
tivna i prociklička politika (Švaljek et al. 2009). Nadalje, Grdović Gnip 
(2011) analizira u kojoj mjeri automatski stabilizatori odnosno diskreci-
jske mjere doprinose uravnoteženju poslovnog ciklusa. Rezultati ukazu-
ju na relativno slabo djelovanje automatskih stabilizatora u odnosu na 
zemlje EU i OECD-a, odnosno da je stabilizacijsko djelovanje fiskalne 
politike potpomognuto diskrecijskim mjerama što je u Hrvatskoj dovelo 
do destabilizacije ekonomske aktivnosti u procikličnom smjeru (Grdović 
Gnip, 2011).
Kad se govori o koordinaciji fiskalne i monetarne politike u Hrvatskoj, 
ne postoji velik broj empirijskih radova (SVAR) koji izravno analiziraju 
interakciju monetarne i fiskalne politike (Rukelj, 2009; Ćorić et al., 2014). 
Uglavnom prevladavaju pregledni radovi koji analiziraju interakciju mon-
etarne politike s politikom javnog zaduživanja (Babić et al., 2001; Raspu-
dić Gomeljić, 2007 i 2012). Bez obzira na aspekt analize, prevladavaju 
stavovi o slaboj ili nikakvoj koordinaciji fiskalne i monetarne politike u Hr-
vatskoj, ili pak potpune koordiniranosti u slučaju obostranog procikličkog 
djelovanja (Grgurek i Vidaković, 2009). 
Uloga monetarne politike često se propitkuje (Jakovčević et al., 2011), 
ali se od strane kritičara često zaboravlja da se na Hrvatsku kao malu 
otvorenu ekonomiju mogu primijeniti predikcije Mundell-Fleming modela 
odnosno tzv. nemoguće trojstvo makroekonomskih ciljeva (engl. impos-
sible trinity), što implicira nemogućnost istovremenog održavanja fiksnog 
deviznog tečaja, slobodu kretanja kapitala i nezavisnost monetarne poli-
tike. I u tom kontekstu postoje radovi koji negativno promatraju postojeći 
koncept monetarne i fiskalne politike (Zdunić, 2010), kao i radovi koji vide 
prostor u mogućnosti zajedničkog djelovanja monetarne i fiskalne politike 
u jačanju konkurentnosti hrvatskog gospodarstva (Ćorić et al., 2013).
Kad se govori o održivosti fiskalne politike, riječ je području u kojem je 
kod dosadašnjih istraživanja prisutna najveća razina usklađenosti rezul-
tata istraživanja. Uglavnom se već više od jednog desetljeća upozorava 
na neodrživi koncept fiskalne politike, pogotovo u segmentu deficitarnog 
financiranja potrošnje, što samo dodatno ograničava potencijalno (ek-
spanzivno) djelovanje fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj (Tablica 1.). 
Ključ neuspjeha i nelogičnosti u provedbi fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj 
najbolje se može objasniti kroz prizmu političke ekonomije. Na žalost, 
broj i opseg empirijskih istraživanja u tom području vrlo su ograničeni. 
Svakako je potrebno spomenuti kako na rast državne potrošnje značajan 
utjecaj ima fragmentiranost vlade (koalicije) (Vučković i Basarac Sertić, 
2013), zatim oportunistički političko-poslovni i političko-proračunski ciklu-
si na središnjoj i lokalnoj razini prije i poslije izbora (Klašnja, 2008; Vučk-
ović, 2010; Mačkić, 2014), čemu svakako doprinosi veći utjecaj izvršne 
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vlasti (Vlade) u odnosu na zakonodavnu (Sabor) u proračunskom proce-
su (Bratić, 2004). 
Ne bi bilo korektno ne spomenuti čitav niz radova i teorijskih rasprava 
koji su značajno doprinijeli znanstvenoj raspravi o ulozi fiskalne politike 
u Hrvatskoj. Potrebno je napomenuti kako je većina tih radova nastala 
tijekom globalne ekonomske i financije krize čiji se negativan u Hrvatskoj 
još uvijek osjeti. Upravo je stabilizacijska funkcija fiskalne politike postala 
primarni fokus istraživanja u Hrvatskoj, što nije bio toliki slučaj prije krize 
(Jurčić, 2010; Mates, 2011), kao i kritika politike fiskalne konsolidacije i 
štednje (Radošević, 2012). Naprotiv, radovi o fiskalnoj politici u Hrvat-
skoj prije krize ukazivali su na iscrpljivanje fiskalnog kapaciteta, nužnost 
konsolidacije i smanjivanja javne potrošnje, nužnost intervencije u pre-
raspodjeli dohotka te poticanju ekonomskog rasta i razvoja kroz strukture 
elemente i poticanje ponude (Družić, 1999; Škare i Škrtić, 2002; Kraft i 
Stučka, 2002; Krtalić, 2005; Družić i Krtalić, 2006). Nadalje, u čitavom nizu 
istraživanja upozorava se na neusklađenost fiskalne i drugih ekonomskih 
politika te nužnost izgradnje primjerenijih socijalnih odnosa, kao i realok-
aciju državne potrošnje infrastrukturnim i kapitalnim rashodima (Družić, 
1998; Sever, 2002a i 2002b; Sever et al., 2009; Drezgić, 2009 i 2011). 
3. Ograničenja i nedostaci fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj
Ograničenja fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj su brojna. Ona se ogleda-
ju kroz (ne)koordinaciju fiskalne s monetarnom politikom, kontinuirano 
loše proračunsko planiranje i nepovoljne projekcije gospodarskog rasta, 
trendove u kretanju javnih prihoda, problem postojeće visine i strukture 
javnih rashoda te problem financiranja deficita i nepostojećeg sustava 
upravljanja javnim dugom. Svako ograničenje može biti zasebno pod-
ručje istraživanja, ali u kontekstu ovog rada promatra se kroz prizmu 
stabilizacijskog djelovanja fiskalne politike.
3.1. „Policy mix“ i uloga monetarne politike
U domaćoj ekonomiji je tijekom posljednjih 20 godina generiran čitav 
anomalija koje u velikoj mjeri onemogućavaju značajniji doprinos mon-
etarne politike ukupnoj ekonomskoj politici (valutna klauzula, neslužbe-
na dolarizacija/euroizacija, nepovjerenje u domaću valutu izd.). Nadal-
je, značajan utjecaj na razvoj sustava imala je činjenica da je domaći 
bankarski sektor krajem 90-ih godina u najvećoj mjeri prodan stranim 
vlasnicima. U uvjetima relativno slabe domaće likvidnosti i nastojanja 
središnje banke da kontrolira novčanu masu, domaće banke okrenule 
su se inozemnim izvorima sredstava. U okolnostima stalnog jeftinog 
novčanog priljeva iz inozemstva, središnja banka je u potpunosti ig-
norirana kao „posljednje utočište“. Njezine kamatne stope bile su i os-
tale nereferentne. Unatoč rastu BDP-a, negativni trendovi rasta vanjskog 
duga i deficita bilance plaćanja, s vremenom su postajali sve veći prob-
lem. Pokušaji središnje banke da uspori vanjsko zaduživanje banaka 
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stigli su relativno kasno. Njezina funkcije emisije novca svela se na in-
strument deviznih aukcija, dok su operacije na otvorenom tržištu kao 
osnovni instrument moderne monetarne politike bile i jesu od sekundar-
nog značaja. Na žalost, doprinos središnje banke suzbijanju negativnih 
trendova i više je nego ograničen jer je postojeće stanje u monetarnoj 
sferi ekonomije gotovo nemoguće značajnije izmijeniti (vidjeti više Ćorić 
et al., 2014).
U takvom režimu monetarne politike, koja se zasniva na stabilnom teča-
ju, središnja banka je znatno ograničena u suzbijanju utjecaja inozemnih 
šokova i stimuliranju gospodarske aktivnosti u realnom sektoru. Smanjivši 
regulatorno opterećenje i povećavši time likvidnost banaka središnja ban-
ka je djelomično uspjela samo neutralizirati negativan utjecaj vanjskih šok-
ova. Također, središnja banka je jednim dijelom uspjela spriječiti državu u 
istiskivanju realnog sektora s tržišta kredita, koji je nastao zbog povećanih 
potreba za deficitarnim financiranjem države (Bokan et al., 2009).
Takva reakcija monetarne politike je bila jedina moguća ali nedovoljna 
da se preokrenu ekonomski trendovi. Zbog postojećih ograničenja mon-
etarne politike, u fiskalnoj se politici često vidi jedina mogućnost znača-
jnijeg djelovanja u uvjetima krize. Posebno se od HNB-a ističe potreba 
za jačom fiskalnom prilagodbom i konsolidacijom, što je razumljivo jer bi 
se time prije svega olakšala pozicija HNB-a u provedbi monetarne poli-
tike. S druge strane, ako se štedi u uvjetima krize kakva je onda uloga 
fiskalne politike u poticanju (održavanju) ekonomske aktivnosti? 
Zbog toga, u cijelom razdoblju krize postavlja se pitanje da li bi zbog kred-
itnih ograničenja (visok i rastući javni dug i deficit, pad kreditnog rejtinga, 
poskupljenje tržišnih izvora financiranja) ekspanzivna fiskalna politika u 
Hrvatskoj bila učinkovita, odnosno koliko bi umanjila fiskalnu održivost i 
financijsku stabilnost. Budući da su diskrecijske mjere fiskalne politike u 
domeni političkog procesa donošenja odluka, pravovremeno djelovanje 
fiskalne politike, bez obzira na moguća ekonomska ograničenja, često 
se svodi na domenu „magije“, dok je monetarna politika ostala u domeni 
„znanosti“ (prema Leeper, 2010). Navedena Leeper-ova (2010) hiper-
bola najbolje oslikava postojeći „policy mix“, odnosno (ne)koordinaciju 
fiskalne i monetarne politike u Hrvatskoj.51 Zbog navedenih ograničenja 
postojeća interakcija se svodi na primarno prilagođavanje fiskalne poli-
tike monetarnoj politici, iako bi po logici problema u uvjetima krize trebalo 
biti obrnuto (Leeper, 2010).
3.2. Proračunsko planiranje, projekcije rasta i kretanje javnih  
prihoda i rashoda
Jedna od temeljnih pretpostavki za vođenje odgovorne i kredibilne 
fiskalne politike je proračunsko planiranje i značajno pridržavanje zacr-
tanih planova u srednjoročnom razdoblju koje planira kroz Smjernice 
51 Za teorijsku analizu i kritiku interakcije fiskalne i monetarne politike u Hrvatskoj vidjeti 
Drezgić (2011).
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ekonomske i fiskalne politike. Na žalost, Hrvatska je u razdoblju od 1995. 
do 2009. godine gotovo svake godine imala minimalno jedan rebalans 
državnog proračuna, iznimka su davne 1996. i 1997. godina (Beš i Ott, 
2010; Švaljek, 2009). Od 2010. do 2013. godine ta se praksa nastavlja, 
odnosno u posljednje četiri godine jedino u 2011. godini nije bilo rebal-
ansa dok su u 2013. godini bila čak dva rebalansa državnog proračuna.52 
Također, i u tekućoj 2014. godini nije izostao rebalans, nadamo se jedini 
u ovoj godini. U skladu s lošim proračunskim planiranjem ali i negativnim 
ekonomskim kretanjima nakon 2008. godine, sve srednjoročne projekci-
je fiskalne politike uglavnom se nisu ostvarile (vidjeti Ministarstvo financi-
ja, razna godišta).
Temelj za svako proračunsko planiranje, odnosno za planiranje fiskalne 
politike u narednom razdoblju su projekcije rasta BDP-a u srednjem 
roku. U Tablici 2. prikazane su projekcije rasta BDP-a za Hrvatsku od 
strane Vlade RH, Ekonomske komisije, Međunarodnog monetarnog fon-
da (MMF), Hrvatske narodne banke (HNB) i Ekonomskog instituta Za-
greb (EIZ).
2012 2013p 2014p 2015p 2016-18 
Vlada RH (prosinac 2013.) -2,0 0,2 1,3 2,2 2,5 (2016) 
Vlada RH (ožujak 2014.) -2,0 ? ? ? ?
MMF -2,0 -0,6 1,5 - 2,5 (2018)
Europska komisija (Jesen 2003) -2,0 -0,7 0,5 1,2 -
Europska komisija (Zima 2014) -2,0 -0,7 0,5 1,2
HNB -2,0 -0,8 0,7 0,9 -
EIZ -2,0 -0,7 0,0 1,0
Tablica 2. Projekcije rasta BDP-a za Hrvatsku
Izvor: Ministarstvo financija (2013: 12), European Commission (2013b: 67; 2014a: 69), IMF 
(2013: 59 i 157), HNB (2013: 4), EIZ (2014).
Već je jasno da će Hrvatska 2013. godinu, odnosno petu godinu zare-
dom, završiti s negativnom stopom rasta BDP-a, a u 2014. godini očeku-
je se stagnacija ili blagi rast. Ono što je važno analizirati jest na kojim 
činjenicama Vlada RH bazira svoj optimizam. Najveći doprinos rastu u 
razdoblju od 2014. do 2016. godine Vlada vidi u rastu bruto investicija 
u fiksni kapital. S druge strane, Europska komisija ne očekuje takav do-
prinos rastu kroz povećanje investicija već primarno kroz blagi oporavak 
domaće potražnje. Na neki način to je i očekivano jer je upravo najveći 
doprinos padu ekonomske aktivnosti posljedica pada domaće potražnje, 
prije svega osobne potrošnje koja čini najveći udio u hrvatskom BDP-u. 
Također, potrebno je spomenuti kako su sve navedene projekcije rasta 
BDP-a skromne. Čak i najviša predviđena stopa rasta BPD-a od 2,5% 
ne može biti dovoljna da okrene trendove u javnim financija, odnos-
no da učini javni dug održivim (npr. vidjeti procjene kod Sopek (2009, 
2010 i 2011)).
52 Važno je napomenuti kako je u 2012. godini, uz rebalans u studenom 2012., zbog par-
lamentarnih izbora bilo tzv. privremeno financiranje za prvo tromjesečje tako da je državno 
proračun za 2012. izglasan tek krajem veljače 2012.
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S obzirom na postojeće projekcije rasta BDP-a te očekivani doprinos 
rastu pojedinih kategorija BDP-a, može se zaključiti kako bi moglo doći 
do problema u ostvarivanju pojedinih planiranih stavki, prije svega, na 
prihodnoj strani proračuna (na svim razinama vlasti). Na Slici 1 prika-
zano je kretanje prihoda i rashoda na razini opće države od 2003-2012. 
godine.
Kad se promatraju javni prihodi na razini opće države, najveći doprinos 
smanjenju javnih prihoda je ostvaren kroz pad prihoda od PDV-a (nomi-
nalno 4,3 mlrd kuna u 2012. u odnosu na 2008. godinu), što je posljedica 
pada osobne potrošnje ali i uvoza kao temeljnih makroekonomskih os-
novica za ubiranje PDV-a. Oporavak prihoda od PDV-a u narednim godi-
nama posljedica je prije svega u dva navrata povećanja stope PDV-a 
(prvo na 23% pa na 25%), a tek onda slabog i neznačajnog oporavka 
osobne potrošnje. Uz PDV, socijalni doprinosi su najznačajniji javni pri-
hod, a zajedno čine preko 60% ukupnih javnih prihoda. U razdoblju prije 
krize doprinosi su davali najveći doprinos rasu javnih prihoda. Uslijed 
smanjenja mase plaća (bruto plaća i broja zaposlenih) u razdoblju nakon 
2008. godine, prihodi od doprinosa bilježe konstantan pad. U tom kon-
tekstu, bez značajnijeg oporavka bruto dohotka i/ili broja zaposlenih ne 
može se očekivati rast javnih prihoda na temelju doprinosa.
Slika 1. Prihodi i rashodi opće države (u mlrd. kuna)
Izvor: autori na temelju Ministarstvo financija (2014)
Napomena: Ukupne prihode čine prihodi poslovanja i prihodi od prodaje nefinancijske 
imovine. Ukupne rashode čine rashodi poslovanja i rashodi za nabavku nefinancijske 
imovine.
Slično vrijedi i za ostale porezne oblike. Prihodi od poreza na dohodak 
također ovise o masi plaća, koja je uvjetovana brojem zaposlenih i vis-
inom bruto plaća. Budući da se porez na dobit u tekućoj godini plaća 
na temelju poslovanja poduzetnika prethodne godine, očekuje se pad 
poreznih prihoda po osnovi ovog poreza s obzirom na negativnu stopu 
rasta BDP-a u proteklih pet godina. Eventualni rast poreznih prihoda, 
kao što je i slučaj u kriznim godinama, može se temeljiti isključivo na 
rastu porezne presije i/ili uvođenju novih poreznih oblika (npr. porez na 
nekretnine). 
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Za razliku od javnih prihoda, rashodi na razini opće države nisu doživ-
jeli značajniji pad, odnosno zadržani su na pretkriznoj razini, a što se 
kasnije odrazilo na rast javnog duga. Sukladno već dokazanoj praksi 
(procikličnost fiskalne politike), u pretkriznom razdoblju gotovo sve kate-
gorije javnih rashoda bilježe rast. Doprinos rastu daju upravo kategorije 
rashoda koje imaju najveći udio u javnim rashodima kao što su plaće, 
mirovine i izdaci za dobra i usluge. Nastupanjem krize ni jedna kategorija 
tekućih rashoda ne bilježi značajniji pad već stagnaciju. Jedina kategori-
ja koja bilježi značajnije smanjenje su kapitalni rashodi, odnosno rashodi 
za nabavku nefinancijske imovine. Nadalje, jedina kategorija rashoda 
koja bilježi kontinuirani rast su rashodi za kamate. Kontinuirano defici-
tarno financiranje, posebno u posljednjim kriznim godinama, generiralo 
je visoku razinu javnog duga. Pad kreditnog rejtinga te uvjeti na financi-
jskim tržištima poskupili su zaduživanje države. Posljedično, rashodi za 
kamate nakon 2009. godine prosječno godišnje rastu preko 15,2%. Za 
očekivati je da će se taj trend nastaviti i u narednim godinama, što znača-
jno umanjuje prostor za djelovanje ekspanzivne fiskalne politike.
3.3. Struktura javnih rashoda i primarni saldo
Prethodno je spomenuto kako su javni rashodi generator neučinkovite 
fiskalne politike. Zbog toga je potrebno detaljnije proučiti strukturu javnih 
rashoda prema ekonomskoj ali i funkcijskoj klasifikaciji. Na Slici 2. prika-
zana je struktura rashoda opće države prema ekonomskoj klasifikaciji za 
razdoblje od 2004. do 2012. godine. 
Slika 2. Struktura rashoda opće države (ekonomska klasifikacija)
Izvor: obrada autora prema Ministarstvo financija 2014
Iz priloženog je razvidno kako se struktura javne potrošnje u proma-
tranom razdoblju samo pogoršava, odnosno zanemaruje se razvojni as-
pekt javne potrošnje kojom se uglavnom financira tekuća potrošnja. Na-
jveći udio u rashodima opće države čine plaće i mirovine što je ukupno 
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u 2012. godini iznosilo 56,8%. Nadalje, taj se udio povećao u proma-
tranom razdoblju za 5,2 postotna boda godišnje i to najviše u segmentu 
mirovina, prije svega zbog rasta broja korisnika mirovina. U prethodnom 
dijelu je već navedeno, a grafički prikaz potvrđuje konstantan pad udjela 
izdataka za nabavku nefinancijske imovine (kapitalni izdaci) s 10,8% u 
2004. na 3,8% u 2012. godini. S druge strane, raste udio rashoda za 
kamate koji se, prema podacima iz 2012. godine, povećao za 50% u 
odnosu na početak promatranog razdoblja. 
Koliko izdaci za kamate umanjuju prostor za djelovanje fiskalne poli-
tike pokazuje Slika 3. na kojoj su prikazani primarni saldo i rashodi za 
kamate. Primjerice, Hrvatska je od 2006. do 2008. bilježila primarni sufi-
cit, ali zbog rashoda za kamate ukupni saldo je bio u deficitu. Danas smo 
došli u situaciju da smo tekuće prihode i rashode sveli u ravnotežu, ali 
povećani rashodi za kamate jednostavno istiskuju prostor za produktivni-
je deficitarno financiranje i fiskalnu ekspanziju.
Slika 3. Primarni saldo i rashodi za kamate (GFS, u milijardama kuna)
Izvor: izračun autora prema podacima Ministarstva financija 2014
Utvrđivanje konkretne namjene pojedinih rashoda zahtijeva analizu funk-
cijske klasifikacije javnih rashoda.53 Na Slici 4. prikazana je funkcijska 
klasifikacija državnog proračuna za razdoblje od 2004. do 2013. godine. 
Slično kao i kod ekonomske klasifikacije, iz analize funkcijske klasifik-
acije je jasno kako država trenutno preko 55% proračunskih sredstava 
troši na socijalnu zaštitu (38,1%) i zdravstvo (16,9%). Radi se o tekućim 
rashodima čiji udio raste u promatranom razdoblju. 
53 Funkcijska klasifikacija javnih rashoda dostupna je samo na razini državnog proračuna. 
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Slika 4. Struktura rashoda državnog proračuna (funkcijska klasifikacija)
Izvor: obrada autora prema Ministarstvo financija
Nakon općih javnih usluga, najveći udio rashoda države odnosi se na 
ekonomske poslove (10,8% ili 13,7 mlrd. kuna). Oni predstavljaju ra-
shode sa značajnim dodatnim impulsom ekonomskoj aktivnosti kao 
mjera fiskalne politike. U slučaju Hrvatske, radi se o relativno velikom ud-
jelu države u gospodarstvu, no očekivani učinak na ekonomsku aktivnost 
i stopu rasta je izostao jer su u promatranom razdoblju kod rashoda za 
ekonomske poslove dominirale uglavnom subvencije neefikasnim sek-
torima kao što su promet (cestovni 3,25 mlrd. kuna, željeznički 1,17 mlrd. 
kuna) i poljoprivreda (3,4 mlrd. kuna). 
3.4. Dug i deficit opće države
Politika deficitarnog financiranja pretežno tekućeg potrošnje posljednjih 
15 godina utjecala je na kumuliranje visoke razine javnog duga. Izuzev 
1998. godine, Hrvatska je od svoje samostalnosti svake godina imala 
deficit proračuna opće države. Kao što je prethodno prikazano, u kriznim 
godinama dolazi do značajnog smanjivanja prihoda, a rashodi se uopće 
nisu smanjivali. Sve to utječe na eksploziju proračunskog deficita, neo-
visno o metodologiji njegova izračuna.54 Na Slici 5. prikazano je kretanje 
deficita opće države prema obje metodologije te procjena do 2015. go-
dine, dok Slika 6. prikazuje kretanje duga opće države i procjenu za isto 
razdoblje.
54 Ministarstvo financija koristi metodologiju MMF-a (GFS – Government Finance Statis-
tics 2001), dok Europska komisija, odnosno Eurostat za potrebe procedure prekomjernog 
deficita (EDP – Excessive Deficit Procedure) primjenjuje metodološke standarde ESA 95. 
Za razliku najbolje vidjeti European Commission (2014b).
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Slika 5. Deficit opće države prema GFS i ESA 95 (u milijardama kuna i % BDP-a)
Izvor: obrada prema Ministarstvo financija i Eurostat
Slika 6. Dug opće države prema (u milijardama kuna i % BDP-a)
Izvor: obrada prema Ministarstvo financija i Eurostat
Krajem 2008. godine razina javnog duga bila je oko 100 milijardi kuna, 
dok se krajem 2013. godine očekuje da će doseći razinu od 200 milijardi 
kuna. Udvostručenje javnog duga u petogodišnjem razdoblju rezultat je 
eksplozije deficita tijekom krize. Ovako snažna dinamika rasta javnog 
duga sigurno će se nastaviti i naredne tri godine jer je procedurom pre-
komjernog deficita predviđeno da deficit opće države bude iznad 3% 
BDP-a sve do 2016. godine, kada će razina javnog duga biti već preko 
70% BDP-a (European Commission, 2013). 
Također, važno je spomenuti tzv. potencijalni javni dug koji se krije u 
državnim jamstvima i dugu HBOR-a za kojeg također garantira države. 
Krajem 2012. godine jamstva i dug HBOR-a iznosili su preko 55 mili-




Prethodno analizirana kretanja i trendovi u iznosu javnog duga ukazuju 
na izazov financiranja deficita i u narednim godina. Na žalost, u Hrvat-
skoj ne postoji sustav upravljanja javnim dugom i gotovo svako izdanje 
državnih obveznica predstavlja tek refinanciranje dospjelih dugova. Na 
Slici 7. prikazano je dospijeće dugoročnog duga u razdoblju od 2014. 
do 2024. godine. Većinu dugoročnog duga predstavljaju obveznice iz-
dane na domaćem ili međunarodnom financijskom tržištu. Iznimka su 
sindicirani devizni krediti kod domaćih banaka koja dopijevaju većinom u 
2014. godini. 
Slika 7. Dospijeće dugoročnog duga (stanje studeni 2013., u mlrd. kuna)
Izvor: izračun autora
Napomena: SDK –sindicirani devizni krediti
U 2014. godini dospijeva preko 21 milijarda kuna dugoročnog duga. 
Osim 2016. godine, u predstojećem srednjoročnom razdoblju intenzivirat 
će se potreba i aktivnosti za refinanciranjem postojećih dugova. Uzima-
jući u obzir i novo kreirani dug u vidu planiranih deficita (Slika 7.) bruto 
potreba za kreiranjem novog duga premašivati će i 40 milijardi kuna na 
godišnjoj razini.
Postavlja se pitanje pod kojim uvjetima možemo refinancirati dospjeli 
dug i kakva je percepcija Hrvatske na financijskim tržištima. Pri tom treba 
uzeti u obzir činjenicu da je našoj zemlji u posljednjih godina u nekoliko 
navrata smanjivan kreditni rejting (Tablica 3.), a izgledi za servisiranje 
duga prognozirani su kao negativni. 
Godina Moody’s Investors Service Standard & Poors Fitch Ratings
2009 Baa3/stabilan BBB/stabilan BBB-/negativan
2010 Baa3/stabilan BBB-/negativan BBB-/negativan
2011 Baa3/stabilan BBB-/negativan BBB-/negativan
2012 Baa3/negativan BB+ BBB- 
2013 Ba1/negativan BB+ BB+ /stabilan
2014 BB/stabilan BB+/negativan
Tablica 3. Dugoročna ocjena Hrvatske za dug u inozemnoj valuti
Izvor: web stranice navedenih rejting agencija
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Bez obzira na krediti rejting, u prvim godinama krize uvjeti na međunar-
odnim financijskim tržištima općenito su bili nepovoljni za (re)financiran-
je. Sve je to utjecalo na rast kamatnih stopa. Prije krize u razdoblju od 
2004-08. godine Hrvatska se na domaćem tržištu prosječno (dugoročno) 
zaduživala po kamatnoj stopi od 4,97%, a na inozemnom tržištu od 
5,00%. Nakon krize, odnosno u razdoblju od 2009-13. godine prosječna 
kamatna stopa na domaćem financijskom tržištu iznosila je 6,04%, a na 
inozemnom 6,23% (izračun autora).55
Nadalje, percepcija Hrvatske na međunarodnom financijskom tržištu 
uopće nije povoljna. Kao pokazatelj rizika neplaćanja dospjelih obveza 
često se uzima CDS (Credit Default Swap), koji ujedno služi kao dobra 
podloga za usporedbu rizičnosti među pojedinim zemljama. Na Slici 8. 
prikazan je CDS na petogodišnju obveznicu za odabrane zemlje EU koje 
su posljednjih godina imale određenih problema u financiranju javnog 
duga i prema rizičnosti slične Hrvatskoj. Prema ovom pokazatelju, Hr-
vatska je među najrizičnijim zemljama u EU. Krajem 2013. godine CDS 
na hrvatsku petogodišnju obveznicu iznosio je oko 340 bodova. Sličnu 
razinu rizičnosti ima Slovenija i Portugal, s time da Portugal ima silazni 
trend. Najgore razine rizičnosti u EU imaju Grčka i Cipar (preko 1000), ali 
zbog preglednosti nisu uvrštene na grafikon. 
Uslijed negativnih makroekonomskih pokazatelja i daljnjeg pada kred-
itnog rejtinga, buduće refinanciranje i novo zaduživanje Hrvatske pratit 
će vjerojatno još lošiji uvjeti od dosadašnjih, što predstavlja dodatni pri-
tisak na rast rashoda za kamate i sužava mogućnost za ekspanzivno 
djelovanje fiskalne politike.
Slika 8. Credit Default Swap (CDS, 5-godišnja obveznica)
Izvor: izračun autora i Bloomberg
55 Važno je napomenuti kako se ovdje radi uglavnom o nominalnim kuponskim kamatnim 
stopama na izdanjima obveznica. Često su obveznice izdane uz određeni diskont pa je 
prinos do dospijeća uglavnom bio viši od kamatne stope. Također, postoje i razni drugi 
troškovi koji nastaju prilikom izdanja obveznice (npr. agencijske naknade, valutni swap-ovi 
ako se ugovaraju i sl.) koje efektivno mogu poskupiti zaduživanje. 
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Slika 9. Premija rizika (razlika prinosa)
Izvor: izračun autora i Bloomberg
Od 2009. godine čak je šest izdanja obveznica bilo je na američkom 
financijskom tržištu. Razlog tome su nešto povoljniji uvjeti nego na eu-
ropskom tržištu, te izbjegavanje domaćeg tržišta kako bi se izbjeglo is-
tiskivanje privatnih investicija. Takvo zaduživanje ima i svoje lošije strane, 
jer je proizvelo narušavanje valutne strukture duga i povećanja valutnog 
rizika. To se vidi iz Slike 9. na kojoj je s jedne strane prikazana razlika pri-
nosa između referentne američke obveznice i hrvatske obveznice izdane 
u SAD-u, a na drugoj između referentne njemačke obveznice i hrvatske 
euro-obveznice. U promatranom razdoblju ta razlika prinosa je u prosje-
ku bila veća za 35 baznih bodova, što ukazuje na to da je premija rizika 
na dug u američkim dolarima veća nego na dug u eurima. 
4. Mogućnosti fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj
Bez obzira na prethodno iznesena ograničenja, iz pregleda literature 
predstavljenog u prvom dijelu rada naziru se određene mogućnosti 
fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj. Važno je još jednom naglasiti kako se mo-
gućnosti fiskalne politike promatraju u kontekstu postojećeg polito-ekon-
omskog okvira (donošenje diskrecijskih mjera fiskalne politike od strane 
Vlade) te makroekonomskog modela u Hrvatskoj (uloga HNB-a i ciljevi 
monetarne politike ostaju nepromijenjeni). Imajući na umu navedeno, 
postavlja se pitanje koji je najbolji način za iskorištavanje ograničenog 
prostora fiskalne intervencije? 
Mogućnosti djelovanja ogledaju se prije svega kroz promjenu strukture 
javnih rashoda te davanju naglaska na onim rashodima koji imaju na-
jveće multiplikativne učinke na rast BDP-a u Hrvatskoj. U skladu s time u 
nastavku se provodi ekonometrijsko istraživanje kojim se nastoji ispitati 
koji segmenti javnih rashoda i javnih prihoda imaju najveći multiplikativni 
učinak na BDP. Preciznije, u nastavku rada se ispituju mogućnosti sta-
bilizacijske uloge fiskalne politike i javnih financija kroz analizu utjecaja 
prihoda i rashoda opće konsolidirane države na kretanje bruto domaćeg 
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proizvoda (BDP). Zbog izražene međuovisnosti navedenih varijabli, 
strukturnog karaktera teorijskih modela na kojima se istraživanje temelji 
te potrebe za ekonomskom interpretacijom inovacijske analize u radu se 
koristi model strukturne vektorske autoregresije (SVAR). Nadalje, u radu 
se analizira tzv. pametna fiskalna konsolidacija kao temelj za stvaranje 
određenog prostora za djelovanje mjera fiskalne politike.
4.1. Empirijski pristup procjeni učinaka fiskalne politike 
na ekonomski rast u Hrvatskoj
Empirijska analiza se provodi na kvartalnim podacima u razdoblju od 
trećeg kvartala 2004. do trećeg kvartala 2013. godine, što čini uzorak 
od 37 opservacija. Zbog malog uzorka rezultati koji će biti prezentirani u 
nastavku rada moraju biti uzeti s dozom opreza budući da veličina uzor-
ka značajno utječe na osnovne pretpostavke regresijske analize (koja je 
u osnovi VAR metodologije). Razlog za odabir ovog uzorka je dostup-
nost podataka na stranicama Ministarstva financija koje, zbog promjene 
GFS metodologije, podatke o prihodima i rashodima opće konsolidirane 
države objavljuje od trećeg kvartala 2004. godine. 
Opća konsolidirana država je u fokusu ovog rada jer se pretpostavlja 
da se mogućnosti fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj najbolje mogu procijeniti 
ako se u analizu uključi zajedničko djelovanje središnjeg proračuna, iz-
vanproračunskih korisnika te jedinica lokalne i regionalne samouprave. 
Zavisna varijabla u modelima koji će se prikazati u nastavku je bruto 
domaći proizvod, pri čemu se pretpostavlja da, osim „domaćih“ objašn-
javajućih fiskalnih varijabli, na njegovo kretanje značajan učinak ima i 
inozemna potražnja, budući da je Hrvatska mala otvorena ekonomija, 
sve snažnije integrirana u tržište Europske unije. Detaljan opis podataka 
nalazi se u Tablici 4.
Kategorija Naziv varijable Očekivani utjecaj na zavisnu varijablu Opis varijable Izvor podataka
Zavisna varijabla BDP n/a Bruto domaći proizvod u stalnim  cijenama iz 2005. godine






Originalni podaci izraženi u tekućim 
cijenama i tisućama kuna deflaci-
onirani su Indeksom potrošačkih 
cijena HNB-a s bazom 2005. i pre-
računati u jedinicu milijun kuna
Ministarstvo financija; Vremenske 
serije podataka; Konsolidirana 
opća država
Porez na dohodak +/-












Varijabla je konstruirana kao po-
nderirani zbroj BDP-a Njemačke, 
Austirije, Slovenije i Italije pri čemu 
se kao ponderi koriste ponderi koje 
koristi Hrvatska narodna banka za 
izračun Indeksa realnog efektivnog 
tečaja kune
Eurostat; National accounts
Tablica 4. Opis korištenih podataka
Izvor: autori
Napomena: *Varijabla kapitalne investicije je konstruirana kao zbroj kapitalnih rashoda i nabave nefinancijske imovine
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Model od kojeg polazimo u analizi je reducirani oblik multivarijatnog56 
VAR modela:
(1)
u kojem vektor  uključuje deflacionirane, se-
zonski prilagođene i logaritmirane vrijednosti pojedine fiskalne varijable
, bruto domaćeg proizvoda  i ponderiranog BDP-a glavnih 
trgovinskih partnera Hrvatske , koji služi kao proxy varijabla za 
inozemnu potražnju. Vektor  je vektor rezidu-
ala iz reduciranog VAR modela (RF), pri čemu se pretpostavlja da je 
.57
Nakon identifikacije SVAR modela pristupa se njegovoj procjeni te ana-
lizi funkcija impulsnog odziva temeljenoj na strukturalnoj dekompoziciji. 
Funkcije impulsnog odziva u ovako postavljenom modelu prikazuju reak-
ciju BDP-a u % na promjenu pojedine fiskalne varijable u %, a prikazane 
su na Slikama 10 i 11.
Slika 10. Impulsna reakcija BDP-a na strukturni šok u rashodima opće države (%)*
Izvor: izračun autora
Napomena: *zbog preglednosti na slici nisu prikazani intervali pouzdanosti (68%) pa 
je potrebno istaknuti da efekti povećanja dobara i usluga nisu statistički signifikantni u 
navedenom periodu; efekti plaća su statistički signifikantni od petog do desetog kvartala; 
socijalnih naknada od desetog do dvanaestog kvartala; subvencija od sedmog do desetog 
kvartala te kapitalnih investicija od trećeg do sedmog kvartala
56 Zbog ograničene veličine uzorka u radu se provodi zasebna analiza učinaka javnih 
prihoda i javnih rashoda.
57 SVAR metodologija temelji se identifikaciji prema Blanchard-Perotti (2002). Za detalje 
o specifikaciji modela vidjeti Šimović i Deskar-Škrbić (2013: 229-232). Također, zbog ek-
stenzivnosti ispisa svi su testovi stabilnosti modela te heteroskedastičnosti, autokorelacije 
i normalnosti reziduala dostupni na zahtjev.
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Funkcije impulsnog odziva na Slici 10 pokazuju kako fiskalni šok pov-
ećanja izdataka na dobra i usluge kratkoročno povećava BDP u prva 
tri kvartala nakon nastanka šoka, nakon čega ostaje negativan do 
iščezavanja šoka. Šok povećanja plaća vrlo je blago pozitivan u trenut-
ku nastanka šoka, nakon čega utjecaj postaje dominantno negativan do 
iščezavanja. Impulsni odziv na šok povećanja socijalnih naknada poka-
zuje kako one kratkoročno imaju pozitivan učinak na BDP (s vremenskim 
odmakom od jednog kvartala), međutim nakon četvrtog kvartala utjecaj 
postaje negativan i doseže svoj minimum u jedanaestom kvartalu, nakon 
čega počinje iščezavati. Zanimljivo je zamijetiti da socijalne naknade, 
prema rezultatima analize, imaju i najniži minimum od svih rashoda, tj. 
dugoročno imaju najizraženiji negativan utjecaj na BDP. Šok povećanja 
subvencija kratkoročno povećava BDP, u trajanju od dva kvartala na-
kon čega utjecaj postaje negativan i intenzivno se pojačava do osmog 
kvartala nakon kojeg počinje iščezavati. Kapitalne investicije su jedina 
kategorija javnih rashoda koja prema rezultatima ima dugotrajno pozi-
tivan učinak na BDP. Maksimalan utjecaj na BDP kapitalne investicije 
ostvaruju u sedmom kvartalu, nakon čega on počinje iščezavati. 
 
Slika 11. Impulsna reakcija BDP-a na strukturni šok u prihodima opće države (%)*
Izvor: izračun autora
Napomena: *zbog preglednosti na slici nisu prikazani intervali pouzdanosti (68%) pa je 
potrebno istaknuti da su efekti povećanja poreza na dohodak statistički signifikantni u prvom 
kvartalu; da efekti socijalnih doprinosa i poreza na dobit nisu signifikantni u promatranom 
razdoblju; da su efekti PDV-a i trošarina signifikantni u prvom kvartalu
Na Slici 11 su prikazane funkcije impulsnog odziva koje prikazuju reakciju 
BDP-a na šokove u komponentama prihoda opće konsolidirane države. 
Mogućnosti porezne politike o pozitivnom učinku na BDP mnogo su manje 
u odnosu na javne rashode, što je uostalom u skladu s recentnom teorijom 
i praksom (npr. vidjeti Myles, 2000). Prema rezultatima inovacijske ana-
lize porez na dohodak ima negativan učinak na kretanje BDP-a u cijelom 
promatranom razdoblju, a minimum (najveći negativan učinak) dosežu u 
šestom kvartalu. Socijalni doprinosi kratkoročno povećavaju BDP u prva 
tri kvartala nakon čega efekti njihovog povećanja postaju negativni do 
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iščezavanja. Prema rezultatima analize upravo ove dvije komponente 
prihoda proračuna opće države imaju najnepovoljniji učinak na kretanje 
BDP-a. Šok povećanja poreza na dobit ima negativan učinak na BDP od 
prvog kvartala nakon nastanka šoka, ali taj učinak najbrže iščezava. 
Iznenađujući rezultati analize odnose se na indirektne poreze, PDV i 
trošarine. Funkcije impulsnog odziva za ove dvije kategorije prihoda po-
kazuju kako one u cijelom promatranom razdoblju imaju pozitivan učinak 
na kretanje BDP-a, što nije moguće objasniti standardnom ekonomskom 
teorijom. Međutim, Mirdala (2009), čiji su rezultati analize pokazali pozi-
tivnu reakciju BDP-a na šokove u javnim prihodima u šest tranzicijskih 
zemalja središnje i jugoistočne Europe, ističe kako povećanje prihoda 
proračuna ne mora nužno biti posljedica povećanja poreznih stopa. Rast 
prihoda proračuna prirodna je posljedica intenziviranja ekonomske ak-
tivnosti pa taj rast ne mora nužno značiti usporavanje ekonomske ak-
tivnosti58. S obzirom na karakteristike poreznog sustava u Hrvatskoj, koji 
je potrošno orijentiran, PDV i trošarine su posebno osjetljivi na kretanje 
BDP-a pa bi ova činjenica mogla poslužiti kao potencijalno objašnjenje 
ovakvog kretanja impulsnih reakcija ovih kategorija prihoda. 
Prije nastavka potrebno je istaknuti određena metodološka ograničen-
ja prikazane empirijske analize. Prvo i vrlo važno ograničenje proizlazi 
iz vrlo kratke vremenske serije na kojoj je analiza provedena. Mali broj 
stupnjeva slobode može značajno utjecati na rezultate analize s ob-
zirom da može narušiti centralni granični teorem i temeljne pretpostavke 
OLS-a, na kojem se temelji VAR metodologija. Drugo, kratka vremenska 
serija u ovom razdoblju u kontekstu hrvatske ekonomije rezultira činjen-
icom da je Hrvatska u gotovo 50% analiziranog perioda u recesiji, što 
može značajno utjecati na veličinu fiskalnih impulsa i njihovo kretanje. 
Također, zbog recesijskog šoka u svim serijama postoji značajan struk-
turni lom za koji se može reći da dijeli analizirani period na dva „ekonom-
ska režima“ pa bi u budućnosti učinke fiskalnih šokova trebalo promatrati 
u okviru tzv. regime-switching modela (vidi Auerbach i Gorodnichenko, 
2012). Posljednje, Caldara (2011) ističe kako su rezultati fiskalnih SVAR 
modela prilično osjetljivi na pretpostavke o veličini poreznih elastičnosti 
pa se u interpretaciji rezultata treba uzeti u obzir kako su u radu korištene 
porezne elastičnosti iz radova koji su ih procjenjivali na drugim razdo-
bljima i na drugim razinama konsolidacije proračuna. Iz svih navedenih 
razloga rezultate treba tumačiti s dozom opreza. 
4.2. Pametna fiskalna konsolidacija
Kas se govori o mogućnostima fiskalne politike, fiskalna konsolidacija 
često se spominje i zagovara u Hrvatskoj kao jedina preostala mjera. 
Uzimajući u obzir prethodno analizirana ograničenja, jasno je da se u 
kratkom roku zadani koncept ne može sprovesti, izuzev nepopularnih 
58 Iako VAR metodologija rješava određene probleme endogenosti, nije moguće u pot-
punosti ukloniti problem reverzne kauzacije.
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političkih poteza na strani rezanja rashoda (plaće i mirovine) te dodatnog 
povećanja porezne presije. 
Ostvarivanje ciljeva fiskalne konsolidacije u kratkom roku, bez prethod-
no učinjenih priprema (strukturne reforme), izaziva određene rizike i pri-
jeti daljnjim produbljivanjem krize. Već je prije dokazano kako karakter 
fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj uglavnom prociklički (vidjeti Tablicu 1.), što 
znači da bi svako značajnije smanjenje rashoda (i/ili povećanje poreza) 
vodilo padu ekonomske aktivnosti. Nadalje, u međunarodnoj literaturi 
postoji vrlo malo dokaza da fiskalna konsolidacija vodi oporavku u vri-
jeme krize. To vrijedi i za razvijene zemlje ali i i zemlje u razvoju, posebno 
one s velikom kreditnim ograničenjima (Ghosh et al., 2009; Baldacci et 
al., 2013; Blanchard & Liegh, 2013).
Politika zadržavanje postojećeg stanja, odnosno „politika nečinjenja“, 
također bi izazvala probleme u ekonomskoj slici Hrvatske. To prije svega 
podrazumijeva stagnaciju (niske stope rasta), daljnje istiskivanje inves-
ticija i fiskalnu neodrživost (visok domaći i inozemni javni dug). Viso-
ka razina nezaposlenosti jamči daljnje ubrzavanje procesa socijalnog 
raslojavanja stanovništva čemu već pridonosi regresivan porezni sustav 
(potrošno orijentiran) kao i nepovoljni monetarni uvjeti u zemlji (visoke 
kamatne stope).
Prethodno iznesena ograničenja nisu karakteristična samo za Hrvatsku. 
Više zemalja EU tijekom ove krize suočilo se s politikom fiskalne konsoli-
dacija i politike štednje, što je u konačnici izazvalo negativne rezultate ali 
i sve veću kritiku takve politike (vidjeti npr. Butti & Carnot, 2013). S druge 
strane aktivnija uloge fiskalne politike zahtijeva određen prostor koji je 
teško ostvariti bez značajnih rezova. Pomirbu ova dva naočigled različi-
ta cilja najbolje utjelovljuje koncept tzv. pametne fiskalne konsolidacije 
(prema Kolev & Matthes, 2013). U okviru ovog koncepta, fiskalna konsol-
idacija ne prestaje biti cilj koji je potrebno postići kako bi fiskalna politika 
mogla učinkovito djelovati, ali su brzina, dinamika i vrijeme fiskalne prila-
godbe te usmjerenost na veće multiplikativne učinke ključni u postizanju 
učinkovitosti fiskalne politike.
Sukladno proučenoj literaturi i rezultatima empirijske analize može se 
istaknuti nekoliko skupina mjera. Prije svega, svakako bi bilo uputno za-
držati postojeću razinu javne potrošnje (nikako smanjenje), s time da je 
potrebno mijenjati njezinu strukturu. Pritom je nužno orijentirati se na 
produktivne javne rashode s najvećim multiplikativnim učincima (kapital-
ni i investicijski rashodi). Nikakva hirovitost, odnosno naglo povećanje ili 
smanjenje, u pogledu navedenih investicija neće doprinijeti rastu BDP-a. 
Nasuprot tome, najmanje bi se trebalo težiti tekućim rashodima jer im-
aju najmanje multiplikativne učinke i najmanje su produktivni u duljem 
roku. Bez obzira na negativan učinak plaća, u dugom roku subvencije 
i socijalne naknade imaju najsnažniji negativan utjecaj na BDP, pa bi 
u tim područjima trebalo prije pristupiti reformama. Strukturne reforme 
vezane uz javnu upravu i zdravstvo prije bi trebale biti usmjerene ka 
povećanju učinkovitosti nego smanjenju plaća. Nadalje, uz reformu 
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javne uprave potrebno je provesti reformu lokalne samouprave te težiti 
optimalnoj fiskalnoj decentralizaciji, što konkretno podrazumijeva učink-
ovitiji i pravedniji sustav fiskalnog izravnanja. Također, mirovinski sustav 
u pogledu kapitalizirane štednje (II. stup) treba postepeno jačati, prije 
svega zbog negativnih demografskih trendova i prisutnog raslojavanja 
stanovništva. Ne treba bježati od procesa privatizacije u svim sektori-
ma u kojima ne postoji određeni stupanj monopola ili javnog dobra, te 
unaprijediti određene modele javno-privatnog partnerstva, posebice na 
lokalnoj razini.
Drugo, fiskalna prilagodba (konsolidacija) treba se provoditi postepeno. 
Svakako tu u prilog ide i postojeća procedura u slučaju prekomjernog 
deficita koja je Hrvatskoj ostavila dosta prostora i vremena za nužne 
reforme. U najkraćem mogućem roku potrebno je uspostaviti adekvatan 
sustav upravljanja javnim dugom jer on u Hrvatskoj uopće ne postoji.59 
Hrvatska će tijekom 2014. godine na razini opće države platiti 13,6 mili-
jardi kuna kamata. S obzirom na to da se radi o velikom trošku te ve-
likoj imovini s kojom nitko adekvatno ne upravlja (javni dug preko 60% 
BDP-a), samo na rashodima za kamate mogle bi se napraviti znača-
jne uštede za proračun. Nadalje, proračunsko planiranje je ključno za 
provedbu fiskalne prilagodbe. Svaka godina bez rebalansa znači i manje 
uplitanje u promjene u poreznom sustavu te razne ad hoc intervencije na 
strani javnih rashoda. Realno proračunsko planiranje dodatno bi utjecalo 
na jačanje kredibilnosti fiskalne politike te bi svim potencijalnim investi-
torima slalo sliku kredibilne porezne politike.
Treće, uz promjenu strukture potrošnje i fiskalnu prilagodbu, osiguravan-
je dugoročne kredibilnosti fiskalne politike potrebno je dodatno istaknuti. 
Uz prethodno napomenuto (EDP i planiranje) ne treba bježati od po-
tencijalnih aranžmana s MMF-om koji bi dugoročno osigurao provedbu 
reformi ali i bitno smanjio politički rizik vezan uz koalicijske vlade i zastu-
panje određenih interesnih skupina. 
Četvrto, karakter i intenzitet fiskalne politike treba usmjeriti na kretan-
je strukturnog salda (deficita), a ne ukupnog fiskalnog salda. To bi do-
prinijelo jačanju fiskalne pozicije, smanjilo bi prociklički karakter fiskalne 
politike u Hrvatskoj te bi osiguralo kakvu takvu zaštitu od vanjskih šok-
ova. To podrazumijeva i doradu postojećih fiskalnih pravila60 koja su se 
u uvjetima kriza pokazala dosta rigidna i restriktivna. U tom kontekstu 
treba jačati i analitičku podlogu Ministarstva financija (Zavod za mak-
roekonomske analize). S obzirom na relativno slabo djelovanje automat-
skih stabilizatora, a s ciljem bržeg djelovanja i povećanja učinkovitosti 
fiskalne politike potrebno je jačati automatske stabilizatore u Hrvatskoj. 
To znači reformu sustava socijalne zaštite ali i poreznog sustava gdje se 
59 Konkretne prijedloge u pogledu upravljanja javnim dugom vidjeti Bajo i Primorac (2013: 
6-7).
60 Fiskalna pravila se ogledaju kroz Zakon o fiskalnoj odgovornosti, Narodne novine 
139/10. Trenutno se ta pravila, odnosno Zakon uopće ne poštuju pa se postavlja pitanje 
smislenosti uspostave takvih pravila koja se u uvjetima krize neće poštovati.
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treba osigurati veća progresivnost putem svih direktnih poreza (ne samo 
poreza na dohodak). To podrazumijeva širenje porezne osnovice na dru-
ge oblike dohotka i imovine (vidjeti Šimović, 2012; Drezgić, 2009), gdje bi 
adekvatni oblik poreza na imovinu mogao pozitivno djelovati. 
Peto, svaka porezna reforma ne bi trebala biti ishitrena (krpanje pro-
računskih rupa) nego dobro utemeljena, raspravljena, najavljena te na 
koncu donijeta kroz paket zakona. Empirijska analiza pokazala je na 
pretežno negativan učinak poreza na BDP, te lažan dojam koji ostavljaju 
indirektni porezi. U uvjetima smanjenja ekonomske aktivnost svaka ob-
lik poreznog poticaja kod indirektnih poreza (npr. snižena stopa PDV-a) 
za određena dobra i usluge koje nisu socijalnog karaktera apsolutno je 
neopravdan. Takvi potezi samo značajno smanjuju porezne prihode, 
povećavaju proračunski deficit, a ne djeluju na povećanje ekonomske 
aktivnosti (BDP-a).
Prethodno iznesene mjere primarno se odnose na kratki te srednji rok 
do pet godina. Potrebno je spomenuti i određene mjere koje se odnose 
na nešto dulju dimenziju djelovanja fiskalne politike (srednji i dulji rok). 
Svakako, još jednom valja naglasiti dugoročne pozitivne učinke produk-
tivnih javnih investicija U tom kontekstu potrebno je težiti smanjenju onih 
javnih rashoda koji se pokazuju neučinkovitima u dugom roku (npr. sub-
vencije). Drugi segment tzv. „poželjnih rashoda“ jesu oni za zdravstvo i 
obrazovanje, jer se u literaturi uglavnom promatraju kao produktivni javni 
rashodi. S obzirom na to da je postojeća razina navedenih rashoda već 
visoka, treba kroz pojedine reforme težiti većoj kvaliteti (obrazovanje) i 
učinkovitosti (zdravstvo). S prihodovne strane, u dugom roku trebalo bi 
težiti poreznom rasterećenju rada, posebice onoga s nižim dohocima, 
čime bi se preko utjecaja na štednju dao dodatni impuls investicijama u 
privatnom sektoru. Također, to implicira prethodno spomenuto povećan-
je progresivnosti poreznog sustava i prebacivanja poreznog tereta s rada 
na kapital i imovinu. Općenito, treba težiti ka smanjivanju države, odnos-
no javnog sektora u BDP-u, ali osigurati snažan regulatorni i institucion-
alni okvir za uklanjanje potencijalnih neuspjeha tržišta.
5. Zaključak
Ograničenja fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj su velika i brojna. S dru-
ge strane, empirijski je dokazano da mogućnost pozitivnog djelovanja 
fiskalne politike na BDP postoji, ali da bi fiskalna politika bila što učink-
ovitija trebalo bi se pridržavati nekoliko skupina preciznih mjera koje su 
prethodno formulirane kao mjere pametne fiskalne konsolidacije. S ob-
zirom da na to da se Hrvatska nalazi pred šestom godinom recesije i 
stagnacije, svako značajnije smanjenje javnih rashoda, a time i državne 
potrošnje, zasigurno će u kratkom roku negativno utjecati na BDP i pro-
longirati krizu. Rezultati empirijske analize ukazuju na potrebu promjene 
strukture javnih rashoda, odnosno davanja većeg značenja javnim ra-
shodima koji u dugom roku pozitivno djeluju na BDP. Također, takva poli-
tika implicira relativno smanjenje svih onih rashoda koji u dugom roku 
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nemaju pozitivan učinak na BDP, odnosno jačanje pratećih politika koje 
ne bi uvjetovale dugoročnu ovisnost pojedinih subjekata o državnom pro-
računu (npr. razne subvencije). Također, kad se govori o fiskalnoj politici, 
u javnosti se često mogu čuti prijedlozi raznih mjera u domeni porezne 
politike prije svega zbog političke popularnosti određenih poreznih mjera 
(razne poticaji i olakšice, snižene stope i sl.). Empirijska analiza je poka-
zala kako direktni porezi, posebno porez na dohodak i doprinosi, imaju 
dugotrajno negativan i snažan učinak na kretanje BDP-a, dok pozitivne 
učinke indirektnih poreza treba promatrati dozom opreza.
Sva ograničenja fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj posljedica su tzv. „politike 
nečinjenja“, gdje se sustav javnog financiranja podredio kupovanju so-
cijalnog mira i održavanju visoke razine neproduktivnih rashoda, što je 
uvelike utjecalo na prociklički karakter fiskalne politike u promatranom 
razdoblju. Pregled istraživanja o fiskalnoj politici u Hrvatskoj pokazao je 
kako je većina istraživanja ukazivala na iste ili slične probleme, te upo-
zoravala na crne scenarije koje posljednjih godina proživljavamo. Da se 
nositelji ekonomske politike ne žele suočiti s problemima pokazuje i kon-
tinuirana praksa prosječno više od jednog rebalansa državnog proraču-
na godišnje. Strukturna obilježja hrvatskog gospodarstva poput režima 
tečaja, stupnja zaduženosti (javnog i vanjskog duga), razvijenosti tržišta 
kapitala, percepcije investitora, otvorenosti ekonomije, članstva EU itd., 
ne bi trebala (više) biti opravdanje za inertnost nositelja ekonomske poli-
tike, a isto tako nije fiskalna politika ta koja može rješiti sve probleme 
hrvatskog društva i gospodarstva. 
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KARAKTER FISKALNE POLITIKE  
I POLITIČKA EKONOMIJA FISKALNE KONSOLIDACIJE 
U HRVATSKOJ U POSLIJEKRIZNOM RAZDOBLJU61
THE TYPE OF FISCAL POLICY AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN CROATIA 
IN THE POST-CRISIS PERIOD
SAŽETAK
U ovome radu se na temelju podataka o ciklički prilagođenom primarnom pro-
računskom saldu (CAPB-u) analizira karakter fiskalne politike te snaga fiskalne 
konsolidacije u poslijekriznom razdoblju. Osim toga, analiziraju se temeljna obil-
ježja fiskalne konsolidacije s posebnim naglaskom na rashode proračuna budu-
ći da u političko-ekonomskom smislu oko ovih kategorija postoji najveći sukob 
između nositelja fiskalne politike i različitih interesnih skupina. Rezultati analize 
pokazuju da su sve vlade, osim vlade Jadranke Kosor, vodile restriktivnu pro-
cikličku fiskalnu politiku te da je najveća fiskalna konsolidacija provedena u vri-
jeme socijaldemokratske vlade Zorana Milanovića kada je CAPB poboljšan za 
5,7 postotnih bodova BDP-a, što otvara i pitanje je li ova činjenica jedan od 
temeljnih razloga za gubitak parlamentarnih izbora 2015. godine. Također, anal-
iza je pokazala da je veliki dio fiskalne konsolidacije proveden kroz smanjenje 
kapitalnih investicija, iako se radi o produktivnoj kategoriji rashoda koja je mogla 
imati važnu ulogu u ispunjavanju stabilizacijske funkcije fiskalne politike. Anal-
iza ekonomske politike vlade pokazala je kako nestabilne vlade, koje ovise o 
nizu manjih parlamentarnih aktera koji joj održavaju većinu, teško uspijevaju biti 
uspješne u fiskalnoj konsolidaciji. One vlade koje su najviše pozornosti pridav-
ale fiskalnoj politici bile su i najuspješnije u fiskalnoj konsolidaciji. Analiza akata 
Vlade i Sabora pokazala je kako su sve vlade bile sklone korištenju učestalih 
izmjena poreznog zakonodavstva kao instrumenta fiskalne politike.
Ključne riječi: fiskalna konsolidacija, politička ekonomija, kapacitet vlade, stabil-
nosti vlade, policy- kapacitet, Hrvatska
61 Ovaj rad sufinancirala je Hrvatska zaklada za znanost projektom „Održivost javnih fi-
nancija na putu u monetarnu uniju“ IP-2016-06-460.
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ABSTRACT
Based on cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB), this paper analy-
ses the type of fiscal policy and the power of fiscal consolidation in the post-crisis 
period. Basic characteristics of fiscal consolidation are also analysed with special 
emphasis on budget expenditures since the greatest conflict in the political and 
economic sense of these categories is between fiscal policy makers and differ-
ent interest groups. The results of the analysis indicate that all governments, 
except for Jadranka Kosor’s, applied a restrictive procyclical fiscal policy and 
that the largest fiscal consolidation was carried out during the social democratic 
government of Zoran Milanović when CAPB was improved by 5,7 percentage 
points of GDP, which brings up the issue whether this fact is one of the main 
reasons for the loss of parliamentary elections in 2015. Also, the analysis in-
dicated that a large part of fiscal consolidation was achieved by a decrease in 
capital investments, although it is a productive expenditure category which could 
have played an important role in the fulfilment of the fiscal policy stabilisation 
function. The analysis of the government’s economic policy has shown that un-
stable governments that depend on a number of smaller parliamentary groups to 
keep the majority can hardly succeed in the process of fiscal consolidation. The 
governments that devoted the most attention to fiscal policy were also the most 
successful in fiscal consolidation. Analysis of the acts passed by the Government 
and the Parliament indicated that all governments were inclined to use frequent 
tax legislation changes as a fiscal policy instrument.
Key words: fiscal consolidation, political economy, government capacity, gov-
ernment stability, policy capacity, Croatia  
1. Uvod
Prelijevanje globalne financijske krize na domaće gospodarstvo u 2008. 
godini62 rezultiralo je višegodišnjom recesijom te pogoršanjem fiskalne 
pozicije i narušavanjem održivosti javnih financija u Hrvatskoj. Zbog 
značajnih fiskalnih neravnoteža Hrvatska je bila prva članica Europske 
unije nad kojom je pokrenut Postupak u slučaju prekomjernog proračun-
skog manjka (engl. Excessive Deficit Procedure, EDP) gotovo odmah po 
ulasku u Uniju 2013. godine (usp. Bartlett, 2014: 17). Sredinom 2017. 
godine Vijeće je donijelo odluku o obustavljanju EDP-a za Hrvatsku zbog 
značajnog smanjenja deficita opće države ispod referentne razine od 3 
% BDP-a i stabilizacije putanje javnog duga. Ovo smanjenje deficita je 
posljedica fiskalne konsolidacije. 
Iako se radi o značajnom napretku u smjeru održivosti javnih financija, 
koji pozitivno djeluje i na percepciju rizika, ostaju otvorena pitanja na 
koji je način fiskalna konsolidacija provedena te je li ona potencijalno 
djelovala destabilizirajuće na hrvatsko gospodarstvo. Ciljevi ovoga rada 
su: (i) utvrditi karakter fiskalne politike nakon izbijanja globalne financi-
jske krize i ulaska hrvatskog gospodarstva u recesiju, (ii) detaljno ana-
62 Strogo metodološki gledajući, recesija je u Hrvatskoj započela u trećem kvartalu 2008. 
godine (Krznar, 2011).
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lizirati obilježja fiskalne konsolidacije u Hrvatskoj u poslijekriznom razdo-
blju, (iii) utvrditi nositelje najsnažnijeg dijela fiskalne konsolidacije, (iv) 
identificirati proračunske kategorije i interesne skupine koje su podnijele 
najveći teret fiskalne konsolidacije. 
Rad je podijeljen u šest dijelova. U prvome dijelu rada se definiraju temel-
jni pokazatelji proračunskog salda. U drugome dijelu rada se na temelju 
tih pokazatelja određuje karakter fiskalne politike. U trećemu dijelu rada 
se identificiraju razdoblja fiskalne konsolidacije te se analiziraju njihova 
temeljna obilježja, dok se u četvrtome dijelu rada promatraju odrednice 
kretanja javnog duga. U petome dijelu se ova fiskalna kretanja stavljaju 
u širi okvir političke ekonomije, a u šestome dijelu se iznosi zaključak.
2. Mjere proračunskog salda
Financijsko poslovanje države se u užem smislu promatra kroz koncept 
proračunskog salda. Pritom postoje različite mjere proračunskog sal-
da koje nude informacije o različitim aspektima financijskog poslovanja 
države.
Najčešće korištena definicija proračunskog salda je ukupni proračunski 
saldo ili neto pozajmljivanje / zaduživanje koji se prema metodologiji ESA 
2010 (Eurostat, 2016) definira kao razlika ukupnih prihoda i rashoda pro-
računa. Ova mjera uključuje tekuće prihode i rashode te prihode i ra-
shode od transakcija na dugoročnoj nefinancijskoj imovini.
Operativni (tekući) saldo predstavlja razliku između redovitih prihoda i 
rashoda poslovanja bez promjena u dugoročnoj nefinancijskoj imovini. 
Tako definiran pokazatelj, pojednostavljeno, pruža informaciju o tekućoj 
likvidnosti države. (Bajo i dr., 2011).
Primarni saldo se definira kao razlika između ukupnih prihoda i ukupnih 
rashoda umanjenih za izdatke za kamate. Ovo je važna mjera u visoko-
zaduženim zemljama (s visokim udjelom izdataka za kamate u ukupnim 
rashodima) koja jasnije pokazuje trenutačne aktivnosti nositelja fiskalne 
vlasti. Slika 1 pokazuje kako je ovaj pokazatelj u tom kontekstu vrlo 
važan za Hrvatsku budući da troškovi kamata predstavljaju značajan dio 
rashodne strane proračuna (iznad 3 % BDP-a) te postoji značajna razlika 
između ukupnog i primarnog proračunskog salda.
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Slika 1. Ukupni i primarni proračunski saldo (% BDP-a)
Izvor: obrada prema AMECO-u
Navedena tri pokazatelja daju važne informacije i najčešće se koriste u 
međunarodnim usporedbama. Međutim, glavna manjkavost ovih mjera 
je ta što ne uzimaju u obzir djelovanje ekonomskog okruženja na prihode 
i rashode proračuna. Konkretnije, one ne uzimaju u obzir djelovanje au-
tomatskih stabilizatora (npr. progresivni porez na dohodak ili naknada za 
nezaposlene).
Iz tog razloga su definirani pokazatelji koji daju bolje informacije o kar-
akteru tekuće fiskalne politike, ciklički prilagođeni saldo, ciklički saldo i 
strukturni saldo.
Ciklički saldo je fiskalni pokazatelj koji mjeri visinu proračunskog sal-
da kao posljedicu djelovanja isključivo cikličkih oscilacija na elemente 
proračuna. 
Ciklički prilagođeni saldo (CAB) se definira kao fiskalni pokazatelj koji 
prikazuje koliko bi iznosio proračunski saldo kada bi stvarni output bio 
jednak potencijalnom, odnosno kada bi upotreba faktora proizvodnje bila 
na «normalnoj» razini (Švaljek i dr., 2003). Strukturni saldo je ciklički pri-
lagođeni saldo koji je dodatno prilagođen za učinke jednokratnih i privre-
menih mjera fiskalne politike (Moure i dr., 2014). Prema Joumard i dr. 
(2008), u jednokratne i privremene mjere se ubrajaju prodaja nefinanci-
jske imovine, adsorpcija sredstava mirovinskih fondova63 u proračun, 
privremeni porezi (npr. krizni porez u Hrvatskoj) i sl. 
Radi boljeg razumijevanja razlike između ovih fiskalnih pokazatelja, na 
slici 2 je prikazana shema koja prezentira hipotetsku situaciju recesi-
je u nekoj zemlji (realni BDP ispod potencijalne razine) koja je dovela 
63 Mađarska vlada je 2010. g. u proračun transferirala sredstva iz mirovinskih fondova u 
vrijednosti 9 % BDP-a.
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do rasta ukupnog deficita. Ciklički prilagođeni deficit (plavo) je manji od 
ukupnog deficita jer ne uključuje učinke pada prihoda i rasta rashoda 
proračuna koji su posljedica usporavanja gospodarstva. Pretpostavka je 
da je zemlja provela i pojedine jednokratne mjere za smanjenje defi-
cita pa postoji razlika između ciklički prilagođenog i strukturnog salda 
(svijetloljubičasto).
Slika 2. Shematski prikaz različitih definicija proračunskog manjka
Izvor: obrada autora
Na slici 3 su prikazani ukupni, ciklički prilagođeni i strukturni proračun-
ski saldo. Kretanje ovih pokazatelja daje važnu informaciju o uzrocima 
značajnog porasta deficita na početku recesije. U razdoblju od 2009. do 
2011. godine rast ukupnog proračunskog salda se velikim dijelom može 
pripisati posljedicama diskrecijskog dijela fiskalne politike budući da je 
razlika između ukupnog salda i ciklički prilagođenog / strukturnog salda 
vrlo mala.
Slika 3. Ukupni, ciklički prilagođeni i ukupni proračunski saldo (% BDP-a)
Izvor: obrada autora  prema AMECO-u
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Osim što daju uvid u izvore promjene deficita (diskrecijske mjere na-
suprot djelovanju automatskih stabilizatora), ovi pokazatelji daju važnu 
informaciju o karakteru fiskalne politike. Ako se ciklički prilagođeni saldo 
dodatno prilagodi oduzimanjem troškova kamata, dobiva se „čisti“ poka-
zatelj fiskalne politike koji je izravno pod utjecajem tekućih diskrecijskih 
mjera. On se naziva ciklički prilagođeni proračunski saldo (CAPB).
Kako bi se utvrdio karakter fiskalne politike, potrebno je ovaj pokazatelj 
staviti u odnos sa stadijem poslovnog ciklusa pa se mogu definirati četiri 
temeljne vrste fiskalne politike.
• ekspanzivna prociklička – nositelji politike povećavaju CAPB u 
uvjetima gospodarske ekspanzije
• ekspanzivna protuciklička – nositelji politike povećavaju CAPB 
u uvjetima recesije
• restriktivna prociklička – nositelji politike smanjuju ciklički 
CAPB u uvjetima gospodarske ekspanzije
• restriktivna protuciklička –nositelji politike smanjuju CAPB u 
uvjetima recesije
Na slici 4 je prikazan karakter fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj od 2003. 
godine s očekivanjima do kraja 2019. godine na temelju ciklički pri-
lagođenog primarnog salda.
Slika 4. Karakter fiskalne politike
Izvor: obrada autora  prema AMECO-u
Ovaj grafikon zorno prikazuje neadekvatnost karaktera fiskalne politike 
u Hrvatskoj s aspekta stabilizacijske uloge javnih financija, tj. upravljanja 
poslovnim ciklusom. 
U fazi od 2003. do 2008. godine vlade su uglavnom vodile ekspanzivnu 
procikličku politiku umjesto da su restriktivnom protucikličkom politikom 
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pokušavale stvoriti fiskalni prostor za reakciju na buduće recesije. Ne-
dostatak fiskalnih zaliha rezultirao je restriktivnom procikličkom politikom 
tijekom razdoblja recesije, kada je stvarni dohodak bio ispod potenci-
jalne razine, umjesto da se u ovom razdoblju djelovalo ekspanzivnom 
protucikličkom politikom koja bi mogla doprinijeti bržoj stabilizaciji gosp-
odarske aktivnosti. Prema projekcijama Europske komisije u razdoblju 
od 2017. do 2019. godine ponovno se očekuje neadekvatna reakcija 
fiskalnih vlasti budući da se očekuje procikličko djelovanje.
Adekvatnost fiskalne politike je u Hrvatskoj od posebne važnosti budu-
ći da je, zbog različitih strukturnih obilježja hrvatskog gospodarstva i fi-
nancijskog sustava, prostor za djelovanje monetarne politike u Hrvatskoj 
(v. Šimović, Ćorić i Deskar-Škrbić, 2014) prilično ograničen, pa fiskalna 
politika predstavlja glavni instrument ekonomske politike. Uloga i važnost 
fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj će dodatno porasti nakon uvođenja eura.
Osim što ovi pokazatelji daju potpuniju informaciju o karakteru fiskalne 
politike, budući da su pod utjecajem isključivo diskrecijskih mjera nos-
itelja fiskalne politike, oni su izrazito važni za vođenje fiskalne politike 
zemalja članica unutar fiskalnog okvira EU-a.64 
Kako ističu Švaljek i dr. (2003), Sporazumom o stabilnosti i rastu za 
članice je EU-a propisano da njihova proračunska pozicija mora biti u 
srednjem roku uravnotežena ili u suficitu kako bi nositelji fiskalne poli-
tike mogli djelovati anticiklički u fazi recesije. Strukturni saldo upravo 
pokazuje koliko „manevarskog“ prostora imaju nositelji politike da an-
ticikličkim diskrecijskim mjerama ne prodube deficit iznad EDP razine od 
3 % BDP-a. 
Razina, u ovom smislu dozvoljenog, strukturnog deficita se određuje u 
okviru tzv. „srednjoročnog proračunskog cilja“ (engl. medium term ob-
jective, MTO),65 koji za zemlje članice određuje Odbor za ekonomska i 
financijska pitanja (ECOFIN), a vlade zemalja članica implementiraju u 
Program konvergencije. Za proračunsko razdoblje 2018.-2020. g. razina 
strukturnog deficita je određena na 1.75 % BDP-a (Vlada Republike Hr-
vatske, 2017b).
Osim gore navedenih primjena ciklički prilagođenog i strukturnog sal-
da, oni su važni i za definiciju fiskalne prilagodbe u okviru Procedure za 
suzbijanje prekomjernog proračunskog manjka (EDP) (tzv. „djelotvorne 
mjere“; engl. effective action) te opću definiciju fiskalne konsolidacije. 
3. Obilježja fiskalne konsolidacije u poslijekriznom razdoblju
Prema Burnać (2017) i Mirdala (2013), razdoblje fiskalne konsolidacije 
predstavlja onu godinu u kojoj se ciklički prilagođeni primarni proračunski 
saldo poboljšao za najmanje 1.5pb BDP-a (tzv. „hladni tuš“) ili razdoblje 
64 Za detaljni pregled fiskalnog okvira Europske unije pogledati Šimović (2005).
65 U Hrvatskoj je ovaj cilj definiran i u Zakonu o fiskalnoj odgovornosti (NN 139/10, 19/14). 
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od tri uzastopne godine u kojima se ciklički prilagođeni primarni pro-
računski saldo neće pogoršati za više od 0.5pb BDP-a (postupna kon-
solidacija). 
U ovome radu će se koristiti manje stroga definicija te će se svako pobol-
jšanje ciklički prilagođenog primarnog proračunskog salda smatrati ob-
likom fiskalne konsolidacije.
Na slici 5 je prikazano kretanje ciklički primarnog proračunskog salda 
od 2008. do 2016. godine, a u tablici 1 promjena CAPB-a u postotnim 
bodovima BDP-a.
Slika 5. Ciklički prilagođeni primarni proračunski saldo
Izvor: obrada autora  prema AMECO-u
*osjenčana područja predstavljaju razdoblja fiskalne konsolidacije; negativan predznak 
upućuje na poboljšanje fiskalne pozicije
Tablica 1.Promjena CAPB-a u postotnim bodovima BDP-a
Izvor: obrada autora  prema AMECO-u
Iz gornje slike i tablice se može zaključiti kako je do prvih konsolidacijskih 
mjera došlo 2009. godine za vrijeme mandata vlade Ive Sanadera / Jad-
ranke Kosor. Ciklički prilagođeni primarni deficit se u toj godini smanjio 
za 0,9 postotnih bodova BDP-a. U 2010. i 2011. godini, u mandatu vlade 
Jadranke Kosor, konsolidacija je zaustavljena. Nastavak fiskalne konsol-
idacije i najsnažnija konsolidacija zabilježena je 2012. godine, na počet-
ku mandata vlade Zorana Milanovića, kada je CAPB smanjen za visokih 
3,7 postotnih bodova. Kukuriku koalicija je nastavila s konsolidacijom 
do kraja mandata kada je zabilježen ciklički prilagođeni primarni suficit. 
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Vlade Tihomira Oreškovića i Andreja Plenkovića nastavile su s konsoli-
dacijom budući da je ukupni deficit i dalje bio iznad referentne vrijednosti 
od 3 % te da je Hrvatska i dalje bila u EDP-u, bez obzira na činjenicu da 
je CAPB već bio u suficitu. 
Kako bi se dobio bolji uvid u prirodu fiskalne konsolidacije, u tablici 2 je 
prikazano kretanje ciklički prilagođenih prihoda i rashoda bez kamata, a 
u tablici 3 je prikazano kretanje temeljnih kategorija rashoda proračuna 
budući da je u kontekstu političke ekonomije „rezove“ uobičajeno pro-
matrati kroz prizmu rashoda66. U tom kontekstu su najvažniji rashodi za 
plaće te transferi budući da upravo oko ovih kategorija dolazi do najvećeg 
sukoba između nositelja fiskalne politike i različitih interesnih skupina (v. 
Perotti, 1998). U tablici 4 su kao zasebna kategorija potrošnje izdvojene 
naknade građanima i kućanstvima67 budući da je u političko-ekonom-
skom pristupu posebno zanimljiv odnos nositelja politike prema skupina-
ma koje ovise o socijalnoj zaštiti države. 









Tablica 2. Ciklički prilagođeni prihodi i rashodi bez kamata 
(promjena u postotnim bodovima BDP-a)
Izvor: obrada autora  prema AMECO-u
66 Za detaljnu analizu poreznih promjena vidjeti Šimović (2017)
67 S obzirom na specifičnost teme zdravstva u ovome radu se neće analizirati uzroci 
promjena na toj stavci naknada građanima i kućanstvima. Također, u kontekstu političke 
ekonomije, zdravstvo nije kategorija u kojoj se mogu jasno identificirati interesne skupine.















2009. 2,632 916 850 -511 -149 -285 3,864 -1,643 -1,024
2010. 2,399 -215 -21 168 -128 172 886 378 -717
2011. -384 474 289 531 -27 -681 -225 -1,127 -65
2012. -1,210 -374 129 -477 -793 -167 -287 -336 -378
2013. 4,776 -727 -184 -230 -224 1,737 2,871 288 456
2014. 2,184 -215 -389 -416 -363 2,155 397 152 293
2015.* -10,234 3,583 2,814 3,445 1,252 2,956 -22,273 194 1,295
2016. 1,720 793 355 95 -339 1,790 -366 63 -90
*učinci izdvajanja HZZO-a iz proračuna
Tablica 3. Najznačajnije kategorije rashoda (bez kamata) –promjena u milijunima kuna
Izvor: obrada autora prema Ministarstvu financija
Godina Naknade građanima i kućanstvima
od čega:        









2009. 3,864 1,615 1,383 1,367 184 308 432 -113 8
2010. 886 422 17 17 30 94 259 -39 -116
2011. -225 76 -399 -401 67 -85 -11 5 -8
2012. -287 250 -351 -355 33 -10 -11 -18 -97
2013. 2,871 928 1,854 1,847 85 -34 149 -19 -28
2014. 397 275 28 21 73 -108 -137 -51 -156
2015.* -22,273 352 -21,950 -21,953 15 -780 36 -51 -58
2016. -366 122 -6 0 125 -40 -88 -109 -1
*učinci izdvajanja HZZO-a iz proračuna
Tablica 4. Naknade građanima i kućanstvima – promjena u milijunima kuna
Izvor: obrada autora prema Ministarstvu financija
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Iz tablice 2 se može zaključiti kako je konsolidacija 2009. godine prven-
stveno posljedica smanjenja rashoda, a tablica 3 ukazuje na to da su 
najveći rezovi u toj godini napravljeni u kapitalnim investicijama, ostalim 
rashodima (veliki dio čine sredstva za modernizaciju HŽ-a), materijalnim 
rashodima i pomoćima. Iako je vlada Ive Sanadera / Jadranke Kosor 
donijela odluku o smanjenju plaća u javnom i državnom sektoru za 6 
%, učinci ove odluke su se većinom vidjeli 2010. godine. Ova je vlada 
također povećala PDV s 22 % na 23 % u toj godini, ali to nije bilo do-
voljno da bi se spriječio pad prihoda proračuna. Na temelju tablice 4 se 
može zaključiti kako je dječji doplatak jedina kategorija transfera koja je 
u toj godini smanjena.
U mandatu Jadranke Kosor 2010. godine fiskalna konsolidacija je 
zaustavljena jer su ciklički prilagođeni prihodi proračuna padali brže od 
rashoda. Međutim, u toj godini je zabilježen pad rashoda za zaposlene 
(utjecaj smanjenja plaća iz 2009. g.) te je zanimljivo zamijetiti prvo sman-
jenje sredstava za skrb za branitelje. Također, u ovoj je godini došlo do 
najznačajnijeg pada kapitalnih investicija (slika 6). U 2011. g. je došlo 
do rasta rashoda, pri čemu su ključnu ulogu imali povećanje troškova 
plaća i materijalnih rashoda, ali je prvi put zabilježen pad ukupnih nak-
nada građanima i kućanstvima. Iako je veći dio pada bio rezultat odnosa 
državnog proračuna i HZZO-a, zanimljivo je zamijetiti da je došlo i do 
smanjenja naknada za nezaposlene bez obzira na porast nezaposlenos-
ti, što se jednim dijelom može protumačiti boljom kontrolom prava po toj 
osnovi. Pad porodiljnih naknada je teže objasniti diskrecijskim mjerama 
budući da veliki dio iznosa naknada ovisi o broju rodilja.
Vlada Zorana Milanovića je u 2012. godini provela najveću konsolidac-
iju (koja se s obzirom na veličinu može klasificirati kao pristup „hladnog 
tuša“), pri čemu je ona većim dijelom posljedica smanjenja rashoda nego 
povećanja prihoda proračuna (najvažnija izmjena odnosila se na pov-
ećanje opće stope PDV-a s 23 % na 25 %). Iz tablice 3 je vidljivo kako je 
u toj godini zabilježeno smanjenje svih kategorija rashoda proračuna, pri 
čemu se smanjenje rashoda za zaposlene velikim dijelom može pripisati 
manjem trošku doprinosa zbog smanjenja doprinosa za zdravstveno osi-
guranje s 15 % na 13 %. U 2012. g. je zabilježen i značajniji pad naknada 
građanima i kućanstvima, pri čemu su smanjenje zabilježile sve kate-
gorije rashoda osim rashoda za socijalnu skrb. U 2013. i 2014. godini 
je nastavljeno smanjenje ciklički prilagođenih rashoda bez kamata, pri 
čemu je kao posebno važnu mjeru potrebno istaknuti smanjenje plaća 
u državnim i javnim službama za 3 % u 2013. godini, koja je rezultirala 
značajnijim smanjenjem rashoda za zaposlene u 2013. i 2014. godini. 
Rast rashoda vezanih uz članstvo u EU-u i sanacija zdravstva u 2013. 
godini ne pripisuje se promjeni karaktera politike. U 2013. g. je zabilježen 
blagi porast investicija u fiksni kapital (slika 6). U 2014. godini je zabil-
ježeno najveće smanjenje izdataka za braniteljsku skrb zbog stupanja na 
snagu novog Zakona o mirovinskom osiguranju koji je smanjio određena 
prava primatelja mirovina po posebnim propisima, dok su određene kat-
egorije naknada građanima i kućanstvima bile obuhvaćene uvođenjem 
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zajamčene minimalne naknade (od siječnja 2014. g.) i strožih pravila u 
sustavima socijalne skrbi i dječjeg doplatka. Kraj mandata Zorana Milan-
ovića u 2015. godini obilježen je rastom ciklički prilagođenog primarnog 
suficita na 1.7 % BDP-a te značajnom promjenom u sustavu financiranja 
zdravstva nakon izdvajanja HZZO-a iz državne riznice, što otežava ana-
lizu rashoda u ovoj godini (npr. značajan rast rashoda za zaposlene je 
velikim dijelom posljedica uključivanja rashoda za zaposlene ustanova 
u zdravstvu kojima je osnivač Republika Hrvatska u državni proračun). 
Javne investicije su u toj godini smanjene za 10 % na godišnjoj razini, 
što je imalo značajan doprinos približavanju ukupnog salda referentnoj 
vrijednosti od 3 % BDP-a.
U 2016. godini, u mandatima Tihomira Oreškovića i Andreja Plenkovića, 
konsolidacija je nastavljena gotovo isključivo na strani prihoda budući da 
su ciklički prilagođeni rashodi bez kamata narasli za relativno visokih 0,8 
postotnih bodova BDP-a, što je jednim dijelom i posljedica rasta javnih 
investicija. Međutim, u toj je godini važno istaknuti značajno smanjenje 
izdataka za dječji doplatak.
U kontekstu adekvatnosti fiskalne politike iz prethodnog poglavlja potre-
bno je istaknuti kako je veliki dio fiskalne konsolidacije u promatranom 
razdoblju bio temeljen na smanjenju izdataka za nabavu nefinanci-
jske imovine, tj. rezovima u kapitalnim investicijama, što se bolje vidi 
na temelju EDP definicije bruto investicija u fiksni kapital na razini opće 
države (slika 6). Kumulativno su javne investicije u promatranom razdo-
blju smanjene za gotovo 60 %.
Slika 6. Bruto investicije u fiksni kapital na razini opće države – postotna promjena
Izvor: Eurostat; DZS; autori
Šimović (2017) ističe kako se ovakva odluka nositelja vlasti može sma-
trati paradoksalnom jer upravo ti rashodi generiraju najveći impuls za 
poticanje gospodarskog rasta u odnosu na ostale kategorije javnih ra-
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shoda (vidi Šimović, Ćorić i Deskar-Škrbić, 2014; Sever, Drezgić i Blažić, 
2011). Međutim, potrebno je istaknuti kako su neki autori skeptični prema 
javnim investicijama kao instrumentu ekonomske stabilizacije u Hrvat-
skoj (npr. Šonje, 2014).
4. Odrednice kretanja javnog duga
Fiskalna konsolidacija je u uvjetima usporavanja gospodarstva i znača-
jnog rasta potrebe za financiranjem zbog viših deficita u recesiji vrlo 
važna za stabilizaciju putanje javnog duga. Međutim, kretanje javnog 
duga nije određeno isključivo ponašanjem nositelja fiskalne vlasti. Ono 
je određeno kretanjem i međuovisnošću različitih faktora vezanih uz rast, 
inflaciju, troškove kamata, deficit, jednokratne učinke, promjene tečaja, 
privatizacijske prihode i sl. Zbog toga je u analizi održivosti javnog duga 
uobičajeno rekonstruirati promjene duga i utvrditi koji je od navedenih 
faktora najzaslužniji za njegovu putanju. 
Pojednostavljeni pristup dekompoziciji javnog duga se, prema ECB-u 
(2016) i Andabaka, Družić i Mustać (2017) temelji na jednadžbi 1:
(1)
gdje je  promjena duga,  je stopa rasta nominalnog BDP-a, je nom-
inalna kamatna stopa na javni dug (efektivna, prosječna),  je primarni 
deficit (ukupni deficit umanjen za troškove kamata), a  (engl. stock-
flow adjustment) predstavlja dio duga koji nije posljedica ovih faktora, a 
može uključivati promjenu tečaja, privatizacijske prihode, učinke predfi-
nanciranja i sl.
Prvi izraz se naziva „efekt grude snijega“. Logika iza tog efekta je da, 
ako nominalni BDP raste sporije od nominalne kamate, kamate će se 
kumulirati na postojeću grudu javnog duga koja će se povećavati kao 
kada grudu snijega zakotrljate niz liticu. Primarni deficit u jednadžbu ula-
zi s negativnim predznakom jer smanjenje primarnog deficita ili primarni 
suficit smanjuju javni dug. SFA može imati pozitivan ili negativan utjecaj 
na kretanje duga, ovisno o tome koji faktori u njemu prevladaju.
Na temelju ove jednadžbe je na slici 7 prikazana dekompozicija prom-
jene javnog duga u Hrvatskoj u desetogodišnjem razdoblju od 2007. do 
2016. godine.
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Slika 7. Dekompozicija javnog duga (u pb BDP-a)
Izvor: obrada autora
Slika pokazuje kako je u promatranom razdoblju kretanje javnog duga 
bilo podjednako određeno efektom grude snijega i primarnim deficitom. 
Učinak SFA nije bio velik, osim u 2013. godini, što se može povezati 
s učinkom izdanja USD euroobveznice koja je služila za refinanciranje 
dospijeća duga u 2014. godini (učinak predfinanciranja) (HNB, 2010).
Ako se promatraju kumulativni rast duga i doprinosi ovih komponenti, 
može se zaključiti da je efekt grude snijega čak bio i nešto važniji za 
kretanje duga od primarnog deficita, što je prikazano u tablici 5.
 Kumulativ Udio
Promjena duga 44  
Efekt grude snijega 18.8 43%
Primarni deficit 17.4 40%
SFA 7.8 18%
Tablica 5. Kumulativni rast duga i doprinosi od 2008. do 2016. (u pb BDP-a i %)
Izvor: obrada autora
Najveće povećanje duga (osim 2013.g.zbog predfinanciranja) zabil-
ježeno je 2009. godine uz istovremeni snažan utjecaj grude snijega i 
rasta primarnog deficita. U 2010. i 2011. godini rast duga je većinom bio 
potaknut rastom primarnog deficita, a značajniji konsolidacijski napori 
nakon 2012. godine smanjili su doprinos primarnog deficita te je kretanje 
duga većinom bilo određeno efektom grude snijega. Smanjenje u 2015. 
godini bilo je potaknuto poboljšanjem primarnog deficita (ostvaren je 
suficit) i dijelom SFA-om, dok je značajno smanjenje u 2016. godini bilo 
rezultat pozitivnog djelovanja sva tri čimbenika.
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5. Politička ekonomija fiskalne konsolidacije
Mjere fiskalne konsolidacije u promatranom su razdoblju (2008.-2016. 
godine) provodile vlade raznolike unutarnje strukture (s obzirom na broj 
i narav koalicijskih partnera) i raznolikih parlamentarnih većina, što je 
uvelike utjecalo na javnopolitičke kapacitete izvršne vlasti da dosljed-
no i učinkovito provede zacrtane ciljeve fiskalne politike koji su isticani 
kao prioriteti u Vladinim dokumentima. U ovom dijelu rada ćemo skicirati 
strukturu vlada u promatranom razdoblju, skrenuti pozornost na ključne 
faktore stabilnosti/nestabilnosti koji su utjecali na provedbene sposob-
nosti pojedinih kabineta te potom analizirati Vladinu agendu, ali i konk-
retne javnopolitičke ishode (akte Vlade i Sabora) u tematskim područji-
ma koja spadaju pod fiskalnu politiku kako bismo ispitali kakve su točno 
mjere poduzimane u okviru (ne)uspješne fiskalne konsolidacije. 
Razdoblje Premijer Ostale stranke u vladi Većina Tip vlade
siječanj 2008.-  








































Tablica 6. Struktura hrvatskih vlada u poslijekriznom razdoblju, 2008.-2016. g. 
Izvor: obrada autora prema Döring, Manow, 2016; Nikić Čakar, Raos, 2015, 2016
U tablici 6 prikazana je struktura hrvatskih vlada koje su sudjelovale u 
procesu fiskalne konsolidacije, s time da je svaka rekonfiguracija u sud-
jelovanju političkih stranaka u vladi tretirana kao nastanak novog kabi-
neta, bez obzira na to je li novi sastav vlade potvrđen investiturom (glas-
ovanjem o povjerenju) ili je tek nastavak postojeće vlade, no s drugačijim 
brojem koalicijskih partnera. Za razliku od konvencionalnog tumačenja, 
često prisutnog u medijima, ali i među samim političarima u Hrvatskoj, 
da je manjinska vlada samo ona koja nema zajamčenu natpolovičnu 
saborsku većinu, već mora sklapati ad hoc saveze oko svakog zakon-
skog prijedloga koji poželi „progurati“ kroz Sabor, ovdje se dosljedno, 
sukladno uvriježenoj teoriji koalicija (usp. Lijphart, 2014: 82-86), minimal-
nim kabinetom, tj. minimalnom vladom, smatra svaka vlada čije stranke 
članice (stranke koje daju ministre u vladi) samostalno ne raspolažu 
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parlamentarnom većinom. Sukladno tome, većinu promatranog, posli-
jekriznog razdoblja, izvršna je vlast bila u obliku manjinskih vlada. Kada 
nisu bili manjinski, kabineti su bili minimalne pobjedničke koalicije, tj. sa-
državale su minimalan broj stranaka koji je potreban kako bi se osigurala 
natpolovična većina. 
Manjinski kabinet koji djeluje u parlamentarnom sustavu koji ne iziskuje 
investituru nove vlade, poput danskog, može proizvoditi kvalitetne jav-
nopolitičke ishode budući da je u poziciji da traži široki konsenzus, no 
manjinski kabinet u hrvatskom slučaju, koji mora okupiti parlamentarnu 
većinu da bi uopće mogao funkcionirati, a uz činjenicu relativno visoke 
fragmentiranosti Sabora,68 lako može biti podložan ucjenama i izvlačen-
ju partikularnih javnopolitičkih koncesija manjih zastupničkih klubova ili 
pojedinačnih zastupnika koji su potrebni za ostvarivanje većine. Naime, 
kako je još ustvrdio Sartori (2002: 259), relevantnost političkih stranaka 
nije nužno vezana uz njihovu stvarnu veličinu (broj zastupnika), već uz 
njihov koalicijski i ucjenjivački potencijal kojim provode utjecaj na izvršnu 
vlast ili na smjer provođenja javnih politika. Sukladno navedenom, bit će 
stabilniji (pa onda i javnopolitički bolje kapacitirani i jasnije usmjereni) 
oni kabineti koji neće ovisiti o velikom broju koncesija koje treba dati u 
procesu iznalaženja parlamentarne većine. Nadalje, kada govorimo o 
minimalnim pobjedničkim koalicijama, možemo očekivati da će stabilnije 
i propulzivnije biti one vlade koje se temelje na minimalnim pobjedničkim 
koalicijama koje su bile formirane prije izbora, tj. koje su proizašle iz 
predizbornih koalicija, za razliku od onih koje su bile plod poslijeizbornog 
pregovaranja. 
Naime, kapacitet vlade za provedbu jasne fiskalne politike ovisi o (1) 
stabilnosti parlamentarne potpore, (2) homogenosti vladine koalicije, (3) 
javnopolitičkoj kompatibilnosti koalicije, (4) provedbenim kapacitetima 
predsjednika vlade te o (5) kadrovskoj i institucionalnoj stabilnosti. Već 
smo bili rekli kako se (1) stabilnijima mogu očekivati vlade čije same 
stranke imaju većinu u parlamentu te koje nisu primorane tražiti širok 
broj parlamentarnih aktera koji će im osigurati natpolovičnu većinu. Kada 
govorimo o (2) homogenosti vladine koalicije, idemo s pretpostavkom 
da su homogenije koalicije s manjim brojem stranaka koje u njoj sud-
jeluju i u kojima je premijerova stranka značajno veća od ostalih koal-
icijskih partnera. Što se tiče (3) javnopolitičke kompatibilnosti koalicije, 
snažniji kapacitet vlade očekujemo u slučaju koalicije koja je ideološki 
homogenija, pa će biti i suglasnija oko ključnih javnih politika. Ideološ-
ka homogenost se očituje u tome da stranke u vladi dolaze iz iste ili 
srodnih stranačkih obitelji te da su se već obvezale na usuglašavanje 
javnopolitičkih prioriteta putem predizbornog koalicijskog sporazuma. (4) 
Provedbene kapacitete predsjednika vlade možemo mjeriti razlikovan-
jem između stranačkih i nestranačkih premijera, zatim premijera koji 
68 U promatranom razdoblju efektivni broj (parlamentarnih) stranaka (indeks Laakso-Taa-
gepera), standardna mjera fragmentiranosti nacionalnog predstavničkog tijela, za Hrvatsku 
je iznosio iznad četiri, s time da je nakon izbora 2015. godine skočio na 4,78 (usp. Döring, 
Manow, 2016). 
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dolaze iz najveće stranke i onih koji su članovi manjih koalicijskih part-
nera te naposljetku razlikovanjem između onih premijera koji su bili na 
čelu vlastite stranke prije nego što su postali predsjednici vlade i onih koji 
to nisu. Može se očekivati da će premijer ili premijerka koji dolazi iz na-
jveće stranke u vladi te koji je već bio predsjednik/ca svoje stranke prije 
nego što je preuzeo/la mjesto premijera/ke, imati više političke i upravl-
jačke moći koju će moći pretočiti u provedbene kapacitete potrebne za 
javnopolitičku uspješnost izvršne vlasti. (5) Kadrovsku i institucionalnu 
stabilnost možemo mjeriti na temelju učestalosti promjena ministara u 
vladi te promjena strukture ministarstava. Naime, može se pretpostaviti 
da će vlada koja rjeđe mijenja svoju strukturu prema ovim dimenzijama 
biti uspješnija u provedbi svojega programa i zacrtanih javnopolitičkih 
prioriteta, u ovom slučaju fiskalne konsolidacije. 








III + + + + -
Jadranka 
Kosor I - + + - +
Jadranka 
Kosor II - + + + +
Zoran  
Milanović - + + + -
Tihomir 
Orešković - - - - -
Andrej  
Plenković I - - - + +
Tablica 7. Kapaciteti hrvatskih vlada u poslijekriznom razdoblju, 2008.-2016. g.
Izvor: obrada autora  prema Döring, Manow, 2016; Nikić Čakar, Raos, 2014, 2015, 2016
Tablica 7 otkriva nam stanje poslijekriznih vlada prema gore prezenti-
ranih pet kriterija za procjenjivanje njihovog kapaciteta. Kasna Sanader-
ova vlada tijekom 2008. i 2009. godine uživala je stabilnu parlamentarnu 
potporu, bila je interno homogena, kao numerički, tako i ideološki, te 
je premijer kao šef najveće stranke svakako posjedovao provedbene 
kapacitete. Međutim, o kadrovskoj i institucionalnoj nestabilnosti ove 
vlade svjedoče brojne ostavke i smjene ministara (usp. Kasapović, 2011: 
4-5). Premijerka Kosor se, za razliku od svoga prethodnika, morala nositi 
s neizvjesnom potporom u Saboru, a i bila je opterećena time što preds-
jednica stranke nije postalaredovnim putem, već aklamacijom na poticaj 
prethodnika koji joj je ujedno prepustio premijersko mjesto. Vlada Zorana 
Milanovića posjedovala je unutarnju homogenost, kako odnosa strana-
ka, tako i njihovih javnopolitičkih prioriteta. Milanović je kao šef najveće 
stranke u vladi imao nepobitne provedbene kapacitete, no kadrovska 
stabilnost je bila ozbiljno narušena odlaskom brojnih ministara, uključu-
170
jući dvojicu ključnih potpredsjednika vlade. Usto, zbog neizborne parlam-
entarizacije, Milanovićeva vlada dočekala je kraj mandata kao manjinska 
vlada, iako su stranke u vladi većinu mandata imale jasnu parlamentarnu 
većinu (usp. Nikić Čakar, Raos, 2016: 51, 54). Vlada Tihomira Orešk-
ovića nije zadovoljavala nijedan kriterij za kapacitete za provođenje 
uspješne fiskalne politike. Naime, nije uživala stabilnu parlamentarnu 
potporu, činile su je dvije stranke od kojih je jedna stalno erodirala u 
članstvu (MOST), a druga (HDZ) nije bila navikla na koalicijskog partnera 
srednje, a ne male veličine. Premda načelno ideološki kompatibilni, zbog 
nedorečenosti programa stranke MOST, ni ovaj uvjet nije mogao biti 
zadovoljen. Nestranački premijer nije mogao nametnuti osobne kapac-
itete, a česte promjene članova Vlade narušile su i kadrovski kapacitet. 
Situacija se prema posljednja dva kriterija poboljšala s vladom Andreja 
Plenkovića, a značajno se poboljšala nakon što je Plenković osnovao 
svoju drugu vladu, ovaj put s HNS-om, no to izlazi iz vremenskog okvira 
ove analize. 
Zanimljivo je istaknuti razliku između fiskalne politike Jadranke Kosor i 
Zorana Milanovića, tj. njihovih vlada, osvrtom na analizu izbornih pro-
grama 2011. godine koja je pokazala značajan zaokret HDZ-a ulijevo 
u ekonomskoj politici te stavljanje programskih prioriteta na (proračun-
sko) zadovoljavanje stranci važnih biračkih skupina (usp. Nikić Čakar, 
2011: 15). Usto, valja naglasiti da upravo „fragmentiranost donositelja 
odluka“, tj. raspršivanje procesa donošenja na mnogo aktera (koalicijskih 
partnera ili podupiratelja iz parlamenta) utječe na štedljivost, odnosno 
rastrošnost javnih politika koje oni predlažu, tj. pokušavaju „progurati“ 
kroz odluke Vlade (Perotti, 1998: 376). Ovo dodatno objašnjava gore 
spomenute razlike u (potencijalnim) provedbenim kapacitetima pojedinih 
vlada u poslijekriznom razdoblju. 
Nakon što smo utvrdili velike razlike u pretpostavljenim kapacitetima 
pojedinih vlada koje su djelovale u promatranom razdoblju, trebamo se 
osvrnuti i na njihove deklarativne fiskalnopolitičke prioritete na temelju 
kojih možemo procjenjivati njihove rezultate na području fiskalne konsol-
idacije, tematizirane u ranijim dijelovima ovoga rada. Prioritete ćemo tu-
mačiti na temelju istaknutih ciljeva u programima vlade ili ekvivalentnim, 
javno dostupnim dokumentima. 
Prva vlada koja je započela svoje djelovanje nakon izbijanja svjetske 
gospodarske krize 2008. g. i njenog prelijevanja na hrvatsko gospodarst-
vo bila je vlada Jadranke Kosor, koja u travnju 2010. godine donosi 
Program gospodarskog oporavka koji u okviru ciljeva fiskalne politike 
podcrtava fiskalnu konsolidaciju koju namjerava provesti uz kombinaciju 
prodaje državnih udjela u trgovačkim društvima, racionalizaciju troškova, 
veću prohodnost i učinkovitost poreznog sustava te uz cilj postupnog 
smanjenja udjela opće države (na prihodovnoj i na rashodovnoj strani) 
za 3 pb u BDP-u do 2020. godine (Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 2010: 
13-14). Iste godine, Vlada donosi (u okviru paketa zakona koji su bili po-
trebni zbog prilagodbe zakonodavstvu Europske unije) Zakon o fiskalnoj 
odgovornosti, noveliran 2014. godine za vrijeme vlade Zorana Milanovića. 
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Program vlade Zorana Milanovića, donesen u prosincu 2011. g. u svo-
jem planu fiskalne konsolidacije predvidio je ciljeve poput „smanjenja 
deficita konsolidirane države na manje od 3 % BDP-a i primarnoga defi-
cita na nulu, smanjenja udjela proračunskih rashoda u BDP-u za oko 
4,5 postotnih poena do kraja mandata, zaustavljanja rasta i preokretanja 
trenda udjela javnoga duga, uvećanoga za državna jamstva, u BDP-u 
na razinama manjima od 60 %“ (Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 2011: 10). 
Kao instrumenti postizanja ovih ciljeva istaknuti su pomaci u strukturi 
javne potrošnje (od neproduktivnih do produktivnih) te općenita racion-
alizacija javne i državne uprave te državnih poduzeća, a ne toliko puke 
kontrakcije na rashodovnoj strani. Program vlade Tihomira Oreškovića, 
usvojen u siječnju 2016. godine, u okviru svoje vizije za 2020. godinu, 
navodi ciljeve smanjenja javnog duga na ispod 80 posto BDP-a te defici-
ta na ispod 3 posto BDP-a kako bi se zadovoljili kriteriji iz Maastrichta, no 
ne eksplicira konkretne mjere kojima se ovi ciljevi trebaju postići (Vlada 
Republike Hrvatske, 2016: 8). Vlada Andreja Plenkovića u svojemu pro-
gramu iz listopada 2016. g. ističe dugoročnu održivost javnih financija uz 
zacrtani cilj održavanja uravnoteženih državnih proračuna te smanjenja 
udjela javnog duga u BDP-u za 10 pb tijekom četverogodišnjeg mandata 
(Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 2017: 22). 
Slijedi nam analiza agende Vlade iz perspektive fiskalne politike, kao 
i odlučivačkih ishoda temeljenih na Vladinim fiskalnopolitičkim prior-
itetima. Ova analiza temelji se na bazi podataka prikupljenoj u okviru 
projekta Poliptih (Politički prioriteti u Hrvatskoj), koji prati odlučivačku, 
zakonodavnu i medijsku agendu u Hrvatskoj od 1990. do kraja 2015. 
g. na temelju svjetske istraživačke mreže Comparative Agendas Project 
(CAP).69 Budući da ova baza pokriva samo podatke do kraja 2015. go-
dine, ona ne može reflektirati rad Oreškovićeve i Plenkovićeve vlade, no 
pružit će uvid u razvoj političkih prioriteta tijekom glavnine poslijekriznog 
razdoblja analiziranoga u ovome radu.
Na temelju CAP-ovog šifrarnika javnopolitičkih sadržaja (tematskih 
odrednica), u bazi podataka izlučena su, unutar glavne teme „Unutarnja 
makroekonomska pitanja (kôd 100)“, dva tematska bloka – „Nacional-
ni proračun i dug (kôd 105)“ te „Oporezivanje, porezna politika, PDV i 
porezna reforma (kôd 107)“. Premda je Vlada u hrvatskom slučaju domi-
nantni akter koji nameće političke prioritete te presudno utječe na proces 
stvaranja javnih politika (usp. Petek, 2017: 831), te bez obzira na to što, 
kao što se može vidjeti i iz priloženih Slika 8 i 9, raspravna aktivnost 
Vlade opsegom nadmašuje njen odlučivački output, kao i output Sabora, 
naglasak u ovoj analizi bit će na praćenju trendova političkih prioriteta, 
ali i političkih odluka u području fiskalne politike kroz tri segmenta. Prvi 
segment odnosi se na Vladinu agendu, tj. na razvoj političkih prioriteta 
mjerenih prema tematskim odrednicama točaka dnevnog reda sjednica 
Vlade prikupljenih u okviru već spomenutog projekta. Drugi segment se 
69 Projekt Poliptih proveden je od 2015. do 2016. g. na Fakultetu političkih znanosti u 
Zagrebu uz financiranje iz Europskog socijalnog fonda. Na temelju Projekta osnovan je 
Centar za empirijska politološka istraživanja (CEPIS) pri Fakultetu političkih znanosti.
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odnosi na akte Vlade objavljene u Narodnim novinama. Drugim riječi-
ma, radi se o segmentu u kojemu raspravne točke rezultiraju Vladin-
im političkim odlukama. Treći segment odnosi se na akte Sabora, uz 
pretpostavku da je Vlada kao dominantni akter u kreiranju javnih politi-
ka i glavni inicijator zakonodavnog procesa ujedno i akter koji „stoji“ iza 
spomenutih akata Sabora, tako da sva tri segmenta zajedno tvore sliku 
o fiskalnoj politici hrvatskih vlada u promatranom razdoblju.
Slika 8 nam pokazuje kako je Vladina agenda u području proračuna i 
duga imala nekoliko vrhunaca u promatranom razdoblju, tj. u nekoliko je 
točaka u vremenu došlo do značajnog povećanja količine raspravljenih 
točaka dnevnog reda sjednice Vlade o ovim pitanjima. Značajne skok-
ove u postavljanju prioriteta izvršne vlasti na pitanja proračuna i duga 
možemo uočiti pred kraj vlade Jadranke Kosor, konkretnije tijekom 2011. 
godine. Doneseni akti Vlade i akti Sabora, objavljeni u Narodnim novina-
ma, ne prate ove skokove, tj. nije moguće govoriti o paralelnim trendovi-
ma. U tablici 7 su pak pobrojane Vladine odluke, tj. akti Vlade i Sabora 
objavljeni u Narodnim novinama koji se tiču tematskog područja proraču-
na i duga, s time da su pojedine odluke izostavljene budući da su proci-
jenjene irelevantnima. Nazivi odluka su reducirani radi ekonomičnosti, a 
brojke u zagradama označavaju ponavljajuće odluke.
Slika 8. Kretanje Vladine agende te akti Vlade i Sabora u području proračuna i duga, 
2008.-2015. g.
Izvor: obrada autora prema Širinić i dr., 2016; www.cepis.hr
Sadržaj tablice 8 potvrđuje opaženi trend snažnog fokusa Vladine agen-
de na temu proračuna i duga u kasnoj fazi mandata Jadranke Kosor. Ve-
liki broj akata Vlade vrtio se oko tuzemnog i inozemnog zaduživanja, kao 
i oko optimiziranja sustava državne potpore. Za vrijeme Milanovićeve 
vlade manje se poseže za novim izvorima financiranja, no i dalje se 
pokušava preraspodjelama unutar okvira državnih potpora postići svrho-
vitiju alokaciju sredstava uz istovremene uštede. Analiza akata Vlade 
173
i Sabora pokazuje učestalu praksu preraspodjele proračunskih sredstava, 
što svjedoči o ne posve uravnoteženom proračunskom planiranju. Sve ovo 
baca drugačije svjetlo na proces fiskalne konsolidacije opisan u ranijim di-
jelovima rada.
Vlada Godina Akt Vlade Akti Sabora
Sanader 2008.
Preraspodjela proračunskih sredstava (4)




Pravila o državnim potporama 
Tuzemni kredit, 750 000 000 eura
Pravila o državnoj potpori u obliku jamstava
Pravila privremenog okvira za mjere državnih 
potpora gospodarskoj krizi




Preraspodjela proračunskih sredstava (3)




Tuzemne obveznice, 350 000 000 eura
Pravila o državnim potporama za javne radio-
difuzijske usluge
Pravila o državnim potporama
Tuzemni kredit, 500 000 000 eura
Tuzemne obveznice, 650 000 000 eura
Euroobveznice, 1 250 000 000 dolara





Euroobveznice, 1 500 000 000 dolara
Euroobveznice, 750 000 000 eura
Tuzemne obveznice, 600 000 000 eura










Privremeno financiranje državnih tijela i drugih 
proračunskih korisnika
Euroobveznice, 1 500 000 000 dolara












Visina, rok i način uplate sredstava strateškim 
poduzećima
Dubinska analiza proračunskih rashoda







Milanović 2015. Dubinska analiza proračunskih rashoda Državni  proračun (2)
Tablica 8. Akti Vlade u području proračuna i duga, 2008.-2015. g.
Izvor: obrada autora prema Širinić i dr., 2016
Drugi bitan aspekt fiskalne politike, pa onda i napora oko fiskalne konsol-
idacije, leži u Vladinim intervencijama na prihodovnoj strani proračuna. 
Stoga se posljednji dio ove analize bavi kretanjem Vladine agende, te 
aktima Vlade i Sabora u području porezne politike. Za razliku od prethod-
nog grafikona, slika 9 ne pokazuje tako izražene trendove ni amplitude, 
dok su pak intenzitet Vladine deliberacije (dnevni redovi) i outputa (akti 
Vlade i Sabora) puno ujednačeniji. 
Slika 9. Kretanje Vladine agende te akti Vlade i Sabora u području porezne politike, 2008.-
2015. g.
Izvor: obrada autora prema Širinić i dr., 2016; www.cepis.hr
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Vlada Godina Akt Vlade Akti Sabora
Sanader 2008. -
Zakon o porezu na dobit
Opći porezni zakon
Sanader 2009. - -
Kosor 2009. -
Zakon o trošarinama
Zakon o PDV-u (2)
Zakon o posebnom porezu na plaće
Zakon o posebnom porezu na pri-




Zakon o posebnom porezu na plaće
Zakon o posebnom porezu na pri-
mitke od samostalnog rada
Zakon o porezu na dohodak
Zakon o porezu na dobit
Kosor 2011. -
Opći porezni zakon
Zakon o posebnom porezu na kavu
Zakon o porezu na dohodak
Milanović 2011. -
Milanović 2012. Trošarina na cigarete
Zakon o PDV-u (2)
Zakon o porezu na dohodak (2)
Zakon o porezu na dobit
Opći porezni zakon (2)
Zakon o trošarinama
Porez na luksuzne proizvode
Milanović 2013. -
Zakon o trošarinama (3)
Zakon o PDV-u (2)
Zakon o porezu na dohodak (2)
Zakon o porezu na dobit
Zakon o porezu na kavu
Milanović 2014. Pravilnik o porezu na dobit
Zakon o PDV-u
Zakon o porezu na dohodak
Zakon o porezu na dobit
Milanović 2015. - Opći porezni zakon
Tablica 9. Akti Vlade i Sabora u području porezne politike, 2008.-2015. g.
Izvor: obrada autora prema Širinić i dr., 2016
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Tablica 9 pokazuje da su mahom sve vlade koje su djelovale u posli-
jekriznom razdoblju intenzivno i opetovano mijenjale gotovo sve ključne 
porezne zakone kako bi optimizirale državne prihode uz istovremeno 
ciljano rasterećenje pojedinih slojeva stanovništva. Dakako, poznato je 
kako učestale izmjene poreznog zakonodavstva unose poslovnu nesig-
urnost koja se negativno reflektira na tuzemne i inozemne investicije, što 
pak dodatno usporava gospodarski rast. Iz ovih podataka nije moguće 
razlučiti razlike u fiskalnim politikama pojedinih vlada u poslijekriznom 
razdoblju budući da se njihova porezna politika kao dio šire fiskalne poli-
tike nije odveć razlikovala. 
6. Zaključak
Ovaj rad je pokazao kako je početna fiskalna kosolidacija za vrijeme 
kasnog dijela mandata premijera Ive Sanadera i početka mandata Jad-
ranke Kosor bila temeljena na dizanju poreznog opterećenja da bi zatim 
u uvjetima bržeg pada prihoda od mogućnosti zauzdavanja rashoda kon-
solidacija prestala u drugom dijelu mandata Jadranke Kosor. Najsnažnija 
fiskalna konsolidacija provedena je za vrijeme vlade Zorana Milanovića, 
s time da se u tom razdoblju nastavio rast poreznog opterećenja, kao i 
rezanje plaća te odgađanje ili zaustavljanje investicija. Za vrijeme vlada 
Tihomira Oreškovića i Andreja Plenkovića veći je naglasak stavljen na 
snaženje prihodovne strane proračuna, negoli na daljnje racionaliziranje 
troškova. Analiza strukturnih političkih pretpostavki za kapacitet izvršne 
vlasti u području fiskalne politike, a posebice u kontekstu ispunjavanja 
ciljeva fiskalne konsolidacije, pokazala je da manjinske vlade, oslonjene 
na šaroliku potporu u parlamentu, teško mogu izbjeći popuštanje disci-
pline i otvaranje prostora fragmentiranom ostvarenju partikularnih inte-
resa nauštrb balansiranog proračuna. Vlade temeljene na predizbornim, 
ideološki homogenim koalicijama, imaju jače pretpostavke za punu up-
otrebu svojih provedbenih kapaciteta u svrhu ispunjenja ciljeva fiskalne 
konsolidacije. Kada se analiziraju dnevni redovi Vlade, kao i akti Vlade i 
Sabora, može se ustvrditi kako je najveći fokus na fiskalnoj konsolidaciji, 
ali ne i najveći uspjeh u njoj, bio tijekom 2011. godine, u zadnjoj godini 
mandata Jadranke Kosor. Analiza akata Vlade i Sabora pokazuje snažna 
zaduživanja tijekom vlade Jadranke Kosor te jačanje fiskalne discipline 
za vrijeme Zorana Milanovića, uz učestalo dorađivanje sustava državnih 
potpora kroz cijelo promatrano razdoblje. Usto, pokazalo se da su sve 
vlade u promatranom razdoblju izrazito često mijenjale ključne porezne 
zakone te da su po više puta godišnje preraspoređivale proračunska 
sredstva, što svjedoči o izostanku planiranja. 
Zaključno možemo reći da je fiskalna konsolidacija u Hrvatskoj više reak-
tivne, a manje proaktivne naravi budući da je snažno obilježena potre-
bom za ispunjavanjem kriterija koje nameću institucije Europske unije, a 
manje je plod unutarpolitičkih prioriteta i stranačkih opredjeljenja. 
177
Literatura:
Andabaka, A., Družić, I. Mustać, N., (2017.), Drivers of public debt in 
Croatia. Ekonomski pregled, 68(5), p. 463-487.
Bajo, A., Primorac, M., Andabaka Badurina, A., (2011.), Osnove upravl-
janja javnim dugom, Institut za javne financije, Zagreb
Bartlett, W., (2014.), Ekonomska politika Milanovićeve vlade 2012.-2014, 
Političke analize, 5(20), p.15-21.
Burnać, P., (2017.), Fiskalna konsolidacija: teorijski okvir i slučaj Repub-
like Hrvatske, EFZG working paper series, (06), p.1-16.
Deskar-Škrbić, M., Šimović, H., (2014.), Porezna politika Milanovićeve 
vlade od 2012. do 2014. Političke analize, 5(20), p. 22-32.
Döring, H., Manow, P., (2016.), Parliaments and governments database 
(ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern de-
mocracies, Development version, http://www.parlgov.org/ 
European Central Bank (2016.), Government debt reduction strategies in 
the euro area, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 3, https://www.ecb.europa.
eu/pub/pdf/other/eb201603_article02.en.pdf 
Eurostat (2016.), Manual on Government Deficit and Debt: Imple-
mentation of ESA 2010, Eurostat; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/docu-
ments/3859598/7203647/KS-GQ-16-001-EN-N.pdf/5cfae6dd-29d8-
4487-80ac-37f76cd1f012 
Hrvatska narodna banka (2014.), Bilten, br. 200, Zagreb, Hrvatska nar-
odna banka
Joumard, I., Minegishi, M., André, C., Nicq, C., Price, R. W., (2008.), 
Accounting for one-off operations when assessing underlying fiscal posi-
tions, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1618204 
Kasapović, M., (2011.), Drugi kritični izbori u Hrvatskoj - slom jednog 
modela vladanja, Političke analize, 2(8), p. 3-9. 
Krznar, I., (2011.), Identifikacija razdoblja recesija i ekspanzija u Hrvat-
skoj, Istraživanja I-32, Hrvatska narodna banka
Lijphart, A., (2014.), Modeli demokracije: oblici i učinkovitost vlasti u 
trideset šest zemalja, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Zagreb 
Mirdala, R., (2013.), Lessons learned from tax versus expenditure based 
fiscal consolidation in the European transition economies, Journal of Ap-
plied Economic Sciences, 8(1), p. 73-98.
Mourre, G., Astarita, C., Princen, S. (2014.), Adjusting the budget balance 
for the business cycle: the EU methodology No. 536, Directorate General 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission
Nikić Čakar, D., (2011.), Kukuriku versus HDZ – analiza izbornih progra-
ma, Političke analize, 2(8), p. 10-15.
178
Nikić Čakar, D., Raos, V., (2014.), Croatia. European Journal of Political 
Research Political Data Yearbook, 53(1), p. 66-77.
Nikić Čakar, D., Raos, V., (2015.), Croatia. European Journal of Political 
Research Political Data Yearbook, 54(1), p. 60-68.
Nikić Čakar, D., Raos, V., (2016.), Croatia. European Journal of Political 
Research Political Data Yearbook, 55(1), p. 50-58.
Nikić Čakar, D., Raos, V., (2017.), Croatia. European Journal of Political 
Research Political Data Yearbook, 56(1), p. 51-59.
Perotti, R., (1998,), The political economy of fiscal consolidations, The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 100(1), p. 367-394.
Petek, A., (2017,), Croatian Decision Agenda: An Analysis of the Acts 
Published in the National Gazette Since 1990, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta 
u Zagrebu, 67(5), p. 815-841.
Sartori, G., (2002.), Stranke i stranački sustavi: analitički okvir, Politička 
kultura, Zagreb 
Sever, I., Drezgić, S.,  Blažić, H., (2011.), Budget spending and econom-
ic growth in Croatia-Dynamics and relationships over the past two dec-
ades, Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci: časopis za ekon-
omsku teoriju i praksu, 29(2), p. 291-331.
Šimović, H., (2005.), Fiskalna politika u Europskoj uniji i Pakt o stabilnos-
ti i rastu, Zbornik Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 3(1), p. 75-88.
Šimović, H., (2017.), Potraga za optimalnim i efikasnim javnim financija-
ma u Hrvatskoj: od reformi do zaduživanja, EFZG working paper series, 
(08), p. 1-31.
Šimović, H., Ćorić, T., Deskar-Škrbić, M., (2014.), Mogućnosti i ograničen-
ja fiskalne politike u Hrvatskoj, Ekonomski pregled, 65(6), p. 541-575.
Širinić, D., Nikić Čakar, D., Petek, A., Šipić, J., Raos, V., Kekez, A. (2016.), 
Politički prioriteti u Hrvatskoj od 1990. do 2015. – Arhiva deklasificiranih 
dnevnih redova sjednica Vlade Republike Hrvatske (v.1.0) (Arhiva doku-
menata i šifrarnik), Zagreb: Centar za empirijska politološka istraživanja, 
Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
Šonje, V., (2014.), Mijenjati se ili nestati: tri godine vlade Zorana Milano-
vića iz ekonomskog kuta. Političke analize, 5(20), p. 3-14.
Švaljek, S., Vizek, M., Mervar, A., (2009.), Ciklički prilagođeni proračun-
ski saldo: primjer Hrvatske,  Radni materijali Ekonomskog instituta, Za-
greb, (1), p. 5-51.
Vlada Republike Hrvatske (2010.),  Program gospodarskog oporavka, 
http://www.hrt.hr/uploads/media/Program_gospodarskog_oporavka.pdf 
Vlada Republike Hrvatske (2011.), Program Vlade Republike Hrvatske 
za mandat 2011.-2015., http://www.sabor.hr/fgs.axd?id=19445 
179
Vlada Republike Hrvatske (2016.), Strategija transformacije Hrvatske, 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/296251691/Mandatar-Prezentacija-Progra-
ma-Vlade-Rh-Sabor-22-1-2016 
Vlada Republike Hrvatske (2017a.), Program Vlade Republike Hrvatske 
za mandat 2016.-2020., https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/ZPPI/Do-
kumenti%20Vlada/Program_Vlada_RH_2016_2020.pdf 
Vlada Republike Hrvatske (2017b.), Program konvergencije Republike 
Hrvatske za razdoblje 2017.-2020., https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/
files/2017-european-semester-convergence-programme-croatia-hr.pdf
180
prof. dr. sc. Mario Pečarić
Ekonomski fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci i Ekonomski fakultet Sveučilišta u Splitu 
e-mail: mpecaric@efst.hr
Vlado Slišković, M. Fin.
e-mail: vlado.sliskovic@gmail.com
JAVNI DUG KAO STRUKTURNI EPIFENOMEN 
MONETARNO-FISKALNOG NEKSUSA
PUBLIC DEBT AS A STRUCTURAL EPIPHENOMENON 
OF THE MONETARY AND FISCAL NEXUS
SAŽETAK
Iako javni dug i njegovo upravljanje predstavljaju eminentno područje fiskalne 
politike, javni dug je u suštini strukturni monetarno-fiskalni fenomen. Dugovna 
kriza i odgovori na nju ukazali su na nedostatke u poimanju značaja, učinaka i po-
imanja optimalnog upravljanja dugom. Štoviše, ekonomska teorija dugo je zane-
marivala značaj dugova (dugovne ekonomije) općenito, osobito javnog duga. 
U radu se naglašava da nagli rast javnog duga nije uzrok krize, već posljedica 
„krize modela“. Antikrizna politika zbog dominantnog mainstream teorijskog ok-
vira te na njenim temeljima izgrađene institucionalne strukture zamjenjuje uzrok 
i posljedicu, čime slabi učinkovitost svoje reformske pozicije. Učinkovito upravl-
janje javnim dugom pretpostavlja rekonceptualizaciju teorijskog okvira značaja i 
uloge javnog duga i na tim temeljima reformu institucionalne strukture. Cilj rada 
je analizirati endogeni karakter javnog duga heterodoksnim teorijskim pristupom 
kao podlogom reforme monetarno-fiskalnog neksusa.
Ključne riječi: javni dug, monetarno-fiskalni neksus, heterodoksni pristup, kriza 
modela
ABSTRACT 
Although public debt and its management are an eminent fiscal policy area, pub-
lic debt is basically a structural monetary and fiscal phenomenon. The debt crisis 
and the subsequent responses pointed to the shortcomings in understanding 
the importance, effects and the perception of optimal public debt management. 
However, economic theory has for a long time neglected the importance of debts 
(“debt economy”) in general, especially public debt. It is pointed out in the paper 
that sudden growth of public debt is not the cause of the crisis, but the effect of 
the “model crisis”. The counter-crisis policy, due to the dominant mainstream the-
oretical framework and the resulting institutional structure, confuses causes and 
effects, thus weakening the effectiveness of its reform position. Effective public 
debt management implies reconceptualisation of the theoretical framework and 
the role of public debt and the subsequent reform of the institutional structure. 
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The aim of the paper is to analyse the endogenous character of public debt us-
ing the heterodox theoretical framework as the foundation for the reform of the 
monetary and fiscal nexus.
Key words: public debt, monetary and fiscal nexus, heterodox approach, model 
crisis
1. Uvod
Financijska kriza u EU-u ubrzo se pretvorila u krizu javnog duga. Kriza 
javnog duga nametnula je potrebu iznalaženja sustava njegovog razvo-
jno učinkovitog upravljanja. Upravljanje javnim dugom je, par excellence, 
pitanje kompleksne interakcije monetarne i fiskalne politike te se svako 
teoretiziranje značaja i učinaka javnog duga svodi na pitanje adekvat-
nosti postojećeg teorijskog koncepta interakcije i iz njega proizašlog in-
stitucionalnog okvira. U radu se argumentira potreba rekonceptualizacije 
ovoga odnosa. Dugovna kriza i odgovori na nju ukazali su na nedostat-
ke u poimanju značaja, učinaka i poimanja upravljanja dugom. Štoviše, 
ekonomska teorija dugo je zanemarivala značaj dugova (dugovne 
ekonomije) općenito, osobito javnog duga. 
Vjera u efikasnost financijskih tržišta i njome strukturno oblikovane 
monetarne sfere i monetarne politike (monetarno-financijska dominaci-
ja), pridala je fiskalnoj politici prvenstveno deflacijski i prilagođavajući 
značaj. Vertikalna koordinacija politika značila je prilagođavanje fiskalne 
sfere i njenih ciljeva ciljevima monetarne stabilnosti kao poželjnog i 
„zdravog“ razvojnog okruženja. Stoga ne čudi razumijevanje suvremene 
krize kao krize javnog duga i naglašavanje neodgovorne proračunske 
politike gomilanja proračunskih deficita sukladno diskrecijskoj prirodi 
fiskalne politike i političkih odluka. Zato se i politika štednje (austerity) i 
fiskalne konsolidacije naglašava kao prioritetna politika u cilju povećanja 
konkurentnosti i poticanja stopa gospodarskog rasta. U radu se naglaša-
va da nagli rast javnog duga nije uzrok krize, već posljedica „krize mod-
ela“. Antikrizna politika zbog dominantnog mainstream teorijskog okvira i 
na njenim temeljima izgrađene institucionalne strukture zamjenjuje uzrok 
i posljedicu, čime slabi učinkovitost svoje reformske pozicije. Stoga se u 
radu obrazlaže heterodoksni pristup značaju i ulozi javnog duga.
Dosadašnji teorijski i iz njega proizašli institucionalni okvir ocjenjuje se 
neadekvatnim za reformske procese. Egzogeno tretiranje javnog duga 
i njegovih učinaka na inflaciju, kamatne stope i rast nužno je zamijen-
iti endogenim tretiranjem javnog duga poštujući razvojnu specifičnost 
zemalja, a u cilju minimiziranja razvojnih troškova reformskih procesa. 
Temeljna teza rada je da je kretanje javnog duga prvenstveno mone-
tarno-financijski fenomen, premda je upravljanje javnim dugom prven-
stveno zadatak fiskalne politike.
Suodnos monetarno-financijskog i fiskalnog neksusa određen je kar-
akterom i prevladavanjem financijske sfere i iz nje izvedenog načela 
gospodarskog rasta na temelju neograničene multiplikacije (eksplozije) 
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privatnog duga. Temeljni problem suvremenih gospodarstava je nekon-
trolirano pretkrizno bujanje dugova, posebice privatnog duga i njegove 
strukture, te negativni učinci istog na rast i kretanje javnog duga. Nagla-
sak reformskih procesa zato mora biti na redizajniranju neksusa mone-
tarno-financijske i fiskalne sfere. Naglašavanje reforme i institucionalnog 
okvira samo fiskalne sfere argumentira se nedostatnim za prevladavanje 
„krize modela“.
Efikasno upravljanje javnim dugom kao endogenim fenomenom, u cilju 
minimiziranja razvojnih troškova, pretpostavlja teorijski okvir istraživanja 
njegovih odrednica (kratkoročnih i dugoročnih), nacionalnih i suprana-
cionalnih razina koordinacije upravljanja dugom te promjenu institucion-
alnog okvira koordinacije, posebice za posttranzicijske zemlje EU-a. 
Prisilna konvergencija putemfinancijske integracije kojoj su podređene 
fiskalna i druge politike pokazala se naivnom i štetnom za sam integraci-
jski proces. Reforma dosadašnjeg institucionalnog okvira mora biti sve-
obuhvatna. Oslanjanje samo na fiskalna ograničenja ne osigurava tra-
jniju stabilizaciju i održivost javnog duga, niti otklanja eventualne štetne 
učinke visokog javnog duga na gospodarstvo. Dapače, smanjivanje 
javnog duga u situaciji nereformiranog monetarno-financijskog sektora 
i njegovog slabog utjecaja na rast samo produbljava recesiju. Preduvjet 
reforme institucionalnog okvira je rekonceptualizacija neksusa politika. 
Rad je teorijskog karaktera i dio je šireg istraživanja međuovisnosti mon-
etarne i fiskalne sfere. Cilj rada je analizirati značaj javnog duga kao 
endogenog strukturnog  fenomena u heterodoksnom teorijskom okviru. 
U drugom dijelu rada opisana je ukratko fenomenologija krize javnog 
duga, dok se u trećem dijelu analiziraju teorijski aspekti tretiranja duga 
uz naglašavanje njegovog konceptualno endogenog karaktera. Na kraju 
se, u zaključku, daju smjernice za institucionalnu reformu.
2. Fenomenologija krize javnog duga
Globalna financijska kriza 2008. g. koja se javila u većini razvijenih 
ekonomija svijeta u 2009. g. je u Europskoj uniji rezultirala Europskom 
krizom javnog duga (European Sovereign Debt Crisis) iznjedrivši mnogo-
brojne strukturne probleme specifične za EU (European Union) i EMU 
(European Monetary Union). 
Prelijevanje krize iz SAD-a u Europu se, kao i drugdje, dogodilo uslijed 
naglog prestanka prekograničnog priljeva kapitala (sudden stop) u pri-
vatni sektor uzrokujući ispuhivanje imovinskih balona i pad vrijednosti 
kolaterala, što je kod banaka uzrokovalo problem adekvatnosti kapitala 
ograničavajući izdavanje novih kredita. Padom očekivanja privatnog sek-
tora i prestankom ulaska novih kredita zupčanici ekonomije prestali su se 
podmazivati uzrokujući duboku financijsku krizu. Ona se ubrzo pretvorila 
u krizu realnog sektora što je za rezultat imalo pad agregatne potražnje, 
rast nezaposlenosti i, u konačnici, pad BDP-a. 
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Aktivacijom fiskalnih stabilizatora i socijalnih transfera dolazi do pov-
ećanja državne potrošnje, a kako s druge strane dolazi do smanjenja 
poreznih prihoda, to rezultira strelovitim rastom fiskalnih deficita.70 Pa-
dom BDP-a relativna zaduženost mjerena udjelom javnog duga (JD) u 
BDP-u postaje još izraženija i dovodi do Europske krize javnog duga.
Iako je svoje korijene neupitno imala u prelijevanju financijske krize iz 
SAD-a, Europska kriza javnog duga potpuno je zasebna kriza i predstav-
lja drugu rundu globalne financijske krize, specifične samo za EMU/EU. 
Ona je svoje neposredne uzroke imala u promjeni investitorske percep-
cije o rizičnosti ulaganja u državne obveznice pojedinih zemalja EMU-a, 
i to gotovo isključivo onih s periferije, a posebno Grčke. Rastom rizika na 
financijskim tržištima dolazi do pada cijena obveznica i rasta kamatnih 
stopa, povećavajući spread u odnosu na centralne zemlje, što kod tih 
zemalja dovodi do problema izdavanja novog javnog duga i refinanciran-
ja starog. Dotad se pretpostavljalo da se ovakve stvari ne bi trebale/mo-
gle dogoditi u monetarnoj uniji kakva je EMU. S obzirom na to da Europs-
ka središnja banka (ESB) nema mandat kreditora u krajnjoj nuždi (lender 
of last resort), a fiskalne politike su u rukama zemalja članica, došlo je 
do krize javnog duga. Investitori su, uz pomoć kreditnih rejting agencija 
koje su snizile kreditne rejtinge pojedinih perifernih zemlja, EMU doživ-
jeli kao nedovoljno „unioniziranu“, a obveznicama njenih članica pripisali 
default rizike kakve imaju korporativne obveznice koje nemaju pokriće u 
središnjem bankarskom sustavu. 
Naime, neoliberalni koncept EMU-a/EU-a temelji se na (njemačkom) 
modelu izvozom poticanog rasta (export led growth) čija je okosnica nis-
ka i stabilna inflacija kao pretpostavka provođenja zajedničke monetarne 
politike i opstojnosti eura kao zajedničke valute. Eurozona nije po kriteri-
jima OCA teorije optimalno valutno područje, ali je uvođenje zajedničke 
valute zamišljeno kao poluga daljnje integracije tržišta i povećanja bla-
gostanja njenih stanovnika (endogenost optimalnog valutnog područja). 
Da bi prihvatile zajedničku valutu (i time se odrekle monetarne suverenos-
ti), zemlje su trebale ispuniti  nominalne kriterije nominalne konvergenci-
je (Maastricht criteria). Njihova svrha bila je sniziti inflaciju prvenstveno 
ograničavajući proračunski deficit i razinu javnog duga. Fiskalna konsol-
idacija time je postala jedna od nužnih pretpostavki funkcioniranja mod-
ela. Naime, značajne razlike u stopama inflacije među zemljama činile 
bi provođenje monetarne politike putem jedinstvene kamatne stope za 
cijelu eurozonu neostvarivom. „Zdrava“ (sound) fiskalna politika time je 
strukturni preduvjet niskih kamatnih stopa kao pretpostavke investicija 
i rasta uz, naravno, slobodu kretanja kapitala i strukturne prilagodbe, 
prvenstveno fleksibilizaciju tržišta rada. Heterogene zemlje EMU-a/EU-a 
ostale su bez nacionalnih monetarnih politika, a fiskalne, iako u nacional-
nim domenama, umnogome su ograničene (Stability and Growth Pact). 
70 Kumulirajući deficiti (s prosjekom od 0,7 % BDP-a prije krize na 6 % BDP-a u 2010. g.) 
dovode do snažnog rasta JD-a (ukupni JD EMU-a prije krize iznosio je 66 %, a u 2010. g. 
85 % udjela u BDP-u) čiji razmjeri kod pojedinih zemalja dosežu rekordne razine.
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Optimistična neoliberalna perspektiva temeljila se na pretpostavci da će 
sloboda kretanja kapitala i financijska integracija uz tržišno orijentirane 
reforme dovesti do većih ulaganja, povećanja alokativne efikasnosti i 
blagostanja njenih stanovnika. Dakle, koristi zajedničkog tržišta nadići će 
troškove odustajanja od nacionalnih monetarnih politika. Umjesto stalnih 
devalvacija i valutnih fluktuacija, zajednička valuta trebala je stvoriti pret-
postavke brzog neinflatornog rasta i makroekonomske stabilnosti. 
Odustajući od vlastite valute i monetarne politike, u načelu, zemlje više 
nisu izdavatelji valute već njeni korisnici, a valutni rizik zamijenjen je, 
kao što će se pokazati, rizikom bankrota (default). S druge strane, vjer-
ovalo se da će euro dovesti do pada kamatnih stopa, većih ulaganja 
i time bržeg rasta. Zbog zajedničke monetarne politike konzervativnog 
usmjerenja te ograničene fiskalne politike, zemljama ostaju samo tržišne 
reforme, odnosno mikroekonomske reforme. Temeljni smisao ovoga 
koncepta je uvjerenje kako apatridna valuta (stateless currency) putem 
financijske integracije i uz slobodu kretanja kapitala dovodi do veće 
konkurentnosti i rasta, a time i konvergencije. Financijske frikcije imaju 
kratkoročni negativni utjecaj na ekonomiju, dok se dugoročni utjecaj pret-
postavlja pozitivnim.
Usklađivanje u modelu zajedničke valute / fiksnih tečajeva odvija se, kao 
što je poznato, internom devalvacijom odnosno deflacijom. Fiskalna ek-
spanzija u pojedinim zemljama povećavala bi inflacijske i kamatne difer-
encijale te stvarala percepciju investitora o mogućem bankrotu (default) 
u situaciji endogenih kamatnih stopa. Monetarno nesuverene zemlje, da 
bi trošile više, moraju se: zadužiti, povećati poreze ili prodavati imovinu 
(privatizacija). Monetarno suverene zemlje imaju još jednu mogućnost - 
monetizirati javni dug utječući pritomna kamatne stope i održavajući ih 
niskim kao što je to slučaj u nizu velikih ekonomija. Monetarno suverene 
zemlje, u načelu, izdaju javni dug u vlastitoj valuti (monetizacija javnog 
duga) i ne mogu bankrotirati te investitori percipiraju javni dug tih zemalja 
niskorizičnim. U tom slučaju ceteris paribus, visina javnog duga neće imati 
značajan utjecaj na kamatne stope, odnosno kamatna stopa je egzogena. 
Koristeći pogodnost percepcije niskog kreditnog rizika i uz obilje kapi-
tala došlo je u pretkriznom vremenu do ubrzanja gospodarskog rasta, 
ali uz velike makroekonomske neravnoteže, posebice u manje razvijen-
im zemljama. Zbog naglog priljeva kapitala rastu deficiti tekuće bilance 
plaćanja, privatni i javni dugovi zemalja.
3. Endogenost javnog duga 
U ovom kontekstu problem javnog duga postaje prvorazredni politički 
problem što otvara mnoga pitanja koja se u konačnici svode na to radi li 
se kod krize javnog duga o platno-bilančnom problemu, čisto fiskalnom 
ili institucionalno monetarno-financijskom problemu? Platno-bilančni 
problem podrazumijeva da su njeni uzroci rezultat makroekonomskih 
neravnoteža prethodnih razdoblja manifestiranih kroz kontinuirani deficit 
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tekućeg računa bilance plaćanja i pretjerana vanjska zaduženost (Gros, 
2011)71. 
S druge strane, institucionalni montarno-financijski problem pretpostav-
lja mnogo šire i dublje uzroke krize i stvaranja makroekonomskih ner-
avnoteža dovodeći u pitanje sam teorijski okvir zasnovan na New Conse-
sus Macoreconomics (NCM-u) na kojemu je izgrađena EMU, atime i njen 
institucionalni dizajn i arhitektura monetarnog okvira kao optimalnog 
valutnog područja, kao i uloga, međusobni odnos i adekvatnost ekonom-
skih politika primjenjivanih prije i nakon izbijanja krize.
U okviru prevladavajućeg teorijskog okvira NCM-a, iz kojeg proizlazi i 
struktura te instrumenti politike i njihovi međusobni odnosi, problem mak-
roekonomskih neravnoteža dijagnosticiran je ključnim. Time je odabran 
put vraćanja sustava u ravnotežu jačanjem fiskalne discipline u cilju 
jačanja financijske integracije i veće slobode kretanja kapitala među 
zemljama članicama, ali i tržišno orijentiranih reformi kao preduvjeta, 
čini se, više zbog održavanja postojeće monetarne arhitekture i održa-
vanja eura kao zajedničke valute negoli zbog ostvarenja stopa rasta 
BDP-a. Kriza strukture, odnosno modela predstavlja se time kao pitanje 
neadekvatnosti teorijskog okvira iz kojeg je i nastala, a rješavanje krize i 
potonje recesije neostvarivim.
Konačno, govorom Marija Draghija, predsjednika ESB-a, u kojem navodi 
da će ESB „napraviti sve što je potrebno“ da sačuva euro, završava se 
i europska kriza javnog duga pri čemu je Europa već u međuvremenu 
kliznula u treću uzastopnu krizu, „krizu modela“, koja traje do danas i 
kojoj je kriza javnog duga bila samo uvod i naznaka dubljih problema 
kojima je EU izložena. Kriza modela rezultat je dijagnostičkih pogreški 
nastanka europske krize javnog duga (arhitektura) kao i kasnije primi-
jenjene terapije u okviru ekonomskih politika, a rezultirala je anemičnim 
gospodarskim rastom i visokom zaduženošću javnog sektora. 
Uloga monetarno-fiskalnog neksusa je pritom izuzetno bitna. Rekon-
ceptualizacija ovog odnosa u smislu izgradnje razvojno učinkovitog in-
stitucionalnog mehanizma mora uzeti u obzir kako fiskalnu tako i mon-
etarno-financijsku sferu. Recentna kriza dovela je u pitanje paradigmu 
pretkrizne monetarne i fiskalne politike. Pretkrizna paradigma monetarne 
politike temeljila se na konsenzusu o neovisnosti središnjih banaka uz 
održavanje cjenovne stabilnosti. Ovo razdoblje (Great Moderation) kar-
akterizirano je niskom i stabilnom inflacijom i makroekonomskom stabil-
nošću, ali i uvjerenjem, ne toliko zastupljenim kod ESB-a, o nepostojanju 
jake veze između novčanih i kreditnih agregata i inflacije, uvjerenju o 
značajnoj ulozi monetarne politike u kratkoročnom upravljanju potražn-
jom te uvjerenju u efikasnost financijskih tržišta i zanemarivanju uloge 
71 Također, naglašavanje makroekonomske neravnoteže u obliku vanjske zaduženosti 
kao uzroka krize javnog duga pružaju radovi koji se mogu sažeti u rečenici da „nijedna 
zemlja koja je tijekom 2008. godine imala suficit tekućeg računa i/ili pozitivnu neto vanjsku 
imovinsku poziciju nije imala dugotrajnu financijsku krizu - bez obzira na razinu javnog 
duga“ (Gros, 2015). Time se samo dobilo na potvrdi dijagnoze da je vanjski dug, odnosno 
cjenovna nekonkuretnost glavni krivac europske krize javnog duga.
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monetarne politike prilikom stvaranja cjenovnih „mjehura“ na  kapital-
nim tržištima. Financijske neravnoteže i eksplozija dugova, praćene 
enormnim rastom novca i kredita, dovele su u pitanje strategije mone-
tarne politike i ispunjavanje cilja stabilnosti cijena te iznjedrile zahtjev za 
njenom srednjoročnom ex ante orijentacijom, nužnost adekvatne reg-
ulatorne i kontrolne politike (prvenstveno makroprudencijalne politike i 
politike kapitalnih zahtjeva)72. U situaciji velikih dugova ESB je dovodio 
u pitanje učinkovitost monetarne politike u poticanju rasta i smanjivanju 
output gapa preporučujući strukturne politike kao najbolji lijek. Spona iz-
među financijskog sektora i institucija te vlada rezultiralo je povratnom 
vezom – rast javnog duga uzrokovan strukturnim nedostacima financi-
jskog sektora doveo je u pitanje financijsku stabilnost samog sektora jer 
financijske institucije drže najveći dio javnog duga.   
S obzirom na pristup „krize modela“ analitički napori u literaturi posebno 
dovode u pitanje: 
1) inzistiranje na neutralnosti fiskalne politike i njen „deflatorni kar-
akter“ ograničavanjem „rastrošnosti i zaduženosti“ javnog sektora 
2) poboljšanje cjenovne konkurentnosti privatnog sektora (ne-
konkurentnost je indicirana kao rezultat kroničnih deficita tekućeg 
računa u vremenima prije krize) postavljeno je za cilj ekonom-
ske politike. Zbog pretpostavljenog negativnog utjecaja visokog 
javnog duga i proračunskih deficita na kamatne stope i inflaciju, a 
time i na konkurentnost, fokus reforme bio je upravo na fiskalnoj 
stabilizaciji i ograničavanju rasta javnog duga. 
Odgovor na pitanje značaja stabilizacijske funkcije te održivosti javnog 
duga može se dati samo razumijevanjem načina i uzroka njegova nas-
tanka (endogenost pristupa), a ne samo analizom učinaka koje on ima 
na rast. Upravo su način i uzrok njegova nastanka sistemske prirode, tj. 
vezani za pitanja monetarno-financijske sfere odnosno sistemske prirode 
nastanka privatnog duga. S obzirom na nedovoljnu razinu razumijevan-
ja uzročno posljedičnog odnosa između javnog duga (posebice njegove 
održivosti) i rasta te uopće značaja, odnosno uloge privatnog duga, u 
ovom odnosu i dalje ne postoji jasan uvid u kojim slučajevima i u kojem 
roku javni dug ima prevladavajuće negativan utjecaj na rast, a još manje 
je li on uzrok slabog rasta. 
72 Poziciju ESB-a vidjeti kod Stark (2011) 
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Pregledom literature uočena su uvjetno dva pristupa (doktrine) u treti-
ranju navedenog problema: ortodoksni i heterodoksni. Dok se ortodok-
sni, prije svega, bavi odnosom javnog duga na rast (JD→G), i, ceteris 
paribus, mogućnosti njegove održivosti s aspekta postojećeg financi-
jskog sustava i njegovih karakteristika, heterodoksni pristup propituje 
endogenost stvaranja i uloge javnog duga te time njegove održivosti 
kao posljedice dinamike i institucionalnih uvjeta pod kojima se stvara i 
poništava javni dug. 
Potvrdu opravdanosti mjera ograničavanja visine i rasta javnog duga 
pokušala su dati i brojna istraživanja koja utvrđuju negativnu korelaciju 
odnosa javnog duga i gospodarskog rasta koristeći tzv. „threshold pris-
tup“. Jedan od najutjecajnijih radova ovoga tipa je onaj autora Carmen 
Reinhart i Kennetha Rogoffa This Time is Different. U istome i popratnim 
radovima autori provode opsežna empirijska ispitivanja predmetnog utje-
caja, utvrđujući pritom da razina javnog duga ima utjecaj na gospodarski 
rast čiji se predznak i intenzitet razlikuju ovisno o visini relativnog udjela 
duga u BDP-u, dajući podlogu za provođenje ekonomske politike štednje 
(Reinhart i Rogoff, 2010a,b).  Dodatnu potvrdu za to daju i druga empiri-
jska istraživanja73 koja, osim negativnog utjecaja javnog duga na gosp-
odarski rast, utvrđuju i negativnu vezu privatnog duga na isti (Cecchetti, 
Mohanty i Zampolli, 2011). Tako, primjerice, utvrđuju slične „prihvatljive“ 
razine duga javnog sektora, ali ukazuju i na postojanje značajne nega-
tivne veze između duga nefinancijskih tvrtki i kućanstava i BDP-a.
73 Od niza radova treba izdvojiti: (Kumar, Woo, 2010; Cecchetti, Mohanty, Zampolli, 2011; 
(Checherita-Westphal, Hallet, Rother, 2012).
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S druge strane, kritike takvog threshold pristupa, uz metodološke man-
jkavosti, kao temeljni problem ističu pitanje uzročnosti, s obzirom na to 
da prethodno navedena istraživanja polaze od javnog duga kao zadane 
varijable i pretpostavke da smjer utjecaja ide od javnog duga ka stopi 
rasta74. Istraživanja koja provode Irons i Bivnes (2010); Herndon et al. 
(2013), Dube (2013) pokazala su nedostatak jasnog teorijskog okvira 
utjecaja, odnosno kauzalnosti veze javnog duga i rasta te podastrla ra-
zloge za odbacivanje implikacija rezultata gore navedenih istraživanja. 
Ono što gotovo sva empirijska istraživanja detektiraju, osim nelinearne 
prirode javnog duga i rasta, je nemogućnost utvrđivanja kauzalnosti te 
veze, tj. nemogućnost potvrde da korelacija (nekad negativna, nekad 
pozitivna) kretanja javnog duga i rasta ima kakav uzročan odnos. Upravo 
problem kauzalnosti, tj. uzročnosti, ključan je za definiranje teorijskog 
okvira odnosa duga i rasta. Problemu kauzalnosti treba pristupiti prven-
stveno kroz razumijevanje utjecaja monetarno-financijske sfere na javni 
dug i na BDP s obzirom na to da je upravo rast privatnih dugova, a time i 
njegova kvaliteta investiranja, odrednica i javnog duga i rasta75. 
74 Ova debata je prethodila, a još više i rezultirala, mnogobrojnim istraživanjima koja su 
u pokušaju rasvjetljavanja značaja i utjecaja javnog duga na ekonomiju utvrdila nekoliko 
spoznaja o ovom odnosu, a to su: 
 - postojanje negativne korelacije između rasta javnog duga i rasta BDP-a 
 - nemogućnost utvrđivanja kauzalnosti tog odnosa (kako empirijske tako i teorijske) 
 - nelinearnost tog odnosa (očituje se u različitim prihvatljivim granicama javnog 
duga u BDP-u, tzv. thresholdima) te 
 - postojanje drugih varijabli koje bolje objašnjavaju uzročnost ove veze, od kojih je 
najznačajniji privatni dug.
Prema Keenu, jedino se uvidom u proces nastanka i kretanja privatnog duga može objasniti 
uzročnost između javnog duga i gospodarskog rasta. Keen daje teorijski okvir zaključujući 
da promjena privatnog duga uvjetuje zaposlenost, pri čemu kriza započinje kada dolazi 
do smanjenja privatnog duga u BDP-u, odnosno razduživanja privatnog sektora, te da 
javni duga raste kao odgovor na rast nezaposlenosti. I on prepoznaje teorijska ograničenja 
postojećih modela, odbacujući neutralnost duga, prevenstveno zbog endogenosti njegova 
stvaranja, čime odbacuje tezu o neutralnosti banaka, odnosno bankarskog i financijskog 
sustava kao kreatora duga. Keen uviđa da krediti banaka podižu ukupnu kupovnu moć u 
ekonomiji jer banke ostvaruju profit, utječući time na agregatnu potražnju, pritom se poziv-
ajući na teoriju endogenosti novca. Ovim doprinosom Keen ujedno odbacuje neoklasične i 
neokejnezijanske teorijske modele smatrajući ih manjkavima (Keen, 2014).
S druge strane, važnost privatnog sektora naglašava i Michel Roberts, ali on ide i dalje, jer 
smatra da divergencija između rasta kredita i rasta BDP-a nije dobar pokazatelj s obzirom 
na to da javni dug dijelom preuzima funkciju rasta (Roberts, 2012). Iz tog razloga smatra 
da je marksistički pogled (law of profitability) bolji s obzirom na to da on mjeri divergenciju 
između opadajaućih profita i rasta kredita. Na taj način on zamjenjuje BDP s profitabilnošću. 
Pritom drži da je najbolji pokazatelj profitabilnosti neto vrijednost (net worth) koju, smatra 
Roberts, treba usporediti s kapitalom (fiksnom imovinom, ali i skupnom imovinom koja ukl-
jučuje i financijsku – fiktivni kapital). On utvrđuje da se rast javnog duga podudara s rastom 
ulaganja privatnog sektora u fiktivni kapital (financijsku imovinu) kao rezultat pada profitabil-
nosti (neto vrijednosti) privatnog sektora. Kontrakcija profitabilnosti uzrokuje pad investicija 
i ekonomije što uzrokuje rast privatnog duga. Ako pritom država mora spašavati privatni 
sektor, dolazi i do rasta javnog duga. Javni sektor nije izravno uključen u proces uzročnosti.
75 Ovu poziciju dodatno objašnjava niz radova u kojima se argumentira pozitivni značaj JD-a 
u manje razvijenim zemljama kao značajne poluge prikupljanja štednje i njenog ciljnog razvo-
jnog usmjeravanja. Dapače, u takvim okolnostima JD potiče razvoj financijskog sustava. 
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Sve je više radova koji empirijskim uvidima ukazuju na mogućnost da 
je javni dug tek posljedica određenih zbivanja koja su mu prethodila, a 
u kojima on igra tek stabilizacijsku ulogu. Sukladno takvim uvidima, u 
kojima je njegova uloga posljedična, i ortodoksnim uvidima, u kojima je 
njegova uloga uzročna, nastaju dva osnovna doktrinarna pristupa rješa-
vanju problema sporog rasta, pri čemu jedan zagovara politiku državne 
štednje, smatrajući javni dug uzrokom slabog rasta, a drugi politiku stim-
ulacije, doduše, tijekom recesije, smatrajući ga posljedicom slabog rasta. 
Cilj ranije uvedenih kriterija fiskalne stabilnosti definiranih kroz Pakt o 
stabilnosti i rastu te u 2011.g. uvedenih ekonomskih mjera implementi-
ranih kroz Procedure makroekonomskih neravnoteža (MIP) koje su usli-
jedile, bio je prevenirati buduće i ispraviti postojeće riskantne makroe-
konomske pozicije kao što su deficiti tekućeg računa, neodržive razine 
vanjskog i javnog duga itd.76.  
Cilj politike štednje bio je smanjiti trgovinske deficite, odnosno deficite 
tekućeg računa te zaustaviti rast JD-a smanjenjem razlike između pri-
hoda i rashoda državnog sektora ne bi li navedeno dovelo do povećanja 
konkurentnosti. Suprotno očekivanjima, smanjenje deficita tekućih raču-
na (pad priljeva kapitala) te pad javne potrošnje, a na koncu i nastavak 
pada neto investicija u privatnom sektoru (deleveraging), uzrokovali su 
stagnaciju, a ponegdje i daljnji pad BDP-a. Mjere štednje kratkoročno 
negativno utječu na BDP, dok je njihov dugoročan utjecaj nepoznat. 
Kako je rast BDP-a preduvjet (u smislu zadovoljenja uvjeta g ≥ r) refinan-
ciranja, pa i smanjenja nagomilanih javnih dugova, oni mjerama štednje 
nisu zaustavljeni već je njihov rast nastavljen. Treba prepoznati stoga da 
su pad i stagnacija BDP-a nakon provedbe navedenih ekonomskih mjera 
rezultat njihove provedbe i da nisu vezani za inicijalni pad koji se javio 
kao rezultat u krizi nastalih makroekonomskih neravnoteža77.
Visoke stope nezaposlenosti, blage stope rasta i visoke stope štednje 
navode na zaključak kako postojeći makroekonomski okvir politika te-
meljenih na NMC-u nije uspješno razriješio pitanje neravnoteža, niti je 
rezultirao željenim učincima te da je Europa i dalje žrtva vlastite nes-
posobnosti da iznađe ekonomska, ali prvenstveno politička rješenja za 
76 Tako se, primjerice, kroz MIP-ov korektivni mehanizam Procedura prekomjernog defi-
cita (EDP) pristupilo provođenju politike štednje, tzv. austerity measures, a za povećanje 
konkurentnosti politike strukturnih reformi, prvenstveno u vidu promjene strukture rashodne 
strane proračuna te interne devalvacije. U skladu s neoklasičnom i nekokejnezijanskom te-
orijomna čijim osnovama je MIP i kreiran, JD je problem makroekonomskih neravnoteža, 
pa tako i platno-bilančne. Prema tome se u optici postojećeg liberalnog institucionalnog 
okvira EU-a/EMU-a može rješavati daljnjim supply-side reformama, strukturnim promjena-
ma i politikom štednje u okviru export-led strategije (German money mercantilism), zapravo 
kao prisilna konvergencija. 
77 Budući da prije krize JD i fiskalni deficiti u većini članica, osim Italije i Grčke, nisu pred-
stavljali nikakav problem, između ostalog i zbog institucionalnih ograničenja u obliku Maas-
trichtških kriterija, koji su udio JD-a ograničavali na dopuštenih 60 % udjela u BDP-u, a 
deficita na 3 % BDP-a, u posljednjih nekoliko godina navedeni razvoj događaja rezultirao 
je sve glasnijim kritikama takve ekonomske politike. 
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stanje u kojemu se nalazi. Doveden je u pitanje kako okvir ekonomske 
politike tako i politika one-size-fits-all kao razvojno neučinkovita neolib-
eralna politika merkantilističkog tipa.  
Kako se monetarna politika već ranije pokazala neefikasnom, s obzirom 
na već dosegnuti zero lower bound, a fiskalna politika pasivnom, sumnja 
da je ekonomski instrumentarij na raspolaganju dostatan i adekvatan za 
rješavanje navedenih neravnoteža sve je izraženija. 
Kritike dijagnoze uzroka sve su artikuliranije pa se objašnjenje uzroka 
krize kao institucionalno monetarno-financijskog pitanja sve više traže 
u pokušajima alternativnog pristupa (npr. u različitim kejnezijanskim i 
poslijekejnezijanskim teorijskim konceptima koji problem javnog duga 
razumijevaju kao monetarno-financijski fenomen i javni dug kao endog-
enu varijablu. 
Prema njima, javni dug je posljedica inherentne dominacije financijskih 
tržišta (financijalizacije) i vjere u njihovu savršenost (Minsky, 1992) te 
nedovršenosti institucionalne arhitekture EMU-a/EU-a, koja nije postigla 
stupanj optimalnog valutnog područja (OCA). Palley (2017) tako govori o 
„izvornom grijehu“ razdvojenosti monetarne i fiskalne politike, odsutnosti 
bankarske unije itd. 
Sve to vodi ka potrebi za alternativnim rješenjima ekonomske politike i 
redefiniranog institucionalnog okvira za situaciju u kojoj se nalaze zem-
lje EMU-a/EU-a, i osobito za one koje se nalaze u EU-u, a nisu članice 
EMU-a. 
S obzirom na navedeno, razlozi makroekonomskih neravnoteža mogu 
se tražiti  u uzrocima prije same krize, što upućuje na probleme adekvat-
nosti arhitekture financijsko-monetarnog sustava EMU-a/EU-a, dizajnu 
samih institucija nastalih na novoklasičnim i neokejnezijanskim teorijskim 
pretpostavkama, kao i nedovršenoj arhitekturi Unije u pogledu bankar-
ske i fiskalne unije, preliberalnom pristupu financijskim tržištima i kretan-
ju kapitala, kao i cijelog export-led-growth modela rasta koji proizlazi iz 
konkurentnosti Njemačke kao dominantne ekonomske izvozne sile Unije. 
Iz navedenog slijedi cijeli niz razloga, a svode se na tri osnovna: 
neadekvatna teorijska osnova temeljena na NMC-u, pogrešno postavlje-
na institucionalna arhitektura koja je iz nje proizašla  i ekonomske politike 
koje su proizašle iz prethodnog.
Kriza se može slikovito objasniti kao neodrživa neravnoteža nekog 
sektora koja utječe na stvaranje ili prelijevanje neravnoteže na druge 
sektore. Međusektorska povezanost ukazuje na to da neravnoteža jed-
nog sektora mora izazvati neravnoteže drugih. Sukladno teorijskom 
i institucionalnom okviru ekonomskih politika, međusektorski odnos 
pretpostavlja i naglašava različite smjerove uzročnosti i time djelovanja 
ekonomskih politika. Tako npr. „tržišni fundamentalizam“ financijalizirane 
ekonomije pretpostavlja efikasnost tržišta i  nepostojanje „private failure“ 
a naglašava „public failure“, odnosno nedostatke države (Melor, 2010). 
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Pretpostavljeni suodnosi i ocjene učinkovitosti politika proizlaze iz teori-
jskih elemenata institucionalnog okvira ekonomske politike.
Objašnjenje uzroka pojedine neravnoteže otvara brojna teorijska i in-
stitucionalna pitanja, kao i modele ekonomske politike u njihovu rješa-
vanju. Postojeći okvir ekonomske politike EU-a/EMU-a naglašava u re-
centnoj krizi makroekonomske neravnoteže vanjskog i javnog sektora te 
traži poveznice između njih, i to u segmentu konkurentnosti. Naime, u 
situaciji pada investicija i porasta štednje privatnog sektora i posljedično 
pada BDP-a (razduživanja), rješenje je, sukladno institucionalnoj struktu-
ri i politikama, u štednji – smanjivanju nadnica i javne potrošnje, odnosno 
internoj devalvaciji zemalja fiksnog tečaja ili monetarne unije, odnosno, 
u održivosti ili smanjenju javnog duga. Pretpostavlja se da visoki i ras-
tući javni dug  djeluje na inflaciju i kamate te time i na privatni sektor 
(istiskivanje - (crowding out), rikardijanska ekvivalencija itd.). Fiskalna 
ravnoteža se osobito drži preduvjetom makroekonomske stabilnosti 
zemalja s fiksnim tečajem i učinkovitosti zajedničke monetarne politike 
zemalja monetarne unije. 
U situaciji apatridne valute (stateless currency) razdvojenost monetarne 
i fiskalne politike (tzv. „ruptura“) osmišljena je kao pokušaj „nekvarenja 
novca“ i njegove dugoročno neutralne uloge na realne varijable s jedne 
strane (klasična dihotomija), te, s druge strane, u sprječavanju deficitnog 
financiranja državnog proračuna od strane monetarnih vlasti. Privatni i 
javni sektor svedeni su pojmovno na kućanstvo (household) s „tvrdim 
budžetskim ograničenjima“. Time je i fiskalna politika zadobila neutral-
nu ulogu u srednjem i dugom roku. Ekonomska politika je svedena na 
mikroekonomske reforme u cilju povećanja efikasnosti (konkurentnosti) 
u stabilnom makroekonomskom okruženju. Deficiti ili suficiti privatnog i 
javnog sektora namiruju se na financijskom tržištu posredstvom „neu-
tralnih“ financijskih posrednika (lonable funds theory u vremenima domi-
nantnog endogenog stvaranja novca) (!!!). 
Dinamika neravnoteže sektora, osobito privatnog (koji u razvijenim zem-
ljama nosi rast), rezultira stanjem (stock) duga. U mainstream literaturi 
se zbog pojednostavljenih teorijskih pretpostavki o funkcioniranju su-
vremene ekonomije i njenih institucionalnih oblika zanemaruju uloga i 
proces stvaranja privatnog duga na makrorazini i formiranja domaće i 
strane štednje iz kojih se financiraju investicije. Neravnoteža štednje i in-
vesticija, pa time i deficiti i suficiti, naizgled su normalna razvojna pojava. 
Problem nastaje na makrorazini koja ima drugačije zakonitosti i nije ju 
moguće objasniti mikroekonomskim zakonitostima i modelima (poznati 
Keenov uvid na temeljima Keynesovih stavova). Kriza privatnog duga 
rezultat je nepostojanja ugrađenog (in built) kanala osiguranja (private 
insurance channel). Ako ovoga kanala nema, neravnoteže će se preliti 
na druge sektore, a okvir ekonomske politike mora biti toliko efikasan da 
spriječi negativne učinke na cjelokupno gospodarstvo.
Vjera u pozitivne učinke slobode kretanja kapitala, značaj financijske in-
tegracije i efikasnost „samoregulirajućih financijskih tržišta“ doprinijelo je 
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stvaraju  EU/EMU modela čija je temeljna strukturna odrednica financi-
jska integracija kao preduvjet zajedničke valute. Cjelokupna ekonomska 
politika svodi se na omogućavanje procesa financijske integracije i slo-
bode kretanja kapitala pri čemu se teorijski ne dovodi u pitanje adekvat-
nost institucionalne strukture financiranja privatnog sektora i održivost 
njegovih neravnoteža. 
Rastuća i neodrživa neravnoteža investicija i štednje, kroz odvojenost 
financijskog i realnog sektora, dovela je, bez sumnje, do neravnoteže 
vanjskog i javnog sektora. Tekući deficiti (flow) kumulirali su se u stanja 
(stock) „neodrživih“ vanjskih i javnih dugova. Suvremenu situaciju pon-
ajbolje je moguće opisati kao eksploziju dugova. Mainstream pozicija, 
zahvaljujući gore navedenim pretpostavkama, teško može razriješiti pos-
tojeću situaciju. 
Problem jednih i drugih zemalja u EU-u/EMU-u prije svega je kako osigu-
rati ekonomski rast dovoljan za pokriće dugova. Ako je stopa rasta manja 
od kamate na dug (g < r): 1) privatni i javni subjekti moraju se zadužiti, 
odnosno mora doći do priljeva kapitala, što povećava dug ili 2) ako to nije 
moguće, do mjera štednje. Kao što to navodi Collignon (2017), problem 
zemalja EMU-a je kriza likvidnosti, što upućuje na nedovoljan stupanj 
integracije bankovnog sustava. Dakle, fokusiranje primarno na sman-
jivanje deficita za zemlje EMU-a/EU-a može biti negativno za rast, a time 
i srednjoročnu i dugoročnu održivost javnog duga. 
Ono što bi bilo potrebno, kako zaključuje Collignon (2017), je diferencira-
ni pristup utjecaju navedenih varijabli na ekonomski rast i fokusiranje na 
kapitalnu produktivnost (on ju mjeri kao udio nominalnog BDP-a u agre-
giranom stanju (stock) kapitala i pokazuje stopu iskorištenosti kapacite-
ta u kejnezijanskom stilu). Dakle, problem konkurentnosti vezuje prije 
svega za produktivnost. To znači da je MIP politika kontraproduktivna, 
jer ne uzima u obzir distorzije između zemalja i nema eksplicitni cilj ut-
jecaja na stopu rasta. Prema ovim autorima, štednja smanjuje produk-
tivnost i time negativno djeluje na rast. S tim u vezi, povezivanje reformi 
na strane ponude (supply side) u svrhu povećanja produktivnosti i rasta 
predstavlja se kao alternativni model izlaska iz današnje recesije što bi 
značilo i napuštanje modela konkurentne dezinflacije te naglasilo dru-
gačiju i aktivniju fiskalnu politiku kreiranu  specifično za pojedine zemlje 
(custom approach). 
Dakle, uzrok financijske krize ili krize konkurentnosti i nadnica, kako je 
predstavljena od strane promotora dosadašnje ekonomske politike u 
EU-u/EMU-u, jesu, zapravo, ogromni priljevi kapitala koji su uzrokovali 
dugovno financiranje, mjehure imovina i slabiji rast praćen inflatornim 
pritiscima i deficitima bilanci plaćanja. Kapitalni priljevi posebno su utje-
cali rast uvozne potražnje praćen i rastom cijena i nadnica. Asimetrični 
ishodi ove situacije vidljivi su u povećanju profitnih marži u Njemačkoj 
bez značajnijeg reinvestiranja i plasiranja tih sredstava kroz bankovni 
sektor zemljama periferije i novopridošlim zemljama EU-a/EMU-a. U sit-
uaciji financijske krize, kao krize privatnog duga, jedina politika suklad-
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na institucionalnom okviru bila je interna devalvacija kroz strukturne re-
forme i smanjivanje nadnica i javne potrošnje što je negativno djelovalo 
na domaću potražnju i rast čineći problem javnog duga još izraženijim. 
Kritika interne devalvacije kako je vidi Janssen (2017) može se sažeti u 
sljedećem: 
1) smanjivanje plaća (wage moderation) dovelo je do povećanja 
profitnih margina koje su se koristile kao interni izvor financiranja 
u nedostatku priljeva kapitala. Bila je to slaba zamjena za jasnu 
financijsku politiku poticanja kreditiranja i obnavljanja monetarnog 
transmisijskog mehanizma
2) zanemarivanje strukturnih razlika između ekonomija dovodi 
do necjenovne konkurencije. Stoga se u slučaju EU-a radilo o 
klasičnoj greški dijagnoze prema kojoj je konkurentnost vezana 
samo za plaće, odnosno cjenovnu konkurentnost.
3) jedna od naznačenih kritika interne devalvacije vezana za je za 
poznatu Fisherovu teoriju deflacije duga (debt deflation theory). 
Naime, realan teret duga raste što su plaće i cijene niže, što dovo-
di do narušavanja domaće potražnje i rasta (Fisher, 1933). 
Postojeći model ne samo da pogrešno dijagnosticira probleme EU-a/
EMU-a, nego nije ni adekvatan mehanizam za prevladavanje postojećih 
neravnoteža između zemalja. Drugim riječima, financijsko spašavanje 
kombinirano s politikama štednje dovodi do deflacijske stagnacije, od-
nosno recesije s duplim dnom, poništavajući napore u smanjivanju om-
jera državne potrošnje i BDP-a (Arestis, 2012). Postizanje rasta, pa time 
i konvergencije,dakle je nesigurno u ovome modelu kako za zemlje per-
iferije EMU-a, tako i za novopridošle zemlje EU-a.
Prema poslijekejnezijanskoj teoriji, ako zemlje smanjuju deficit tekuće bi-
lance plaćanja, državni deficit u srednjem roku mora trajno nadopunjava-
ti razliku veće štednje od investicija privatnog sektora u cilju zadržavanja 
željene razine ekonomske aktivnosti i zaposlenosti. To imanentno znači 
da fiskalna politika mora imati aktivnu ulogu u uravnoteživanju volatil-
nosti razlike privatne štednje i investicija. Naravno, to znači da u situaciji 
većih investicija od štednje privatnog sektora, državni sektor mora biti u 
plusu kako bi se izbjegao fiskalni moralni hazard. Iz ovoga proizlazi još 
nekoliko važnih uvida, a to su: 1) da fiskalna politika može biti učinko-
vito sredstvo kontrole inflacije, 2) da će ekspanzivna monetarna politika 
sama po sebi u situaciji primijenjene politike štednje biti neefikasna te 
3) da strukturno gledajući, uz kreiranje specifičnih industrijskih regional-
nih politika, fiskalna politika može biti učinkovita pod uvjetom postojanja 
kreditora u krajnjoj nuždi od strane ESB-a.  
U konačnici, prethodno ukazuje na to da je kriza u EU-u svoje izvore 
imala u prekomjernom i prenaglom gomilanju privatnog duga, a ne 
javnog duga, što vrijedi i za zemlje u kojima je javni dug rastao čak i prije 
krize. Dokaz tomu su upravo makroekonomske neravnoteže vanjskog 
sektora proizašle iz masovnog porasta prekograničnih tokova kapitala 
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nakon uvođenja eura (što je dovelo do jednako masovnih neravnoteža 
tekućih računa unutar samih članica EMU-a). Stoga je važno prepoznati 
strukturne uzroke nastanka duga: sve to može biti praćeno stvaranjem i 
neispravnom arhitekturom monetarne unije, ali, također, predstavljati loš 
okvir ekonomske politike zemalja koje su članice EU-a, a još nisu ušle 
u EMU.
4. Zaključak
Iz gore navedenog proizlazi da se JD prvenstveno može razumjeti kao 
strukturni monetarno-financijski fenomen. S obzirom na pretpostavljeni 
negativni utjecaj javnog duga na BDP i posljedično poslijekriznih ekon-
omskih politika, poput politike štednje, kojima je cilj, posebno u EU-u/
EMU-u bio upravo njegovo ograničavanje kroz fiskalno ujednačavanje 
javnih prihoda i rashoda te, u konačnici, odsutnost ikakvih značajnih 
pozitivnih učinaka takvog pristupa, nameće se pitanje: je li identifikacija 
javnog duga kao glavnog krivca anemičnog poslijekriznog rasta točna te 
je li razumijevanje uloge i nastanka javnog duga uopće takvo da može 
iznjedriti ikakva pozitivna rješenja kako po sâm javni dug tako i po ekon-
omski rast? Pretpostavka je da je pitanje održivosti JD-a strukturni prob-
lem, kako EMU-a tako i EU-a, koji se ne može riješiti politikom štednje, 
prvo zbog pogrešne dijagnoze, a zatim i zbog ograničenja okvira ekon-
omske politike temeljene na NMC modelu. Ovo, naravno, ne znači aboli-
ranje neodgovorne fiskalne politike i mogućnost deficitnog dugoročnog 
poticanja rasta. 
Monetarno-fiskalni neksus u situaciji financijskih neravnoteža, koje su 
se prelile u brzi rast javnog duga,  doveo je do paradoksalnog stanja 
u situaciji nepostojanja monetarnog financiranja javnog duga. Pitanje 
dugoročne održivosti javnog duga i njegovog utjecaja na financijsku sta-
bilnost pretpostavilo se kao temeljno pitanje izlaska iz krize. Visoki javni, 
ali i privatni dug, dovodi u pitanje cjenovnu stabilnost i cjelokupni dos-
adašnji koncept rasta. U članku se argumentira da bi dosadašnji koncept 
temeljen na nereguliranom financijskom sektoru i akumuliranju duga 
trebao biti zamijenjen konceptom povećanja produktivnosti i konkurent-
nosti kroz jaču financijsku kontrolu i snažan, ali i aktivan, fiskalni okvir. 
Reforma monetarno-financijskog sektora tako je uvjet održivosti javnog 
duga. Štoviše, linearne monetarne mjere, kako zbog zamke likvidnosti, 
tako i nepovoljne kreditne strukture bankovnog sektora, neće značajnije 
doprinijeti rastu, posebice ako su praćene fiskalnim restrikcijama. Potre-
bno je, u takvoj situaciji stvoriti okvir aktivne uloge javnog duga kroz re-
formu politika javnih rashoda i istražiti pozitivan utjecaj javnog duga kroz 
investicije u socijalnu infrastrukturu na ukupnu faktorsku produktivnost, 
konkurentnost i rast. 
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FISCAL MULTIPLIER DETERMINANTS 
IN THE CESEE REGION78
ABSTRACT
In this paper we use the panel VAR model with exogenous variables to analyse 
the effects of various structural characteristics of the economies on the effec-
tiveness of government consumption in the Central Eastern and Southeastern 
European region (CESEE). More precisely, we analyse the effects of government 
consumption on economic growth in this region, controlling for the effects of the 
size of the economy, level of public debt, level of tax burden, openness of the 
economy, rigidity of the labour market, monetary regime and the phase of the 
business cycle. Our results indicate that these characteristics have a significant 
impact on the effectiveness of fiscal policy (in terms of the size of the fiscal mul-
tiplier). Also, these effects are in line with the theoretical assumptions as the re-
cessionary phase of the cycle, size of the economy, rigidity of the labour market 
and the fixed exchange rate regime increase the average size of fiscal multipliers 
while tax burden, indebtedness and openness of the economies reduce the size 
of the fiscal multiplier, when compared to the base model.
Key words: fiscal multipliers, CESEE region, panel VAR
1. Introduction
The importance and possibilities of fiscal policy were neglected by the 
academia and by the policy makers for decades after the revolution of 
78 This is a reprint of a paper published in the Journal of Management and Financial 
Sciences, X, 29, p. 11-26, that is available at: http://kolegia.sgh.waw.pl/pl/KZiF/czasop-
isma/Journal_of_Management_and_Financial_Sciences_JMFS/Documents/Issue%20
29%20September%202017.pdf
This work has been supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under project 
number IP-2013-11-8174, and in part by the University of Zagreb under project number DP 
079-2016. 
Research results from the paper were presented at the International Scientific Conference 
“Mechanisms of financial system stability in an unstable environment”, 21st November 
2016, Warsaw School of Economics
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macroeconomics in the 1970/80s. However, the Great Recession, euro 
zone crisis and prolonged recession in many European economies have 
put fiscal policy, especially its stabilization role, in the middle of expert and 
public discussions again recently. The role of fiscal policy is especially im-
portant in the countries which are characterized by the high share of the 
government sector in the economy and whose monetary policy is limited 
by various structural characteristics of the economy and financial system, 
which make fiscal policy the main economic policy channel and lever. 
Exactly these characteristics typify most of the countries in the Central 
Eastern and Southeastern European (CESEE) region, which makes this 
region convenient for the analysis of the effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
Thus, in this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of gov-
ernment consumption on the economic growth through the concept and 
size of the fiscal multiplier in eleven selected CESEE countries, namely 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montene-
gro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. However, the aim 
of this paper is not only to estimate the size and a sign of fiscal multiplier 
in selected CESEE countries, but also to analyse the determinants of its 
size, based on various characteristics of the selected economies: the 
size of the economy, level of public debt, level of tax burden, openness 
of the economy, rigidity of the labour market, monetary regime and the 
phase of the business cycle. 
Our methodological approach relies on the panel VAR analysis, with the 
introduction of exogenous “control” variables, which allows us to: (i) es-
timate the size of the fiscal multiplier in the panel framework and (ii) to 
analyse the effect of aforementioned determinants on the size of the 
fiscal multiplier, i.e. on the effectiveness of government consumption. 
Our sample covers eleven economies and ten years (2006-2015), which 
gives us a relatively small, but still acceptable sample size79.
The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction in the second 
part of the paper we present a literature overview, mostly focusing on the 
panel VAR approaches. In the third part we briefly present our method-
ological approach and data, which is followed by the discussion of the 
results in the fourth part of the paper. In the last part of the paper we 
present the concluding remarks.
2. Literature Review
Following the empirical approach employed in the paper, the literature re-
view is focused mainly on papers using the panel VAR and SVAR meth-
odology in analysing the determinants of fiscal multipliers. Table 1 gives 
a brief literature overview on determinants of government consumption 
multipliers. Most of the reviewed literature is based on a heterogeneous 
sample of countries, including both advanced and emerging economies. 
Very few papers estimate fiscal multipliers and their determinants for 
emerging economies only. 
79 Our sample is determined by data availability and comparability of the countries.
Determi-
nants Authors Country Time period Methodology Results
Level of  
public debt
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 44 EMEs and AEs 1960Q1- 2007Q4 Panel SVAR 















Contreras Banco and 
Battelle (2014) 55 EMEs and AEs 1988Q1-2010Q4
GMM estimator, panel SVAR 
model
Government consump-
tion multiplier equal 




Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 44 EMEs & AEs 1960Q1- 2007Q4 Panel SVAR 
Trade openness re-
duces the government 
consumption multiplier
Kraay (2013) 102 EMEs and AEs 1970–2010 OLS, 2SLS, and first-stage re-gressions
Silva et al.(2013) Euro area 1998-2008 PVAR 
OECD (2009)



















Cole and Ohanian 
(2004) US DSE Labour market rigidities 
increase FM (if imply 




Kraay (2013) 102 EMEs and AEs 1970–2010 OLS, 2SLS, and first-stage re-gressions
Government consump-
tion multipliers are 
higher in recessions
Silva et al. (2013) Euro area 1998-2008 Panel-data VAR approach
Corsetti et al. (2012) 17 OECD countries: 1975-2008 PVAR
Grdović, Gnip (2014) Croatia 1996Q1-2011Q4
SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002);
STVAR 
Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 
(2010)
Muir and Weber (2013) Bulgaria 1999Q1–2011Q4 
Exchange 
rate regime
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 44 EMEs & AEs 1960Q1- 2007Q4 Panel SVAR 
Government consump-
tion multipliers are high-
er in fixed exchange 
rate regime
Kraay (2013) 102 EMEs and AEs 1970–2010 OLS, 2SLS, and first-stage re-gressions
Government consump-
tion multiplier  is larger 
in the flexible exchange 
rate regime 
Contreras Banco and 
Battelle (2014) 55 EMEs and AEs 1988Q1-2010Q4
GMM estimator, panel SVAR 
model
Government consump-
tion multiplier equal to 
zero in flexible ex-
change rate regime
Development
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 44 EMEs & AEs 1960Q1- 2007Q4 Panel SVAR 
Government consump-
tion multipliers higher 
in AEs
Hory (2016) 48 EMEs and AEs 1990Q1-2013Q4 PVAR
Kraay (2013) 102 EMEs and AEs 1970–2010 OLS, 2SLS, and first-stage re-gressions
Contreras Banco and 
Battelle (2014) 55 EMEs and AEs 1988Q1-2010Q4 GMM estimator, panel SVAR 
Positive and larger gov-
ernment consumption 
multiplier in developing 
than in high-income 
countries
Table 1. Determinants of the size of fiscal multipliers
Source: the authors’ elaboration
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Starting with the level of public debt, the theory indicates that a higher 
government debt-to-GDP ratio decreases the government consumption 
multiplier due to a higher risk premium and a decrease in private sec-
tor confidence which is consequently de-stimulating consumption and 
investment. This determinant is often accounted for in the empirical lit-
erature, which generally confirms the theory (Ilzetzki et al., 2013; Hory, 
2016; Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović, 2015). 
When it comes to trade openness, another determinant broadly ob-
served, especially for small open economies, the theory suggests that 
countries more open to trade have lower the government consumption 
multiplier due to outflow effects. The surveyed empirical literature is in 
line with previous hypothesis (Ilzetzki et al., 2013; Kraay, 2013; Silva et 
al., 2013; Deskar-Škrbić et al., 2014; Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović, 2015). 
Regarding labour market rigidity, theory suggests that a more rigid labour 
market is less responsive to economic movements, thus reduces the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal policy. Cole and Ohanian (2004) and Gorodnichenko 
et al. (2012) find that labour market rigidities increase FM. 
Another determinant of the multiplier size often investigated in empiri-
cal literature is the business cycle phase.  The reviewed papers (Kraay, 
2013; Silva et al., 2013; Corsetti et al., 2012; Grdović Gnip, 2014) con-
firm that government consumption multipliers are higher in recessions. 
The reviewed literature on the exchange rate regime is ambiguous. Il-
zetzki et al. (2013) find that government consumption multipliers are 
higher in the fixed exchange rate regime while Kraay (2013) claims that 
the government consumption multiplier is larger in the flexible exchange 
rate regime. On the other hand, Contreras Banco and Battelle (2014) find 
that the government consumption multiplier is equal to zero in the flexible 
exchange rate regime. 
Finally, regarding the level of development, Ilzetzki et al. (2013), Hory 
(2016) Kraay (2013) confirm that government consumption multipliers 
are higher in AEs while Contreras Banco and Battelle (2014) obtain a 
positive and larger government consumption multiplier in developing 
than in high-income countries.
3. Methodology and Data
As shown in the literature review, when assessing the effects of govern-
ment consumption most authors look through the lens of fiscal multipli-
ers. The fiscal multiplier is the ratio in which the change in a country’s 
GDP is affected by government spending. The fiscal multiplier is used 
to measure the effect of government consumption (fiscal policy) on the 
subsequent level of that country. In theory, increased fiscal spending can 
lead to increased consumption, which then leads to a cycle of consump-
tion and wealth creation (for more details on the fiscal multipliers see 
Šimović, H. & Deskar-Škrbić, M. (2013)).
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We can divide fiscal multipliers in two main categories. The first category 
is the impact multiplier which measures the effect of government con-
sumption on GDP in the first period after the shock. The second category 
is the cumulative multiplier which can be defined as the sum of multipli-
ers in each period after the shock. The calculation of these multipliers is 
based on Equation 1 (a) and (b):
(a) Impact multiplier (b) Cumulative multiplier
(1)
As already stated above, our methodological approach is based on the 
panel vector autoregression with the exogenous variables framework. 
Thus, our model takes the following form:
(2)
where  is matrix polynominals in the lag operator ,  coefficients 
of exogenous variables, the country pair index is  , the time index is 
 and  is the vector of errors. The endogenous vari-
ables vector  comprises the real annual change in GDP and the real 
annual change in government consumption, defined as the final gov-
ernment expenditure in national accounts. Depending on the estimated 
model, vector   includes one of seven “control” variables: the size of 
the economy, level of public debt, level of tax burden, openness of the 
economy, rigidity of the labour market, monetary regime and the phase 
of the business cycle. The analysis is based on the sample of eleven 
economies (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia) in the 
2006-2015 time period. Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the 






GDP Real growth rate Eurostat; national statisti-cal offices
G o v e r n m e n t 





Public debt Share of GDP Eurostat; national minis-tries of finance
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Share of GDP (sum 




Size Population (in mil) World bank












Business cycle Recession = 1 Eurostat; national statisti-cal offices
Monetary re-
gime Eurozone/fixed =1 
ECB; national central 
banks
Table 2. Variable list and explanations
Source: the authors’ elaboration
Endogenous variables are defined as an annual percentage change of 
gross domestic product (GDP) and final consumption expenditure of 
general government in 2010 constant prices, in millions of euros. Exoge-
nous, non-binary, variables are public debt expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, openness of the economy, defined as a sum of imports and exports 
and expressed as a percentage of GDP, population in millions of citizens, 
tax burden defined as a share of tax revenues in GDP and labour market 
rigidity defined through the indicator of labour market flexibility (1-7) in 
the Global Competitiveness Report Database80. We also included two 
binary exogenous variables. The first variable, the business cycle dum-
my, is constructed in a way that it takes the value of 1 if the country of 
interest recorded a negative real GDP change in a particular year and 0 
otherwise. The second dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the coun-
try in a member of the euro zone (Slovenia and Slovakia), unilaterally 
adopted the euro (Montenegro) or has the fixed exchange rate regime 
(Macedonia).
Before the presentation of the obtained results it is important to explain 
the expected effects of the included exogenous variables on the size 
of fiscal multipliers, i.e. the effectiveness of fiscal consumption. Follow-
ing Batini et al. (2014)81, we can divide our determinants in two groups, 
structural and conjectural.
80 In this paper we inverted the scale meaning that a higher value of the indicator points to 
the more rigid labour market.
81 Although we follow Batini et al. (2014), the determinants selected in this paper slightly 
differ as we included the level of tax burden and the size of the economy but we do not 
assess the effects of automatic stabilizers and ZLB
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Starting with the structural determinants:
i) a high degree of trade openness reduces the size of the fiscal 
multiplier through the “outflow effects” of the imports;
ii) countries with more rigid labour markets have larger fiscal multi-
pliers since rigid wages tend to amplify the response of output to 
demand shocks;
iii) countries that have the flexible exchange rate regime have lower 
fiscal multipliers because effects of fiscal policy on their domestic 
economy are limited by the effects on international flows;
iv) countries with high levels of public debt have lower fiscal multi-
pliers because an additional fiscal expansion can lead to an in-
crease in the risk premium and a decrease private sector confi-
dence, thus de-stimulating consumption and investment;
v) countries with a higher tax burden tend to have lower fiscal mul-
tipliers as the fiscal capacity of a country is limited and there is 
a stronger possibility of the prevalence of Ricardian households, 
and finally
vi) large economies have large domestic markets, so the multiplica-
tive effects of fiscal policy are stronger. 
As for the conjectural determinants, as already mentioned, fiscal policy 
is more effective in conjectures than in the expansionary phase of the 
business cycle 
The summary of this discussion is given in Table 3:





Labour market rigidity +
Fixed exchange rate +
Recession +
Table 3. Determinants of the size of fiscal multipliers and expected effect
Source: the authors’ elaboration
4. Results
The most common approach in the presentation of VAR-based results 
are impulse responses (IRFs). Thus, in Figure 1 we present the impulse 
responses functions of each estimated model, which gives us the total 
of eight models – the baseline model (without control, exogenous vari-
ables) and seven models including each of the aforementioned exoge-
nous variables.
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Figure 1: Impulse response of real GDP growth to the shock in government consumption
Source: the authors’ elaboration
Note: x-axis shows the number of periods after the shock and y-axis shows the size of the 
impulse (in pp)
The estimation of the base model suggests that the average size of the 
fiscal multiplier in selected CESEE countries in the first year after the 
shock is 0.8, which is in line with the conclusions of the fiscal multiplier 
literature for individual countries in the sample (see Appendix 1). When 
compared to the baseline results we can see that the introduction of the 
business cycle dummy, monetary regime dummy, size and rigidity in-
crease the size of the fiscal multiplier, while trade openness, tax burden 
and a high level of public debt decrease the size of the fiscal multiplier, in 
line with the assumptions presented in Table 3. 
To get a clearer view on the size of fiscal multipliers, in Figure 2 we pres-
ent the impact and the cumulative multipliers, ordered by the size of the 
multiplier, given the corresponding determinant.
  
Figure 2: Size of impact and cumulative multipliers
Source: the authors’ elaboration
Looking at the cumulative responses (which can be seen as the total 
effect of fiscal consumption) we can conclude that recessions lead to the 
largest multipliers, followed by the size of the economy and the rigidity 
of the labour market. On the other hand, tax burden and indebtedness 
lead to a notable reduction in the effectiveness of fiscal policy. These 
results are in line with theoretical assumptions and the existing literature 
indicating that they are robust. 
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5. Conclusion
The results presented in this paper indicate that fiscal policy is an impor-
tant growth determinant in the CESEE region as the increase in govern-
ment consumption has a positive and relatively strong (the fiscal multi-
plier around 0.8) effect on economic growth. Such a result fits well to our 
discussion in the Introduction, where we pointed out that fiscal policy is 
especially important in countries whose monetary policy is constrained 
and in which government holds a large chunk of the economy; the char-
acteristics which are strongly related to the countries included in this 
analysis. In addition, our results confirmed the theoretical assumptions 
and expert view on the effects of various structural characteristics of the 
countries on the effectiveness of fiscal consumption. More precisely, our 
analysis showed that countries that face a recession, which are larger, 
which have a more rigid labour market and have the fixed exchange rate 
(or are a member of a monetary union) tend to have larger multipliers. On 
the other hand, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is limited in highly open 
economies, economies with a high public debt level and economies with 
a high tax burden.
Our conclusions have some policy implications, as in our view fiscal poli-
cy makers should take all these determinants into account when making 
policy proposals and defining the main policy instruments. Large fiscal 
packages aimed at the stabilization of the domestic economy could be 
“wasted” if countries are characterized by the determinants that signif-
icantly reduce the size of fiscal multipliers. In that case policy makers 
should look beyond the traditional fiscal measures. On the other hand, 
some policy makers are faced with strong opposition when proposing a 
fiscal stimulus, but if they stress that all determinants are favorable and 
that the empirical and theoretical literature suggest that the proposed 
stimulus could be effective, critics could become more benevolent. Fi-
nally, all the discussions related to changes in fiscal consumption and/
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Appendix
Country Authors Time pe-
riod





Bulgaria Mulr and Weber (2013) 1999Q1–
2011Q4 
SVAR, Blanchard & Perotti (2002) Insignificant
2003M1–
2006M12
SVAR, Blanchard & Perotti (2002) 0.16
GIMF 0.51
Karagyozova-Markova et al. (2013) 1999 Q1 
–2011Q3
VAR, recursive identification 0.17
SVAR, Blanchard &Perotti (2002) 0.41
TVP-VAR 0.3-0.15
(higher in recessions)
Czech Republic Franta (2012) 1999Q1–
2011Q3
VAR, recursive identification 0.32
VAR, sign restrictions 1.43
Klyuev and Snudden (2011) GIMF 0.41









OECD (2009) DSGE 0.3
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
–0.01
Croatia Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić (2013) 2004Q1-
2012Q4
SVAR











Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
2.45
Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović (2015) 2001Q1-
2014Q1
SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
0.80
Hungary OECD (2009) DSGE 0.3
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) 1995Q1–
2009Q4 
SVAR
Blanchard &  Perotti (2002)
0.02
Macedonia Filipovski et al. (2016) 2000Q1-
2011Q4
recursive VAR-model
adjusted Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
-0,29816 
Montenegro - - - -
Poland OECD (2009) DSGE 0.4
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) 1995Q1–
2009Q4 
SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
–0.01
Romania Stoian (2012) 2000Q1-
2011Q3





Recursive VAR model 0.1
Serbia Hinić et al. (2013) n.a. SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
0.77
Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović (2015) 2003Q1-
2014Q1
SVAR






OECD (2009) DSGE 0.3
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) 1995Q1–
2009Q4 
SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
–0.01
Slovenia Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) 1995Q1–
2009Q4 
SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
0.00
Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović (2015) 2001Q1-
2014Q1
SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
-0.53
Jemec et al. (2013) 1995Q1–
2010Q4
SVAR
Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
1.61
Table A1. Short term government consumption multipliers in 11 CEE economies
Source: the authors’ elaboration
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PUBLIC EXPENDITURE EFFICIENCY  
AND THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION82
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates public expenditure efficiency and its relation to the op-
timal size of government. It provides an insight into methods developed for es-
timating efficiency and possible constraints of the analysis. Literature review of 
related papers covering the European Union and OECD countries shows sig-
nificant differences in efficiency coefficients across countries with most coun-
tries having the potential for increased efficiency of public spending. Specifically, 
there is large space for reduction in government size by raising the efficiency. 
The literature includes aggregate expenditure efficiency analysis and efficiency 
analysis of its main components. A more disaggregated analysis of individual 
public functions seems to be more adequate to capture the efficiency and deter-
mine the main drivers of inefficiency and draw policy implications. In that respect, 
the paper provides an insight into the structure of government expenditure by 
function across the EU countries and its changes over the period 2002-2015. 
Differences in tradition and priorities in financing public goods and services can 
be noted between countries. Due to high sensitivity of non-parametric methods 
to data heterogeneity, this should be taken into account when selecting the sam-
ple for the analysis.
Key words: government expenditure efficiency, optimal size of government, 
functional classification
82 This paper was originally published in „Proceedings of the 11th International Confer-
ence European Entrepreneurship Forum 2017 Euro zone: Evolution or Revolution?“. Spe-
cial thanks to the Proceedings editors for their permission to reprint the paper in this book. 
The paper was language edited.
This work  has  been  supported by  the   Croatian  Science  Foundation  under  the  pro-
ject  number  IP-2013-11-8174 and IP-2016-06-4609.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the European Union (EU) countries are facing severe 
challenges in public finance management. Globalisation (free movement 
of capital induces tax competition and causes revenue erosion) and de-
mographic trends (aging population causes social protection and health 
expenditure to rise) have exerted pressure on both revenue and expend-
iture side of the budget. Given that the countries are bound to fiscal dis-
cipline through the Stability and Growth Pact, space for further indebted-
ness is limited. With these problems in focus, the question of reduction 
of the size of government becomes the most important. The key question 
is: Is it possible to reduce the government size without hampering the 
economy’s growth? If so, how can it be done?
A number of research investigated the size of government-growth nexus. 
Government size is commonly proxied by general government expendi-
ture in % of GDP. There have been mixed results regarding this relation-
ship. While some researchers find positive effects (Ram, 1986), others 
find negative effects of government size on growth (Afonso & Jalles, 
2011). Recent papers describe the size-growth relationship as inverted 
U-shaped relation. This connection is in literature often called the BARS 
(Barro-Armey-Rahn-Scully) curve (Barro, 1990; Rahn & Fox, 1996; Scul-
ly, 1998, 2003). Barro’s (1990) endogenous growth model was the first 
to introduce the non-monotonic relationship between government size 
and growth.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the efficiency of public expenditure 
and its relation to the optimal government size in the European Union 
countries. Methodology and literature review on government efficiency 
will be provided in that respect. The aim is to accentuate the importance 
of decomposing government expenditure due to different structure of 
government expenditure across EU countries. The countries have differ-
ent traditions in financing public goods and services and different priori-
ties. Taking only the overall expenditure into account could cause losing 
valuable information.
The paper is organized as follows: the first part introduces the concept 
of public sector efficiency, the second part surveys measurement tech-
niques developed for efficiency estimation, the third part provides a brief 
overview and discussion of previous literature on government efficiency, 
the fourth section provides a brief insight into the size and structure of 
government expenditure of the EU countries and conclusion is provided 
in the last section.
2. The concept of government expenditure efficiency
The prevailing measurement of utility from public activities in the general 
public is the amount of budget allocated to a certain function. Higher 
budget would imply proportionally larger utility from a certain activity. 
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In reality, that is not necessarily the case. The concept of efficiency is 
being introduced to explain the relation between the input and the output 
and to objectively measure the performance of public activities.
In terms of efficiency, it is important to distinguish technical from alloc-
ative efficiency. Technical efficiency reveals whether the same output 
could have been attained with lower quantity of inputs (input inefficien-
cy) or whether a higher output could have been attained with the same 
quantity of inputs (output inefficiency). It puts the unit’s performance in 
relation with the best output-input ratio that could have been attained. On 
the other hand, allocative efficiency shows the best possible allocation 
of inputs with respect to their market prices and includes the cost-bene-
fit analysis. Together they form the overall economic efficiency (Farrell, 
1957). However, the concept of efficiency is often confounded with pro-
ductivity. While productivity is a simple ratio of output over input, it does 
not give information on the highest output-input ratio attainable.
Analysis can be conducted for aggregate level of government expend-
iture (Adam et al. 2011; Afonso et al., 2005a, 2010; Agasisti, 2011; An-
gelopoulos et al., 2008; Bađun et al., 2014; De Witte, 2009; Rahmayan-
ti & Horn, 2011) and for each of the government services separately. 
Also, some researchers conduct theanalysis at local government level 
(Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Afonso & Fernandes, 2008).
Aggregate level efficiency analysis has several drawbacks. Since the 
composition of government expenditure varies among countries, data 
can be highly heterogeneous and lead to spurious results. Furthermore, 
such an analysis provides weak information on environmental factors 
that can affect efficiency. Inefficiency can be detected, but its main drivers 
remain unfound. In that respect, disaggregated analysis of specific gov-
ernment activities has recently become more frequent. Most researched 
public expenditure functions are health and education (Adam et al. 2011; 
Afonso et al. 2005a; Afonso & St Aubyn, 2005b; Aristovnik, 2009; Hauner 
& Kyobe, 2010; Herrera & Pang, 2005; Jafarov & Gunnarsson, 2008; 
Prasetyo, 2013), education alone (Aristovnik, 2011; Afonso & Aubyn, 
2006) while a number of researchers deal with public investment and 
public administration efficiency (Afonso et al., 2005a; Adam et al., 2011; 
Bađun et al., 2014
3. Methods for measuring efficiency
Methods for measuring government efficiency usually rely on formulation 
of a production possibility frontier. The most common methods can be di-
vided into parametric and non-parametric methods. The main difference 
between them is that non-parametric methods do not require a prede-
termined form of the production function while parametric methods do. 
Non-parametric methods use input-output data from the sample to form 
a production possibility frontier which links the best performing units in 
the sample following a mathematical linear programming method. Once 
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formed, best practice frontier is used to calculate the efficiency scores 
based on distance of each unit to frontier.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric method mostly 
used in recent research. It was originally introduced by Charnes et al. 
(1978). This method uses input-output data to form the best practice 
frontier. The frontier is calculated as linear combination of the best per-
forming units. Units positioned on the frontier are given the score of 1, 
while the units inside the frontier have an efficiency score between 0 and 
1. However, the fact that a unit is positioned on the frontier does not imply 
that it is fully efficient. It means the unit is more efficient in relation to the 
other units. DEA analysis can be input- or output-oriented. Input-oriented 
DEA reveals how many resources can be saved maintaining the output 
unchanged, while the output-oriented DEA shows whether a higher out-
put can be reached without changing the inputs.
The main advantage of DEA analysis is simplicity of its application, given 
that it does not require a predetermined production function. It is mainly 
data driven, simply takes the output- input data, and does not need input 
or output prices, it is thus appropriate for analysing non-profit institutions. 
However, this method has its downsides. An important shortcoming of 
this method is sensitivity to outliers and measurement errors since it in-
terprets random errors as inefficiency. Bearing this in mind, homoge-
nous data would be a prerequisite for the analysis, which is already an 
issue given the fact that expenditure is relatively heterogeneous among 
countries. Another shortcoming of this method is that it does not account 
for possible exogenous macroeconomic and environmental factors that 
could affect efficiency, which could result in biased efficiency coefficients.
There are many ways to deal with this issue. The most common is the 
two-stage DEA/Tobit approach while some researchers use the simple 
least square regression (OLS). Both approaches are parametric meth-
ods. Tobit approach is usually considered appropriate due to the cen-
sored nature of efficiency coefficients. It is a maximum likelihood method 
used for limited data with lower and upper bound (efficiency coefficients 
range between 0 and 1). The coefficients, previously calculated through 
DEA, are being regressed on a number of possible determinants. This 
approach has been recently criticised for being inconsistent since ef-
ficiency scores are estimated through a non-parametric method, while 
efficiency determinants are detected by using a parametric method. Al-
ternative approach is using non-parametric approach in the first and in 
the second stage applying single and double bootstrap procedures.83
Another non-parametric method for efficiency estimation is Free Dispos-
al Hull (FDH) suggested by Deprins et al. (1984) and Tulkens (1986). 
FDH poses the least restrictions compared to the other methods. The 
units that are efficient under the DEA are efficient under the FDH method, 
but not necessarily vice-versa. The only difference between the two is 
83 For more details on bootstrapping techniques, see Simar and Wilson (2007)
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that, in DEA analysis, any linear combination of efficient units forms the 
frontier, while FDH does not require convexity.
An example of a parametric approach for estimating efficiency is sto-
chastic frontier analysis (SFA). Its advantage is that it can include other 
exogenous and environmental factors affecting efficiency aside from the 
production inputs, which provides more robust results. Its most important 
shortcoming is that it requires a predetermined shape of the production 
function.
Composite indicators are another measure that can be used to compare 
different countries’ performance and efficiency. They can serve as input 
or output indicator in the efficiency analysis or an overall efficiency indi-
cator. Developed by Afonso et al. (2005a) the Public Sector Efficiency 
Index (PSE) takes the performance (PSP) of each of the selected dis-
aggregated government functions and compares it to related expend-
iture. Afterwards, the calculated sub-indicators are given weights and 
composed into a composite overall indicator of government efficiency. 
However, the results are dependent on the arbitrary selection of sub-in-
dicators and given weights and can vary substantially depending on the 
sample selection.
A few important issues regarding input and output measurement in the 
efficiency analysis need to be noted. Inputs are usually defined in mone-
tary terms, but can also be referred to in physical terms. When measur-
ing resources in monetary rather than physical terms, countries that have 
comparably more expensive resources can wrongly reveal inefficiency. 
On the other hand, countries in which the resources are less expensive 
can have overestimated efficiency scores. The former is called the Bau-
mol (1967) effect. Moreover, some issues can occur with output meas-
urement. Since public goods are not tradable, there is no information on 
their prices. With no information on output prices, it becomes difficult to 
take the output quality into account. By comparing only quantity, impor-
tant information might be omitted causing biased results.
4. Review of the recent literature on government  
expenditure efficiency
A systematic review of the related papers on efficiency and the optimal 
government sizecan be found in the appendix. While many of them ap-
ply to the EU countries, the OECD countries are the most investigated 
in this field. Considering that most EU countries are members of OECD, 
literature review includes papers based on both samples. The results 
suggest that there is large space for reducing government expenditure 
by usingresources more efficiently (Afonso et al., 2005a, 2010; Afonso & 
St Aubyn, 2005b; Aristovnik, 2009, 2011; Bađun et al., 2014). Afonso et 
al. (2005a) find that the average input efficiency of the EU-15 shows that 
the same level of output could be attained using only 73% of the inputs. 
Bađun et al. (2014), on the other hand, find that the average optimal size 
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of government in old EU countries is larger than that in new EU coun-
tries. Moreover, old EU member states have, on average, more efficient 
governments than new EU countries regarding education expenditure, 
health care, public investment and public administration.
Research in individual spending areas is more frequent than aggregate 
level analysis with health and education in the lead. The usual mone-
tary input for education is public expenditure on education (% of GDP) or 
(public) expenditure per student (% of GDP per capita), while quantitative 
input is hours per year in school. The education output is usually test 
results (PISA), secondary or tertiary school enrollment or teacher/pupil 
ratio. The usual monetary input for health sector is average public spend-
ing on health (% GDP) or health spending per capita (private and public) 
while quantitative inputs are number of doctors, nurses, hospital beds etc. 
The most common health outputs are infant mortality rate and life expec-
tancy at birth. For the efficiency at aggregate level the usual input is total 
government expenditure (% GDP) and the output is per GDP growth rate 
or public sector performance composite indicator (PSP). Some research-
ers use Human Development Index as the output (Prasetyo, 2013).
As mentioned above, recent papers include the analysis of efficiency 
determinants. Since this is an in-depth analysis, efficiency determinants 
become more specific and targeted. Due to limited space, only the most 
frequent ones are reviewed in this paper. One of them is the size of 
government expenditure. Afonso et al. (2005a) find that “small” govern-
ments are the most efficient among industrialised countries, implying di-
minishing marginal products of higher public spending. Hauner & Kyobe 
(2010) and Herrera & Pang (2005) reach the same conclusion for health 
and education sector, that higher government expenditure (% of GDP) is 
associated with lower efficiency. Aristovnik (2009) finds a negative effect 
of high public spending on health efficiency. On the other hand, at local 
government level, the efficiency scores are found to be higher for large 
municipalities. (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007).
Another determinant is income per capita, found to have a positive ef-
fect of efficiency on aggregate level (Agasisti, 2011; Afonso et al. 2010) 
and for health and education (Herrera & Pang, 2005; Afonso & Aubyn, 
2006; Hauner & Kyobe, 2010). It was found that a country’s openness 
had a negative effect on efficiency (Bađun et al., 2014; De Witte & Mo-
esen, 2010). The explanation would be that open economies are more 
sensitive to external shocks and need a larger government take on the 
role of economy stabilizer (Rodrik, 1998). It was proven that family size 
had a positive effect on gross efficiency (Bađun et al., 2014; De Witte & 
Moesen, 2010). Countries with larger average family size can attain the 
same growth rates with lower government expenditure. Findings show 
that a higher degree of urbanisation has a positive effect on aggregate 
level efficiency (De Witte & Moesen, 2010), also in health and education 
(Herrera & Pang, 2005). Higher urbanisation enables providing public 
services at lower costs through the economy of scale. Regarding capital 
stock of a country, Afonso et al. (2010) point out that physical capital has 
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a positive effect on government efficiency. Countries with larger physical 
capital stock, measured by the share of gross investment in GDP, can 
attain the same growth rates with less government expenditure (Bađun 
et al. 2014). It was found that greaterpopulation density, like urbanisa-
tion, had a positive effect on efficiency due to economies of scale which 
enable the provision of public goods and services at a lower cost (Her-
rera and Pang, 2005; De Witte & Moesen, 2010). It was also found that 
greater population density improved the performance in education and 
health (Hauner & Kyobe, 2010).
5. The structure of government expenditure in the European 
Union
The average EU-28 general government expenditure has been continu-
ously stagnating since its peak in 2009 (induced by the economic crisis, 
increases in unemployment and social protection) when it amounted to 
50.1% of GDP. It decreased from 47.3% of GDP in 2015 to 46.6% of 
GDP in 2016. The greatest reduction was reported in Greece, Bulgaria 
and Slovakia respectively. General government expenditure in the EU 
varied between 29.4% of GDP in Ireland and 57.0 % of GDP in both 
France and Finland in 2015. Regarding the general government expend-
iture structure, notably four government functions amount to 79.2% of to-
tal expenditure in 2015. These are respectively social protection (40.6% 
of the total), health (15.2% of the total), general public services (13.1% 
of the total) and education (10.3% of the total).
Growing share of government expenditure in GDP was primary driven 
by growing social protection and health expenditure. Social protection 
expenditure as the largest function has become more important in terms 
of share of GDP and in the share of total expenditure. It increased in the 
share of GDP by 1.7 p.p. between 2002 and 2015. A slight slowdown is 
noticeable in the last two years when it decreased from 19.4% of GDP 
in 2014 to 19.2% of GDP in 2015. It was accompanied by total gener-
al government expenditure slowdown. Health expenditure kept a stable 
share in the past 4 years (7.2% of GDP). The evolution of EU-28 general 
government expenditure by function as share of GDP between 2002 and 
2015 is illustrated in Graph 1.
Graph 1. EU-28 average general government expenditure by function 2002-2015 (% of 
GDP)
Source: Eurostat; authors’ calculations
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Regarding the average shares of total expenditure, social protection in 
the EU increased in the share of total expenditure from 38.4% in 2002 to 
40.6% in 2015, and continues to move upwards. Health expenditure in-
creased from 13.7% in 2002 to 15.2% in 2015, while education has been 
on a downward trend in the last years (from 11.1% in 2002 to 10.3% in 
2015). General public services ranged from 14.9 % in 2002 to 13.1 % of 
total expenditure in 2015. The shares of each function in total expend-
iture are very stable. However, a trend towards an increase in social 
protection (+2.2 p.p.) and health (+1.5 p.p.) shares at the expense of 
general public services (-1.8 p.p.), education (-0.8 p.p.), housing and 
community amenities (-0.6 p.p.), and defence (-0.4 p.p.) shares can be 
noticed in the period 2002-2015.
Observing government expenditure structure across the EU countries, 
it is evident from Graph 2 that shares show significant heterogeneity. 
Relatively higher shares of social protection are reported in the old EU 
member states compared to the new EU member states (joined 2004 or 
after). Social protection varies from 29.9% of the total in Cyprus to 44.9% 
of total expenditure in Finland. The divergence across the EU countries 
can be noted in public health expenditure. It ranges from 6.4% in Cyprus 
to 19.3% of total government expenditure in Ireland.
Graph 2. EU-28 General government expenditure by function in 2015 (% of total 
government expenditure)
Source: Eurostat; authors’ calculations
Along with the fact that education and health have features of private 
goods, it is important to account not only for public expenditure, but also 
include also private expenditure on education and health. According to 
WHO data, high variety can be found across countries. Public expend-
iture on health in the EU amounted to, on average, 73 % of total health 
expenditure in 2014. The reported range is between 45% of the total in 
Cyprus and 87% of total health expenditure in the Netherlands. Public 
expenditure on education is generally larger in share than private when 
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compared to health expenditure. Public expenditure accounts for the av-
erage 88% of education expenditure ranging from 79% in the United 
Kingdom to 98% of education expenditure in Finland in 2011 (Eurostat, 
2017).
The reported data show a large variety of government expenditure size 
and structure across countries, which can be a serious drawback in effi-
ciency analysis. Moreover, with different tradition of financing public ser-
vices among countries (private vs. public funding), some countries are 
not suitable for comparison. Leaving out the private sources of health 
and education expenditure could result in serious bias. All these con-
straints need to be borne in mind when selecting the sample, conducting 
the research and interpreting the results.
6. Conclusion
In the environment of government expenditure cuts being in the centre of 
attention of both economists and the public, the question of optimal gov-
ernment size and its efficiency is taking center stage. Numerous research 
have been conducted on this topic, both parametric and non- parametric. 
It can be concluded from the literature review that most countries suf-
fer from government inefficiency and could retain the same output with 
lower government size. With fiscal pressure most countries are facing, 
these findings provide a positive sign that substantial resources can be 
saved without hampering the economy’s growth. However, more recent 
research include 2-stage or 3-stage approaches to investigate the pos-
sible exogenous environmental factors affecting efficiency. These newer, 
more sophisticated methods can distinguish inefficiency from other fac-
tors affecting the performance that is beyond control of policy makers. 
Substantial gains in measurement techniques have been made in the 
past few years; however the availability of data is a drawback in the anal-
ysis. For future research, it would be useful to track efficiency progress in 
countries over time. Given the drawback of non-parametric methods and 
sensitivity of their results to sample variation, it would be beneficial to 
apply the parametric methodology to check the robustness of the results. 
The future is in a more targeted analysis on specific public functions 
where the inputs, outputs and drivers of efficiency can be more accurate-
ly measured. A deeper analysis could help create a targeted policy mix 
to improve efficiency and assess the performance of the public sector. 
A more detailed research of causes of inefficiency in specific public ser-
vices would help reveal the mystery behind the varying efficiency coef-
ficients across countries. Nowadays, efficiency analysis is a developing 
area of research, expected to become even more important in the com-
ing years with substantial contributions to public finance management.
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Appendix: Literature Review
Author Analysis subject Method and sample Input and output Results
Adam et 
al. (2011)
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tries 1980 – 2000
INPUT: Government spending (% GDP) for 
each function OUTPUT:
EDUCATION: (secondary school enrollment, 
quality indicator) HEALTH: (infant mortality 
rate, life expectancy at birth) WELFARE:                
(GINI coefficient) ECONOMIC AFFAIRS: 
(the electric power transmission losses, 
standard telephone access lines)
GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICES:(corruption 
in government,  bureaucratic quality mea-
sures)
GENERAL GOVERNMENT: general eco-
nomic performance indicator (unemployment 
rate, GDP per capita, annual GDP growth 
rate) and economic stability indicator (stan-
dard deviation of the GDP growth rate, the 
inflation rate)
-The results in all 3 stages are not 
significantly different, implying than 
governance quality is more important 
than the environmental factors.
Efficiency determinants
-Urbanisation rate, population density, 
proportion of the population above 
65 years of age, international market 
openness, government stability mea-
sure, the investment profile variable, 
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INPUT: PSP, PSE, total public spending, 
average spending on goods, services, trans-
fers, functional spending on education and 
health and public investment
OUTPUT:
Administration (corruption, red tape, quality 
of the judiciary, the        size        of         the     
shadow         economy) The education 
indicator (secondary school enrollment, 
OECD educational                   attainment          
indicators) The health performance indicator 
(infant mortality, life expectancy)
public infrastructure indicator (communica-
tions quality, transport infrastructure quality)
Income distribution (income share of the 
poorest 40% of the households)
Economic stability (the coefficient of varia-
tion of output growth and    average inflation) 
Economic performance (per-capita GDP, 
GDP growth, unemployment)
FDH-INPUT: Public spending % GDP OUT-
PUT: PSP indicator
- Small governments are the most 
efficient among industrialised coun-
tries, implying diminishing marginal 
products of higher public spending.
-Large potential for expenditure sav-
ings in many countries
FDH:
-The average input efficiency of the 
EU-15 shows that the same level of 
output could be attained using
only 73% of the inputs
-The output efficiency score implies 
that with given public expenditures, 
PSP is 82% (or 18% less) of what 
could be attained with the same level 
of expenditure












1. monetary  – spending per  stu-
dent  (secondary) 2. quantitative 
– hours per year in school, teachers 
per 100 students
OUTPUT: PISA results INPUT:
1.monetary – health spending per 
capita (private and public) 2. quan-
titative – doctors, nurses, hospital 
beds.
OUTPUT: the infant survival rate, 
life expectancy
FDH education
- In the education sector, the average 
input efficiency varies between 0.859 
and 0.886 In health, between 0.832 
and 0.946
- There is a scope for attaining higher 









INPUT: teachers per student, time 
spent at school OUTPUT: PISA 
results
Countries could attain higher output 
by 11.6% using the same resources, 
on average
Efficiency determinants: Country’s 
wealth and parents’
education levels are associated with 
higher education efficiency








Government spending (% GDP) 
OUTPUT: PSP
- Countries with public expenditure 
around 30% of GDP are the most 
efficient according to PSP and PSE
- From the average input scores coun-
tries could attain the same output with 
45% less resources
- Average output scores show that 
countries are attaining around two-
thirds of the output they could attain 
with the same resources
Efficiency determinants: higher 
income, civil service competence, 
education levels and the security of 












INPUT: level of per capita municipal 
spending for the input measure.
OUTPUT: composite local govern-
ment indicator of municipal perfor-
mance
The results suggest that most munici-













INPUT: Total government expendi-
ture % GDP OUTPUT: PSP
Growth regression:
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: total 
government expenditure (% GDP), 
PSE, TE, control variables
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GDP per 
capita growth
When the fiscal size is measured by 
the government consumption share 
in GDP, the size-efficiency mix is sig-








Sample: new EU 
member states
Health:
INPUT: average public spending on 
health (% GDP) in 2001-2004
OUTPUT: standardised death rates 
(per 100,000 people) Education:
INPUT: average public spending 
on health (% GDP) in 2001-2004 
period
- Efficiency and effectiveness differ 
across the sample
- Health inefficiencies are related to 
high public spending
- Education inefficiencies appear in 
the transforming of intermediate out-
put into real outcomes.
- Space to reduce public (health and 
education) spending and retain the 
same output.










per student, tertiary (% of GDP per 
capita)
- total expenditure on education (% 
GDP)
OUTPUT: school enrollment tertiary, 
teacher/pupil ratio, primary comple-
tion rate, unemployment with tertiary 
education, labour force with tertiary 
education, and PISA 2006 average 
score.
- New EU member states show 
relatively high efficiency in tertiary 
education efficiency
- CEE countries, Hungary, Estonia 
and Slovenia have high efficiency in 
primary, secondary and tertiary educa-
tion, respectively.
- Most CEE countries have a potential 
for increased efficiency in (public) 
spending

















INPUT: general government expen-
diture % GDP , OUTPUT: average 
GDP growth rate
Public investment:
INPUT: general government gross 
investment in % GDP OUTPUT: The 
public infrastructure quality
Public administration:
INPUT: share of expenditure on gen-
eral government employees’ salaries 
in GDP
OUTPUT: government effectiveness, 
2) regulatory quality and
3) rule of law efficiency of the legal 
framework in settling disputes and 
the number of days to start a busi-
ness (both from GCR).
-The average optimal size of govern-
ment in old EU countries is larger than 
that in new EU countries
-The optimal government size for the 
sample is 39.21%; thus, the countries 
should, on average, reduce their gen-
eral government expenditure (% GDP) 
by 3.54 p. p.
Efficiency determinants
- Family size has a positive effect 
on gross efficiency, openness has a 
negative effect on efficiency
- GDP per capita, the share of popula-
tion over 65, total population, popula-
tion density, are insignificant.
- Countries with larger physical capital 
stock can achieve the same growth 
rates with less government expendi-
ture.
- Countries with longer life expectancy 
show a larger optimal government 
size with the given growth rates.













Public sectors should decrease by 
3.74 p. p. to reach an overall tax bur-
den of 41.22% of GDP.
Efficiency determinants: larger exports 
have a negative effect on efficiency, 
GDP per capita shows a positive, but 
insignificant effect on efficiency, family 
size, country size, population density 
and urbanisation show a positiveeffect 
on efficiency
Herrera & Pang 
(2005)
Efficiency of govern-
ment spending in 
health and education






INPUT: Public expenditure on health 
per capita in PPP terms, public 
expenditure on education per capita 
in PPP terms OUTPUT:
Education: Primary school enroll-
ment, secondary school enrollment, 
literacy of youth, average years of 
school, first level complete, second 
level complete, and learning scores. 
Health: lLife expectancy at birth, 
immunisation, disability,
adjusted life expectancy
Higher expenditure levels, the wage 
bills a larger share of the total budget, 
publicly financed service provision, the 
prevalence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
income inequality, and the degree 
of external aid financing (negatively 
associated with efficiency)
Degree of urbanisation (positively 
correlated with efficiency)
Jafarov &  
Gunnarson 
(2008)



















public health expenditures (PPP per capita), public expen-
diture
spending (inadequate cost recov-
ery for health and
social benefits (PPP dollars per capita) education services, weaknesses in the financing
OUTPUT: mechanisms and institutional arrangements, weak
Health care: competition in the provision of social services, and
intermediate output (the density of physicians, pharma-
cists, and weaknesses in targeting benefits)
healthcare workers, number of hospital beds, number of Efficiency determinants:
immunisation vaccines), outcome (infant, child, and mater-
nal
Inefficiencies in health spending in 
Croatia related
mortality rates; the standardised death rate from all causes 
per
to high pharmaceutical spending, 
long stays in hospitals,
1,000people, incidences of tuberculosis, healthy average 
life
low levels of out-of-pocket spend-
ing and of private
expectancy) participation.
- Education: - Positive relationship between overall efficiency and the
intermediate output indicator (primary pupil-teacher ratios, share of current expenditure in total education, classroom
enrollment rates, rates of progression to secondary educa-
tion,
size, parents’ education and school 
quality and autonomy
and graduation rates), outcome indicator (PISA). indicators




Government DEA, Malm-quist INPUT: government expenditures per capita
Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, 
Chile, Georgia, Japan,
expenditure Index on education and health sectors and also on subsidies and other
Republic of Koreac, Lao PDR, 
Madagascar, Niger, Norway,
efficiency in 
health, Sample: 81 transfers
the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sin-
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government DEA, panel fixed INPUT: government share to GDP (%)
-Above a certain threshold, effi-
ciency reduces the
efficiency effect regres-sion, OUTPUT:
government expenditure required 
to maximise growth.
optimal (GMM-HAC) - literacy rate for education (%), electricity use for - Optimal size for government expenditure exists if
government 
size Sample: 63 infrastructure, life expectancy for health (%)
the country’s efficiency score is 
higher than 0.865.
developing -With the average sample efficien-cy score of 0.89, the
countries 
1990-
optimal government expenditure is 
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INTRODUCTION OF A LOCAL REAL ESTATE TAX 
IN CROATIA: A SURVEY OF EXPERT AND PUBLIC 
OPINION84
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the results of surveys of both expert and public opinion 
regarding the introduction of a local real estate tax in Croatia. The methodology 
encompasses descriptive statistics and two models (the PLS-SEM and the bino-
mial probit regression model). Support for the introduction of the real estate tax is 
stronger among the experts than the general public. However, the experts differ 
on professional lines, with faculty specialized in economics from departments 
of finance and accounting generally being against the tax. Both models reveal 
positive relationships between support for the tax and support for more equitable 
taxation. Meanwhile, the broader expert model is, besides profession and equity, 
also negatively influenced by attitudes in favour of lower taxation costs and pos-
itively influenced by attitudes in favour of property being an adequate indicator 
of ability to pay and of the need to tax capital income. The public opinion model 
is positively influenced by equity and negatively influenced by negative expec-
tations about the abolition of existing real estate user charges and taxes. Work 
status is also relevant.
Key words: real estate tax, expert opinion survey, public opinion survey, Croatia
1. Introduction
Local real estate tax (local recurrent immovable property tax) is tradition-
ally regarded as a “good” local tax that increases fiscal decentralization 
and the fiscal capacities and autonomy of local government units (e.g. 
Oates, 1999; Bird, 2011: 3-5; Bahl and Bird, 2008:8-10; Bahl and Mar-
84 This is a reprint of a paper published in the Lex Localis, Vol 14, No 1,  2016,http://pub.
lex-localis.info/index.php/LexLocalis/article/view/14.1.53-74%282016%29
This work has been supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under pro-
ject number IP-201311-8174 and in part by the University of Rijeka under project number 
13.02.1.2.02
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tinez-Vasquez, 2007:8). The strong and renewed interest for this tax is, 
besides strengthening local governments, especially in (post)transition 
and developing countries, also based on macroeconomic efficiency and 
equity aspects.
Real estate tax (local property tax) seems to be the best tax in terms 
of minimizing negative impacts on economic growth (Arnold 2008; Jo-
hansson et al. 2008; Arnold et al. 2011 and Xing 2011, 2012; European 
Commission, 2014a: 44; European Commission 2014b). This implies the 
necessity of shifting taxes away from corporate and personal (especially 
labor) income towards the real estate tax (i.e. recurrent tax on immov-
able property) (e.g. Arnold, 2008; Arnold et al., 2011; European Commis-
sion, 2014b, Coda Moscarola et al., 2015). This tax has been advocated 
especially in recent times of financial and economic crises and resultant 
fiscal consolidation (e.g. OECD 2010; Norregaard, 2013; IMF 2013; Gar-
nier et al. 2014) not only based on its efficiency1 and fiscal considera-
tions2, but also on equity3 considerations (Hills, 2013; IMF 2013). Unfor-
tunately, many advantages of this tax (transparency, visibility, minimized 
evasion opportunities) are the main causes of its greater disadvantage 
– strong unpopularity among taxpayers (e.g. Norreggard, 2013: 4; Bahl 
and Martinez – Vasquez, 2007: 6; Bahl and Bird, 2008: 15-18; Cabral 
and Hoxby, 2012; Cole and Kincaid, 2006; National Public Radio/Kaiser 
Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government, 2003: 3; Hammar 
et al., 2008). Therefore “the differences of opinion are probably stronger 
on property taxation than on most other taxes” (Norregaard, 2013: 4). 
While economists favour it, there is a widespread popular and hence 
political resistance” (Norregaard, 2013: 4; Bahl and Bird, 2008:15). The 
resistance could be especially pronounced in (post)transition and devel-
oping countries concerning low-income households with relatively highly 
valued real estate (e.g. European Commission, 2012: 23), which could 
lead to regressivity of the tax.  An additional problem in comparison with 
the area-based assessments / user charges are administrative costs, 
that are particularly high and troublesome at the time of the introduction 
of “real” – value-based real estate tax. These costs and lack of admin-
istrative capacity in general are especially significant in developing and 
transition countries (e.g. Bahl and Martinez – Vasquez, 2007: 5-6, 14-15, 
Bahl and Bird, 2008: 15; McCluskey and Plimmer, 2011: 130-132; Bahl, 
2013: 29-30; Ahmad et al., 2014: 24-27).
Unfortunately, the literature overview does not provide a general unique 
conclusion, so “… property taxes may be viewed as either equitable and 
efficient ways of raising revenue or regressive and undesirable forms of 
local public finance, depending upon one’s assumptions, the environ-
ment and how exactly the taxes are designed and applied.” (Bird and 
Slack, 2004: 1). So, with regard to (post)transition and developing coun-
tries, the local real estate tax is “still full of potential, but also full of un-
certainty as an instrument for bringing revenues and accountability to 
sub-national governments” (Bahl and Martinez – Vasquez, 2007: 15). 
The intention of this research is to contribute to this issue.
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Although Croatia’s real estate tax legislative proposal dates from 2012, 
the debate about its pros and cons is ongoing. Establishing whether 
the proposal has general acceptance is difficult. This research aims to 
better understand attitudes (and associated underlying reasons and as-
sumptions) in relation to this tax in Croatia, which are, of course, under 
the influence of its institutional and fiscal environment as well as design 
and application of the existing and future real estate charges/taxes. Two 
opinion surveys (expert and public) were used to facilitate proper as-
sessment. Besides descriptive statistics and correlations, two relevant 
models were developed — the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation 
Model (PLS-SEM) and a binomial probit regression model—indicating in-
fluences on acceptance/rejection of the introduction of a real estate tax.
The research hypotheses indicate lesser support of the general public for 
real estate introduction in comparison with experts. Furthermore, deci-
sions are expected to be influenced by attitudes towards equity, property 
as the ability to pay indicator, costs of taxation and general tax burden 
attitude, also including some other parts of the (local) tax system, as well 
as demographic characteristics.
After the introduction, the proposed legislative model of a real estate tax 
in Croatia is presented, including discussion of its pros and cons. The 
methodological presentation includes a description of two surveys along 
with other research methods. First, the results of the survey of expert 
opinion are presented using analysis of frequency distribution, median, 
mode, interquartile range and correlations between research questions 
on real estate tax, followed by application of the PLS-SEM model, and 
explanation of the latent endogenous variables using latent exogenous 
variables. Second, the same descriptive statistic data are presented for 
a shorter survey of public opinion on real estate taxation, followed by 
application of the binomial probit regression model.
2. Real estate tax in Croatia: proposed model
Exceptional circumstances, such as economic crisis, necessitate re-
thinking and changes in the tax system. Thus, the Ministry of Finance, 
in 2012, proposed a new local tax: the real estate tax. This tax was an 
entirely new tax concept that did not previously exist in the Croatian tax 
system, and was part of the pre-election program of the new coalition 
Government (Ministarstvo financija 2012). Meanwhile, due to the critics 
(based mostly on the already stated arguments against such a tax) and 
unpopularity, as well as the upcoming elections, the Government de-
layed the introduction of the tax.4
2.1. The basic characteristics of the proposed model
The real estate tax is intended to target all immobile properties located 
within the construction zone of the living area. These can be either con-
structed or unconstructed properties that are listed in the fiscal cadastre.
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Taxpayers are to be either the landlord or users of the property, namely 
occupants/tenants. In the case of a concession or lease, the taxpayer 
would be the user of that concession/lease.
The tax base is to be 70% of the fiscal value, where fiscal value is based 
on the market value and parameters of the real estate as registered in 
the fiscal cadastre. The valuation would be set by the Tax Authority at 
intervals of 5 years or less. Local self-government units would be enti-
tled to seek a reassessment from 3 years after the previous assessment 
if they believed a significant change in quality of life had affected the 
property value.
The planned tax rate is to be 1.5% levied on a predefined tax base. Tax 
relief is planned for properties that provide permanent housing (for the 
owner, family members and even tenants), and even for temporary res-
idences and places of business. However, tax relief would not apply to 
unused, non-functional or illegal properties.
The proposed real estate tax would replace existing utility fees (the “com-
munal charge” would be replaced immediately and the monument annuity 
would be replaced later) and tax on holiday houses (with the local income 
tax surtax to be replaced later). An easement system would ensure the 
final tax burden does not significantly exceed the burden of current utility 
fees and related taxes. A range of tax relief measures has been defined, 
with the actual amount of relief to be stipulated by local self-government 
units. Because real estate tax revenue goes to local units, those local 
units should spend part of the collected tax on financing public utilities.
2.2. Discussion
The Government announced a correction of the tax system to ensure 
it is equitable and considers the real economic strength of taxpayers. 
This means higher taxation of capital income and extra assets over and 
above those used directly by the taxpayer, including the introduction of a 
real estate tax (Vlada RH 2011: 11).
Currently in Croatia the only official tax on real estate ownership is a 
tax on holiday houses. The most important feature of this tax is that it is 
determined by the area of built floor space on the property rather than 
by its market value. The same is true for the local utility charge, called 
the “communal charge”, which is a simple local property taxed based on 
property location and the area of built floor space on the property, and 
whose level varies significantly among autonomous municipalities. Other 
local real estate charges encompass the monument annuity, which is 
levied on real estate protected for historical value reasons and shared 
between local and central government, and the flooding amelioration 
charge, which is collected together with the communal charge and based 
on the same collection principle. Although the latter is collected by local 
municipalities and spent locally, it is revenue of Croatian Waters (the 
public company concerned with national water management). 
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During the time that Croatia was part of Yugoslavia, a property tax was 
levied on the ownership of real estate, allowing certain experiences and 
lessons to be drawn from the past. Problems and doubts from that period 
remain valid, such as the problem of determining the value of real estate 
(tax base), incomplete records of assets (lack of fiscal cadastre) and 
shortfalls in tax administration (Šimović 1989: 70-72). A recent example 
of mass valuation in Slovenia indicates the time, resources and knowl-
edge needed to establish a tax base for the real estate tax (Mitrović and 
Žibrik 2012).
The main reason for the introduction of the real estate tax is fiscal. Ex-
isting property taxes in Croatia do not contribute significantly to public 
revenue, particularly at the local level. When the share of property taxes 
to the total tax revenues is compared between Croatia and other EU 
countries, it becomes clear that a property tax offers significant poten-
tial for revenue raising (Kesner-Škreb 2009; Kordić and Podborkić 2010; 
Blažić and Grdinić 2012; Kukić and Švaljek 2012; Rašić Bakarić 2014). 
Moreover, this potential contribution increases further when different lo-
cal real estate charges are added (Fatur and Žiković 2009). Furthermore, 
reasons for the introduction of the “real” local real estate tax should be 
sought in the absence of such tax concepts in Croatia, which would mean 
establishing the tax base according to market (estimated, fiscal) value, 
which is the most common model throughout most of the EU.
The proposed real estate tax should immediately replace the local utility 
fee (communal charge) and tax on holiday houses. The basis for deter-
mining tax liability in the case of utility fees and taxes on holiday houses 
was property location and the area of built floor space on the property. 
By abolishing these tax forms their revenue loss would be neutralized by 
new real estate tax, while significant redistribution of the tax burden and 
strengthening of the equity principle is expected (Ministarstvo financija 
2012 and 2013).
The Ministry of Finance stated a number of secondary reasons for in-
troducing a real estate tax, such as the arrangement of cadastre (real 
estate evidence data), legalization of property ownership, shrinking the 
unofficial economy, boosting liquidity of the real estate market, and low-
ering real estate prices (Ministarstvo financija, 2013).5
The proposed real estate tax caused great debate between advocates 
and critics, based on its numerous apparent advantages and disadvan-
tages. It should once again be mentioned that the introduction of the 
proposed tax would broaden the tax base, which would not only con-
tribute to tax revenues, but also increase equity in taxation (Kordić and 
Podborkić 2010: 117). Besides fiscal effects, Blažić and Grdinić (2012: 
74) point out the arguments in favour of the real estate tax, such as pos-
sible negative savings (through better use of existing assets), enhanced 
control over economic resources, status and non-monetary forms of in-
come (unrealized capital gains and imputed rent). The real estate tax is 
considered less distortionary than a net wealth tax (synthetic taxation of 
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property) because it does not influence decisions of economic entities 
regarding labour supply and investment in capital (Blazić and Grdinić 
2012: 76). Furthermore, Kukić and Švaljek (2012: 55‒60) point out the 
advantages of the real estate tax in terms of improved stabilization, be-
cause it shifts the tax burden from labour to consumption and property 
(real estate), thus indirectly promoting employment. The real estate tax 
can also contribute to redistributive goals and ability-to-pay principle. 
On the other hand, the proposed real estate tax has disadvantages. It 
represents an additional burden on taxpayers, increases administrative 
costs (especially the cost of determining the tax base), and in this con-
text, uncertainty regarding effects on net revenue is usually the most 
emphasized drawback (Kordić and Podborkić 2010: 108; Kesner-Škreb 
2012; Kukić and Švaljek 2012: 61-62). The most notable disadvantage 
is that the real estate tax would negatively impact investment allocation, 
because it would encourage economic entities to change their behav-
iours to avoid tax, whether fully or partially. Also, the complaint most of-
ten singled out by tax theorists is that the real estate tax, and other taxes 
on property, lead to double taxation of the same tax base (i.e. income). 
Taxation first occurs when income is earned, and then repeats when in-
come is directed to pay real estate tax (Kukić and Švaljek 2012: 58-60).
The disadvantage emphasized by all authors, and even the Government, 
is the cost of establishing a fiscal cadastre. This disadvantage relates to 
problems of expensive administration and property valuation mentioned 
above, especially in the first years of implementation. Also, for any prop-
erty tax, unanswered questions remain: what is net effect of a tax6, which 
property (real estate) should not be taxed, and how to estimate the tax 
base. Of course, the truth always lies somewhere in the middle; the real 
estate tax could enhance the Croatian local tax system, based on the key 
assumptions underlying its implementation.
3. Methodology
3.1. Two Surveys
Opinion/attitude surveys in taxation research often include local real es-
tate taxation and may be administered to experts (Slemrod 1995; Bran-
non 1995; Ashworth and Heyndels 1997; Lim et al. 2013, Šimović et al. 
2014) as well as to the general public (e.g. National Public Radio/Kaiser 
Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government 2003; Hammar et al. 
2008; Cole and Kincaid, 2006).
To obtain a broad perspective on reactions to the proposed local real 
estate tax in Croatia, both types of survey were administered. First was a 
general expert opinion survey dealing with the entire Croatian tax system 
(and policy); this was followed by a public opinion survey focused specif-
ically on the proposed local real estate tax.
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The general expert opinion survey7, conducted in Croatia in the summer 
of 2013, covered taxes of all types and levied by all levels of government 
(92 statements/questions). The proposed local real estate tax thus was 
included as the future main source of local tax revenue, together with its 
relationship to other local taxes and charges, which are presumed to be 
abolished in the course of the tax’s introduction and further development 
(including the elimination of the public utility charge, called the “com-
munal charge”, the tax on holiday houses and the surtax on personal 
income tax). The alternative to the proposed tax, i.e. a net wealth tax, 
was also questioned. Besides questions on specific tax types, the sur-
vey also included general questions on tax policy (efficiency, equity, tax 
burden shift in tax structure and tax compliance costs) in relation to new 
real estate taxation. 
Croatian tax experts from the public (local government units, heads of 
finance departments, and the tax administration), private (tax advisers 
and accounting houses) and academic sectors were asked by e-mail 
to assess relevant on-line questions/statements using five-level Likert 
items. Out of 1,000 targeted population experts, 304 responded.
The second survey, that of public opinion, was performed in autumn 2014 
and targeted the entire Croatian population over 18 years old, excluding 
collective households. For simplicity, but also because the proposed real 
estate tax lacked certain details, the survey focus was limited to devel-
oped real estate. With a confidence level of 95%, the smallest required 
sample size of 385 respondents (necessary to ensure a 5% margin of 
error) was successfully achieved, with the number of survey respondents 
reaching 407. The sample was structured by region, age, sex, type of 
settlement (i.e. urban versus rural) and work status. 
A short telephone survey based on random sampling was used. The rel-
atively short survey encompassed the following questions: two questions 
about taxpayers’ perceptions/attitudes concerning the new real estate tax 
and redistributive characteristics of the tax system (using five-level Lik-
ert items), questions about real estate ownership, including number and 
type of properties owned, questions about taxpayer awareness of the 
current burden associated with the communal charge, as well questions 
regarding awareness/doubts concerning the announced abolishment of 
both the charge and other local taxes (following the introduction of new 
real estate tax), and finally questions on demographic characteristics.
3.2. Research methods
Questions in both relevant surveys are analysed using descriptive statistics 
- frequency distribution, median, interquartile range and mode—and this is 
followed by correlation analysis of the questions on property taxation.
To establish the relationships relevant to the introduction of the proposed 
local real estate tax, Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modelling 
(PLS-SEM) or Partial Least Squares Path Modelling has been applied 
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to the expert survey, using all the relevant survey questions and data. 
This is a method for estimating causal relationships between unobserved 
latent variables, which are measured indirectly by observed or manifest 
variables. PLS-SEM comprises three components: inner or structural 
model, outer or measurement model and weighting schemes. The in-
ner model specifies the relationship between latent constructs, the out-
er model specifies the relationship between latent constructs and their 
manifest variables, and the weighting scheme is used to determine the 
inner weights. This method is selected because the PLS-SEM model can 
deal with non-normal data and be applied to models with reflective and 
formative constructs. SmartPLS v. 3.1.6. (Ringle et al. 2014) was used to 
perform model estimation.
The model for the public opinion survey on real estate tax introduction 
was developed using binomial probit regression with relevant attitude/
value questions and demographic variables as independent variables.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Expert opinion survey: basic descriptive statistics results
The expert opinion survey entails 10 questions related to the introduc-
tion of a real estate tax in Croatia. These questions, together with basic 
descriptive statistics on the answers provided, are presented in Table 1.8
Table 1. Frequency distribution, median (Mdn), interquartile range (IQR) and mode for 
experts
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Notes: a 1-completely/strongly disagree, 2 – mostly disagree, 3 – neither agree nor 
disagree, 4 – mostly agree, 5- completely/strongly agree
b Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
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Although most respondents moderately supported the introduction of 
the real estate tax, the interquartile range reveals both a considerable 
number of moderate opponents of the tax as well as lack of strong sup-
porters. Consensus that the tax should be local (as proposed by the 
legislator) was much stronger, with the bulk of respondents fully support-
ing the idea. The same degree (and structure) of support exists for the 
general idea of the introduction of property taxation. Since support for a 
net wealth tax, traditionally enforced by central government, is generally 
slightly weaker than that for the real estate tax (though the number of full 
supporters is also slightly higher), it can be concluded that respondents 
generally support property taxation, especially a local real estate tax, but 
have reservations concerning the current legislative proposal. Surpris-
ingly, and in contrast to the proposed real estate tax that includes imme-
diate abolition of the communal charge (local utility charge) and tax on 
holiday houses, as well as future abolition of the local personal income 
tax surtax, respondents generally do not favour the removal of those 
taxes/charges. This holds especially true for the taxes (i.e. the tax on 
holiday houses and the surtax), unlike for the communal charge, since 
the latter takes the form of a “simplified” (i.e. built area based) local real 
estate tax. The respondents thus are more aware of the similarity of the 
proposed tax to the “classic” real property tax, and of the fact that it is to 
be replaced by the more appropriate real estate tax. Not surprisingly, the 
mode for the communal charge is only 1, while for the other taxes and 
charges it is 5. As expected, local government financial officials favour 
retention of all three taxes/charges and this support rises with each addi-
tional question/statement, but academics also support this attitude, and 
especially in relation to the local (personal income tax) surtax (based on 
detailed survey results).9 
The other surprising fact is that respondents, despite advocating strongly 
for property taxation (in addition to income taxation), remain reluctant to 
pay such taxes personally. 
Furthermore, some consistency exists among respondent answers. This 
consistency is presented by the Spearman’s correlation coefficients, pre-
sented in Table 2. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix with only those 
coefficients that are statistically significant.
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Table 2. Correlation matrix (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients)
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Notes: * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01
As expected, a significant and strongest positive correlation exists be-
tween maintaining the communal charge and the tax on holiday houses 
(despite the introduction of the local real estate tax). There is also a 
highly significant correlation between maintaining the local income tax 
surtax and both those questions, but the correlation is weaker. The rea-
son lies in the immediate abolishment of the former taxes/charges and 
the planned future abolishment of the surtax.
The highly significant and positive correlation between general attitude 
in favour of property taxation and the introduction of a real estate tax is 
completely expected, as is the correlation between the introduction of 
such a tax and its belonging to the local government. Not surprisingly, 
experts supporting a new real estate tax mostly also support the “theo-
retical ideal” of a synthetic property tax, i.e., a net wealth tax. However, 
the positive correlation between a general attitude in favour of property 
taxation and the property tax is stronger for the real estate tax than the 
net wealth tax (although one could expect the same correlation to exist in 
reverse). This probably reveals the awareness of respondents that recur-
rent property taxation, due to administrative obstacles, could be easily 
applied through a real estate tax.
4.2. PLS-SEM model
The different causal relationships of the introduction of a real estate 
tax with the survey questions have been further investigated using the 
PLS-SEM model (Figure 1). The manifest variables (survey questions/
statements10) in rectangles (jointly) form latent variables in ovals. The 
direction of their relationships (arrows, including coefficients and their 
statistical significance) depends on whether the manifest variables are 
reflective (survey questions/statements reflecting taxpayers’ opinions/at-
titudes about tax policy) or formative (explicit data, like profession). The 
inner model, that proves most of the hypotheses, is made by manifest 
variables (in ovals) and their relations (again, including coefficients and 
their statistical significance). The manifest variables that form the final 
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endogenous variable are the statement in favor of introduction of the 
proposed real estate tax (Q1) together with the statement that the tax 
burden should be shifted from income to property. These manifest vari-
ables form the final endogenous latent variable - the planned shift from 
income to property (real estate) taxation. This final endogenous variable 
is influenced by a couple of latent variables (inner model), which are 
measured indirectly by observed/manifest variables (outer model). 
The highest positive influence comes from the general positive attitude 
towards property taxation, manifested by accepting property as a nec-
essary additional indicator of ability to pay as well as supporting the net 
wealth tax as the “real” synthetic property tax. The same support for prop-
erty taxation influences also support for capital taxation alongside person-
al income tax. Within personal income tax (PIT) the reliance on indirect 
taxation of property/capital through taxation of capital/property income 
(dividends, interests and capital gains), which naturally is positively influ-
enced by the importance of equity (over efficiency), has a positive causal 
relationship with the final endogenous latent variable. Since the introduc-
tion of local real property taxation is accompanied by higher administra-
tive costs of taxation and could result in a higher tax burden in the end, 
it is logical that it is negatively influenced by the latent variable reflecting 
attitude towards lower taxation costs (tax burden and especially admin-
istrative and compliance costs of taxation). In the end, profession of tax 
experts has been already found to play a significant role in the local real 
estate tax introduction (Blažić et al. 2014, 349-354, 358, 359). While ac-
ademics from finance departments (from the faculties of economics) are 
strongly opposed to that proposal (median of 2), other experts are much 
supportive (median of 4). It is evident that the stated hypotheses/expec-
tations about different influences on decision-making have been verified.
Figure 1. Path model
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Notes: * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01
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The estimated path model presented in Figure 1 is evaluated in two 
steps, by testing both the measurement model and the structural model. 
4.2.1. Assessment of the measurement model
The measurement model comprises both reflective and formative blocks. 
The reflective measurement blocks are assessed by reliability and valid-
ity analysis of multiple-item latent constructs. The formative measure-
ment block is a single-item latent variable and has the control variable 
Profession, which shows whether a person is a member of the Faculty of 
Economics Academics: Department of Finance (or accounting). 
Reliability analysis is examined based on the internal reliability of the 
latent variables and the reliability of the indicator variables. Validity anal-
ysis is tested using convergent and discriminant validity.
Results of the internal consistency reliability and convergent validity anal-
ysis are given in the appendix Table A1, and indicator reliability measured 
by item loading is given in Table A3. The internal consistency reliability as 
indexed by the composite reliability exceeds the recommended thresh-
old value of 0.7 (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Outer loadings exceeding 
0.7 show that latent constructs explain a substantial amount of the vari-
ance of each indicator (Henseler et al. 2009). 
Convergent validity measured by average variance extracted (AVE) ex-
ceeded the threshold of 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker 1981), indicating that 
on average the latent construct can explain over half the variance of its 
manifest variables.
Discriminant validity is analysed by the Fornell–Larcker criterion (Fornell 
and Larcker 1981) given in the appendix (Table A3) and by cross-load-
ings (Chin 1998, Grégoire and Fisher 2006) given in Table 3. 
Appendix Table A2 shows that the square root of AVE of every latent con-
struct (diagonal numbers) exceeds the correlation with every other latent 
construct. The Fornell–Larcker criterion indicates that the latent variable 
shares more variance with its block of manifest variables then with other 
blocks of manifest variables.
Table A3 shows that every manifest variable correlates more closely with 
its own latent variable than with any other latent variable. The Fornell–
Larcker criterion shows that discriminant validity is reached on the con-
struct level, while the cross-loadings show it is reached on the indicator 
level.
4.2.2. Assessment of the structural model 
Since the measurement model reached acceptable fit, the structural 
model could be assessed. Before assessing the structural model, multi-
collinearity is checked and all VIF values are less than 5, so path coeffi-
cients are not biased by significant collinearity (Hair et al. 2013). 
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The structural model is evaluated by analysing the explained variance, 
path coefficients and predictive relevance. 
The explained variance of the endogenous latent construct is assessed 
by R2. According to Chin (1998), R2 is evaluated as substantial, moder-
ate, or weak based on values of 0.67, 0.33, or 0.19, respectively. Figure 
1 shows that the R2 of Capital income taxation (PIT) is 0.22 and the R2 
of Local taxation shift from PIT surtax to real estate tax is 0.31, so the 
factors included in the model explain weak and moderate variance for 
endogenous latent constructs.
The bootstrapping technique with 5000 samples is used to estimate the 
significance of the path coefficients. Table 3 shows that all the coeffi-
cients between latent constructs in the model are significant at least at 
the α = 0.10 level. Property taxation with β=0.453 and Capital income 
taxation (PIT) with β=0.122, have positive direct effect on Local taxation: 
Shift from PIT surtax to real estate tax, while the control variable Pro-
fession with β=−0.103 and Lower taxation costs with β=−0.101 exert a 
negative direct effect. Property taxation has the greatest direct effect on 
Local taxation: Shift from PIT surtax to real estate tax and with indirect 
effect via Capital income taxation (PIT) has also the greatest total effect 
of 0.507.
The predictive relevance of the exogenous latent construct for endog-
enous latent construct is achieved by a blindfolding procedure that cal-
culates the cross-validated redundancy measure Q2. Positive Q2 implies 
the predictive relevance of the model for a particular reflective endoge-
nous latent construct, while negative values imply a lack of predictive rel-
evance (Chinn, 1988). Construct cross-validated redundancy for Capital 
income taxation (PIT) is 0.162 while that for Local taxation: Shift from 
PIT surtax to real estate tax is 0.204, indicating the model has predictive 
relevance.
Table 3. Path coefficients
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
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4.3. Public opinion survey
Unlike the previous survey, the public opinion survey concentrated solely 
on the introduction of the real estate tax. The relevant attitude questions 
and basic descriptive statistics of the answers are presented in Table 
4. Besides different demographic and real estate characteristics, ques-
tion(s) about knowledge of tax/user charges and real estate economic 
plans (buying or selling property), three basic survey questions were set. 
The first one closely resembled the expert opinion survey question re-
garding real estate tax, but also used the term “property” since the tax 
is denoted as such to the general public. The equity question (Q2) was 
also modified to better suit the public. We also wanted to check whether 
people know/believe that communal charge (and tax on holiday houses) 
will be abolished, and so Q3 was also set. This related not so much to 
knowledge of the new law, but to what people expect to happen. Unlike 
the previous five Likert items, this one has only four answers—1) They 
will be abolished; 2) They will be reduced; 3) They will remain; 4) They 
will be increased—with “Do not know” answers being excluded from the 
analysis.
Table 4. Frequency distribution, median (Mdn), interquartile range (IQR) and mode for 
general public
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Notes: a Answers to questions Q1 and Q2: 1-completely/strongly disagree, 2 – mostly 
disagree, 3 – neither agree nor disagree, 4 – mostly agree, 5- completely/strongly agree
b Answers to question Q3: 1- They will be abolished, 2 – They will be reduced, 3- They will 
remain, 4 – They will be increased
As expected (indicated under hypothesis), the general public is less 
in favor of a local real estate tax introduction than tax experts. The 
Mann-Whitney test indicates that the difference in medians between ex-
perts and general population regarding a local real estate tax is signifi-
cant, U=6752, p=0.280.
As seen from the modes in Table 4, the largest groups of taxpayers 
strongly favour tax equity in general but oppose the introduction of the 
real estate tax and believe in increasing the real estate burden, i.e., they 
expect retention of the communal charge and the tax on holiday houses. 
However, medians still suggest strong reliance on equity together with 
acceptance, perhaps better expressed as indifference to the introduction 
of the real estate tax (again based on the belief that existing taxes will 
remain).
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It is interesting to gain insights into the correlations among the questions, 
which are presented in Table 5, together with two additional questions 
concerning real estate planning (Q4 — Do you plan to sell the real estate 
within the next 5 years?; Q5 — Do you plan to buy real estate within the 
next 5 years?)11.
Table 5. Correlation matrix (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Notes: a Somers’ d for Q3/Q4
* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01
The very weak but still statistically significant positive correlation between 
Q1 and Q2 suggests that, as expected, some of those supporting the 
equity principle still believe it can be achieved through the introduction 
of the real estate tax. The slightly stronger negative correlation between 
Q1 and Q3 is very important, and indicates that the strongest opponents 
of the introduction of the real estate tax are those who remain sceptical 
about the government’s promise to abolish existing real estate taxes or 
those who are not even aware of that promise. The median of Q1 (3, 
Table 4) together with this negative correlation offer potential for (mild) 
acceptance of the introduction of the real estate tax given sharing of ap-
propriate information among the general public, followed by a strong and 
reliable assurance that the existing taxes/charges are to be abolished. 
Furthermore, even if both were accomplished, scepticism remains that a 
new tax might (somehow) bring an additional burden.
The remaining correlations are logical. Those planning to sell real estate 
(Q4) do so, among other reasons, because of financial problems and it 
is logical that they are more inclined to income redistribution (Q2). Natu-
rally, since other factors influence this relationship the correlation is very 
weak. The positive correlation between Q4 and Q5 is easy to explain, 
while those highly engaged in selling real estate (Q4) are also highly 
engaged in buying it (Q5) owing to resale. More interesting for our analy-
sis are the correlations of Q3 with Q4 and Q5, respectively, with the first 
being positive and the second being negative, as expected. Those who 
do not believe the existing real estate charge (and tax) will be abolished 
and even fear they will increase, combining with the new real estate tax 
to increase the combined tax burden, much more strongly favour divest-
ing from real estate.
Ultimately, the binomial probit regression model for real estate introduc-
tion (Q1) was developed (Table 6), using Q2 and Q3 as well as one de-
mographic variable (D1)—work status (employment)—as regressors12. 
For Q1 and Q2, the neutral answer (3) is omitted and the remaining 
answers are classified as either “Yes” (4, 5) or “No” (1, 2), where “No” 
is a reference value (RF). Q3 is divided into a group that believes the 
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previous charges/taxes will be abolished (reference value) and the re-
maining group that does not believe that (expecting a decrease, mainte-
nance of the status quo, or increase). For the demographic variable (D1), 
work status is grouped as follows: permanent employment (reference 
value), fixed-term contract workers, unemployed, pensioners, students 
and housewives.
Table 6 Binomial probit regression model for real estate tax introduction (Q1)
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Notes: * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01
Q2: RF=tax system should not contribute to the redistribution of income
Q3: RF= Communal charge and tax on holiday houses will be abolished
D1 – Work status: RF= Premanent employment
As indicated by both correlation results and regression results (and in 
accordance with the hypotheses/expectations), acceptance of the intro-
duction of a real estate tax is positively influenced by positive attitude 
towards income redistribution and negatively influenced by scepticism 
about the abolition of communal charges and the abolition of the tax 
on holiday houses. Furthermore, the only important demographic char-
acteristic is work status. Thus not only does current income matter, but 
expected income matters even more. As expected, people that lack per-
manent employment are generally reluctant to accept the introduction 
of new real estate taxes. The only exception is student population that 
obviously expects (relatively) higher incomes in the near future. Howev-
er, only unemployed people displayed statistical significance, which once 
again matches expectations.
5. Conclusion
Instead of a classical local tax on real estate as a main source of local 
government revenue, Croatia burdens real estate with local user charges 
(communal charges) and a tax on holiday houses, while simultaneous-
ly making extensive use of personal income tax surcharges as a main 
source of local tax revenues. A detailed proposal to introduce a local real 
estate tax was made in 2012, and included the removal of communal 
charges and the tax on holiday houses, as well as the future removal 
of the personal income tax surtax. However, the tax had not been intro-
duced as of the end of 2014 and will not be introduced until further notice.
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As expected, support for the introduction of the real estate tax in Croa-
tia is stronger among experts than the general public. However, strong 
support is lacking even among experts, especially among faculty of eco-
nomics’ members from departments of finance and accounting. Support 
among experts for this tax and for the shift from income to property tax-
ation is, regardless of their profession, negatively influenced by support 
for lower taxation (including both the official tax burden and the “hidden” 
tax burden in the form of tax compliance costs) and positively influenced 
by attitudes in favour of tax equity and of property being an indicator 
of adequate ability to pay, as well as the necessity of capital (income) 
taxation.
Interestingly, despite legislators explicitly announcing the removal of the 
existing real estate user charge (communal charge) as well as the tax 
on holiday houses (and in the future the local surtax) even some experts 
claim the communal charge should remain local revenue, and moreover 
this should apply especially to the tax on holiday houses and the local 
personal income surtax. Thus there is no doubt that the general public 
does not believe these taxes/charges will be withdrawn as a result of the 
introduction of the real estate tax, and fears an ultimate increase in the 
real estate tax burden. This fear is one reason for the rejection of this tax 
by some taxpayers, leading to the establishment of a statistically signif-
icant and moderately negative correlation. The public opinion binomial 
probit regression model of the introduction of the real estate tax confirms 
this negative relationship as well as the positive relationship with attitude 
to income redistribution and relevance of work status.
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Appendix
Table A1. Internal consistency reliability and convergent validity
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Table A2. Fornell-Larcker criterion
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Note: Bold numbers are square root of AVE
Table A3. Combined loadings and cross-loadings
Source: Authors, based on survey responses
Note: Bold numbers are outer loadings
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Notes
1. It is traditionally considered as efficient and the “second best” solu-
tion of taxing the “missing part” of income - imputed rent on own-
er-occupied housing (EC, 2012: 16; Norregaard, 2013: 16; Oates, 
1999…), which is in accordance with the logic of the comprehensive 
income concept, and thereby also reduces the efficiency loss gen-
erated by other parts of the tax system related to owner-occupied 
housing (non-taxation of imputed interest and capital gains and pos-
sible deduction of mortgage interest). However, this could discour-
age the use of capital in a housing market
2. Although area-based assessments/charges as the existing alterna-
tive to real estate tax have lower administrative costs, “local gov-
ernments are not likely to move to a higher intensity of property tax 
use with this approach” (Bahl and Martinez-Vasquez, 2007: 15). Ar-
ea-based assessments may avoid problems of instability, but they 
“rarely raise significant revenue, for arbitrary levies are politically 
acceptable only when they remain at nominal levels” (Malme and 
Youngman, 2004:2). 
3. Besides classical understanding of equity as progressivity (in rela-
tion to income), there is a question of appropriateness of using prop-
erty, as an additional indicator of the ability to pay principle. The com-
prehensive personal net-wealth tax is a much better solution. Real 
estate tax is the “second best” solution, but the fact that introduction 
of net-wealth tax is almost impossible for (post)transition and devel-
oping countries (and still very complicated for developed countries), 
makes it much more attractive.
4. It was first delayed until 2015, and then until 2016. The current ruling 
coalition does not want to announce its introduction in the election 
year; however the renewed EC recommendation in favor of the tax 
could probably change this.
5. It should be noted that the huge resistance to this tax may be moti-
vated by secondary objectives. Croatia is affected by a distortion of 
relative prices of real estate. Moreover, prices are adjusting either 
too slowly or not at all to existing market conditions (Posedel and 
Vízek 2011). The proposed real estate tax could impact the adjust-
ment speed and decrease real estate prices, which is not in the in-
terest of property owners.
6. Property taxes by themselves will always decrease the value of the 
taxed property, but if the local public expenditures create more ben-
efits for property owners than the cost of taxation, the net effect of 
a tax and expenditure increase would be an increase in the value 
of the taxed property. Evidence on this subject usually suggests a 
decline in the value of a property (Carroll and Yinger, 1994).
7. It was based mostly on NTA survey, whose results were presented 
in Lim et al. (2013).
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8. 1 – completely/strongly disagree, 2 – mostly disagree, 3 – neither 
agree nor disagree, 4 – mostly agree, 5 – completely/strongly agree 
9. For the communal charge: median 4 and mode 5; for the tax on 
holiday houses: median 4,5 and mode 5; and for the surtax: median 
5 and mode 5
10. Complete list of expert opinion survey questions/statements is pre-
sented in Šimović et al., 2014 (Appendix).
11. These questions had to be answered with simple answer of “No”, 
“Unsure” or “Yes”. The “Unsure” answer is also included in the cor-
relation analysis, except for Q3/Q4 when only the exception of this 
answer led to a significant correlation.
12. It is interesting that other demographic variables such as education, 
income, residence ownership, region and sex, despite expressing 
statistical significance in the tests of their different individual rela-
tionships with Q1, are not significant in the regression model.
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ABSTRACT
Financial sector was the trigger of the recent crisis due to harmful effects of ex-
cessive risk-taking. At the same time, its high profitability, low taxation and state 
support resulted in high moral hazard of financial institutions and different nati-
onal approaches for financial sector taxation. Therefore, nine European Union 
countries have agreed to adopt a unified FTT along with enhanced cooperation 
which should come into force during 2018. The mMain benefits of implementation 
of FTT is to generate significant fiscal revenues, to properly share the cost of the 
crisis with the financial sector, and to reduce the possibility of a new crisis. Adver-
se effects primary include the declining effectiveness of pricing mechanism. FTT 
is a policy tool that can raise a substantial amount of revenue and reduce the size 
of financial trading in relation to the economy’s level of productive activity. The 
aim of this paper is to investigate the possibilities of introduction of FTT in the Eu-
ropean Union, with special reference to the question of the potential application 
in the Republic of Croatia. Preliminary analysis suggests the conclusion that the 
economic and fiscal effects of the introduction of FTT in Croatia could not justify 
the cost of its implementation. Due to the underdeveloped, illiquid and highly 
concentrated capital market, introduction of the new tax burden might discourage 
potential investors. Furthermore, tax base for the Croatian capital market is very 
narrow, because there is no trading in derivatives, which in the initial proposal 
made up the largest part of the tax base in securities trading.
Key words: financial transaction tax, public revenues, financial crises, Croatia
1. Introduction
Taxation of the financial sector is a current issue with regard to current 
negative economic and financial trends in the world, but also consider-
ing the fiscal significance of this repercussion on financial and economic 
developments. The financial market collapse of 2007 has pointed out the 
shortcomings in the regulatory and supervisory framework of the financial 
system and the tendency of financial institutions to speculative behaviour 
and excessive risk taking. The public interest was particularly focused on 
reforming the financial sector to ensure fair contribution to public finances 
and to provide fair and long-term growth. Therefore, in addition to im-
provement of supervisory and regulatory structures and new legislation 
aiming to strengthen the European Monetary Union, the European Com-
mission (EC) and some Member States have prompted the question of 
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introduction of the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT). tax on financial trans-
actions implies an indirect form of tax payable when undertaking defined 
forms of financial transactions (purchase and / or sale of securities). FTT 
is an expression of the EU’s overall efforts to address some of the causes 
and effects of financial crises, but also an attempt to make the financial 
sector pay its fair share for its role in the outbreak of the financial crises.
After continuous postponement of its implementation, some EU states 
have maintained their existing taxes while others, including France and 
Italy, independently introduced new ones (in 2012 and 2013 respective-
ly). The first formal initiative for the unification of levying the financial tran-
saction came with the EC proposal in September 2011. Due to the lack 
of unanimous Member States’ support for this initiative, eleven Europe-
an Union countries (EU) have agreed to establish the common financial 
transaction tax (FTT) under the procedure of enhanced cooperation.85 
Discussions on this proposal are still ongoing in the Council. In parallel, 
the proposal to use some of its proceeds as an own resource to the EU 
budget has been abandoned. Presently, FTT legislation has been tabled 
by the EC and 9 EU countries have agreed to enact an FTT during 2018, 
namely Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Fin-
land, and Spain86. However, taking into account the previous changes in 
the agenda, implementation delays are likely. However, there is a lack of 
quantitative analysis of potential positive and negative consequences of 
the introduction of unified European FTT, and it is possible to perceive 
the need to for a comprehensive assessment of  various impacts of the 
FTT on wider economy (including tax revenues).
This paper analyses the possibilities of implementation of FTT in the EU, 
with special reference to the question of the potential application in the 
Republic of Croatia. It will assess the impact and effects of a hypothetical 
implementation of FTT in Croatia, which include revenue estimates and 
the impact on the domestic capital market performance. Although the 
Croatian Ministry of Finance announced in 2016 that it did not plan to 
participate in the implementation of EU FTTs, we hope that this paper will 
contribute to the interest of the scientific community for participation in 
researching new opportunities that would contribute to financial stability 
and crisis prevention. The main hypothesis is that, given the underde-
veloped and illiquid Croatian capital market and the inability to generate 
85 The EC initially proposed FTT to be implemented by all 27 Member States. However, 
following intense discussions in the Council, it was found that unanimity would not be 
reached on this proposal in the foreseeable future. Enhanced cooperation is when a group 
of at least 9 Member States decide to move ahead with an initiative proposed by the Com-
mission, once it proves impossible to reach unified agreement on it within a reasonable pe-
riod. It is only relevant to policy areas which require unanimity, and it aims to overcome the 
situation whereby certain Member States are prevented from advanlly withdrew in March 
2016, and Belgium’s ongoing participation is doubtful.
86 Slovenia finally rejected the introduction of FTT in 2016 because the current proposal 
involves a too narrow  tax base. Current projections show   that Slovenian state budget 
would only receive EUR 3 mil of increased tax revenues, but the cost of tax collection would 
amount to EUR .. Also, Estonia formally withdrew in March 2016, and Belgium’s ongoing 
participation is doubtful.
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substantial tax revenues, it is not opportune to introduce FTT into the 
Croatian tax system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The introductory 
remarks provide an insight into the subject and the research problem, 
followed by the design issues of the proposed European FTTs. The next 
section reviews the estimated effects of FTTs on revenues and economic 
efficiency in the EU. Prior to the conclusion, the authors conducted a pre-
liminary analysis of the effects on the growth of tax revenues as well as 
the level of Croatian GDP. The impact of FTTs has also been perceived 
in terms of the financial system, especially for the domestic capital mar-
ket. The last section offers conclusion.
2. Literature review
In general, financial transaction tax represents a turnover tax which cov-
ers transactions with different types of financial instruments. The well-
known pioneers of introducing the FTT on securities markets are Keynes 
(1936) and Tobin (1978). The idea was first endorsed by J. M. Keynes 
in the work “General theory of employment, interest and money”. He ar-
gued that speculation based on psychology drives market prices render-
ing them unable to allocate capital efficiently. Under his strong influence, 
J. Tobin originally proposed the idea of FTT on foreign exchange mar-
kets. His idea was to impose a specific tax model on financial markets 
that would “throw some sand in the wheels of speculation”. The aim was 
to penalise speculators engaged in short-term trading and hence reduce 
instability in stock markets. Tobin’s tax would be charged on all spot cur-
rency conversions that would alleviate the consequences of short-term, 
speculative activities on foreign exchange markets.
A significant theoretical contribution to the consideration of fiscal burden 
on short-term financial transactions was also provided by Stiglitz (1989) 
and Summers and Summers (1989). Their work suggest that introdu-
ction of new tax form would curb speculation trading. Westerhoff and 
Dieci (2006) and Bechetti etal. (2013) argue that FTT should strengthen 
the stability of financial markets by downscaling the noise trading and 
herding effects. A general FTT with a low and uniform tax rate will most 
probably reduce excessive liquidity in financial markets and, hence, mit-
igate the instability of asset prices (Schulmeister, 2010).
Contrary to these findings, some authors argue that a reduction in trans-
action costs is associated with a decline in stock return volatility (Umlauf, 
1993; Jones and Seguin, 1997; Aliber et. al., 2003). In the light of dis-
advantages of FTT, literature points to lower market liquidity and higher 
capital acquisition costs. Matheson (2011) argues that it could lead to a 
reduction in trading for all categories  which would result in higher mar-
ket volatility. The impact of FTTs on trading volume and market liquidity 
suggests that a narrowly based transaction tax would provide a strong 
incentive for traders to migrate to foreign markets and, furthermore, a 
reduction in trading volume would widen the bid-ask spread while de-
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creasing market liquidity (Wang and Yau, 2012). The most fundamental 
assumptions of critics suggest that market efficiency would be reduced 
by introducing a new tax burden. Additionally, it would increase the cap-
ital cost depressing investment and, consequently, hindering economic 
growth. Findings for volatility change suggest either mixed or absent ef-
fect of FTT, while impact on returns is relatively straightforward and neg-
ative.87 In the case of emerging countries, Baltagi (2006) proved that in-
troduction of FTT  will raise transaction costs as well as market volatility. 
However, most of the mentioned deficiencies can be counteracted by 
adequate design and implementation of the FTT. By combining FTT with 
existing tax burdens on capital gains or other forms of capital income, it 
is possible to significantly reduce the share of speculative trading. Thus, 
the key decision when designing a tax model is to determine the ade-
quate tax rate. It must be set at a sufficiently low level to have no impact 
on the market distortion while at the same time ensuring sufficient reve-
nue in state budgets.
The importance of the issue is particularly emphasised by the fact that in 
the last two decades the share of speculative trading has significantly in-
creased. The growing trend of these processes is particularly enhanced 
by the development of information technology and the introduction of 
high-frequency trading. The global economic and financial crisis has 
again prompted a debate among economists, governments, organiza-
tions and the public about the most adequate fiscal burden for the fi-
nancial sector. Different national solutions underlined the need for fiscal 
consolidation within a single European market.
3. Key features of the unified European FTT 
The European Commission (EC) put forward a proposal for a financial 
transaction tax (FTT) on 14 February 2013 inter alia to (London Econom-
ics 20131): 
 - avoid distortions of competition between financial instruments, ac-
tors and market places; 
 - ensure the proper functioning of the internal market for transac-
tions in financial instruments.
The original proposal for FTT took a “triple A” approach, i.e., the tax sho-
uld apply to all markets (such as regulated markets or over-the-counter 
transactions), all instruments (shares, bonds, derivatives, etc.), and all fi-
nancial sector actors (banks, shadow banks, asset managers, etc.). The 
base of the tax is very wide, covering transactions carried out by financial 
institutions on all financial instruments and markets when at least one 
party to the transaction is located in the EU. Nevertheless, according to 
the last proposal from February 2013 (EC, 2013), FTT would apply to 
87 Comprehensive empirical literature review was given by Šramko (2015) . 
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the purchase of equity or derivatives for exchange-based transactions, 
but also to over-the-counter transactions. Tax rates are set very low, for 
basic financial instruments at 0.1% of the value of buying and selling 
transaction (except the primary market for shares and bonds), whereas 
the tax rates of 0.01% of nominal contract value are defined for derivative 
products (Olgić Draženović et al. 2016: 1067).
The tax combines a residence principle with an issuance principle, ac-
cording to which any transaction involving a buyer or seller resident in 
the FTT-zone would be liable. Hence, all transactions by financial insti-
tutions based in the EU as well as by those based outside the EU are 
to be taxed as long as the transaction takes place in the FTT region. 
Taxing gross transactions on secondary financial markets at relatively 
low rates would prevent disruptions, ensure system stability and gener-
ate substantial public revenues. Furthermore, the proposal of the single 
European FTT leaves out of its scope traditional bank lending, deposit 
taking, currency trading, investment banking activities and the transacti-
ons carried out by the central banks of participating nations and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank, with the European Financial Stability Facility and 
the European Stability Mechanism, and transactions with the EU institu-
tions. FTT is aimed at financial transactions made by financial institutions 
on their own behalf or on behalf of their clients. Financial institutions are 
all entities that make more than 50% of their annual turnover through 
financial transactions, namely: investment companies, regulated mar-
kets, credit institutions, insurance and reinsurance companies, collective 
investment companies, financial leasing companies, with the exception 
of transactions carried out by central securities depositories and central 
banks. This implies that the scope of FTT is primarily limited to financial 
industry, while it excludes the impact on daily citizens’ and small and 
medium enterprises’ transactions.
This initiative was also considered the first tangible step toward taxing 
such transactions at the global level. It contributed to the international 
debate on financial sector taxation in general and to the development 
of a FTT at the global level specifically. FTT can be viewed as a supple-
menting regulatory tool for limiting undesirable market behaviour and pre-
venting future instabilites. FTT will help create economic disincentives for 
speculative transactions as means to stabilise capital markets and reduce 
the frequency of crises. Also, there is an issue significant importance of 
FTT in the political sense and as a matter of economic justice. 
4. Analysis of the revenue potential for European FTT 
Taxing gross transactions on secondary financial markets at relatively 
low rates in general would prevent crises in the future and ensure safer 
and more stable financial markets. Besides reducing speculative behav-
iour of market participants and decreasing risk by disincentive to high 
262
frequency trading88, FTT should reduce the fragmentation of internal 
market and direct the financial sector towards long-term activities rather 
than being focused on the fees from short-term investments89. It will also 
make the finance fit for the purpose of long-term financing of small and 
medium-sized enterprises instead of being focused on the fees they get 
from short-term investments (Griffith-Jones and Persaud, 2015). 
However, one of the main arguments for the introduction of the unifed 
European FTT is revenue raising which could be used for the achieve-
ment of policy goals, particularly at the supranational level. Matheson 
(2011) argues that collecting levies on exchange-based transactions in 
general would be easy and inexpensive to administer. Additionally, FTTs 
are meant to discourage financial transactions that do not enhance effi-
ciency of the financial market and, consequently, to curb excess volatility 
observed in financial markets (Šranko, 2015). Davilla (2014) has paid 
attention to welfare implications of taxing financial transaction. The reve-
nues that could be raised are in fact quite significant, despite deceptively 
low tax rates.
The European Commission considers various scenarios differing in the 
rate of relocation and evasion, the elasticity, and the tax rate. For shares 
and bonds, the turnover reduction is set at 10% or 15%, for derivatives 
trading at 70% to 90% depending on the scenario considered. Estima-
tion of the macroeconomic effects of introduction of FTT using Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium Model is done by Lendvai (2010). The 
initial version of the European Commission model calculated a long-run 
loss of GDP of -0.53% from the FTT. In the updated model by the same 
authors of the study (Lendvai et al., 2013) a far lower estimate of the 
negative effect on growth was given, equal to only -0.2%.  New estima-
tions consider that  only 15% investments by credit institutions in the EU 
are funded via the stock market (10%) or by debt securities (5%), while 
the rest of the external funding of European companies is done by bank 
loans and retained profits. Research findings point to lowering financial 
market volatility. Also, FTT would cause significantlreduction in high fre-
quency trading, which represents 40% of EU financial transactions. This 
would imply a significant breakthrough for financial stability and growth 
without any costs to the real economy. Furthermore, primary markets 
would be excluded, as wouldfinancial transactions that do not involve 
financial institutions. If we take into account these additional effects, the 
net impact on long-term GDP would be only -0.1%.
88 There is a remarkable discrepancy between the levels of financial transactions and the 
levels of the “underlying” transactions in the “real world”. Trading in derivatives markets has 
expanded much more than trading in spot markets. Consequentky, derivatives  trading in 
Europe was already in 2006 84 times higher than nominal GDP, whereas spot trading was 
“only” 12 times higher (Schulmeister, 2010: 5).
89 It is estimated that 70% of the profitability of banks comes from short-term clients and 
as a result, they do not invest in their long-term clients  (Griffith-Jones and Persaud, 2015) 
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According to Griffth-Jones and Persaud (2012), the introduction of FTT 
could bring even more benefits to the European financial system, consid-
ering its contribution to reducing the risk of future crises. They estimated 
a positive effect on growth of 0.25% GDP. Table 1 below is an estimate 
of the effect on revenues and turnover, using the elasticity measures of 
the proposal for a 0.1% tax on equity and bond transactions alike. The 
table shows that, at this tax rate, reductions in equity volumes would be 
modest and the taxes raised still significant and the effect on turnover 
would be greater in the bond markets, but because of their size, the tax 
take would still be highly significant.
Countries
Current turnover,  
$ millions
Assumed max. 
loss of turnover 
(3) (4) 
FTT revenues
Equities (1) Bonds (2) Equities Bonds Equities Bonds Equities & Bonds
Argentina 2,567 52,920 8% 33% 2 36 38
Australia 1,013,594 811,188 8% 33% 933 547 1,480
Brazil 859,258 763,560 8% 33% 791 515 1,306
Brazil 1,395,994 1,143,072 8% 33% 1,285 771 2,056




2,010,284 3,847,284 16% 42% 1,691 2,230 3,921
Germany 1,467,487 2,032,884 16% 42% 1,234 1,179 2,413
Hong Kong 1,488,664 75,600  13% 42% 1,302 44 1,346
India 1,059,712 369,684 8% 33% 978 249 1,227
Italy 972,649 1,663,200 16% 33% 818 964 1,782
Japan 3,980,240 8,070,300 16% 42% 3,348 4,679 8,026
South Africa 251,365 91,476 6% 33% 236 62 298
South Korea 1,596,275 690,228 5% 33% 1,520 466 1,986
Spain 1,351,791 1,108,296 16% 42% 1,137 643 1,779
Switzerland 785,234 505,008 11% 42% 696 293 989
Taiwan 894,685 9,072 6% 33% 844 6 850
UK 2,505,677 3,031,560 7% 42% 2,335 1,758 4,092
US 27,540,235 23,566,032 16% 42% 23,163 13,662 36,825




40,517,508 42,747,264 9% 26% 34,303 24,968 59,271
Euro-6 5,802,211 8,651,664 16% 42% 4,062 5,016 9,896
Emerging 12,732,584 3,758,832 7% 33% 11,796 2,537 14,332
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Assumptions Equities Bonds
FTT rate 0.10% 0.10%
Elasticity -0.6 -0.6








Table 1. Revenue matrix – the FTT calculator
Schulmeister’s (2010) findings implied that the main consequence of the 
FTT would be the reduction of excessive liquidity stemming from trans-
actions which are very short-term oriented and that can be destabilising 
at the same time. A small financial transaction tax would dampen the 
fluctuations of exchange rates, stock prices and commodity prices in the 
short run as well as in the long run. At the same time, such a tax would 
yield substantial revenues and this would help governments consolidate 
their fiscal stance. It would affect the (relative) profitability of different 
types of activities within the financial sector. Financing, insurance and 
risk transformation would practically remain unaffected by a FTT where-
as short-term trading would become more costly (derivatives transac-
tions in particular). 
The size of this reduction effect depends on the tax rate, pre-tax transac-
tion costs and the leverage in the case of derivatives instruments. Most 
of these revenues would stem from derivatives trading at EUREX. Tax 
revenues from spot transactions of stocks and bonds would be small 
(less than 0.1% of GDP even at a tax rate of 0.1%).  In Europe, tax 
revenues at a rate of 0.01% are estimated to range between 0.59% and 
0.78% of GDP.90
Effects on the financial system could be wide-ranging and difficult to 
assess. However, some include cascade effects, sectoral shifts, geo-
graphical shifts, the possible impact on the ISE and on selected financial 
markets such as sale and repurchase agreement markets and sovereign 
debt markets. For financial intermediaries, introduction of FTT could lead 
to lower volumes of transactions and less liquid markets. The proposal 
may mean that intermediaries also face costs due to the administrative 
burden of collecting the tax (ESRI, 2012). 
90 For the  estimation of FTT revenues for the world economy as a whole as well as for the 
main regions, see Schulmeister (2010); Table 10: Hypothetical transaction tax receipts in 
the global economy In % of GDP, p. 52.
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5. Analysis and estimation of the introduction  
of FTTs in Croatia
The Croatian financial system is bank-oriented and therefore,develop-
ment of the financial sector is mainly determined by trends in the banking 
sector. By the structure of its financial institutions, it is still underdevelo-
ped and not  diversified enough. Banks are the most important financial 
institutions and bank loans represent the most important source of exteri-
or financing of the economy. The main characteristic of the Croatian bank 
market is high market concentration, foreign ownership of the banks, 
high spread of interest margins, and prevalence of universal banking. 
The banks are statutorily authorised to offer a wide range of financial 
services. The non-deposit sector is relatively small and not diversified 
enough and it mainly consists of financial institutions like pension funds, 
insurance companies, investment funds, and brokerage houses in the 
money and capital market (Prohaska and Olgić Draženović, 2005: 26).
The Croatian capital market can be defined as underdeveloped, narrow 
and of low liquidity. It is characterised by low standards of corporate go-
vernance, inadequate application of accounting standards and concen-
trated ownership structure in the medium-sized and large companies. In 
addition, corporate governance, reporting to the investment public and 
the role of supervisory boards are not developed to the extent that would 
upgrade investors’ confidence in the domestic capital market. The stru-
cture of financial markets is visible in Table 2, presenting the relative re-
levance of different types of financial instruments. It is evident that bank 
loans are prevalent, however, not to the extent in which the banks’ as-
sets dominate the total assets of the financial system. The reason is that 
the banks in their equity portfolios also have large portfolios of shares 
and bonds.
Financing in the 
Republic of Croatia
Amount % of total amount
2002 2009 2015 2002 2009 2015
Bank loans (cons.) 92,292.9.1 252,428.3 253,132.3 71 60 55
Market  
capitalisation
Shares 28,325.6 135,368.2 128,137.1 22 32 28
Bonds 8,996.4 36,255.8 78,993.8 7 9 17
Structured 
products - - 1,724.2 - -
Total 129,614.9 424,052.3 460,263.2 100 100 100
Table 2:  Financial Market Structure (mil. HRK)
Although the Croatian stock market has existed for more than twen-
ty years and developed solid infrastructure as well as a modern legal 
framework, very low liquidity still places it in the emerging market catego-
ry. By 2007, Croatian companies, financial institutions and government 
were increasingly financed by issuing securities which resulted in the 
improvement of institutional investors’ development and strong growth 
of domestic capital market. However, almost a decade later, one can tell 
that activities in the domestic capital market are significantly reduced 
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and, in addition, traditional bank financing becomes even more signifi-
cant. Although the pension system reform created a great demand for 
shares and debt securities, the ongoing problem is lack of high-quality 
financial instruments and their low liquidity. 
Croatian institutional investors do not invest significant funds in non-do-
mestic capital markets. Most investments are structured extremely con-
servatively and focus on long-term government bonds and, to a lesser 
extent, in domestic equities. For all these reasons, the introduction of 
FTT in Croatian regulatory framework would not be opportune, because 
the realised costs would exceed the benefits from the introduction of a 
new tax burden. Furthermore, taking into account the stability of financial 
institutions, along with the regulatory measures of the Croatian National 
Bank, state interventions in the financial sector have not been necessary 
after the emergence of financial crises. 
According to Griffith-Jones and Persaud, FTTs’ revenue matrix, total rev-
enues for Croatia as an emerging country would be USD 0,507 mil.. 
Given the fact that in the Croatian capital market trading the use of de-
rivatives has not yet been widespread and that speculative trading is of 
minor importance, the main reason (raising revenues) for the introduc-
tion of FTT is unacceptable for  the Croatian capital market. Preliminary 
analysis of the possibilities of FTT in Croatia, according to this proposal, 
leads to the conclusion that Croatian capital market is not developed 
enough to generate substantial tax revenues. This simplified approxima-
tion of FTT revenues does not take into account the possible impacts on 
liquidity, cost of capital and market efficiency, by which results would be 
much worse.
Countries
Current turnover,  
$ millions
Assumed max. tur-
nover loss (3) (4) FTT revenues
Equities (1) Bonds (2) Equities Bonds Equities Bonds Equities & bonds
Croatia 446 99 7% 33% 0.415 0.092 0.507
Table 3: Revenue matrix – the FTT calculator for Croatian capital market
It can thus be concludedthat relatively small amounts of tax revenue wo-
uld be generated by taxing transactions in the Croatian capital market. 
. Additionally, the taxation of turnover in securities on the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange would be insufficiently effective, especially with taking into ac-
count the essential administrative costs involved in the collection of the 
tax. This form of taxationwould thus be insufficiently productive. On the 
other hand, non-taxation of financial transactions in Croatia would im-
pose a fiscal burden for domestic financial institutions when transactions 
take place in the Member States of the FTT jurisdiction or when trading 
in financial instruments is issued in these countries. Such a provision 




In the light of the financial market collapse of 2007, policy makers are 
looking for ways to tackle the systemic risk in the global financial system 
in order to achieve financial stability. This has caused frequent calls for 
unified taxation of financial transactions in the European Union. The 
main premise for the planned introduction of FTT recommended by the 
European Commission is that the financial sector has benefited most 
from the globalisation and liberalisation, but is still one of the most un-
dertaxed industries. At the same time, it has been excessively publicly 
subsidised in the recent crises. European FTT should be levied at mini-
mum tax rates and harmonised with different existing taxes on financial 
transactions. An undeniable advantage of introducing the FTT is in limit-
ing speculative and high-frequency trading and disruptions, which should 
lead to the improvement of system stability. Moreover, it will ensure and 
generate substantial public revenues. It would thus raise the transaction 
costs and to certain extent discourage investment and increase asset 
price volatility. However, there is no consensus about macro-economic 
well-being considering GDP growth and tax revenues. The latest amend-
ments of the personal income tax in the Republic of Croatia have further 
extended the tax base for capital gains, which regulates the taxation of 
dividends, interests and capital taxation. 
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INCOME, PERSONAL INCOME TAX AND TRANSITION: 
THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA91
ABSTRACT
Every personal income tax reform in all countries – developed or transitional – is 
analysed through the ‘sacred trinity of tax specialists’ (Cnossen and Bird, 1990), 
namely efficiency, equity and simplicity/compliance. In this paper, we will briefly 
focus on efficiency and equity trade-off, in developed countries first, and then 
in selected transition countries. From the comprehensive analysis conducted in 
developed countries, we can clearly see that efficiency principle has been given 
priority over equity principle in terms of PIT in the past thirty years. A similar pat-
tern is visible in most analysed transition countries. Based upon the experiences 
of the developed and transition countries, we can make some suggestions re-
garding personal income tax in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H).  
Key words: income distribution, flat tax, progressive tax, transition 
1. Introduction
Developed and transition countries can organise their personal income 
tax (PIT) system in various forms. In theory, discussions regarding in-
come versus consumption as a tax base started more than three centu-
ries ago. Hence, PIT reforms are always in the focus of academic discus-
sions. Nowadays, these discussions evolve around progressive versus 
single or ‘flat tax’, bearing in mind the differences from theoretical to 
empirical models. Since as early as 1994, when Estonia introduced the 
so-called ‘flat tax’, this topic has been in the focus of academic disputes. 
In order to identify the basis for any discussion, it is important to firstly 
define what income is, since definition of income sets sound theoretical 
grounds for the introduction of personal income tax. Furthermore, one of 
the major issues that still remain open is the ever-so popular application 
of the ‘flat tax’ in (ex) transition countries. This issue will be analysed in 
91 This is a reprint of a conference paper published in: Ott, K: Blažić, H. and Šimović H. 
(eds), 2014, Tax reforms: Experiences and Perspectives, Conference Proceedings, Insti-
tute of Public Finance, Zagreb, Croatia, p.157-178, http://www.ijf.hr/upload/files/file/knjige/
tax_reform_proceedings.pdf, which is also synthesis from doctoral dissertation „Income, 
personal income tax and transition: the special case of Bosnia and Herzegovina“ published 
by BERG-Verlag Bamberg
This work has been supported by the Croatian Science Foundation under the project num-
ber IP-2013-11-8174.
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detail following the practice of (ex) transition countries that have joined 
the European Union (EU) in comparison with the case of B&H. Hence, 
the motivation of this paper is to show that ‘flat tax’ is currently an ade-
quate model of personal income taxation in B&H bearing in mind the time 
of transition. In order to prove such a statement, theoretical and empirical 
comparative analysis will be used.
2. Definition of income and personal income tax 
Since the first introduction of personal income tax, definition of the tax 
base i.e. income is of crucial importance. Income can be defined in a 
number of ways, from a narrower to a broader definition (Blazic, 2006). 
The most important aspect of income is the regularity of income flow. 
Other aspects include treatment of income from saving as well as (pos-
sible) return on saving. The most comprehensive definition of income 
relates to the definition given by Schanz-Haig-Simons (SHS). According 
to SHS, definition of income is” market value of consumption plus any 
changes in net wealth measured on accrual basis” (OECD, 2006: 48-
49). This definition accords best with economic ability to pay (Goode, 
1964) and the formation of income so that taxation should be levied ac-
cording to an individual’s ability to pay (in relation to the benefit princi-
ple). If individuals earn the same amount of income, they should pay the 
same amount in taxes. Moreover, individuals with higher income should 
be charged higher taxes. These two principles are called the principles 
of horizontal and vertical equity respectively. However, every personal 
tax system includes personal characteristics of the taxpayer. The equa-
tion (1) shows the basis for SHS calculation of income. Y is income, C 
consumption and iW∆ is changes in net wealth on accrual basis, at the 
beginning of period i, interest r is predictable and Ei are all receipts from 
income, transfers, wages, etc. (Blažić, 2006: 18). The left side of the 
equation shows SHS income (from the consumption side), while the right 
side shows the practical basis of its calculation.
iiii rWEWC +=∆+ . (1)
Apart from SHS definition of income, in theory (and scarcely in prac-
tice), consumption can also be a tax base. In the theory of fiscal doctrine 
distinguished classical/liberal theorists considered that consumption is 
appropriate as a tax base (e.g. Hobbes, 1651, Ricardo, 1817, J. S. Mill, 
1865, Marshall, 1927, Pigou, 1928, in Musgrave, 1998). (Mill, 1865) 
actually developed the modern basis for consumption-based doctrine 
(Musgrave, 1998: 23). He favoured consumption over income taxation 
and considered that saving should not be taxed twice. I. Fisher consid-
ered that the tax base should be the difference between income and sav-
ing. In his definition of consumption/expenditure tax, N. Kaldor consid-
ered that people should be taxed on what they take out of the common 
pool, not on what they put into it. He argued that consumption is a bet-
ter measure of ability to pay than income. Pechman (1980, 1984) most 
recently considered a case of consumption-based income tax. A major 
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disadvantage of income as a tax base in relation to consumption is the 
aforementioned problem of (economic) double taxation of saving. Under 
SHS definition, income includes both consumption and saving which are 
then taxed. Therefore, SHS definition of income taxes all income, i.e. 
regardless of its source, which means that income coming as a return on 
saving is also taxed. This problem could be solved by either deducting 
saving from the tax base prior to taxation or by excluding the return on 
saving from the tax base (since income was previously taxed). The prob-
lem of regarding double taxation of saving has been identified very early 
(Pigou, 1928 in Musgrave, 1998). However, consumption tax has a major 
disadvantage: it is impractical to apply, which was theoretically rightfully 
assumed by Mill, Marshall, Pigou. In addition, consumption tax was em-
pirically scarcely applied (India and Sri Lanka in the 1960’s and 1970’s). 
Consumption as a tax base can be described using previous formulae as 
synthetic income deducted by individual’s saving92 (Blažić, 2006, p. 34):
  (2)
Alternatively, differences between income and consumption tax regard-
ing the treatment of saving could be shown through a budget constraint 
with an income tax.
 (3)
Where t is income tax rate, M income allocated to consumption (after 
saving and borrowing), P is price and X quantity (amount) of goods. If we 






1 , this shows that an income tax at rate t is equivalent to 
consumption tax T at rate t
t
−1 . Again, the real issue regarding PIT and/
or consumption tax is the treatment of income from saving. A standard 
income tax will tax the income from saving (SHS definition) and will not 
be equivalent to consumption tax. However, an income tax that does not 
tax income from saving is equivalent to consumption tax. Moreover, from 
the relationship between income and consumption tax, if income tax rate 
t increases linearly, consumption tax rate T will increase hyperbolically. 
This fact is significant in discussing income versus consumption tax rates.
Regarding the definition of PIT, the definition of income already gives 
answers to the type of personal income tax applied. If income from sav-
ing (and return on saving) is taxed, comprehensive taxation is applied – 
SHS definition of income is considered bearing in mind differences from 
the theoretical grounds (i.e. taxation of wealth, inheritance, etc). This is 
especially true for countries which apply comprehensive income tax with 
progressive rates (i.e. PIT with multiple tax brackets) – all EU-5 countries 
and most OECD countries. Some countries (mostly Nordic countries) ap-
92 Capital gains have to be excluded. If imputed income is also excluded, this is called a 
cash-flow tax.
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ply dual income tax (OECD, 2006). If income from saving is not subject to 
tax, consumption type or expenditure tax is applied. Hall-Rabushka’s ‘flat 
tax’ (1985, 2007) is nowadays the most popular representative of this 
type. Moreover, most (ex) USSR or transition countries mostly apply ‘flat 
tax’ which in terms of the number of tax rates implies only one marginal 
tax rate (above a certain threshold). (OECD, 2006) in the explanation of 
personal income taxation in OECD, members used a term ‘semi’ for all 
three types of income tax. This is mainly due to the fact that none of the 
(OECD) countries actually apply the theoretical model fully in practice. 
Hall-Rabushka’s ‘flat tax’ was proposed in the USA (in 1985) as an al-
ternative model of personal and corporate income taxation. The focus of 
‘flat tax’ revolves, inter alia, around the single tax rate with (in practice 
with or without) personal allowance and the fact that saving is untaxed. 
Significant contribution of the ‘flat tax’ model was the abolishment of all 
types of deductions, exclusions and other loopholes present in PIT sys-
tems. Hall and Rabushka also suggested that tax rates on both personal 
and corporate income should be equalised. In this paper we only deal 
with personal income, and not corporate income. Although discussions 
in the USA in the 1980’s led to the conclusion that progressive PIT was 
inefficient, unequal and too complicated at the time, the final decision 
was that progressive comprehensive PIT (federal tax) should be re-
formed rather than replaced by the ‘flat tax’. Hall-Rabushka’s ideas of 
switching from progressive to ‘flat tax’ were done under the assumption 
of revenue-neutrality. Moreover, ‘flat tax’ was not applied in the USA, but 
less than ten years after its proposal transition (mostly ex-USSR) coun-
tries applied it in various forms. Due to significant differences in ‘flat tax’ 
application in transition countries, not only in terms of different tax rates, 
but also in terms of little theoretical aspects being applied in practice, 
(Blazic, 2006) rightfully asks “what was left from the ‘flat tax’ apart from a 
single tax rate??” Empirical data show little similarities between Hall-Ra-
bushka’s ideas of ‘flat tax’ and its practical application. Nowadays, it is 
considered that the number of PIT rates is the only parametre regarding 
PIT reforms. Hence, if only one PIT rate is applied, it is considered as the 
‘flat tax’ in comparison to multiple tax brackets and progressive PIT. ‘Flat 
tax’ in its variety of forms is best summarised by (OECD, 2006, p. 85) in 
Graph 1. The following characteristics of ‘flat tax’ are important:
• Single rate, no basic tax allowance. All (positive) income is taxed 
at a flat rate (flat tax A).
• Single rate, with a basic tax allowance. All (positive) income above 
a basic allowance (BA) is taxed at a flat rate (flat tax B).
• All (positive) payments to employees above a basic allowance are 
taxed at a flat rate (similar to flat tax B). Additionally, the same 
flat tax rate is levied on all business income (incorporated and 
unincorporated business income). The base of the business tax 
is value added, which is calculated on a cash-flow basis, minus 
the payments to employees. This is equivalent to a consumption 
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tax with a basic allowance and is often referred to as the Hall- Ra-
bushka’s flat tax proposal. Consequently, the income from saving 
and investments is not taxed under this flat tax proposal. 
• Single rate, with a non-wastable tax credit (basic income). This 
non-wastable tax credit is of equal value to all individuals, regard-
less of their income levels (thus, it is in practice a negative income 
tax at low-income levels). This is often called the “basic income flat 
tax”, where the basic income (BI) is supposed to replace all social 
security benefits. In addition, a flat tax rate is levied on personal 
income. This is equivalent to the Atkinson (1995) flat tax proposal 
(Flat tax C).
Graph 1. Types of the flat tax model
Source: OECD, 2006: 87
Graph 1 explains several important points. Firstly, flat tax in practice, 
contrary to theoretical suggestions, can be based on income or con-
sumption. Depending on the existence of personal allowance, personal 
income tax can either be progressive or proportional. All transition coun-
tries analysed in this paper apply either type A or type B ‘flat tax’ – and 
it will be considered in such a manner. Moreover, there are other theo-
rists who gave their interpretations of variations of the ‘flat tax’ model. 
(McLure, 1992; Atkinson, 1995; Rose, 1999; Bradford, 2003) gave their 
theoretical and practical suggestions regarding the application of the ‘flat 
tax’. In addition, Hall-Rabushka’s ‘flat tax’ is empirically applied when PIT 
and CIT rates are equalised regardless of other theoretical suggestions.
Every PIT reform, regardless of progressive or a single - ‘flat’ PIT rates 
being applied, is usually analysed through the ‘sacred trinity of tax spe-
cialists’, i.e. efficiency, equity and simplicity/compliance and the ever-
lasting trade-off between efficiency and equity. Feldstein 1995, 2008; 
Ventura, 1999; Saez, 2001; Slemrod and Traxler, 2010 analyse aspects 
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of efficiency and/or efficiency-equity trade-off of personal income tax in 
developed countries using various methods. Efficiency can mean a num-
ber of things. In this paper it will relate to the fact that ‘flat tax’ in com-
parison to progressive PIT reduces deadweight loss induced by PIT and 
that ‘flat tax’ acts as an incentive in terms of labour demand measured 
using labour tax wedge in the selected transition countries. Redistribu-
tive (equity) function of PIT (progressive or ‘flat’) is at least in theory its 
most important function (Musgrave, 1998). However, in this paper we will 
see that both developed and transition countries face great inequalities. 
The causes of such inequalities will be carefully analysed. Compliance/
simplicity usually relates to prevention of tax avoidance/evasion. The sig-
nificance of an adequate and successful tax reform heavily depends on 
satisfaction of the three tax principles. 
Hall-Rabushka’s ‘flat tax’ model provided theoretical explanations re-
garding the satisfaction of the given three principles in practice. The 
major issue in theory and practice is whether ‘flat’ or progressive PIT is 
an adequate system of PIT in terms of satisfaction of the three tax prin-
ciples. Theoretical grounds for ‘flat tax’ vs. progressive income tax were 
given in (Davies and Hoy, 2002) and (Keen et al., 2006). Empirical test-
ing and modelling relies on micro and macro simulation models. Simula-
tion models are explained in detail in (Peichl, 2008). Simulation models 
are usually derived either from annual tax slips (provided by national tax 
administration) or from income household surveys (provided by national 
statistics office). They are tools designed to answer ‘what if’ questions 
about different policy reform options. Simulation modelling mostly based 
upon EUROMOD has been excessively used in most European coun-
tries (including transition countries). For most European countries (e.g. 
the United Kingdom – (Teather, 2005), Germany – (Peichl, 2008), Swit-
zerland – (OECD, 2006), the Netherlands – (Jacobs et al., 2007), France 
– (Cremer et al., 2010)) switching from current progressive PIT to ‘flat 
tax’ would increase efficiency at the expense of increasing inequality, 
especially in those economies where there is a significant presence of 
the ‘middle class’ (e.g. Germany, Nordic countries, Paulus and Peichl, 
2008, p. 14). For transition countries that have joined the EU applying 
both ‘flat’ and progressive PIT, conclusions are diverse (e.g. Estonia with 
‘flat tax’ versus Slovenia with progressive PIT, (Paulus et al., 2009)). For 
the countries in the region, simulation analysis as a policy tool aimed 
at different micro and macroeconomic issues has also been conducted 
(e.g. Čok for Slovenia 2004, Urban for Croatia, 2010, Randjelovic and 
Zarkovic-Rakic, for Serbia, 2011). There are no clear-cut conclusions 
from the simulation modelling in various countries nor do they provide 
clear answers to the success of PIT system of either progressive or ‘flat’ 
tax. The additional answer might be given by looking at other macroeco-
nomic parameters and linking those to decisions regarding ‘flat’ versus 
progressive PIT. Since all transition economies are trying to ‘catch up’ 
with the best practices of the developed countries, but tend to come from 
different circumstances, adequate tax system as a parametre of the en-
tire economy needs special focus. 
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3. Transition versus developed countries
What has been happening to PIT in developed (i.e. OECD/EU) countries 
in the past thirty years will most certainly affect transition countries and 
their emerging PIT systems. Tax base under SHS or consumption base 
is an important parametre in terms of treatment of income from saving. 
However, theory and empirical insights in developed countries tend to fo-
cus on discussion related to single-flat or multiple-progressive PIT rates 
in current income distribution (before and after tax), especially in terms 
of its effects on satisfaction of the three tax principles. Hence, in order to 
evaluate the effects of PIT reforms in the selected transition countries, 
we have to firstly look at the PIT developments in OECD countries in the 
past thirty years (due to data availability).
In most OECD countries, globalisation under neoliberal economic 
thought has seriously affected tax systems of OECD countries meaning 
that developed countries have also gone through the transition process. 
In fact, China’s four modernisations and opening to the outside world in 
1978 is the milestone of the new age which is in developed countries 
marked as the ‘Big Bang’ (Harvey, 2005). New/old (neo)liberal economic 
thought has had significant consequences on tax systems of developed 
countries, namely PIT. If we look at the history of fiscal doctrine, we can 
see that in terms of PIT, ‘Big Bang’ and ideology switch from Keynes-
ianism (interventionism) to neoliberalism has caused the greatest dis-
tortions in terms of satisfaction of the three tax principles. In addition, 
ideas behind the 1980’s ‘flat tax’ could be traced back to liberal/classi-
cal economists and three per cent proportional income tax in times of 
A. Smith (Auerbach and Feldstein, 1985:16). However, since economic 
circumstances change all the time, PIT rates vary from progressive to 
‘flat’ and vice versa. Therefore, we can say that in developed countries 
PIT has gone through a series of ‘ideological adjustments’ from propor-
tional/liberal to progressive/Keynes to current flattened progressive PIT/
neoliberal ideology, i.e. transition. Prior to the 1980’s, Keynesian policy 
of progressive PIT, contrary to Keynes’s initial ideas, caused over-pro-
gressiveness of PIT which in turn led to underreporting, lack of simplic-
ity/compliance in terms of tax codes and, ultimately, tax underreporting/
evasion. The current third phase dominated by the neoliberal econom-
ic thought with globalisation (Harvey, 2005) brought ideas of PIT base 
broadening, reduction of PIT rates and the abolishment of fiscal drag 
and bracket creep – progressive PIT was/is flattened. This means that 
neoliberal economic thought has put the efficiency principle in terms of 
minimising deadweight loss caused by taxation (with the reduction of 
labour tax wedge, OECD, 2013) ahead of equity principle in personal in-
come taxation in developed countries. Reduction in top PIT rates (OECD, 
2014) in the past thirty years from the highest 93 per cent to 60 per cent 
on average (i.e. PIT flattening) has opened possibilities for greater in-
come/capital/wealth accumulation of the wealthiest members of society 
(top 1 per cent). Atkinson et al. (2009) analyse the trends in top incomes 
focusing on the past thirty years in developed countries. In addition, 
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Davies et al. (2011), Matthews (2011), Piketty and Zucman (2013), and 
OECD (2014) indicate significant determinants of capital accretion com-
ing not necessarily from income, but capital and business income. In 
addition to their analysis, globalisation and opening up of the former 
Soviet countries together with China has ‘added value’ and given the 
opportunity to the highest earners (i.e. investors) in developed countries 
to accumulate income/capital/wealth to a greater extent since opening 
up of the new markets has meant that cheaper factors of production 
are now available resulting in higher profits, hence capital accretion. 
Therefore, the reduction of top PIT rates has given the opportunity to 
most top-earners in developed countries to initially accumulate income/
capital/wealth and opening of the new (transition) markets has furthered 
this opportunity for investment and even greater income/capital/wealth 
accumulation. The result of this process was greater inequality. Accord-
ing to OECD (2014, apart from globalisation together with technologi-
cal advances, especially in the IT industry, ‘financialisation’, i.e. financial 
sector developments bringing high-income earners from such a sector 
together was also a reason for greater inequality. However, financial sec-
tor developments are a consequence of the globalisation process led 
by deregulation where capital was given the opportunity to move freely 
between countries around the world. What seems to be very significant 
is that the final factor affecting greater inequality determined by OECD 
(2014 is the aforementioned halving of top progressive PIT rates in the 
past thirty years. This seems to be the principal reason behind income/
capital/wealth accumulation in most of the developed countries (Atkinson 
et al. 2009: 66-68). As a result of such trends, in the past thirty years the 
share of PIT revenues in total revenues in OECD countries has declined 
by significant five per cent. On the other hand, in the same period, the 
share of value added tax (VAT) revenues to total revenues has increased 
by approximately ten per cent (OECD revenue statistics). This clear shift 
from direct to indirect taxes has per se caused greater inequality bearing 
in mind the regressive effects of indirect taxes. Both OECD and the EU 
Commission (OECD, 2010; Garnier et al., 2013) are still supporting fur-
ther PIT tax rate cuts and base broadening as a labour demand incentive 
due to high labour tax wedge in OECD/EU countries. Hence, in the past 
thirty years, there has been a growing inequality in developed (OECD) 
countries. Also, in theory, if we take equation (4) in a switch from income 
to consumption-based taxation, consumption-based tax rates should be 
significantly higher than income-based tax rates bringing more inequality 
into income distribution.
Bearing in mind the previous discussion, what position can transition 
countries take under such circumstances and how can they organise 
their tax system? A transition country in terms of this paper will relate to 
“an European economy which is changing from a centrally planned or a 
socialist economy93 to a free market or market oriented” (Feige, 1994). 
Thus, it is an economy which is moving towards developed (OECD/EU-5) 
93 This term referrs to ex -Yugoslav states.
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countries. A common measure which determines developed versus tran-
sition countries is the UN’s HDI index (HDI index higher than 0.9 deter-
mines developed countries, United Nations Development Programme). 
Transition is a challenging period that most certainly brings economic 
inefficiency, inequality and lack of compliance. Since the beginning of the 
transition process at the end of the 1980’s, many influential authors (for 
example Tanzi,1991; Ebrill and Havrylyshyn, 1999; Keen et al., 2006) 
have been analysing different aspects of tax reforms. For most of these 
countries, ten policies within the Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 2002; 
Williamson, 2004) were milestones for undertaking overall reforms (three 
out of ten related to tax reforms). However, due to different circumstanc-
es under which the transition process emerged in these countries, there 
is no clear-cut answer to whether the transition process is over even 
when a transition country joins the European Union (EU). 
Therefore, the logical question that arises is the appropriateness of the 
PIT (progressive or flat) system within the transition process. In this pa-
per we will try to evaluate to what extent ‘flat tax’ follows a longer tran-
sition process, especially in terms of leading privatisation process. In 
fact, conversion of property from public to private (i.e. privatisation) is the 
basic precondition for a successful transition process. In addition, it is an 
opportunity for a quick income/capital/wealth accumulation, so the data 
from the initial years of the transition process are scarce, insufficient and 
unreliable, mainly due to high evasion. In terms of organising PIT, transi-
tion countries have applied both progressive and ‘flat tax’. We could con-
clude from the aforementioned discussion that developed countries put 
efficiency principle (together with compliance and simplicity) ahead of 
equity principle – due to growing inequality. Transition countries should 
in their path towards developed countries follow suit, efficiency princi-
ple should be put before equity principle. Theoretically, ‘flat tax’ satisfies 
this scenario better than progressive PIT. Empirically, in most transition 
countries, the results are not easily drawn. All data are likely to be highly 
skewed in the first years of transition crisis, mainly due to poor national 
statistics, underreporting and high tax evasion. In the prior analysis in 
developed countries, it has been clearly stated that progressive PIT has 
been ‘flattened’ primarily due to requirements of globalisation. So, why 
should transition countries apply progressive PIT if the transition process 
is: inequitable; i.e. does not bring greater PIT revenues to total revenues 
(Table 2); creates greater labour tax wedge and acts as a disincentive 
to labour demand; and further complicates the PIT system – distorts the 
principle of compliance/simplicity? To answer all these questions, we will 
briefly analyse the aspects of transition and then examine the case of 
Slovakia since it moved from progressive to ‘flat’ tax and again to pro-
gressive PIT in 2013. Bulgaria, on the other hand, is planning to keep 
the ‘flat tax’ for the next ten years (Peichl, 2013). Based upon the expe-
riences of Slovakia and Bulgaria, we will try to draw suggestions for the 
case of B&H.  
Apart from basic macroeconomic parametres such as GDP per capita, 
inflation and unemployment rate (World Economic Outlook, Database 
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April 2014), a commonly used parametre determining the speed and 
success of transition process are EBRD transition indicators (EBRD, 
2013). Together with Life in Transition survey (2006, 2010) as a quali-
tative measure, these indicators can hint the relationship between tran-
sition process led by privatisation and economic growth (e.g. Krkoska 
and Teksoz, 2005). However, these indicators, since they relate to broad 
measures, say little regarding the success or adequacy of tax system re-
forms. In addition, in the first years of the transition process led by priva-
tisation in most transition countries (four to six years), transition countries 
most certainly face a decline in GDP, rise in unemployment and inflation, 
and most significantly a decline in tax revenues and an increase in public 
expenditures (Tanzi, 1991). This final scenario requires comprehensive 
tax reform. As a result of tax reforms that were undertaken in the transi-
tion countries, we can easily conclude that all transition countries heav-
ily rely on indirect taxes rather than direct taxes in total revenues/GDP. 
In addition, transition countries in terms of organising their entire eco-
nomic/tax system are somewhere between developed and developing 
countries. (Tanzi, 1991:179-180) indicated that PIT is “hardly the most 
important element of taxation in developing countries”, but it is a signifi-
cant element of taxation in developed countries. Hence, low, but growing 
share of PIT revenues could also indicate the significance of the transi-
tion process. Additionally, what seems to determine the size of the share 
of PIT revenues to total revenues are, inter alia, the number and size of 
tax rates as well as the overall model (e.g. Anglo-Saxon, Continental, 
Nordic or Mediterranean94) of tax reforms undertaken by a specific tran-
sition country. Following prior discussion regarding the shift from direct 
(PIT) to indirect (VAT) taxes in developed countries with a side-effect of 
higher income inequality, Tables 1 and 2 show the share of VAT and PIT 
revenues to total revenues in the selected transition countries. Although 
authors (e.g. Aiginger and Leoni, 2009) state that transition countries in 
terms of baseline inequality scenario grouped using Esping-Andersen’s 
classification do not fit into any of the three/four groups but rather form 
a group of their own, the countries were selected using the following 
criteria: Estonia as a Baltic State representative applying ‘flat tax’, but 
historically close to Nordic model; Slovakia as a Visegrad representative 
applying ‘flat tax’, but switching towards progressive PIT – historically 
linked to the Continental model; Croatia as a Western Balkans country 
applying progressive PIT – again close to the Continental model with 
some aspects in terms of income stratification similar to the Mediterrane-
an model; Bulgaria was chosen as a country which is planning to keep 
the ‘flat tax’ in the next ten years (Peichl, 2013) close to the Mediterra-
nean model (Aiginger and Leoni, 2009, p. 15). This grouping is only an 
94 This classification is similar to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classification in Paulus and 
Peichl (2008, p. 11) regarding the inequality in the baseline scenario in the Western Euro-
pean countries. It should be noted that Esping-Andersen’s classification into three groups 
based upon de-commodification index is created using public expenditures rather than 
revenues. This classification has been given in order to stratify society and hence identify/
create/maintain the ‘middle class’ in each group.
280
assumption in terms of each transition country searching its ‘role’ model 
among developed (EU-5) countries in the entire fiscal policy (both public 
expenditures and public revenues – hence PIT reforms and its effects on 
pre-tax income inequality).
Country Estonia Slovakia Croatia Bulgaria B&H
1995 26.5 20.8 ... 22.5 ...
2000 27.2 20.4 ... 26.4 ...
2001 27.0 21.9 ... 27.4 ...
2002 27.0 21.2 31.3 25.6 ...
2003 26.5 22.7 31.5 27.8 ...
2004 25.1 24.7 31.0 30.3 ...
2005 28.3 25.1 31.3 32.7 ...
2006 29.6 25.5 31.1 34.9 30.0
2007 28.2 23.0 29.8 31.1 27.4
2008 24.9 23.6 30.7 33.8 28.8
2009 24.8 23.3 28.9 31.1 27.5
2010 25.7 22.6 30.5 33.3 27.1
2011 26.0 23.9 30.7 32.0 27.0
Table 1. Share of VAT revenues to total revenues in selected transition countries, 1995-
2011
Country Estonia Slovakia Croatia Bulgaria FB&Ha RS
1995 23.3 8.9 ... 13.5 ... ...
2000 22.1 9.9 ... 12.7 ... ...
2001 21.5 10.6 ... 11.4 ... ...
2002 20.7 9.9 8.7 11.2 ... ...
2003 21.0 9.8 8.1 10.2 3.9 6.1
2004 20.5 8.5 8.1 9.5 3.8 6.9
2005 18.2 8.4 7.6 8.7 3.8 6.7
2006 18.2 8.6 7.8 8.4 3.8 6.5
2007 18.5 8.7 7.8 9.5 3.9 4.5
2008 19.5 9.4 8.0 9.0 4.5 5.2
2009 16.0 8.4 8.1 10.2 4.3 4.2
2010 15.9 8.2 7.5 10.9 4.1 4.4
2011 16.1 8.8 7.5 10.5 4.4 6.8
Table 2. Share of PIT revenues to total revenues in selected transition countries, 1995-
2011
Source: Taxation trends in the EU, 2013 for Estonia and Slovakia; for Croatia: Croatian 
Ministry of Finance, Consolidated General Government; for B&H: Directorate for Economic 
Planning, Council of Ministers of B&H – Annual Economic Report, Central Bank of B&H, 
Annual Report 2012, Tables 31, 32 and 33, authors’ calculation
Notes: a Data for B&H in Table 2 in 2003-2009 represents the share of wage tax to total 
revenues; afterwards, the share of PIT to total revenues.
From Table 1, we can easily conclude that all selected transition coun-
tries heavily depend on indirect taxes, namely VAT which solely (exclud-
ing customs, excise and other indirect taxes) takes almost a third of all 
tax revenues. Table 2 shows a significantly lower share of PIT revenues 
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in total revenues in all selected transition countries. PIT rates varied from 
‘flat’ 10 per cent in B&H to the highest progressive 45 per cent (in 2003) 
in Croatia (currently 40 per cent the highest). Interestingly, Croatia as the 
only analysed country applying progressive PIT does not collect more 
revenues from PIT (as a share of total revenues) in comparison to oth-
er selected transition countries applying ‘flat tax’ (even significantly less 
than Estonia). B&H with two different PIT laws in each entity shows a 
significant share of PIT revenues in total revenues prior and during ‘flat 
tax’ introduction. A partial reason behind a decline in the share of PIT 
revenues in total revenues in RS in 2007 lies in the fact that in 2007, 
total revenues in RS significantly increased due to an increase in indirect 
tax revenues – VAT was introduced in B&H in 2006. Other reasons were 
annual changes in PIT rates and/or personal allowances in RS (abol-
ishment and reintroduction). Again, from Tables 1 and 2, it is clear that 
all countries suffered a decline in total revenues primarily due to effects 
of the financial crisis in 2008 and have altered VAT since (an increase 
in Slovakia and Croatia) and PIT rates (a decline in Estonia, RS entity). 
Since there is no significant deviation in terms of PIT revenues to total 
revenues in the case of Croatia compared to other selected ‘flat tax’ tran-
sition countries, another question remains: is Croatian progressive PIT a 
better option than the ‘flat tax’ in terms of more equitable redistribution, 
but with an obvious trade-off in terms of simplicity? (Urban, 2010; Čok 
et al., 2012) give answers regarding horizontal and vertical redistribution 
issues in Croatia (and in comparison to Slovenia). Similar to conclusions 
of other transition countries (Paulus and Peichl, 2008), pre-fiscal income 
inequality together with the existence and the size of ‘middle class’ seem 
to be the main reasons behind differences in redistributive effects and 
hence the significance of progressive PIT application. So, what is the 
significance of the transition process in determining income inequality? 
(Paulus, 2004:219) does not find transition process to be a major factor 
affecting pre-tax income inequality (using Gini coefficients) in the select-
ed transition countries (Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia). However, it should have some importance especially in 
Western Balkans countries due to slow and mostly delayed privatisation 
process and traditionally low tax morale. 
Hence, the main reasons accompanied with the transition process in 
Western Balkans countries, primarily B&H, are lack of institutional frame-
work, high tax evasion, lack of fiscal transparency, shadow economy, cor-
ruption, bribery, etc. Moreover, significant changes in income distribution 
occur during the period of transition, especially in terms of increasing gap 
between the poor and the rich (or the first and last income bracket bear-
ing in mind high levels of underreporting). In addition, the size of average 
income in the period 1995-2010 in the selected transition countries is 
very low and usually at approximately 20 per cent of those in EU-5 (UN-
ECE database, in US$, current exchange rate, own calculation). Hence, 
most ‘average incomes’ earned in transition countries would be taxed (in 
some countries, such as B&H, even exempt) in the first income bracket, 
which in turn indicates that these transition countries should apply the 
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first income tax bracket of EU-15 – hence ‘flat tax’. However, this does 
not mean that in the selected transition countries there are no tendencies 
towards creation of top incomes (see below). (Rutkowski, 1996) gives a 
detailed explanation regarding the effects of the first years of the tran-
sition process (1987-1993) in terms of changes in income structure in 
Central and Eastern European countries. He reaches a conclusion that, 
in the initial transition process, there is inevitable loss throughout income 
distribution, i.e. in real decile wages. However, the 9th decile (highly paid 
workers) have been less affected by transition than low-paid workers 
(Rutkowski, 1996: 12-13). Regarding incentives to move towards pro-
gressive PIT and bringing more equality into income distribution in the 
observed period, due to ‘fading’ middle class in the transition process, 
(Rutkowski, 1996: 42-43) concludes for the analysed period that, if econ-
omy under-utilises its human and physical resources, sacrificing equity 
in order to promote efficiency may prove beneficial, especially in terms 
of upgrading skills and increasing productivity. Popular demands for en-
hancing equity (e.g., by introducing progressive PIT) might “imply a lower 
labour supply (through a substitution effect), a lower rate of human cap-
ital accumulation and, therefore, a lower rate of productivity and output 
growth, or may contribute to the rise in unemployment among low-skilled 
workers. In the context of economic transition, however, the economic 
benefits of a wider earnings distribution outweigh its social costs.” (Rut-
kowski, 1996, pp. 42-43)
In the context of economic transition, however, the economic benefit of a 
wider earnings distribution outweighs its social costs” (Rutkowski, 1996: 
42-43). In addition, we need to bear in mind the fact that in most transi-
tion countries, high labour tax wedge mostly taken by high SSC is in fact 
a major obstacle in terms of labour demand (Kovtun et al., 2014). How-
ever, the question that still remains is: have transition countries since 
1993 achieved better redistribution though progressive PIT than those 
applying ‘flat tax’? This is a very difficult question that cannot be explicitly 
answered. 
Brook and Leibfritz (2005) conducted an analysis regarding the success 
of Slovak comprehensive (reforms in PIT, CIT and VAT) and revenue 
neutral tax reform in 2004 when Slovakia, inter alia, switched from pro-
gressive PIT to ‘flat tax’. Slovakia halved its progressive PIT rates by 
introducing 19 per cent ‘flat tax’ and therefore abolished previous six 
income tax brackets. Basic/personal/family allowances increased bene-
fiting primarily those low-income earners. Labour tax wedge for a single 
earner at 67 per cent of average earnings (low-income earner) decreased 
from more than 40 per cent in 2002 (prior to reform) to approximately 35 
per cent in 2010 (OECD, 201395). Although this decrease is significant, 
it is still above OECD and EU-5 average tax wedge for low-wage labour 
95 For data regarding labour tax wedge in OECD/developed countries as well as Estonia 
for the single earner at 67 per cent of average earnings see: OECD, Taxing wages, 2013; 
for Croatian data (using OECD methodology) see: Grdovic-Gnip and Tomic, 2010; for B&H 
case see: Betcherman and Arandarenko (2008), Kreso and Lazovic-Pita (2011).
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(Brook and Leibfritz, 2005). Simplicity increased, not only due to a de-
cline in PIT rates, but also other labour-related laws (Brook and Leibfritz, 
2005). Although efficiency increased, also in terms of workers switching 
from informal to formal sector, equity or fairness meant, similarly to prior 
analysis, that some groups gained and other lost. Introduction of a single 
VAT rate (compared to prior standard and reduced VAT rate) brought 
higher fiscal burden and hence higher inequality. In terms of PIT, high 
basic/personal allowance is a factor through which some degree of pro-
gressivity was achieved (equity). However, the move from progressive 
PIT to ‘flat tax’ most certainly resulted in inequality and income/capital/
wealth accretion. This tendency is visible to some extent in Table 3 which 
shows interdecile ratio of gross earnings in Slovakia. The ratio is increas-
ing over time, which indicates growing inequality in pre-tax income dis-
tribution. 
In the ten years of ‘flat tax’ application, there has been a growth in the 
final income tax bracket which gave basis for income/capital/wealth to 
be accumulated (Graph 2). In 2013, due to primarily political change in 
Slovakia, progressive PIT was introduced for the top 1 per cent earners 
at the rate of 25 per cent. The success of such a measure is too early 
to evaluate. In the case of Bulgaria, which is planning to keep the ‘flat 
tax’ for the next ten years, there are certain differences compared to the 
Slovak case. This primarily relates to overall Bulgarian macroeconomic 
performance and hence low levels of pre-tax income (World Economic 
Outlook database, April 2014, UNECE database). Labour tax wedge for 
a single earner at 67 per cent of average earnings (Bulgarian Statistical 
Office) decreased from 36 per cent in 2002 (prior to reform) to 32 per cent 
in 2010 (after the reform) which in turn should have increased efficiency. 
A peculiarity of Bulgarian ‘flat tax’ is abolishment of basic/personal allow-
ance (flat tax A, Graph 1) which causes greater inequality than ‘flat tax’ 
with personal allowance (e.g. Estonian case since 1994, Slovak case 
2003- 2013 – flat tax B, Graph 1). In addition, Bulgarian case also shows 
an increase in interdecile ratio (Table 3). In fact, comparison of the Bul-
garian ninth decile of gross and net monthly earnings is also increasing 
indicating income/capital/wealth accumulation (Structure of Earnings in 
Bulgaria, 2006, 2010). Furthermore, Graph 3, similar to Slovakian case, 
shows an increase in the upper end of gross income distribution.
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Graph 2: The share of full-time employees in per cent by bands of average gross nominal 
monthly earnings in Slovak crown in 2002, 2004 and 2008, NACE classification, full and 
part-time employed
N.B. Data for 2002, 2004 and 2008 are taken from the Statistical Office of Slovakia. It 
shows the share of full-time employees in % by bands of average gross nominal monthly 
earnings in Slovak crown (koruna). The graphs are presented in national currency due to 
the fact that Slovak crown changed its exchange rate in 2002 from 42,7 crown for 1 euro, to 
40,02 koruna for 1 euro in 2004, to 31,3 koruna to 1 euro in 2008 (ECB, annual exchange 
rate, 2012). 
Source: Slovakian Statistical Office, own interpretation
Graph 3: Bulgarian gross monthly income distribution according to NACE classification in 
2006 and 2010, in Bulgarian lev, % of full and part-time employed
Source: Bulgarian Statistics Office, http://www.nsi.bg/otrasal-publikaciaen.php? n= 
378&otr=51, Structure of Earnings 2006 & 2010, p. 332, p. 334, own interpretation, 
1 euro = 1,9558 Bulgarian Lev (since 2006), source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse
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Decile ratio (D9/D1) of gross earnings 2002 2006 2010
Estonia 5.89 4.55 4.01






Bulgariab ... 4.14 4.55
FB&Hc 3.2136 (2008) 3.63
Table 3: Decile ratio (D9/D1) of gross earnings, full time employees
Source: OECD statistics; Structure of Earnings in Bulgaria 2006, 2010; Nestic, 2005:63; 
Federal Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, 2009, 2011
aCroatian net income was taken from the Household Budget Survey data.
bBulgarian gross monthly earnings are considered.
No data are available for RS, and for FB&H net monthly earnings are the basis for calculation 
(net income was the basis for wage tax calculation until 2008; although the base changed 
since 2009; in 2010 net income was taken again so that data would be comparable).
In terms of comparison with B&H, an important point needs to be empha-
sised: unlike any other transition country, B&H entered this period com-
pletely war-torn with divided markets between two entities: Federation of 
B&H (FB&H) and Republika Srpska (RS).
3.1. Personal income taxation in transition:  
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.1.1. Constitutional structure of B&H 
As a former Yugoslav republic, B&H gained its independence in March 
1992 through referendum. However, due to a devastating war in B&H 
(from 1992 to 1995), B&H entered transition as late as 1996. B&H’s cur-
rent fiscal structure is determined by the B&H Constitution, i.e. the Day-
ton Peace Agreement (formally The General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) which was signed in December 1995. 
Bearing in mind that B&H’s GDP declined by 80 per cent in 1992, B&H’s 
pre-war macroeconomic performance was/is difficult to reach. Hence, 
the expected decline in GDP per capita, rise in inflation and unemploy-
ment which was expected in all transition countries at the beginning of 
the transition process in B&H occurred under the worst possible circum-
stances. In B&H, all macroeconomic indicators followed the trends of 
those in other transition countries except the rise in inflation. Due to sig-
nificant human, capital and infrastructural losses, up until 2000, B&H’s 
economy heavily depended on international aid i.e. B&H was an aid-driv-
en economy. However, since 2000, one would expect that B&H had fin-
ished its reconstruction process and that it is trying to make progress 
in the transition process. However, this was/is not the case, primarily 
due to unfinished privatisation, lack of political will for reasons of divided 
markets and weak institutional and legal system. Dayton Peace Agree-
ment left the legacy of two entities organised as an asymmetric federa-
tion (Graph 4). Under such challenging circumstances, the fiscal system 
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and the tax system within are decentralised at entity’s levels in the area 
of direct taxes and SSC and centralised at the level of B&H (since 2003) 
in the area of indirect taxes. 
a 
Graph 4: Constitutional structure of B&H
Source: Kreso, 2005, Association of Municipalities and Cities in FB&H and RS, own 
interpretation
Under Article 10 of the Dayton Agreement, OHR stands for “Office of High Representative” 
which oversees the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Principal Deputy 
High Representative serves the role of District Brcko Supervisor; since 1999, the number of 
municipalities in FB&H and RS decreased (from 84 to 79 in FB&H and from 63 to 62 in RS).
Both B&H entities have been passing laws and made constant changes 
in the area of PIT in the past nineteen years. FB&H has since 1996 ap-
plied ‘schedular’ wage tax at the net wage with flat rates decreasing from 
15 per cent to 5 per cent in the period 1996-2008. Additional cantonal 
annual tax on total income existed and tax rates varied at the level of ten 
FB&H cantons from zero to twenty per cent. The system was quite inef-
ficient bearing in mind that simple change of residency (which was the 
basis for income tax payments) would result in tax avoidance. In the pe-
riod 2005-2008, these revenues took on average as little as 0.13 per cent 
of total revenues (Ministry of Finance FB&H, own calculation). A new 
law was passed in 2008 and in 2009 synthetic personal income tax was 
introduced at a flat rate of 10 per cent above a certain threshold – ba-
sic/personal allowance. Unlike the case of Slovakia, we cannot say that 
neither B&H nor entities applied comprehensive tax reform separately 
due to the fact that laws were passed separately and inconsistently. SSC 
rates have been decreasing, but are still very high causing a high labour 
tax wedge especially in FB&H for low-income earners (Betcherman and 
Arandarenko, 2008; Kreso and Lazovic-Pita, 2011). In fact, a switch to-
wards ‘flat tax’ in FB&H insignificantly lowered labour tax wedge (0.5 per 
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cent) for a low-income earner at 67 per cent of average income (with-
out fringe benefits) since the wage/income tax rate increased from 5 to 
10 per cent (bearing in mind that the base changed from net to gross 
income). In FB&H, contrary to the practice of other selected transition 
countries, a switch towards 10 per cent ‘flat tax’ failed to bring more 
efficiency in terms of significantly lower labour tax wedge and/or labour 
demand incentives. 
The RS has been changing legal provisions regarding tax rates, personal 
allowances (abolishing and reintroducing them) and SSC rates almost 
annually (especially after 2010), so the effect on labour tax wedge has 
been mostly affected by these changes in legal provisions without any 
pattern. However, in all analysed years, labour tax wedge for a low-in-
come earner in RS is significantly lower than in FB&H primarily due to 
lower SSC rates (33 per cent and 41.5 per cent respectively). The RS 
currently applies ‘flat’ 10 per cent PIT rate with reintroduced basic/per-
sonal allowance in 2014. The situation of ‘organised mess’ resulting in 
the unfinished transition process in B&H obviously reflects on the tax 
system, namely PIT. Long, inefficient and unfinished transition process 
heavily affects B&H’s economy reflecting in low levels of efficiency, high 
pre-tax income inequality and severe poverty. All this and high costs of 
entering the labour markets in terms of high labour tax wedge induced 
by high SSC cause high levels of unemployment, high informal/shadow 
economy and high tax evasion due to lack of institutional framework. 
In comparison to Slovakia and Bulgaria, net income distribution (due to 
its base of wage tax calculation until 2009) in FB&H and RS in terms of 
switching towards ‘flat tax’ did the following (Graph 5 & 6): 
Graph 5: Net income distributions according to NACE classification in 2008 (prior to reform) 
and 2010 (after the reform) in the Federation of B&H, in BAM, full and part-time employed
Source: FB&H Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook 2009, 2011, own interpretation
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Graph 6: Net income distributions according to NACE classification in 2006 and 2008 and 
2009 in Republika Srpska, in BAM, full and part-time employed
Source: RS Statistical Office, own interpretation
N.B. These years were chosen because of the occurrence of major changes in PIT tax 
legislation
Both graphs indicate that after-tax income distribution in FB&H and RS is 
not moving to the right as quickly as it occurred in Bulgaria and Slovakia 
– especially in the upper tail of distribution. An explanation to this prob-
lem can primarily be found in low GDP per capita, slow after-war growth 
and the effects of global financial crisis. Other explanations include le-
gal ability to avoid and evade taxes, cash remunerations and ‘envelope 
salaries’ which are (in FB&H) ‘induced’ by exclusion of fringe benefits, 
divided markets, lack of political will to speed up the process of B&H 
integration to the EU, high levels of corruption, bribery, and the fact that 
B&H has a high share of shadow economy (on average 33.6 per cent, 
Schneider, 2012: 61). Moreover, unlike cases of Slovakia and Bulgaria, 
both FB&H and RS switched from ‘schedular’ PIT to synthetic, where the 
base has been changed together with rates. Hence, it is the only country 
of those analysed where switching to ‘flat tax’ meant changing the over-
all PIT system. If we look at the PIT rates, they remain quite low com-
pared to other transition countries but, in the case of FB&H, the increase 
from 5 per cent wage tax to 10 per cent PIT was substantial. In FB&H 
cantonal annual tax on total income resulted in insignificant revenues 
(as a percent of total revenues). The interdecile ratio in Table 3 shows 
certain tendencies of growing inequality in FB&H. In addition, the fact 
that both tax administrations (FB&H and RS) do not audit individual tax-
payers serves as a motive to avoid/evade taxes through underreporting. 
Almost 95 per cent of reported income in both entities is earned through 
employer-employee mechanism. With tax reforms and a switch towards 
synthetic PIT, PIT is monthly paid in advance by employers resulting in 
better control of paid taxes. However, annual comprehensive income is 
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an individual/employee’s (self-employee’s) obligation which then serves 
as a motive for high underreporting, hence tax evasion through the loose 
system of non- individual auditing/control. This tendency is also visible in 
the Bulgarian case where interdecile ratio of annual earnings is greater 
than interdecile ratio of monthly earnings (Bulgarian Statistics Office). 
Additional explanation is that annual earnings include “irregular bonuses, 
which are more significant part in the earnings of highly-paid employees” 
(Bulgarian Structure of Earnings, 2006: 34). A similar assumption is valid 
for the case of B&H. Thus, in such a system, introducing progressive 
income tax just to serve a few individuals would only make PIT system 
more complicated, with little or no impact on redistribution mainly due to 
high tax evasion and informal economy. Similar scenarios are present in 
other Western Balkans states, where progressive PIT was replaced by 
‘flat’ since underreporting/evasion occurred. FYR Macedonia’s case can 
serve as an example. Prior to ‘flat tax’ reform, 98 per cent of all taxpayers 
paid income tax in the lowest income bracket, so even with progressive 
PIT, Macedonia already had in substance a flat tax before this reform 
(Murphy, 2008).
4. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to link three important economic parametres: 
income, personal income tax and transition. It started with the problems 
of defining income in terms of comprehensiveness of income. Since PIT 
is only a levy on income, this problem followed suit. Developed (OECD) 
countries nowadays have three PIT systems: progressive (comprehen-
sive) PIT, dual income tax and ‘flat’ or proportional tax. The motivation of 
this paper was to show that, under macroeconomic circumstances, ‘flat 
tax’ is the best solution for PIT in the two entities of B&H. Progressive 
income tax can be introduced, similarly to the case of Slovakia, once the 
society as a whole becomes wealthier and when the transition process 
comes to an end. A country such as B&H requires a comprehensive PIT 
reform including greater involvement and significance of government in-
stitutions in all macroeconomic fields. Shifts in income distribution are 
the results of overall reforms, not only PIT reforms. In selected transition 
countries, a move towards upper end of distribution as well as the growth 
of ‘middle class’ workers in total distribution are of great significance. 
Application of the ‘flat tax’ in transition countries can be therefore ob-
served as an intermediate phase in the wider transition process. A move 
from ‘flat tax’ to progressive income tax in transition countries can occur, 
similar to the case of Slovakia, when the top 1 per cent of the wealthiest 
members of the society becomes visible.
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CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING AND 
FISCAL CONSOLIDATION96
ABSTRACT
The paper covers the latest improvements of government accounting methodol-
ogy that resulted from the implementation of the European System of Accounts 
2010 (ESA 2010) and Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014 (GFSM 2014). 
The main research question is how the changes of government accounting prin-
ciples and classification affect wider fiscal consolidation efforts particularly em-
phasised within the EU member states. Based on thorough analysis of the new 
methodology, the objective of the paper is to provide policy recommendations on 
the introduction of these changes into national accounting systems in the context 
of achieving the objectives of fiscal consolidation and stability of public finances. 
Key words: government accounting, ESA 2010, GFSM 2014, fiscal consolida-
tion, public finances
1. Introduction
Numerous changes and improvements within the framework of govern-
ment accounting presented by the European System of Accounts 2010 
(ESA 2010) and Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014 (GFSM 
2014) provided a basis for a much more accurate presentation of the 
government’s fiscal indicators as well as new possibilities to improve fis-
cal discipline and, at the same time, induce positive economic growth 
effects from underlying fiscal activity. 
In this regard, strengthened by the detrimental economic and fiscal ef-
fects of the last global economic crisis, most of the economies focused 
on consolidation of their public finances. However, this practice, even 
during the crisis, had a clear effect on significant reduction of public in-
vestment level and, thus, economic growth in the short- and long-term 
period. Therefore, the goal is to continue fiscal consolidation without 
jeopardising the goals of economic prosperity. 
96 This work has been supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under project 
number IP-2013- 11-8174 and in part by the University of Rijeka under project number 
13.02.1.2.02
296
There are at least several major fields where governments can benefit 
from understanding and implementing international accounting and fi-
nancial reporting systems. These are the issues of national accounting 
system used (cash or full accrual standard), use of alternative financing 
models (such as concessions, public-private partnerships or operational 
leases), definition of general government and classification of the insti-
tutional sector, valuation of investment and infrastructure assets, use of 
creative accounting. This paper briefly discusses these potentials from 
the aspect of avoiding trade off betweeen fiscal consolidation efforts and 
the burden of public investment financing. 
After the introduction, the second section discusses the relationship be-
tween fiscal consolidation and government accounting. The third section 
presents open issues within contemporary government accounting that 
affect fiscal position and fiscal consolidation results. The conclusion of-
fers several policy recommendations. 
2. Fiscal consolidation and government accounting
Economic and financial crises have intensified the search for the neces-
sary tools for attaining fiscal and macroeconomic stability. Fiscal rules 
have been a widely debated tool for coping with potentially reckless gov-
ernment behaviour. However, there is no unison agreement on the valid-
ity of their use. This is particularly the case for EU member states where 
there are considerations that such rules substantially curbed growth of 
capital accumulation, and thus, economic growth.
One of the major instruments in preventing excessive government 
spending was strengthening fiscal institutions through improvements 
of the methodology of statistical and financial reporting. The focus of 
these improvements has been on improving the quality and comprehen-
siveness of fiscal reports and determination of fiscal position. However, 
very few studies point to the fact that implementation of contemporary 
methodology can enable both better reporting and more favourable fiscal 
position, i.e. results of fiscal consolidation. In terms of relevance of fiscal 
consolidation, there are several important issues that need to be discu-
ssed due to their potentially significant impact on the fiscal position, and 
therefore, fiscal consolidation needs:
1. National accounting basis used, cash or accrual,
2. Use of alternative financing models – such as concessions, pub-
lic-private partnerships or leases,
3. Definition of general government and classification of the insti-
tutional sector,
4. Valuation of investment and infrastructure assets,
5. Creative accounting.
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There are many issues related to application of cash accounting sup-
porting the need for the introduction of accrual accounting. Under cash 
accounting, transactions are recorded only when cash is received or 
paid. Recording under accrual framework means that flows are recorded 
at the time economic value is created, exchanged, transferred, or ex-
tinguished. However, the framework also encompasses the traditional 
cash-based reporting (GFSM 2014). The main issue related to the use 
of cash accounting was deferral of cash disbursements or bringing for-
ward cash receiptss as means of artificially inflating financial balances 
of fiscally weak governments. In addition, governments that follow cash 
accounting do not keep comprehensive and updated records of the value 
of their assets and liabilities. One of the issues is the potential ability to 
transfer assets or incur liabilities to third parties without disclosing their 
financial implications for the government and taxpayers. In other words, 
cash accounting has serious issues related to lack of transparency and 
opens significant space for moral hazard of the tempted government. 
Cavanagh et al. (2016) associate four major innovations with the appli-
cation of accrual accounting:
 - The recognition of economic events in flow reports at the time at 
which they occur, as well as when the related cash receipts and 
payments change hands. These economic events may direct-
ly generate a corresponding or simultaneous cash flow, but in 
many cases – such as depreciation, revaluations, or impairment 
– they do not. Such an approach provides much better credibility 
to future fiscal projections and real costs of government activity;
 - The recording of all stocks of assets and liabilities in balance 
sheets. Governments that use cash accounting account only for 
their cash holdings on the assets side, and debt on the liability 
side of their balance sheets. These are often valued at „book 
value“ or the value depending on the market price at the point 
of their acquisition or issuance. Under accrual accounting, gov-
ernment recognises all assets and liabilities including financial 
assets, non-financial assets and liabilities other than debt se-
curities and bonds. These stocks are usually recorded at their 
current market value, their value in use, or some approximation, 
and are regularly revalued to ensure that the balance sheet re-
flects the goverment’s true financial position,
 - Enhanced monitoring of liabilities and contingent liabilities. Li-
abilities such as employee entitlements, environmental obliga-
tions, insurance claim obligations, expected losses under guar-
antee schemes which are not typically recognised in a cash 
accounting environment receive much more attention once rec-
ognised under accrual accounting system;
 - The consolidation of all entities under government control. Cash 
accounts typically only cover budgetary central government 
(central government ministries and agencies). Accrual-based 
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international accounting standards call for financial statements 
which consolidate all entities under government control (such as 
extra-budgetary funds, arms-length agencies, and public corpo-
rations). 
Bearing in mind the previously stated main features of cash and account-
ing system, it is worth mentioning that cash accounting is very useful and 
necessary to control for the actual fiscal obligations resulting from regular 
government activities. This is particularly important for fiscally weak gov-
ernments which struggle with their payments. Cash accounting defines 
their short-term and medium-term borrowing activities. Therefore, in the 
short term, manipulating with fiscal indicators, that falls directly within 
cash accounting, governments reduce fiscal costs of excessive borrow-
ing. They do not provide true information to the market and government 
borrowing is therefore less costly. In addition, by overspending, the gov-
ernment creates a fiscal illusion which benefits their political option. 
An important feature of accrual accounting, contrary to cash accounting, 
isdepreciation of capital installation over  its service life. In cash account-
ing, new capital expenditures are fully charged to the current budget. Un-
der strict fiscal rules, the government benefits significantly due to the fact 
that deficits under accrual accounting appear to be muchsmaller. Over 
time, however, the depreciation of current and past capital investment 
could be larger than current capital expenditure, therefore worsening the 
deficit (see Mintz and Smart, 2008). 
Both accounting approaches obviously present an obstacle for short-
term and long-term optimal investment policies under the fiscal rules 
engagement. The main question is how to devise a model which would 
prevent weak governments to overspend by manipulating fiscal data 
and, at the same time, would not curb the necessary high level of public 
investment efforts. In other words, the issue is how to optimise trade-
off between government consumption and investment. In theory and in 
practice of some governments, long-term financing should be related 
only to public capital investment. In that sense, Mintz and Smart (2008) 
propose a division of operational and capital budget. The operational 
budget would be accrued revenues and current expenses associated 
with programmes. They associate capital budget with assets and liabil-
ities held by the government. Assets would be tangible and intangible 
and liabilities would include debt and other contingency claims on the 
government. Such an approach could enable more sustainable financing 
of public investment by differentiating types of government assets where 
infrastructure (or public capital which can be financed by user fees or 
evaluated by market prices) would be financed under capital budget and 
other types of government spending (such as non-market capital invest-
ment or other operational costs such as financing education – human 
capital investment) could be financed under operational budget. Thus, 
the capital budget could be self-sustainable based on the market value 
of underlying assets and user fees generated. Operational budget would 
be constrained by future government revenues. Of course, in terms of 
299
risk control, even in capital budget, some sort of golden rule could be 
applied, i.e. only a portion of capital expense could be financed by bor-
rowing.Another development of new accounting methodologies comes in 
extended possibilities of using alternative financing models. Both GFSM 
2014 and ESA 2010 coupled with the Manual on Government Deficit and 
Debt (EU, 2016), provide extensive possibilities of financing public needs 
by engaging private capital. The main feature of such alternative models 
of financing, which mainly refer to concessions, public-private partner-
ships and operational leases, is that they do not affect public debt and 
also have substantially lower impact on public deficit than in the case of 
traditional financing options like borrowing. Anther, even more important 
feature of alternative models, provided that the contracts betweeen pub-
lic and private entities are harmonised with the ESA 2010 propositions, 
is that uncertainty and risk are mainly transferred to the private sector. 
This means that public sector payments within the term of the contract 
are transparent, predictable and stable, which creates much more space 
for other public projects. Realisation of public investment through alter-
native financing models significantly reduces opportunity costs of financ-
ing public investment. Even a slight increase in public debt and deficit 
can jeopardise macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, short and 
long-term growth effects of public investment financed by private capital 
additionaly decrease the public debt-GDP ratio.. 
Understanding the definition of general government and classification 
of the institutional sector can additionaly improve the government’s fis-
cal position without decreasing the level of government services. In this 
case, the government is motivated to leave public companies out of the 
general government financial reporting and, at the same time, provide 
desirable public services. ESA 2010 introduces qualitative criteria for the 
classification of economic units:
When the unit sells only to the government, and does not compete with 
private producers to sell this output to the government, the unit is to be 
classified within general government; or
 - When the government has a single supplier in acertain type of 
goods and services and this single supplier sells less than 50% 
of its output to non-government units and does not compete with 
private producers to obtain its contract with the government, the 
unit is to be classified within the general government; or
 - When a producer has no incentive to adjust supply in order to 
undertake a viable profit-making activity, to be able to operate in 
market conditions and to meet its financial obligations, the unit 
is to be classified within the general government.
Since GFSM 2014 and ESA 2010 base their classification on the evalua-
tion of market activity of a particular entity, governments that favour more 
competitive markets can reap the benefits of a lower level of government 
debt and deficit as well as better quality and lower price of provision of 
public goods and services. The accounting system in this case pushes 
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the governments towards better regulation of public goods and services 
which should be provided (produced) by the private sector (market). 
Valuation of infrastructure assets and investment is important for the fis-
cal position, at least in terms of the following questions (Irwin, 2008):
 - Do the reported values of infrastructure assets approximate the 
present value of cash flows they are expected to generate?
 - Are the present values of guarantees and long-term purchase 
commitments reported?
 - Are infrastructure assets and liabilities of public enterprises in-
cluded in reported assets and liabilities?
 - How well do modern standards deal with the problem of uncer-
tainty and bias?
The main question in this regard, bearing in mind different types of as-
sets in relation to the market or non-market feature, is what technique 
should be used in the valuation of public assets. There are basically 
two main possibilities – fair or market value or value based on aquisition 
(replacement) costs. 
Fair value is based on approximating the present value of user fees mi-
nus cash operating costs. In that sense, the price at which the asset 
would change owner should roughly equal the expected net present 
value of the future operating cash flows. Replacement costs equal the 
present value of future operating cash flows only if user fees are set to 
cover the cost. Estimates of depreciated replacement costs will exclude 
the value of any supernormal profit that the government expects to re-
ceive from user fees set higher than full costs (likewise, it is possible 
that the government would sell assets below replacement costs). How-
ever, mesasures of fair value will not entail any effect of the asset on the 
government’s tax revenues (Irwin, 2008, p.284). Usually, governments 
have weak tools and potentials to evaluate assets. In that regard, a move 
towards more comprehensive accounting systems such as full accrual 
accounting and financing options that require the use of a full financial 
model such as public-private partnerships could significantly improve po-
tentials for setting more accurate and favourable fiscal position. 
Finally, the definition of creative accounting does not imply positive phe-
nomena despite the fact that it can temporarily reduce government costs 
of public investment finance. Historical evidence provide many examples 
of long-term detrimental effects of such activities. True costs of govern-
ment activities have unavoidable real effects. Even accrual account-
ing provides many opportunities to avoid the presentation of true fiscal 
position. 
Relevancy and credibility of accounting information in presenting activi-
ties and degree of fulfilment of goals are affected by different accounting 
manipulations. These manipulations present the accounting situation dif-
ferently from the reality in a specific reporting period. Basically, account-
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ing manipulations are made by deliberate „distorting“, covering up or un-
clear presentation of documents related to government activities or time 
lag (anticipation or postponement) in financial reporting. The accounting 
system is the most comprehensive basis for preparation of information 
for the needs of internal and external users. Due to that fact, unreliable 
and incomplete accounting information may have serious consequenc-
es. Due to problems in recent history, with established practice of „cre-
ative accounting“ shaken by international financial markets, respectable 
accounting organisations and auditing companies have undertaken sig-
nificant efforts towards restoring accounting credibility. The key question 
here is prevention of the use of accounting for purposes of manipulations 
and frauds. 
Regardless of the sector of economy, accounting manipulations by their 
nature always result in a certain distance from the standards of quality 
of accounting information presented in financial reports. However, in re-
lation to the private sector, accounting manipulations in the public sector 
have to be observed in the context of their non-profit character and dif-
ferent terms and goals of their activity compared with the private sector. 
3. Reflections on government accounting methodology
As elaborated above, contemporary literature points out the efforts to-
wards implementation of the accrual concept within national systems of 
government accounting; setting connections between inputs, goals, and 
purpose of the activities and results of government agencies, and match-
ing accounting goals and financial reporting with the budget. Implicitly, 
accrual concept  does not provide comprehensive and actual information 
on total costs of government activities. On the other hand, the key ad-
vantage of application of the accrual principle is the possibility of moni-
toring and management of total assets, debts and public expenditures. 
Consequently, the application of this concept increases transparency, 
comprehensiveness and reliability of accounting information and allows 
the possibility for application of indicators for evaluation of success and 
effectiveness of activities of government entities. This also enables per-
formance evaluation and raising the level of public management respon-
sibility (Diamond, 2002).
It is worth noting that international financial reporting standards are con-
verging in time towards better quality and higher level of comprehensive-
ness. Thus, the GFSM 2014 has updated the internationally recognised 
guidelines for compiling statistics required for fiscal analysis that had 
been established by the GFSM 2001. The revised guidelines are har-
monised with the updates in other macroeconomic statistical manuals 
and guides such as the System of National Accounts 2008 (2008 SNA), 
and others. Also, the revised manuals and guidelines address impor-
tant international economic developments in recent years and take into 
account improved recording and methodological treatments of various 
types of events. The development of International Public Sector Account-
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ing Standards and continued efforts to harmonise statistical reporting 
and financial reporting have led to additional changes incorporated in the 
GFSM 2014 (GFSM 2014, p. 2). 
However, there are many points of divergence when it comes to the 
principal international financial reporting standards for the public sector 
– IPSAS, GFSM 2014, and ESA 2010. Consolidation of financial state-
ments which defines general government is provided within IPSAS 35. A 
controlled entity is defined as an entity controlled by another entity, the 
controlling entity. The controlling entity shall assess whether it controls 
the other entity.  Control is based on whether an investor has 1) power 
over the other entity; 2) exposure, or rights, to variable benefits from its 
involvement with the other entity; and 3) the ability to use its power over 
the other entity to affect the nature or amount of the benefits. The entity’s 
benefits from its involvement with the entity being assessed for control 
can be financial, non-financial or both. Financial benefits include returns 
on investment such as dividends or similar distributions. Non-financial 
benefits include advantages arising from scarce resources that are not 
measured in financial terms and economic benefits received directly by 
service recipients of the entity. Non-financial benefits can occur when 
the activities of another entity are in agreement with the objectives of the 
entity and support the entity in achieving its objectives.
On the other hand, GFSM 2014 and ESA 2010 base the limitations of 
the government on the nature of their economic activity. There are clear 
rules which define that all public sector entities primarily engaged in mar-
ket activity belong to the private sector and all public sector entities that 
primarily engage in „non-market“ activities belong to the general gov-
ernment sector. Such an approach can create substantial differences 
regarding the fiscal position of governments bearing in mind that in many 
countries there are large public companies that heavily invest and are 
engaged in substantial borrowing operations. 
Additional important difference between GFSM 2014 and IPSAS referrs 
to the valuation of the public capital. According to the GFSM 2014 (IMF, 
2014), economic flows as well as assets, liabilities, and net worth are val-
ued at current market prices in the GFS framework. While current market 
prices are readily available for assets and liabilities that are traded in ac-
tive markets, valuation according to market-value equivalents is used for 
valuing assets and liabilities that are not traded in markets, or are traded 
infrequently. IPSAS 16 and 17 deal with the valuation of properties. In-
vestment property shall be recognised as an asset when, and only when:
 - It is likely that the future economic benefits or service potential 
that are associated with the investment property will flow to the 
entity.
 - The cost or fair value of the investment property can be meas-
ured reliably.
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It is further defined that investment property shall be measured initially at 
its cost. Transaction costs shall be included in this initial measurement. 
Where an investment is acquired through a non-exchange transaction at 
no cost, or for a nominal charge, its cost shall be measured at its fair val-
ue as on the date of acquisition. After recognition, an entity shall choose 
as its accounting policy either the fair value model or the cost model:
 - Fair value model: Investment property is measured at fair value, 
and changes in fair value are recognised in surplus or deficit for 
the period in which it arises.Cost model: Investment property is 
measured at depreciated cost, minus any accumulated impair-
ment losses. Fair value of the investment property shall still be 
disclosed.
If an entity uses the fair value model but, when a particular property is ac-
quired, there is clear evidence that the entity will not be able to determine 
fair value on a continuous basis, the cost model is used for that property 
— and it shall continue to be used until disposal of the property. In that 
case, the residual value of the investment property shall be assumed to 
be zero.
Depreciation is charged systematically over the asset’s useful life. The 
depreciation method must reflect the pattern in which the asset’s future 
economic benefits or service potential is expected to be consumed by 
the entity. The residual value must be reviewed at least annually and 
shall equal the amount the entity would receive currently if the asset 
were already of the age and condition expected at the end of its useful 
life. If an operation of an item of property, plant and equipment (for ex-
ample, an aircraft) requires regular major inspections, when each major 
inspection is performed, its cost is recognised in the carrying amount of 
the asset as a replacement, if the recognition criteria are satisfied.
The carrying amount of an item of property, plant and equipment must 
be de-recognised:
 - On disposal
 - When no future economic benefits or service potential is expect-
ed from its use or disposal
The gain or loss arising from the derecognition of an item of proper-
ty, plant and equipment shall be included in surplus or deficit when the 
item is derecognised. Gains shall not be classified as revenue; the gain 
or loss arising from the derecognition of an item of property, plant and 
equipment must be determined as the difference between the net dis-
posal proceeds, if any, and the carrying amount of the item.
Based on previous stipulations of GFS and IPSAS, it is possible to con-
clude that, in terms of valuation, modern accrual accounting has two 
weaknesses. Firstly, it ignores tax effect of investment in public capital. 
Secondly, it treats assets that create future user fees no differently from 
assets that do not. 
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The budget accounting system is featured by a high level of normativ-
ism that subjects all entities of general government to  unified and uni-
form accounting procedures. In this way, according to the regulations 
on budgetary accounting, the procedures on bookkeeping, bookkeeping 
statement and data processing, the content of budgetary plan, recording 
of revenues and expenditures, evaluation of balance positions, reval-
orisation, financial reporting and other areas are related with budgetary 
accounting. 
Implementation of regulations thus determines unique budgetary pro-
cedures and introduces data processing uniformity. Such an approach 
means that the possibility of application of different accounting policies 
in recording financial elements of financial reports is eliminated. For this 
reason, the space for legal accounting manipulations is almost entirely 
eliminated. However, the fact that the regulation cannot cover all possi-
ble business activities and financial transactions and cannot prescribe 
unified accounting procedures and methods of measurement and eval-
uation – there is certain space for accounting manipulations that can be 
conditionally regarded as legal.
Therefore, it can be determined that, on the one hand, the purpose of the 
legal framework primarily is  to determine the rules and procedures and 
prevent manipulations with accounting information. On the other hand, if 
there is a lack of comprehensiveness and clarity, there are possibilities 
for different interpretation and procedures which can lead to manipula-
tions with accounting information.
• Despite the application of more complex accounting concepts 
(accrual) and IPSAS, we can list accounting procedures which 
could have a significant effect on the reality of presentation of 
financial reporting elements (debt and deficit):Time arrears of 
revenues (recording of unpaid revenues – anticipation of future 
revenues);
• Recording of claims and other property that cannot be paid or 
the real value of these items is reduced (there is no test on prop-
erty reduction);
• Unreal valuation (overestimation/underestimation of value) of 
long-term property;
• Time arrears of expenditures (postponement of recording of li-
abilities);
• The lack of recording of expenditures and debts (interests, ex-
change rate differences, contractual obligations…);
• Treatment of out-balance statements: recording of indirect in-
debtedness, guarantees, public-private partnerships, long-term 
contracts on the operative lease, etc.;
• The lack of comprehensive consolidation by the principle of eco-
nomic unity;
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• The lack of revalorisation procedures;
• Recording of changes in the value and quantity of property and 
liabilities directly to the burden in benefit/cost of capital, past the 
account of revenues and costs, etc.
4. Conclusion 
The paper covers the interconnection of fiscal rules and government ac-
counting from the aspect of their effects at the level of public investment 
and determination of the fiscal position, i.e. presentation of fiscal reports. 
Although the international accounting authorities improve and develop 
accounting standards dealing with possible undesirable accounting prac-
tices, there is still much space for improvement. This paper identified 
some of the problems, but also pointed to some possibilities that govern-
ments can use to improve their fiscal position through the implementa-
tion of the latest methodological improvements in the field of government 
accounting. 
However, it has to be noted that transition of accrual accounting system 
and other improvements of accounting standards is relatively slow. Some 
of the reasons are insufficient educational efforts and human resource 
capacity within government institutions. It seems that, also in this field, 
lower level of human capital curbs fiscal consolidation efforts and poten-
tial economic growth effects through higher public capital accumulation. 
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